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2Abstract
This thesis addresses the question of why, when almost everyone says they wish it
would end, suffering such as that in northern Uganda continues. I argue that, contrary
to popular presentations, the situation is not primarily one of war between the Lord’s
Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda, but instead a form of mass torture,
which I call Social Torture.
The principal victims are the population within the ‘war zone’, particularly in
‘protected villages’ for the internally displaced, where tactics and symptoms typical of
torture, including violation, dread, disorientation, dependency, debilitation and
humiliation, are widespread. The most visible perpetrators are the Government and
LRA, but a range of less visible actors are also involved, not least donor governments,
multi-lateral organisations, academics, churches and NGOs. In many instances these
can be regarded as complicit bystanders; like doctors in a torture situation, they appear
to be there to ease the suffering of victims, but in reality they enable the process to be
prolonged by keeping the victim alive for further abuse. This serves a number of inter-
linked economic, political and psychological functions for perpetrators and bystanders
alike, and is underpinned by psychological and discursive processes of justification,
most importantly the idea that this situation is first and foremost a ‘war’ between the
LRA and the Government.
In short, in a situation such as northern Uganda, means and ends are inverted: rather
than torture being a tactic with which to prosecute war, here war is the guise under
which Social Torture is perpetrated. War continues because Social Torture is not
addressed. Given that those who in principle have the most power to do so are
implicated in Social Torture themselves, the focus has to shift from the intentions of
visible perpetrators to the responsibilities of a far wider range of actors.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Why, when almost every concerned party says they wish it would end, does a situation
of suffering such as that in northern Uganda continue? When I first went to Gulu in
1998 it was already a pertinent question; by 2004, with the vast majority of the
population internally displaced or in exile, further thousands raped, killed or forcibly
abducted, and the economy in tatters, it was still more so.
Contrary to popular presentations of the situation as being primarily an internal war
between the LRA and the Government of Uganda, I shall argue that it is instead a form
of mass torture, which I shall call Social Torture, in which the principal victims are the
population within the ‘war zone’, and whose ultimate function is the subordinate
inclusion of the population in northern Uganda. The so-called ‘protected villages’ for
the internally displaced are primary sites of Social Torture, as evidenced in widespread
violation, dread, disorientation, dependency, debilitation and humiliation, all of which
are tactics and symptoms typical of torture.
In this interpretation visible perpetrators include the Government and LRA, but a
range of less visible actors are also involved, not least the donor governments, multi-
lateral organisations, churches and NGOs. In many instances these can be regarded as
complicit bystanders; like doctors in a torture situation, they appear to be there to ease
the suffering of victims, but in reality they enable the process to be prolonged by
keeping the victim alive for further abuse. Doing this serves a number of inter-linked
economic, political and psychological functions for perpetrators and bystanders alike,
and is underpinned by both psychological and discursive processes of justification, the
most important of which is the idea that this situation is indeed a ‘war’ between the
LRA and the Government. Furthermore, by virtue of the scale at which it operates,
Social Torture becomes in several senses self-perpetuating and time-indifferent.
In short, whereas torture is generally seen as a tactic with which to prosecute war, in
this situation war is being used as the guise under which to perpetrate social torture.
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Once this reversal of the relationship between means and end is clear it also becomes
much clearer why the situation continues: steps to end the war focused on dealing with
the LRA through negotiations or military means are insufficient, what is also needed
are interventions which address the multiple dimensions of Social Torture. These
include addressing political and economic inequities, governmental impunity and
harmful psycho-social dynamics. As those who in principle have the most power to
make these changes are implicated in the Social Torture themselves, the focus has to
shift from the intentions of visible perpetrators to the responsibilities of a far wider
range of actors.
The Mainstream Discourse of today’s wars
Arriving at this thesis was not a linear process.  Rather it involved an iterative to- and
fro- between review of academic literature, policy positions, media coverage, and field-
work findings. In the course of this I came to see the literature in terms of two broad
types; that which contributes to what I would characterise as the mainstream discourse
of today’s wars (which in turn informs the majority of policy and media coverage), and
that which offers the building blocks of a counter-narrative.  The mainstream discourse
argues that post-Cold War conflicts are internal and bi-partisan in nature, as well as
apolitical and at times irrational, and therefore posits them as detached from wider
systemic dynamics at the international level.
Ramsbotham & Woodhouse’s concept of ‘International Social Conflict’ (ISC),
exemplifies the pre-occupation with the internal. They describe ISCs as situations
which are neither inter-state conflicts… nor contained within the resources of
domestic conflict management… There are many other terms for this level of
conflict, most commonly ‘internal conflict’ or ‘civil war’, but these do not capture
the further twin characteristics of ISCs: a) that they are rooted in relations
between communal groups within state borders (the ‘social’ component) and b)
that they have broken out of the domestic arena and become a crisis for the state,
thereby automatically involving the wider society of states (the ‘international’
component) (1996: 87).
The pre-occupation with the internal also pervades the humanitarian sector, which
objectifies such situations through terms such as ‘complex emergencies’, ‘complex
18
humanitarian emergencies’ or even ‘complex political emergencies’ (CPEs). These are
all terms which entered into humanitarian vocabulary following the creation of a safe
haven with military peacekeepers in northern Iraq,1 an event which marked a dramatic
shift in the nature of UN interventions in a range of situations globally (Ramsbotham
and Woodhouse 1996: 70).
The same basic model of two-party internal wars, in which third parties are only
written into the picture in a responsive capacity, is also deeply embedded in the field
of international relations and the related practical fields of mediation and conflict
resolution (see, for example, Kelman 1992, Crocker 1999, 2001). Even in interventions
based on a social-psychological perspective ‘that sees conflict at least partly and at
times predominantly as a subjective social process’ (e.g. Fisher & Keashly, 1996), the
assumption prevails that third parties come in solely to help the conflicting parties sort
out their internal muddle and play no generative role in creating that muddle.
The internal model of war is underpinned by two alternative explanations of what
motivates the people who are visibly involved. Both of these largely exclude the
possibility of political explanations. One is the substantial body of literature which
regards such ‘internal’ conflicts as based on economic rationales. The perspective that
simple ‘greed’ is what motivates people, or more specifically, rebels, has tended to
predominate, and is forcefully articulated by Collier (2000). A more nuanced economic
perspective is provided by Stewart (2002), who explores the role of horizontal
economic inequalities in creating a sense of grievance. Berdal & Malone (2000) argue
that, although ‘the presence of economic motives and commercial agendas in wars is
not so much a new phenomenon as a familiar theme’, the economic dimensions of civil
conflict have not in fact been given sufficiently systematic attention; they therefore seek
to explore how economic motivations, violence and destitution all reinforce one
another and give rise to ‘a particular dynamic of conflict’ (Berdal & Malone, 2000; 1-2).
                                                     
1 UN Security Council Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991
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The other branch of the literature which significantly discounts the existence of any
rationale with which to engage, whether political or economic, is clearest in what Paul
Richards describes as the ‘New Barbarism thesis’ (1996: xiii), a thesis in which the
presumption that today’s conflicts are internal is also central. In his 1994 piece, The
Coming Anarchy, Robert Kaplan manages to situate the problem of today’s conflicts
squarely within countries in which he sees a breakdown of the state monopoly of
violence, the growth of informal and parallel economies and a thinning down of civil
order, but also to suggest what the consequences would be for zones of order if such
anarchy were to be allowed to spill over. Keegan, a military historian with a similarly
high profile, also tends to present today’s conflicts as internal, arising from ‘tribal’
enmities and irrational primitivism which had been long-suppressed during the Cold
War. He argues that ‘many of the newer states, particularly those brought into being by
the dissolution of European empires, have been unable to liberate themselves from the
grip of internal hostilities that pre-date colonisation…’ (1998, 66). The tactics of such
internal wars are said to ‘resemble those of the surviving Stone Age peoples of the
world’s remote regions, at their most savage’ (idem, 68).
Although some have argued that such conflicts are best left to burn themselves out
(e.g. Luttwak’s provocative article Give War a Chance (1999)), the more usual view has
been that solutions are to be found through third party interventions, such as those
suggested by Keegan himself, namely ‘progress in aid and development programmes
allied to stronger alliances with other nations which strengthen the economic
structures of such states and help to neutralise the political insecurities against which
their governments constantly battle’ (Keegan, 1998; 73). As such, fear of the spill-over
of ‘anarchy’ is closely linked to a containment agenda.
As a whole, this body of literature presents war as a series of dichotomised
possibilities; it is either externally or internally driven, it is either rational or irrational,
and it is driven by either grievance or greed. When this lens is applied to today’s wars
it tends to find them as internal, irrational and driven primarily by greed -
characteristics encapsulated in the ‘New Barbarism’ argument. As I shall demonstrate
throughout the thesis, the emphasis on these characteristics is visibly reflected in most
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presentations of the situation in northern Uganda, which is often said to be a war of the
LRA against its own people, and thus fundamentally irrational and without a cause
beyond enjoying the fruits of its looting and pillaging. LRA depradations receive
considerably more attention than Government ones, indeed the Government is nearly
always presented as intervening to protect its own citizens in response to these
depredations. The main protagonists are thus said to be the LRA and the Government
of Uganda, and the chief victim is the Acholi people. In this picture, NGOs, UN,
donors, churches and media are all expressly viewed as external, as responding to,
rather than having any generative role in, the situation.
Building Blocks of a Counter-narrative
My view that such interpretations of today’s wars in general, and of the situation in
northern Uganda in particular, have a practical and political weight which is
disproportionate to their analytical and descriptive value, was strongly influenced by
literature on the constructed nature of war and ethnicity (Jabri 1996, Turton 1997),
political economy perspectives linking ‘new wars’ with processes of globalisation
(Kaldor, 2001) and global governance (Duffield, 2001), and analysis of discourses on
development (Abrahamsen 2000). The latter, in particular, helped to bring into focus
the limitations in the literature on internal war outlined above, and to think of it in
terms of a discourse.
The heart of Abrahamsen’s argument is that the western discourse on good governance
and democracy coincided with the end of the Cold War and the need to find
alternative mechanisms and legitimations for implementing a neo-liberal economic
agenda driven by the West (Abrahamsen 2000; 25-45). She notes that it constructs
whole areas of the globe ‘as objects to be reformed rather than as subjects with a
history and with their own power to transform the world and react to changing
circumstances’ (Abrahamsen 2000; 20). Effectively this discourse ‘is implicated in
power relationships and serves to perpetuate international relations of dominance and
subordination’ (idem, viii). Key to the discourses’ success is that they do ‘not take
sufficient account of the interconnectedness of states and political forces in the global
era, and that they maintain a strict internal/external dichotomy that is no longer an
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accurate or useful description of the world’ (Abrahamsen 2000: xi). In short,
Abrahamsen identifies both the function (subordination) and mechanism (partial
representation and over simplified dichotomies) of public discourses.
When applying this analysis to the literature on internal war outlined above, I could
see many possible parallels. In trying to identify one primary motivation for war it
seemed to play havoc with the subjectivities of people in war, indeed to silence them.
By focusing attention on some actors and diverting it from others simultaneously
discounted the importance of historical process and the possibility of ‘external’
involvement in and responsibility for the state of affairs in a given place. Its functions
thus seemed exculpatory (in that it cast silence on the sins of the past and present),
justificatory (in that it justified particular patterns of intervention), and politically
oppressive (in that subjectivities were silenced, knowledge gaps created, and wars
depoliticised). In short, the discourse on internal war (and the representations of
Northern Uganda which seemed to reflect it) had similar mechanisms and functions to
those on good governance, democracy and development. In considering the political
functions of silence I was particularly struck by Kapucinski’s observation that silence is
a signal of unhappiness and, often, of crime. It is the same sort of political
instrument as the clatter of weapons or a speech at a rally. Silence is necessary to
tyrants and occupiers, who take actions to have their actions accompanied by
quiet…(Kapuscinski, 1998: 189)
To create a resilient counter-narrative to such a mainstream discourses requires a firm
empirical basis. I was inspired in this by a whole series of fine-grained context based
analyses of particular conflict related situations. The importance of external
involvement in the dynamics of supposedly internal situations resonates throughout
these readings, whether in the political economies of assistance (Harrell-Bond 1986,
Keen 1994, De Waal 1997) and war (Berdal & Malone, 2000), or in the de facto cultural
and political connections between very local dynamics and wider social and political
processes (Girling 1960, Allen 1991, 1994, 1998, Richards 1996, Behrend 1999, Finnström
2003, Keen 2005).
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The importance of understanding the ways in which ordinary people are drawn into
and contribute to the dynamics of a conflict situation is also highlighted, notably in
Zur’s work on Guatemala (1993, 1998), and Mamdani’s work on the genocide in
Rwanda in which he highlights the importance of understanding the complex interplay
between a ‘victim-consciousness’ and a perpetrator role (1997b). Mamdani’s work on
the truth and reconciliation processes in South Africa also suggests the imperative of
considering not just the visible perpetrators, but also the indirect beneficiaries of their
acts (1997a, 1997b).
Gilligan’s writing on the epidemiology of violence, based on twenty-five years of
observation in the American penal system, combines a psychoanalytical perspective
with a public health agenda and a socio-political analysis. He isolates humiliation and
shame – notably in relation to men’s sense of their masculinity - as the ‘pathogens’
causing violence. He argues that perpetrators of violence have themselves generally
been the victims of extreme forms of physical and psychological violence which
weaken their self-worth and make them vulnerable to processes of shaming and
humiliation. He goes on to describe the self-defeating nature of a penal system which
punishes the violence born of humiliation by systematically ensuring the perpetrators
are subjected to further humiliation and shame – and he argues that this counter-
productive mechanism is in fact the result of deliberate choices made by the ruling
classes who wish to ensure that the lower classes (both black and white) turn the
shame-induced violence of their social position against themselves and each other
rather than against the ruling classes (Gilligan, 2000).
A reading of this more empirically based literature highlights the way in which
reductivist accounts draw attention away from the systemic dimensions and linkages
of today’s conflicts and violence, and the consequent involvement of multiple actors at
all levels. In ways which resonated with my previous experiences of working with
refugees and ex-combatants from Mozambique (a situation with important parallels to
northern Uganda), it reinforced for me the importance of building a picture both of
local involvement, and of the true extent of external involvement in supposedly
internal dynamics. I saw considerable power in the way Mamdani, Zur and Gilligan, in
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different ways were able to integrate historical, economic, political and socio-
psychological factors into their analyses.  These readings also underlined the value of
taking a ‘bottom-up’ starting point which ensures that the subjectivities which are
silenced by mainstream discourses are heard and inform the counter-narrative.
It was such ‘bottom-up’ views which ultimately prompted me to explore the
relationships between the situation in northern Uganda and the literature on torture. I
was repeatedly struck while working there by how often people referred to what was
happening to them as ‘torture’, and as a form of persecution. Many would describe the
“protected villages” as “concentration camps”, and even talk of a “genocide”. Equally,
it was very common for people to say ‘we are all traumatised’, and this language of
‘trauma’ had become common currency by the time I was in northern Uganda.
UNOCHA, for example, argued that the LRA’s practice of abduction had ‘profoundly
traumatized the entire population’ (Weeks, 2002: 28), and a consultancy report for
NURP II reported that:
… the districts of Gulu and Kitgum were found to be the most affected… …It
was established that there was only a variation of intensity, otherwise in one way
or the other, everybody was found to be traumatised (COWI, 1999; 68).
Initially I dismissed such usages, thinking they were due to English being the second
language, or to rhetorical exaggeration in the interests of making a political point. After
all, there is nothing unusual about the use of protected villages as a counter-insurgency
strategy. Similar strategies were used by the Sandinistas in the mountains of northern
Nicaragua, by FRELIMO in the fight against RENAMO in Mozambique, and perhaps
most uncomfortably as a point of comparison, by Ian Smith in Rhodesia.2  Moreover,
when I asked what people meant by this use of ‘torture’, it turned out to refer to
anything from various degrees of beating through being unlawfully detained under
gruelling circumstances, to extreme violations such as the mutilations of the LRA.
Effectively a whole range of abusive behaviours were being put under the rubric of
                                                     
2 As Lan records:
During the last years of the war [in Rhodesia], the majority of the population had been forced into
concentration camps, the so-called 'protected villages', in order to limit the amount of assistance they
could give the guerrillas. (1985: 230)
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torture. There seemed little connection between this broad picture of torture, much of
which could be seen happening to the population at large in their daily lives, and the
more conventional notions of torture as something which sets out to destroy targeted
individuals in rooms well-hidden from the public gaze. And, given that there were
instances of abuse which clearly did qualify as torture,3 it seemed there was a danger of
diluting the force of the term by seeking to apply it more broadly.
When I turned to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, I found that Article 1 defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.4
Although this definition puts an explicit emphasis on the intentionality of perpetrators,
and appears to narrow the possible range of perpetrators to public officials or other
persons acting in official capacity, it is in many other respects a broad and wide-
reaching one. The phrase ‘for such purposes as’ suggests that while obtaining
information, punishment, intimidation and coercion are major objectives of torture,
they are not exclusive. The inclusion of suffering ‘for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind’ makes the possibilities even broader. And while Article 1
talks of pain or suffering inflicted ‘on a person’ by ‘a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity’, in other words implies a focus on individuals, Article 3 of
the Convention, which prohibits the refoulement of an asylum seeker ‘where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
                                                     
3 In 2002, for example, Amnesty was concerned that 20 prisoners illegally removed to a military detention
facility in northern Uganda were at increased risk of torture or ill-treatment whilst they remain in UPDF
custody (Public AI Index: AFR 59/004/2002).
4 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Adopted
and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December
1984, entered into force on 26 June 1987.
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torture’, defines substantial grounds as including ‘flagrant or mass violations of human
rights’ (emphasis added).
In the light of this I did increasingly wonder if there were there indeed parallels to be
drawn between what happens to individuals in torture chambers and what was
happening to the population living in the war zone, especially but not exclusively to
those people living in the “protected villages”. There is nothing in the convention
definition which excludes the mass violations of human rights entailed in the forcible
displacement of populations, or in the failure to provide physical security and access to
basic education and health care, as described in chapter 5. If these failings could
potentially be considered a form of torture, this raised questions around who the actors
might be, and how they could have organised and legitimised torture on such a grand
scale.  It also began to suggest that the protected villages, despite failing in the stated
objectives of protection of civilians and counter-insurgency, might be serving a
function after all.
When I then turned to the literature on torture I found analyses which, rather than
privileging individual intention above all else, incorporate and integrate multiple
elements, not least the impacts on victims but also the multiple actors and their roles,
the benefits and functions of torture, and the mechanisms used to justify it. As such
there were direct conceptual links to some of ‘building blocks’ of a counter narrative
outlined above, indicating that a non-legal model of torture could and should
incorporate elements from the existing literature on today’s wars, not least
considerations of political economy, social psychology, and discourse analysis.  In
seeking to create a counter-narrative which would make explicit these linkages I
initially focused on what the literature suggested about the following four elements:
impacts of torture, actors, benefits and functions, and justificatory mechanisms.
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Diagram 1.1: Key elements in identifying torture
Impacts
As Melamed et al point out (1990), ‘Torture is defined not only by the acts committed,
but also by the individual’s response to these acts’. In other words, it is not always
necessary to know who the torturer was, how exactly they did it, or what their precise
intentions were, in order to be able to diagnose a victim of torture.  Some of the key
states to be found in victims of torture, as summarised by Suedfeld (1990: 3), include
debilitation, dependency, dread and disorientation.
Debilitation is the result of the captor deliberately inducing physical and mental
weakness. The elements identified by Suedfeld as key to debilitating torture victims are
‘Hunger, fatigue, lack of medical attention, lack of shelter from the elements, lack of
sleep, beatings’. Linked to debilitation is a strong element of enforced dependency,
both material and psychological. The former arises when victims are unable to meet
their own needs, and Suedfeld describes how psychological dependency is created
when ‘friendships and lines of authority among prisoners are destroyed, and the
prisoner is stripped of status and dignity’. Dread is described by  Suedfeld as the state
of mind induced in a victim who is kept ‘in a constant state of fear and anxiety’, and a
key tactic in this is ‘keeping the prisoner in doubt as to when if ever he or she will be
released’. Disorientation is induced by removing the victim’s sense of control by
making events unpredictable and incomprehensible, a process which seriously hinders
the victims’ capacity to develop coping mechanisms (Suedfeld 1990, Melamed et al
Actors
Justificatory
mechanisms
Benefits & Functions:
- Psychological
- Economic
- Political
- Military
Torture
Impacts
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1990: 16). The main tactic to achieve this is to change the treatment of the victim ‘in
unpredictable fashion’ (Suedfeld, 1990:3).
While debilitation, dependency, dread and disorientation are the states which torturers
seek to induce, evidence of torture can also be found in symptoms which are less
visibly linked to the act of torture itself. Thus victims may continue to exhibit
symptoms related to their experiences long after the acts of torture are over. These
would normally fall under the rubric of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, defined as the
development of ‘characteristic symptoms following a psychologically traumatic event
that is generally outside the range of usual human experience’5.  Symptoms of PTSD
which are particularly prevalent in torture victims include ‘psychic numbing or emotional
anaesthesia. There is loss of ability to feel close; frequently, intimacy and sexuality are
not possible’ (Melamed et al 1990: 15). Studies such as those of Peterson & Seligman
(1983) show that the
uncontrollability of the onset and termination of victimization… best explains
why some victims become numb and passive. They [Peterson & Seligman]
believe that because the onset is unpredictable and the event inescapable, coping
attempts are futile. Low self-esteem and self-blame are associated with this state.
(Melamed et al, 1990: 15-16)
Along with victims of abuse and oppression more broadly, torture victims often get
blamed by others for their own misfortunes, and tend to search for their own
responsibility (i.e. blame themselves) for what happened to them.
Actors
Having once identified various states and behaviours as possible impacts of torture, it
is necessary to read backwards to find the actors involved. Much of the literature on
torture and genocide draws on a model of perpetrators, bystanders and victims. The
term perpetrator, as used by Staub, encompasses not only ‘the torturers themselves,
but also those who are in charge of a system which perpetrates torture.’  (Staub
1990:106).
                                                     
5 The American Diagnostic & Statistical Manual.
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The bystander group includes all those who either observe directly or at least are
aware that torture is being committed, but take no action to prevent or stop it. This
inaction may be because they are intimidated as a result of being aware of the torture
of others, or because they share some of the perpetrator group’s values (Staub 1990,
1995, Hilberg 1992). Staub distinguishes ‘internal’ bystanders who are individual
‘members of society who are neither victims nor part of the perpetrator group’, from
‘external’ bystanders whom he considers to be ‘other nations’ who fit into an
international relations model of nations as metaphorical individuals in a community of
states.
Closer scrutiny of the relationship between the actions of perpetrators and those of
ostensibly passive bystanders suggests that over time the distinction between the two
can break down. As Staub himself points out, using the example of the doctors who
help to keep torture victims alive, it is disturbingly easy for actors to shift between
bystander and perpetrator positions:
although their participation may be seemingly humane, it usually serves the
perpetrators not the victims – by helping to revive or keep alive victims for more
torture or selecting methods of torture to minimize visible signs. (Staub 1990: 68)
Futhermore, there is reason to suppose that some victims become perpetrators
themselves - possibly against a less powerful third party – as a means of dealing with
their situation. Gilligan, for example, describes the violent men he dealt with in
maximum security settings as ‘dead souls’, and he argues that ‘The violent criminals I
have known have been objects of violence from early childhood’ (Gilligan, 2000: 45). As
such, in analysing torture, it is necessary to hold two viewpoints simultaneously; on
the one hand the snapshot or cross-sectional view, in which the perpetrator-bystander-
victim distinctions are clear, on the other the filmed or longitudinal view over time in
which individuals shift between roles or indeed experience several roles
simultaneously.
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Benefits and Functions
Staub makes a convincing case that, alongside its overt functions of coercing direct
victims into particular behaviours (e.g. yielding a confession, handing over information
about ‘rebel co-ordinators’), torture serves a psychological function for its perpetrators.
He argues that rich and poor alike - when they experience ‘difficult conditions of life’
such as  ‘severe economic problems, persistent and intense political conflict, and rapid,
substantial social change’ - are liable to develop certain psychological needs.  These
include the need for a sense of security, a sense of ‘positive identity’ (both individual
and group), ‘a meaningful comprehension of reality, a sense of how the world is
ordered and of one’s place in it’, and also a ‘connection to others’.  Turning against
another group is one of a number of processes whereby groups will seek to meet these
psychological needs rather than addressing the actual difficulties they face. Within this,
scape-goating, victimisation, devaluation and dehumanisation of others all help people
to recover a positive sense of self, and adherence to ideologies such as communism or
nationalism help to create a sense of how the world is ordered.
Devaluation and dehumanisation can be achieved in many ways. In Kelman’s analysis,
torturers label their victims as ‘terrorists, insurgents, or dissidents who endanger the
state’ as a part of the dehumanisation process. To move from this kind of de-
humanisation of a limited number of individuals to dehumanisation of an entire social
group is relatively easy, as demonstrated by the post-September 11 2001 blurring of
distinctions between the categories ‘terrorists’ and ‘Muslims’ by western governments
and media. This is the more so if individuals behave in ways which appear to confirm
the negative qualities already ascribed to the social group from which they stem. Once
catalysed, the processes of devaluation and dehumanisation can quickly acquire their
own momentum. As Staub points out, torture often renders victims ‘bloody, dirty,
undignified’ such that ‘they can easily be seen as less than human’ – and as Gilligan
establishes, when victims become perpetrators their own victimhood is forgotten,
resulting in interventions focused on punishment rather than rehabilitation or
reintegration.
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Such processes for devaluing others and creating a sense of order are more easily
catalysed where there is already a ‘history of devaluation of a group of people’, a
‘monolithic rather than a pluralistic society’, a cultural concept which has been
frustrated, ‘strong respect for and a tendency to obey authority’, a history of aggression
in which violence is normalised and made acceptable, and an ‘ideology of antagonism’
(Staub 1990, 1995: 101-103).
Alongside the military and psychological functions it is possible to identify political
and economic ones. The links between the psychological and political ones are likely to
be intimate in a situation such as Uganda; it seems probable that with the colonial
legacy still within living memory, and with neo-colonial forms of control being
exercised through concepts of ‘modernisation’, ‘democracy’, ‘good governance’ and
‘structural adjustment’, the psychological need for a strong sense of ‘positive identity’
will be considerable. Achieving this is likely to entail, through devaluation, the
subordination of minority groups, and, through the signals this sends, the control of
the wider society as a whole.
The economic benefits arising from torture scenarios, I would suggest, are likely to
resemble those emerging in other situations of wide-spread suffering, as identified by
Keen in The Benefits of Famine (1994); they could include the establishment of
activities such as humanitarian relief interventions, the establishment of niche activities
focused on identifiable ‘victims’, and the exploitation of captive markets by particular
individuals and groups. The management of these in turn is liable to be linked to
political functions, such as using economic rewards to buy off dissidents and potential
critics.
Justifications
While the multiple possible functions of torture explain some of the incentives for
keeping it going, it is also necessary to explain how the perpetrators and bystanders
justify it.
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In terms of justifying torture to themselves, the psychological processes adopted by
perpetrators for immediate legitimation are similar to the mechanisms used to meet
their underlying psychological needs discussed above. Staub summarises them as
‘differentiation, devaluation, and moral exclusion’ (1990: 52). Clearly the three are
linked. Differentiation into an ‘in’ and an ‘out-group’ allows devaluation of the ‘out-
group’. Devaluation in turn makes the moral exclusion of the outgroup more feasible,
thereby enabling their torture. Kelman similarly describes ‘dehumanization’, along
with ‘routinization’ and ‘authorization’, as what makes possible ‘the exclusion of
torture victims from the torturer’s moral community’ (1995: 31).
The psychological mechanisms employed by ostensible ‘bystanders’ to justify their
apparent passivity share some characteristics with those used by the perpetrators.
Staub points to their use of what he calls ‘just world thinking’, a process in which,
‘Wanting to believe both in a just world and that they themselves will not become
victims of random circumstances, people tend to view those who suffer as being
responsible for and deserving of their fate because of their character or prior conduct’
(1990: 56, 1995: 106). In other words, ‘just world thinking’ goes hand in hand with
devaluation of the victims.
Elaborating a model of Social Torture
In seeking to apply the above elements of the torture model to my findings from
northern Uganda I felt that while some of the impacts I observed closely resembled
those commonly attributed to torture, the term torture as it stands within a particular
strand of legal practice and the popular imagination, cannot do justice to processes on
the scale I had observed.  I also felt that the processes behind these wide-spread
impacts were in some respects diametrically opposed to those we suppose to take place
in individual torture. To capture this sense of both overlap and difference I arrived at
the term Social Torture. I propose that Social Torture can be differentiated from
individual torture around six key issues, as set out in Table 1.1 below.
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Table 1.1 Key differences between individual and social torture
Individual torture Social Torture
High Intensity Low Intensity
Impact focused on individuals and their
direct associates and family
Wide impact on society as a whole
Place and Time-bound Geographically extensive and Time-
indifferent
Dependent on small set of perpetrators
with specific objectives
Involves multiple actors with broad set of
needs, and is to a degree self-perpetuating
Perpetrators justify actions to themselves ,
using psychological mechanisms
Relies on justification to society as a
whole, using public discourses
Interventions focus on individual justice
and the identification of intention
Interventions need to focus on social
systems and recognise that intentions are
secondary to responsibilities
Low intensity, wide impact: Whereas individual torture is conventionally thought of in
terms of a highly intense and intrusive intervention which impacts primarily on
individual victims and their immediate family, Social Torture can be characterised as
‘low intensity’ in that its methods and impacts are often not immediately visible but
should be identifiable across society as a whole. In other words while in individual
torture only a minority are directly impacted, in Social Torture only a minority will
escape the impacts.
Low intensity goes hand in hand with a wide yet gradual impact. Its mechanisms are
not always immediately identifiable for there is not always a simple one-to-one
correlation between acts of torture and symptoms of such torture, particularly where
the torturer is skilled in working so as to minimise visible damage. One symptom may
arise from a number of discrete causes, or from a combination of them. For example,
the literature suggests that the likelihood of PTSD among torture victims is increased
if, amongst other things, the torture victim has already experienced ‘the phenomenon
of being forcibly uprooted from one’s home’, and if the victim is either very young or
33
very old (Melamed et al, 1990: 20).6  In short, it may be the cumulative impact of
multiple violations which triggers a visible symptom, such that impact cannot be
traced back to any one of those violations in particular. This suggests that it may be
necessary to look for impact over the medium rather than the short term, and that it
may be more useful to speak of causal contexts rather than of single causal incidents.
And even if visible, impacts cannot always be traced back directly to a particular act,
for as studies of the families of Holocaust survivors and of the disappeared in Latin
America have shown, even the torture of individuals affects not just the immediate
object of the torturer’s attentions, but also impacts on those associated with that person
in the form of symptoms such as withdrawal, depression, and intense generalised fear
(Melamed et al, 1990: 25). It is thus possible for impacts to be transmitted across and
down the generations without the continued need of a physical perpetrator. The
gradual impact of Social Torture, and the distance between individual acts and overall
impact, contribute to the low visibility of the phenomenon. As one MP commented in
northern Uganda, ‘This insecurity is a greater threat than the abductions. It is present every
day but nobody sees it’.7
Geographic extension and time-indifference: In the popular imagination torture takes
place in very specific sites, generally away from the purview of the general public, at
the hands of a very particular set of people, and over a delimited period of time
determined by the limited capacity of the individual body and mind to resist torture. It
has a beginning, when the victim is whisked away from their normal daily life, and it
has an end, when the person, if still alive, may be returned to the ‘outside’ world, often
with visible physical and psychological scars to deal with - in the midst of people the
majority of whom have not undergone the same experience.
                                                     
6 Given what is known about the process of forcible displacement into the “protected villages”, this
immediately makes a large proportion of the northern Uganda population, 90% of which was displaced,
increasingly susceptible to PTSD.
7 Then Minister for Northern Uganda Reconstruction, Hon. Owiny Dollo, Bedo Piny Pi Kuc, Gulu, 26 June
1998.
34
Social Torture, by contrast, rather than taking place in very restricted locations in short
bursts, it is both geographically extensive and time indifferent. The whole
environment, in this case both the “protected villages” and the war zone as a whole,
are the site of torture – all the time. For most people, who have no resources with
which to remove themselves from the war zone, there is no ‘outside’. You are not
whisked away from your daily life to be tortured; daily life is your torture. This is not
helped if the ‘outsiders’, who in the individual model of torture give victims hope by
creating political pressure on the victim’s behalf, in this scenario are ‘bystanders’
making their own contributions to social torture.
If your whole world has become the torture chamber, then determining a clear
beginning becomes hard. As I shall suggest in chapter 3, it is never easy to know when
a war truly begins. Nor is it easy to know when torture begins. If, as argued in chapter
6, it is necessary to look at debilitation arising not just from discrete incidents but from
the accumulation of such, then pin-pointing a particular incident as the torture becomes
redundant. Forcible displacement prior to an act of torture does not just render the
victim more susceptible to torture-related PTSD symptoms after such an act, it is a part
of the torture process itself. Just as the beginning is hard to pinpoint, so is the end.
What people experience and the symptoms they exhibit can barely be described as post-
traumatic, as for most people there is no end to the circumstances which caused the
trauma. Whereas the aid workers in war zones are sent on R&R (Rest and
Recuperation), there is no such respite for the population at large. From this point of
view to use the term post-traumatic stress to describe what is happening inside the war
zone can itself be seen as part of a structure of denial, or at least a refusal to
acknowledge that there is no ‘normal’ or pre-traumatic situation to revert to. In short,
the process of social torture is time indifferent, measured in years rather than the days
to which the individual’s body can be subjected to.
Multiple Actors: over time large sections of society (rather than a narrowly selected
group of ‘public officials’) become involved in the process, and a synergy is established
between the psychological needs and wants of some and the petty economic and
political interests of others. These are needs which the various actors involved will
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deny, and interests which they will have no wish to see exposed. In drawing in
multiple actors, social torture furthers underlying processes of social and political
change over which individual actors have little direct control or influence, and, to the
extent that their own interests are furthered by keeping quiet, little incentive to
challenge. This integration of multiple actors into the dynamics of social torture
challenges a key aspect of many existing models of conflict, namely the tendency to
view conflict situations as somehow ‘out there’, completely other and detached from
the contexts in which those doing the analyses are situated. If, as I shall argue, social
torture has to be understood as a systemic process in which what is happening in, for
example, Gulu is influenced by and of import to those making decisions in Kampala,
London, Brussels and Washington, then an internal vs. external model will only hold
insofar as it describes those who are physically inside the war zone and those who are
outside it. It will not have any value in identifying causal responsibility for what is
happening inside the war zone.
Self-perpetuating: Once under way, social torture elicits states of physical and
psychological debilitation, dependency, dread and disorientation and corresponding
behavioural responses from its victims which tend to mutually reinforce and deepen
each other rather than resolving themselves, and thus contribute to perpetuating or
escalating the situation.
For example, although torture is often visited upon the physical body in the first
instance, it is at core an invasion of people’s minds which is very difficult to reverse,
such that methods and impacts ultimately become one and the same thing. As Primo
Levi  (1989) puts it, ‘Anyone who has been tortured, remains tortured’. The mental
state described as ‘disorientation’ is an outcome of torture, but being in that state is
itself an additional form of torture.
Even those who are being devalued may participate in their own devaluation, for
discourses of devaluation which may have been catalysed by external actors (e.g.
colonial notions of the ‘native’, or blaming the Acholi for what happened to them) are
internalised by a particular population and acquire a momentum which is quickly
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independent of the actors who catalysed the discourse and continues long after they
have left.
Not only is the invasion of the mind hard to reverse, it also finds expression in further
physical debilitation. Both direct and indirect victims are subject to severe
psychological stress, which is known to weaken the immune system.8 This may
increase morbidity, thereby accelerating physical debilitation and economic
dependency, a state in which people are unable to fulfil or learn the roles which under
normal circumstances would give them a sense of their adult identity (e.g. provision
and protection). This in turn aggravates psychological debility.
Once physical dependency has been induced through lack of food and lack of sleep
(which in turn is related to dread), people cannot afford to bite the hand that feeds
them, and their time horizons become fore-shortened by the realities of day-to-day
survival in the war zone. Coping mechanisms adopted to ameliorate their personal
situation often have the opposite effect. To eat today, for example, people resort to
selling sex with its concomitant risk of HIV tomorrow (see chapter 6).
In a sense torture becomes involuntarily self-administered, and, insofar as these
behaviours are perceived and/or portrayed as self-inflicted, it also becomes possible to
‘blame the victim’ and thereby reinforce discourses of devaluation and
dehumanisation. This diverts attention away from causes and directs it to symptoms,
in a manner which is used by those who in principle have the capacity to do
differently, to justify their actions and inactions.  It becomes difficult for any of the
multiple actors involved to step back and assess their true contribution to - or position
in - the various inter-secting cycles of violation and violence. Social Torture thus
acquires a degree of momentum independent of the perpetrators’ original actions or
intentions.
                                                     
8 B.G.Melamed et al, in Suedfeld, 1990, p16.
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Public discourses:  Because of the scale of social torture, and its potential visibility to
the public eye, institutions such as Governments, Churches and NGOs need to
convince their constituencies, congregations, and funding bases respectively that the
actions and inaction of those they are supporting make sense and are legitimate.
Fundamentally this is likely to be achieved through the manipulation of discourses and
their accompanying silences - by focusing on some elements of the situation these
discourses serve to divert attention from the bigger picture. In a manner analogous to
the individual perpetrator who draws on a language of devaluation shared with other
members of society to pre-empt any psychological discomfort with his own actions, so
institutions and interest groups pre-empt the threat of exposure outlined above by
using discourses to externalise, make public and thereby involve their public in what -
in the individual - would be internal and private psychological processes of
justification.9
Overview of the thesis
In Chapter 2 I explore set out the institutional framework within which I conducted the
research and the key elements of the approach I adopted in order to address the
contextual and conceptual challenges arising from doing research both on and in a
‘war zone’. I argue that, to uncover the hidden rather than focus on the already visible,
it was necessary to adopt an extremely open and non-prescriptive approach, in which
the subjectivity of people living in that situation was given considerable scope and
priority. I suggest that it was through enabling these subjective voices to be heard that
the findings emerged which both prompted and supported the development of a
model of social torture and a counter-narrative to the accounts shaped by the
mainstream discourse.
                                                     
9 The term ‘internalise’, as used in psycho-analysis, ‘means the process whereby inter-subjective relations
are transformed into intra-subjective ones (internalization of a conflict, of a prohibition, etc.)’(Zur 1998:
189). By extension I shall use externalisation to describe a process whereby intra-subjective relations (in
this case the thought processes used by an individual to justify their non-intervention) are transformed
into inter-subjective ones and given form through discourses.
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Chapter 3 serves a three-fold purpose. It begins with an objective history of major
events occurring in northern Uganda over the period 1986 - 2004, including the various
Governmental initiatives to deal with the LRA. It is ‘objective’ in the sense that few
would dispute these happenings. This is then juxtaposed with peoples’ subjective
memories to illuminate the importance of bringing subjective accounts into ‘objective’
history, for when it is done it indicates that although there were undeniably elements
of intra-ethnic violence, there were no obvious reasons for giving primacy to an intra-
ethnic explanation as there were also inter-ethnic, nationalist, international and trans-
national dimensions. Rather than being lead actor, the LRA appears to be one amongst
many.
Chapter 4 therefore confronts directly the argument that this is primarily a war
between LRA and Government of Uganda. I do this first through a consideration of the
nature of the LRA, second through a review of the gap between the Government’s
stated intentions and actions. While I argue that the LRA can be seen as having both a
certain coherence and an identifiable cause – not least to confront the Museveni
government, as part of a rejection of wider processes of social and political change –
and was more of a force to be reckoned with than national and international
propaganda generally allowed, I also argue that the LRA was inherently self-limiting
by virtue of its rejection of ‘modernity’. As an organisation it could in principle have
been overcome by military means many years ago, and therefore did not offer a
sufficient explanation for the continuation of the war.  In reviewing the Government’s
approach to the 1994 Peace Talks – often cited as the closest they have come to a non-
military solution - I suggest that dealing conclusively with the LRA was never the aim
of the Government and that its ‘peace talks’ were in fact a form of war talk. I conclude
that the main targets of Government policy and strategy were broader than the LRA
and also extended to the Acholi population. The self-limiting nature of the LRA and
the Government’s lack of commitment to achieving peace allow me to substantially
discount the argument that this is primarily a classic internal confrontation between
two opposing groups, and to suggest that the confrontation between LRA and
Government, though real, is limited and is more important in its function as a disguise
for a deeper process, namely social torture.
39
In the following three chapters, in which I focus on the objective and subjective
experiences of the bulk of the population in the war zone in Uganda, particularly in the
protected villages where the majority of my own data was collected, I build the
evidence for this argument. I show how, in the name of protection, the population
experienced violation (chapter 5), debilitation (chapter 6) and humiliation (chapter 7)
on a mass scale.
In chapter 8 I review this evidence, and argue that dread, debilitation, dependency and
disorientation, the key impacts of a torture process, are all evident throughout the war
zone. In exploring these impacts it also becomes evident that while the LRA and
Government were the two most visible parties to the situation, a multiplicity of other
actors were also involved with differing levels of visibility and with different ways of
making the situation function for them. Perpetrators, complicit bystanders and victims
are all in place.
At the most mundane level the functions relate to the petty spoils of war-related
corruption and the internal momentum of the ‘aid industry’. At a more important level
they relate to the shifting balance of economic and political power within and between
states in the post-cold war era of globalisation. In this context Social Torture supports
entire processes of social and political change, and here again analogies can be drawn
between the functions of individual and social torture. When considering the Ugandan
state’s relative vulnerability vis-à-vis its own population and within the wider
international community, the contribution of social torture can be seen as three-fold.
While hard won political independence demands that states control their own
populations, it offers little in the way of economic power with which to exercise this
control. Other means therefore have to be found: demonisation of individuals and sub-
groups, and militarisation in the name of pacification, provide important
opportunities. The political need of the Government is for a process of subordinate
inclusion (rather than social exclusion) of the population in northern Uganda. Insofar as
it breaks down social practices which distinguish the war zone from the wider state
(e.g. cattle-based restorative justice mechanisms) and replaces them with alternatives
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(e.g. the Local Council system), it gradually establishes the inclusion of the targeted
social group into the national structure but on a subordinate basis. Insofar as these
processes are publicised (as chapter 4 suggests they are), they serves as a warning to
other social groups in other parts of the country.
The aid and development donors, while talking of good governance, are in fact
complicit in this process, as it serves their own need to maintain the Government of
Uganda in a subordinate position. By allowing the client state to break with
international conventions, a series of latent conditionalities are created which enable
these donor states to exercise leverage and control over the client. Yet insofar as the
Government is able to implicate external actors, it limits to a certain extent the powers
of intervention of those external actors and thereby increases the Government’s room
for manoeuvre.
To support the vested interests which develop, complex mechanisms are in place to
legitimise the process, including the use of the mainstream discourse on war. This
discourse, and its careful silences about the vested interests of those who promote the
discourse, justifies a whole range of interventions (with the stated intention of doing
good and the observed impact of doing considerable harm), and obscures the need for
alternative interventions. The discourse and its silences are thus shown to be a form of
violence.
The low intensity and wide impact of social torture, its geographical extension and
time-indifference, its involvement of multiple actors and the functions it has for each of
them, and the way the dynamics of violation become to a degree self-perpetuating
(particularly in the sense that some victims themselves become perpetrators) all offer
explanations for why the situation in northern Uganda continues. I conclude that,
taking all these different elements into account, it is possible to see that the
fundamental process is one of social torture, but that this is disguised by the
appearance of it being a war.
41
In Chapter 9, I suggest that the analysis of social torture has a number of implications.
As a counter-narrative to the mainstream discourse on today’s ‘wars’ it highlights the
limitations of models based on binary oppositions such as ‘internal-external’, ‘greed-
grievance’ and ‘rational-irrational’. It also highlights the practical limitations of legal
approaches when it comes to dealing with multiple perpetrators, with the changing
positionality of perpetrators, bystanders and victims, and with the fact that people’s
behaviours are not reducible to the intentionality which lies at the heart of the
Convention against Torture definition.  It suggests that the power of the concept of
torture will be strengthened rather than weakened by broadening the lens from a
primarily legal one to a more socio-economic, psychological and political one,
particularly as such a lens suggests a correspondingly broader range of interventions to
address human suffering in situations such as northern Uganda.
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Chapter 2: The Research Process
Introduction
The majority of fieldwork on which this thesis draws took place in Gulu and Kitgum
districts from May 1998 – March 2000 as part of a wider DFID funded research
Consortium on Political Emergencies (referred to in this text as COPE). At the time, as
well as being registered as a part-time PhD student at LSE, I was employed full-time by
ACORD, an international Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) with a long history
of working in northern Uganda and other conflict affected areas. As the NGO member
of COPE, ACORD (in particular myself) had been given thematic responsibility for
investigating the local impacts of complex emergencies and of interventions into them.
Although it was initially proposed to do this in Rwanda, staff there expressed
reservations about having a large research project being carried out in their name, and
Northern Uganda was suggested as an alternative. During my main period of
fieldwork I was therefore based in Gulu town, with occasional trips to Kampala for
administrative purposes. During this main period I had a number of co-researchers,
including ten fieldworkers, four part-time documentation assistants, and a full-time
research assistant.
After my main period of fieldwork I made three further visits. The first was in March
2000 when I returned to Gulu to co-facilitate a workshop on the implications of the
research for ACORD’s programming in northern Uganda. The second was from
February – April 2002, just as Operation Iron Fist was getting underway. My last visit,
during which I went to Soroti as well as Gulu and Kitgum, was in January 2004. At this
point I was conducting a Conflict Assessment for Christian Aid, in collaboration with
the Refugee Law Project at Makerere University, and found that the humanitarian and
military situation had escalated substantially.
The approaches I adopted to the research were influenced by a number of factors. One
was the simple fact of working within a development NGO and wishing to make the
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research as relevant as possible to the organisation’s activities and to engage colleagues
in the research process. Others were related to logistics, security and political
sensitivities; rather than a post-conflict situation this was an ongoing ‘war’ with
fluctuating levels of insecurity which cast a spell of uncertainty over everything and
left the boundaries of what was possible or desirable distinctly unclear; in particular I
did not know what my colleagues would feel safe to ask or talk about. How I dealt
with these was further influenced by the conceptual considerations outlined in the
introduction, the most important of which were the wish to demonstrate the linkages
or systemic nature of the situation, and the desire to incorporate peoples’ subjective
experiences and interpretations into my analysis and presentation of findings. In short
I needed an exploratory process which was at the same both ethically and
methodologically sound.
Institutional setting
Whereas in all my previous research work I had been a member of academic
institutions, here I was in a development NGO. Although it was fairly typical of
development NGOs, in that research activities were very much the lesser partner in
relationship to ‘programme’ activities, it did have a commitment to research built into
the name (Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development) and was open to
being involved in a piece of work which went beyond more traditional needs
assessments or monitoring and evaluation concerns.
In Gulu itself, ACORD had had a presence since the 1980s. Unlike the majority of other
agencies it had never closed shop since it began operations, even during the most
difficult periods, and it had a correspondingly strong reputation and profile. Thus
when I went to do fieldwork people did not respond purely to my research activity,
but also to their by and large positive experiences of the agency I worked for. This also
substantially eased the task of persuading the authorities of the legitimacy of the
project. It also brought with it certain responsibilities vis-à-vis my colleagues; although
I was there on a time-bound basis and with my own funding, I was expected to fit
myself to a certain degree within the agency’s existing practices. At a minimum this
involved things such as participation in organisational meetings, and, more
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importantly, it meant I had to consider what impact my work would have on theirs
and whether the two could be combined to mutual advantage. It also meant that I
became a participant observer in the at times complex relationships between
Government, humanitarian and aid actors. For example, in the three months following
ACORD being kicked out of Kitgum district by an irate LCV chairman, I attended
numerous meetings at local and national levels between the agencies, the LCVs and the
office of the Minister for Northern Uganda Reconstruction.
Contextual Challenges
As this example shows, even an established NGO such as ACORD faced challenges
and a degree of vulnerability. The necessary authorisations were not always sufficient
to gain access to individuals and places, or to address certain issues. Fluctuating
security made travel outside the immediate vicinity of Gulu town unpredictable, and
the context as a whole created high levels of suspicion, not just of me as an obvious
foreigner, but also of colleagues whose personal political affiliations were not known
but could put respondents at risk.
Possible respondents had many interpretations of our role as researchers, including
that we were spies for foreign governments, or might feed our findings to the Ugandan
government, or alternatively were rebel sympathisers ourselves. It was often extremely
difficult to judge where a given respondent sat on the political spectrum, and how
information flows worked. It was also the case that both respondents and co-
researchers were likely to have occupied several different roles in their lives (e.g.
civilian, soldier, rebel), each with different political overtones. And it was not
uncommon for a person to have different close family members in several different
political camps. They might have a brother in the bush, a sister in local government, an
uncle in central government and cousins in London, Toronto or New York.
These high levels of ambiguity about identities, affiliations and political sympathies,
created serious security/confidentiality concerns for researchers and respondents alike.
This was particularly the case when researching the LRA , for even to ask a question
about them in Gulu was liable to raise suspicion (or fear). Not only was documentation
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scarce, but to attempt to talk with the LRA could be viewed by the authorities as
tantamount to collaboration – as The Monitor newspaper noted, ‘When Presidential
candidate Paul Ssemogerere told voters in 1996 that he would talk to Kony into
abandoning the rebellion, he was branded a rebel himself’10. Even those who had been
authorised to make contact with the LRA were at times arrested by the UPDF, as
happened when three priests, carrying a letter from the Kitgum Resident District
Commissioner, tried to meet with LRA Commander Toopaco on 28 August 2002.11
Individuals offering to make contact with the LRA on my behalf often turned out to be
linked with government security services. I could have interviewed returned child
abductees in centres established for their rehabilitation, such as GUSCO, but I was
reluctant to follow this well-trodden path. Whereas Heike Behrend had observed that
before she ever wrote her own analysis of the Holy Spirit Movement, it  ‘had already
been created by the mass media’ (Behrend, 1999: 2), in the case of the LRA it was
created not only by mass media but also by the UN and Non-Governmental
Organisations using the testimonies of traumatised children who had escaped captivity
and been processed through reception centres such as GUSCO and World Vision.
While the testimonies seemed in many respects genuine, they provided a partial
picture, as adult voices were largely absent. There were though few other obvious
options. At the same time, the LRA were said to have eyes and ears everywhere – at
any public meeting someone would comment to the effect that ‘whatever we say here
will be relayed to the LRA’ - but nobody would go so far as to point out particular
individuals. As a result one could never be sure who was who and had to regard
everyone as a potential informer to Government or LRA – or to both.
The sense of being under surveillance was at times acute; it was not uncommon to
meet a respondent for a meal or drink and then find somebody unknown sitting
exceptionally close by, despite the availability of numerous empty tables further away.
On one occasion in Kitgum, such a 'restaurant observers' was spotted at ten o'clock the
following morning sitting 100 metres away from the ACORD office on a termite
mound reading a book, from where he could observe our comings and goings. Such
                                                     
10 The Monitor, 16 May 1998, Let’s vote on Kony War.
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scrutiny from security services meant that some respondents could also be at risk from
being seen to talk with us, and raised serious concerns about the confidentiality of
sources and security of data collected.  Returning to my hotel room in Kitgum after a
day’s fieldwork to find that my laptop had been tampered with brought this home to
me in a very direct fashion. Furthermore, for much of my fieldwork Gulu had only a
handful of telephones; any call from the post-office was bound to be listened to by the
queue of other people waiting, and any fax received was likely to be perused by
several people before reaching its intended recipient. This also led to a form of self-
imposed censorship in discussing what was happening.
Conceptual challenges
I felt I had to go well beyond simply documenting the impact of war and humanitarian
interventions on people at a local level. I did not wish to simply repeat data collection
which had already been done; some issues, such as LRA abductions and other
atrocities already seemed relatively well documented - indeed they seemed amongst
the few elements of the situation which did not require much research.
Furthermore, I felt that such documentation had a limited impact on the situation.
From a humanitarian perspective, given the multiple indicators of suffering which
already existed when I first went to Gulu in January 1998, northern Uganda should
have been termed a complex emergency, yet it was not recognised as such, and the
humanitarian imperative did not seem to be operating. Eventually – in December 2003
– it would come to be described by Jan Egeland, the UN’s Under Secretary General for
Humanitarian Affairs, as one of the worst humanitarian situations in the world,12 but in
1998, despite being already more than a decade old, the situation in northern Uganda
had attracted relatively little international attention. From day one, therefore, I was
confronted by questions about whether the label had any objective meaning (i.e. was
linked to specific ‘objective’ indicators) or was purely politically contingent.
                                                                                                                                                           
11 Justice & Peace News, August 2002, Vol. 2 – No. 5: p4.
12 IRIN, 28 January 2004, The 18-yearl old war that refuses to go away.
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Horizontal segmentation or vertical linkages?
I was also challenged by the way the larger COPE research project was effectively
segmented horizontally: Officially I was supposed to focus at the local level, while
others (in line with their respective academic disciplines) prioritised state and
international dimensions of CPEs in their respective sites. Although in principle each
member was intended to also consider the questions identified by the other members
in practice there was little space in this structure for considering the linkages between
levels.  I found this limited and limiting, but reflected in the majority of NGO reports
and policy documents; while the premise of internal wars had effectively penetrated
this grey literature, the more subtle linkages between internal and external generally
had not. Kaldor and Duffield’s discussions on new wars, for example, show how
economic and political polarisations, and the tensions these create, transcend
geographical boundaries. This seemed to me to suggest the analytical irrelevance of an
ethnographic approach to understanding the dynamics of war and its continuation and
the need to examine the connections between different parts of the conflict dynamic
and different parts of the globe even while conducting fieldwork at the ‘local’ level. To
do this also indicated the need to go beyond the confines of traditional academic
disciplines; to get away from the economist’s pre-occupation with economic rationality
to look at more politically and psychologically complex models of behaviour and
motivation; to discard international relation’s fixation with two-party models of wars
and their resolution and replace it with multi-actor ones; to take the anthropologist’s
concern with local level motivations and ideologies and integrate it with more systemic
perspectives. Against the backdrop of these needs I felt that development studies, as an
academic setting which embraces multi- or cross-disciplinary perspectives, was an
appropriate ‘home’.
I was encouraged in the pursuit of connections across levels (and disciplines) by
Colson and Kottak’s writings on ‘linkages’ (1996). They observe that
Contemporary anthropologists can no longer even hope to do ethnography
among people isolated from world markets or unaffected by centers of political
and economic power.
Furthermore,
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… No matter what the subject or the research locale, we need to consider
documents describing the interdependencies between local systems and larger
economic and political networks. (Colson and Kottak, 1996: 107)
They propose research focused on linkages, which they define as
…a convenient term to encompass the multistranded involvement in the world
system that ethnographers must now consider in conceptualizing the influences
affecting values, categories, institutional arrangements, and other symbolic
systems. The linkages perspective is the antithesis of traditional anthropological
‘holism’, which looked inward, assuming the existence of some entity, either a
culture or a society, complete and autonomous. Linkages, crucial to social
transformations, work to destabilize, rather than maintain, local systems over
time. (ibid, 1996: 104)
Acknowledging Peoples’ Agency
Furthermore, while some of the academic literature outlined above under ‘building
blocks’ does in fact explore how wars are experienced at a local level and how this
feeds into the dynamics of war (and there is plenty in more theoretical models of
‘grievance’, ‘particularism’, ‘identity politics’ etc which can be read as implying that
these connections really do matter), my sense at that time was that either there was
something of a loud silence around this in the literature being drawn on by NGOs, or
they themselves were selectively ignoring it. Much of the literature I read seemed to be
peopled by concepts rather than real people and, to the extent that people were
brought into the picture, this was in terms of the impacts of war on them, rather than of
their impact on war. In other words, the subjectivities and agency of those living in the
most affected areas were often missing. From within the NGO sector it seemed clear to
me that, as Zur commented in 1998,
‘Despite recent interest in the anthropology of war there has been little
documentation of how conflict is lived by the people caught in its midst or of
how they themselves represent it’ (1998; 18).
Indeed, it could be argued that humanitarian and development agencies, by virtue of
their specific mandates and funder demands for target groups and verifiable
indicators, tend to turn people into passive victims whose objective needs can be
addressed without enquiry into their subjective position or their own agency. Having
just come from a year interviewing ex-combatants in Mozambique where I listened to
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their (extensive) grievances and wondered what this meant for the durability of the
reintegration process there, and having joined an organisation with a commitment to
working at the ‘grass-roots’, I felt that this silence about what motivates people living
in such contexts, and about the extent to which they are actors in war despite living in
difficult circumstances, needed to be both investigated and broken.
Ethical Considerations
This latter challenge was not just conceptual; I doubted that a study of this nature
which failed to give space to the subjective voices of both respondents and co-
researchers could be considered either methodologically or ethically sound. My
previous research experience with Mozambican refugees in South Africa (Dolan, 1996)
and ex-combatants in Mozambique (Dolan, 1997), had made me sceptical about the
value of adhering to a very tight and predefined set of methods which would
automatically preclude the identification of hitherto unsuspected issues and angles.
This scepticism went hand in hand with my awareness that the thinking of everybody
working in a research project is changed and deepened by the experience, and that
there should be some scope for accommodating the ideas which result. In other words,
enabling the subjectivity of my co-researchers within the research process was as much
an issue as reflecting the subjectivity of respondents in the research findings.
Another ethical concern was closely linked with security considerations; I did not wish
to make decisions which put either my co-researchers or our respondents at risk of
trouble from the authorities or other bodies (e.g. LRA, mob justice), nor did I wish to
put people at risk by association with the project (as had been the fear of ACORD
colleagues in Rwanda).
My concern about safety, however, extended beyond what might be termed the
political and physical safety of respondents, and into the question of psychological
risk; although it was an area with very high levels of violence and violation and these
were obviously issues of concern to the study, it seems to me that setting certain types
of questions about deeply personal or sensitive experiences (e.g. ‘how many people did
you kill?’ or ‘how many times were you raped?’) is ethically wrong if it puts the
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respondent under pressure to open wounds which I as a researcher have no way of
dressing, let alone healing. Such questioning also, to my mind, implies that the
questioner believes him or herself to occupy the moral high ground from which they
can ask whatever they choose, because they have objectified the respondent to the
point where his or her experience of being questioned ceases to matter. If, however, the
respondent chooses to divulge deeply personal information, that is a different matter.
The fourth ethical consideration, and often the hardest to address, was to do as my
respondents asked of me, namely to use what I learned to inform people outside. In
other words I was explicitly asked to take seriously my responsibilities as a witness
which putting myself in that environment had created.
Methods adopted
Given all the above considerations, I wanted an approach which maximised
respondent and researcher security, which valued the subjectivity of co-researchers
and respondents alike, and which was on the one hand sufficiently structured to be
implementable and on the other remained sufficiently open that issues and methods
could emerge and be followed up, and joint exercises with my programme colleagues
could also be incorporated. In the end four broad strands emerged; ongoing work with
and through field-workers in the protected villages, further key informant interviews
and participant observation by myself, the collection of press clippings and various
audio-visual data, and discrete research exercises with colleagues from the ACORD
Gulu programme in which we primarily adopted focus group methodologies.
Composition of the research team
As the research progressed the team of people involved grew. After a few weeks in
Gulu I met Komakech Charles Okot, who had already worked as a research assistant to
Sverker Finnstrom, and we agreed to work together on a part-time basis. When I found
myself stuck in Gulu with no certainty about how soon or how regularly I would be
permitted to travel to the protected villages, I had to find another way to do the
fieldwork. In discussion with Komakech, we decided to seek people from a number of
protected villages who could carry out fieldwork in an ongoing fashion by virtue of
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being resident there, could report to us on a regular basis, and could provide us with
entry points when we were able to visit the villages ourselves.
We identified a number of potential fieldworkers from people whom Komakech knew
as a result of working in the Uganda Red Cross. On the basis of our interviews with
them, eight were chosen. As the work progressed, two additional fieldworkers joined
us, one based in Gulu town, the other in Awer camp, such that we ended up with a
group which was highly diverse in terms of backgrounds, experiences and political
positions.  It included individuals who had spent time in the bush, camp leaders,
religious leaders, teachers, students, district councillors, and otherwise unemployed
civilians.  A major weakness, however, was the lack of women field-workers. The one
woman who came for interview was not amongst those selected.
The names of the fieldworkers were registered with the authorities and each individual
received a card and a letter of introduction to present on demand. Notwithstanding
these administrative safe-guards I still could not realistically pre-determine what it was
or was not safe for the fieldworkers to investigate; while it was likely to be OK to
document the visits of priests and politicians, I could not decide for them if it was safe
to document an LRA raid or the Government’s response to that. Just because field
worker X could talk about an incident of rape I could not assume that field worker Y
would feel able to do so, as each person had his own particular profile in his own
camp, some of which offered more protection than others (e.g. teachers, camp officials),
and some of which allowed access to otherwise little represented sections of the
population (e.g. youth). I therefore consciously sought to create a situation in which
such decisions were left to the field-workers own judgement and individual sense of
security;
In discussion with the fieldworkers we developed an approach centred around a report
to be prepared and brought to Gulu for discussion on a monthly basis. This comprised
several elements. The basic one was a standardised questionnaire, which covered relief
deliveries (food, clothing, seeds and tools), health and sanitation services, education,
sources of income, information flows (from LRA), visitors to the camp (e.g. politicians,
52
religious leaders, journalists, cultural and recreational activities (in particular dances),
deaths/burials/funerals. This was supplemented every three months with a price list of
all items available in their local market. Information collected included cost of the item,
and its origin, allowing us to demonstrate, for example; the sale of relief items, the
importance of access to urban markets, and also the wide range of items produced,
hunted or gathered locally, despite the ongoing insecurity.
To capture people’s subjective experience and interpretation of the dynamics within
the war zone, and for the field workers to bring their own subjective view of what was
significant to bear, they were given event and incident report sheets on which to write
about any incident or event or issue which they felt to be of interest to someone who
knew nothing about life in the protected villages. This resulted in reports on a whole
range of issues which it would have been impossible to specify in a pre-formulated
questionnaire. In identifying incidents and events of interest, the field-workers became
'co-investigators' in the Freirean sense of taking an active attitude ‘to the exploration of
their thematics’ (see Freire, 1996: 87). I subsequently clustered the reports as
demonstrated in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Number of reports by subject matter over the six months July - December
1999, from 10 protected villages in Gulu District
Type of
incident
No. Type of
incident
No. Type of incident No. Type of
incident
No.
Raids &
abduction
44 Religious
activities
16 Theft 9 Weather 4
Health 42 Burning 13 Mob justice 7 Shooting 3
NGO
activities
41 Poisoning 13 Music & dance 7 Cattle
restocking
2
Education 38 Politicians 10 Adultery 5 Hunting 2
Actions by
military
30 Rape 10 Land disputes 5 Population
movements
2
Accidents 30 Homeguards
& police
9 Lightning 5 Defilement 1
Government
activities
22 Killings 9 Witchcraft 5 Corruption –
clientelism
1
Domestic
fighting
20 Local
government
9 Administration
– camps
4 Economy of
war
1
Celebrations 19 Rebel
movements
9 Ambushes 4 Combined
Total
481
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Traditional
leaders
17 Suicides 9 Economy of
camps
4
I have drawn heavily on these in providing qualitative evidence for the arguments
made in the thesis. Wherever possible quotations have been used which are as
representative of the wider set of stories as possible.
At the suggestion of one of the field-workers, these accounts were enhanced and
supplemented through the use of cameras. Again, I did not specify what should be
photographed, but requested that each photo be dated and given a brief explanation of
what it depicted and where. In many cases the fieldworkers used such photographs to
corroborate their written accounts and thus strengthened the quality of the incident
and event data.
Over and above the monthly reports the fieldworkers also provided hand drawn maps
of their village, and on occasion filled in supplementary questionnaires related to the
research, for example on HIV and conflict and on livelihoods. Each fieldworker also
provided a history of the origins of his particular protected village. When the security
situation allowed I would also visit their villages with Komakech. This allowed a
degree of mentoring, corroboration of the findings they had already presented, and the
development of relationships of trust with the fieldworkers, whom, in addition to their
role as data gatherers, I also considered as among my key informants.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of developing such trust; I still remember the
initial meetings, which were quite tense, and how over the months this tension was
replaced by what felt like a high degree of mutual confidence and trust. My sense was
that the key elements in this evolution were regularity of contact, regularity of
payment, confidence over time that their reports were not being shared with the
authorities, and the visible influence of their opinions on both the content and
methodology of the research. As this happened, so the nature of what they were
prepared to document changed; reports became more critical and the material more
sensitive. If I had adopted a more rigid approach I would have expected the findings of
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the fieldworkers to become more homogeneous, in reality they became more rather
than less distinctive as each individual felt more able to bring his subjective concerns to
bear.
The diversity of the fieldworkers was also a major advantage in dealing with the
political ambiguities of northern Uganda. Although it is impossible to verify, it is
probable that by having this range of people involved, those parties with an interest in
knowing exactly what was being done were in fact informed and updated by our own
research staff. From a methodological point of view I was more interested in capturing
a wide range of perspectives than in the consistency of data across villages, and again
this was well met by the diversity of the team. In presenting data drawn from the
fieldworkers’ accounts the village of the fieldworker and the date of the incident
referred to are given in the footnotes.
In-depth key informant interviews
In parallel to the ongoing monthly reports I also carried out numerous key informant
interviews, generally together with Komakech, who would also translate when
necessary. We began with interviews on the issue of refugees, the diaspora and
remittances.  These were our earliest interviews, and were the least successful, whether
because they touched on too many sensitive questions, or because we were not familiar
enough to ask them correctly, or due to constrained identification of key informants.13
Later interviews, which in some cases involved interviewing the same person several
times over, focused more on issues such as the peace process led by the then Minister
for the North, Mrs Betty Bigombe in 1993/4, the creation of 'protected villages', and the
teaching and role of traditional dance.
The most in-depth key informant interview, which bears some discussion as I draw on
it extensively in Chapter 4, was one conducted by myself over a ten day period with a
returned LRA soldier. This was unplanned and resulted from our both attending a
meeting in Kitgum in late March 2002. By this point, notwithstanding the problems of
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researching the LRA and the fact that documentation on LRA abductions and other
atrocities already existed, I had realised that, given the central position accorded to the
LRA in mainstream accounts, I would have to make my own assessment of its relative
importance in the overall situation, and that this would require some insight into the
LRA’s internal dynamics and motivations. I therefore asked him if he would be
prepared to tell me his story. Although he said that he would he also avoided me
throughout the rest of the meeting and I assumed he did not really wish to. However,
when I was subsequently in Kampala he phoned me and said he was coming to tell me
the story there.  In the event his story, from the day he was abducted in 1996 aged 19,
to the day he returned to Uganda under the Amnesty in late 2001, took eight days to
tell and a further two days to check through. Rather than taping it I typed it straight
onto my laptop with him looking over my shoulder, and we ended up with a 44 page
transcript.
Against the backdrop of numerous accounts given by returned abducted children, this
account is important because Jacob was already an adult when abducted, and he spent
his six years mainly within the LRA’s headquarters. His story confirms many of the
elements of the feedback given by younger abductees, but adds a whole layer of
information about the day to day running of the LRA and the gradual changes in
political climate and their influence on the LRA - at least as he was able to perceive
them. I have included the entire transcript as Annex B so that readers can assess the
account for themselves.
For several reasons I did not prioritise key informant interviews with NGO or IGO
staff. As an NGO staff member myself, I felt I would have numerous opportunities to
engage in participant observation of NGO activities, such as weekly NGO security
meetings. Most of the international and many local NGOs operating in Gulu district
participated in the September 1999 conference,14 and several international NGOs
                                                                                                                                                           
13 Our starting point was for research staff to contact people known to them to have some family members
living abroad
14 ACORD, ACF, Amnesty International, AVSI, CRS, Christian Aid, Conciliation Resources, CPAR,
DENIVA, IRC, Interpares, Life & Peace Institute, Mennonite Central Committee, NRC, Oxfram, Redd
Barnet, SNV, Stromme Foundation, TPSO, ARLPI, ISIS, JYAK, Legal Aid Project, EPRC, Northern Uganda
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participated in meetings with the Government following the eviction of ACORD from
Kitgum district. More importantly, I wanted to capture their role as institutions as
perceived by their ‘beneficiaries’, rather than the opinions of individuals within them.
As such I decided to rely to a large extent on the observations of their work as seen
throughout the fieldwork, together with their own documentation and statements to
the media. However, in the course of my 18 months fieldwork I did have the
opportunity to have many conversations with many aid workers and to get a sense of
how they saw the problem and how they justified their approaches. I have tried to give
an overview of those conversations, notably in chapter 8.
Audio-visual data
Another major item which informed my view of the LRA (and Government) was a
video recording of the 1994 peace talks, which my research assistants transcribed and
translated (see Annex D).
I felt that our findings would be stronger and more accessible if supported with visual
documentation. In addition to the photos a digital video camera was used to document
a whole range of activities; food distributions, political occasions (e.g. NRM day),
ceremonies (e.g. the installation of Archbishop John Baptist Odama, the anointment of
a local chief), celebrations (e.g. World Women’s Day, World AIDS day). These were
dubbed onto standard VHS tapes and then edited. Again, while basic guidance was
provided on how to use the digital camera, the decision about what to film in a given
place or situation was generally left to whoever had the camera. Where it was not
possible to use video recording, audio recordings of public functions and cultural
activities were made. The team also taped radio broadcasts – covering occasions such
as the District Council meetings and including the LRA's own Radio Voice of Free
Uganda for the few weeks that it succeeded in broadcasting to northern Uganda (see
Chapter 4).
                                                                                                                                                           
Media Forum, Peoples Voices for Peace, Gulu Development Association, Gulu Youth Peace Forum,
GUSCO, Hunger Alert, Justice & Peace Commission, Kacokke Madit, KICWA, Dyere Tek.
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Media Monitoring
In the event I made relatively little use of the transcriptions of these recordings, and
drew instead on newspaper clippings to give a sense of the kind of information
circulating inside the ‘war’ zone. Newspapers were a constant feature of daily life in
Gulu town. The two dailies, the New Vision and The Monitor, arrived with the first
bus in the morning and by mid-morning were sold out. They were eagerly scanned
and their contents fed into numerous discussions. On the one hand they were the only
regular source of news, and did provide some record of events as they occurred. On
the other hand they could not be consumed unquestioningly, the New Vision because
it was Government controlled, The Monitor because it was subject to constant
harassment by the Government. They also seemed inconsistent in the tone adopted, at
times expressing a critical voice, at times simply reflecting official positions. The
ambiguous space thus created contributed substantially to my own sense of being in a
surreal environment in which nothing was quite as it seemed. To try and get an insight
into this phenomeon I employed two part-time documentation assistants to go through
these daily papers (including local language papers), clipping and filing those items of
concern to the project (e.g. Sudan, LRA, Gulu & Kitgum districts, Diaspora,
International NGOs, Human Rights, Gender, West Nile Bank Front, ADF).
Some of these (e.g. Sudan) were a useful source of information on 'linkages', others
were more useful as a control of the quality of reporting as a whole (e.g. we could
compare our own accounts of events in Gulu district with those given in the media).
Analysing the discrepancies found through this juxtaposition of public and private
information allowed some conclusions to be drawn regarding the manipulation of
public information and thereby of public opinion (see Chapter 4).
Throughout the thesis I have quoted from these news clippings.  In some instances I
have used them as references for particular events, in others to demonstrate the biases
in the opinions expressed in them, and in others to give readers a sense of the extent to
which the media contributed to peoples’ sense of disorientation and could thus be
integral to the dynamics of situation.
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Research integrated with programming – the use of focus groups
To engage existing programme staff in the research process I was keen to establish joint
research exercises with my colleagues in ACORD’s Gulu office. These had to emerge
during the course of the work rather than being cast in stone before I had even arrived.
The opportunity to make a connection emerged around ACORD’s involvement in a
Belgian funded project concerning traditional leadership, as it was agreed that some
assessment of how this leadership was generally viewed should be carried out. From
January 1999 we therefore embarked on research into the roles and responsibilities of
traditional and modern leaders, as seen by the members of ten community-based
organisations with whom ACORD had longstanding relationships. These included
youth, subsistence farmers, women victims of conflict, and people living with
HIV/AIDS.15 In each discussion we first drew up a timeline for the period 1986 – 1999
and asked people to remember one or two incidents which had happened in each year
as a result of the war at national, district, community levels, and, finally, to them or
their immediate family. It was a very simple method which left it up to the
respondents to determine what to mention or to keep silent about, but it was
extraordinarily powerful, as in each group, regardless of its composition, a litany of
unceasing abuse and violation emerged. In addition to the better documented LRA
abuses, this stage of the research revealed heavy levels of sexual abuse by the military,
as well as rampant destruction of peoples' livelihoods by different forces at different
points in the history of the conflict.16 Had the exercise just been conducted with one
group it might have appeared exceptional; when it became clear that such experience
of violation was consistent across groups with very different profiles and in very
different parts of the district, it was shockingly unanswerable. With the group of
women victims in particular, as they referred (among other things) to mine accidents
and shootings, I suddenly realised that some were in fact missing entire limbs.
These findings led us into a second phase of research with the ACORD programme on
HIV and AIDS.17 The main objective was to explore the perspectives of the military on
                                                     
15 See chapter 6
16 See chapter 3 for findings from one women’s group
17 See chapter 6
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issues of HIV and of sexual relations with civilians, again using focus group methods
with groups of ordinary soldiers, officers, and military wives, both in Gulu barracks
and in a number of rural detaches. Again, ACORD’s existing relationships greatly
facilitated this otherwise potentially problematic exercise. A third stage involved
gathering data on livelihoods.18 Fieldworkers completed a questionnaire designed to
supplement studies carried out previously by programme staff as part of their earlier
work in this area (for discussion of findings see COPE Working Paper 32).
The work on traditional leaders involved all of us participating in and documenting
numerous meetings in local communities, as well as at the higher policy making levels
of local and central government. These latter also allowed close observation of some of
the NGO/donor politics behind the stated aims of interventions related to the
traditional leadership issue.
Dealing with findings
Quite apart from the political challenges of conducting research in a politically charged
environment and on potentially sensitive topics, there was also the problem of how to
present the findings. The original proposal to DFID suggested that this be done in a
small dissemination workshop at the end of the field-work period. There were though
a number of problems with operationalising this, particularly in terms of venue.
London was rejected as a venue since a lot of people who could contribute to and draw
from the discussions would have been excluded, and it risked accusations of 'extractive
research' or worse. Kampala presented similar problems, though access would be
easier.
At the suggestion of the ACORD Gulu co-ordinator, therefore, we decided to hold the
workshop in Gulu, as this would allow much fuller participation by all those who had
been involved in the research, and by people most directly affected by the situation. It
would also demonstrate a certain level of commitment from the external participants
who were willing to travel to and stay within what was still considered a high risk area
                                                     
18 See chapter 5
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- as well as giving them an opportunity to form their own impressions over and above
what they heard in presentations and papers.
Rather than simply disseminating our own findings we invited a wide range of
organisations and individuals to make presentations of their experiences and research
too. By collaborating with the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (a high profile
local initiative by the Muslim, Protestant and Catholic religious leaders working for
peace in Acholi) and with last minute support from central government, we ended up,
in September 1999, with an international conference with some 290 participants rather
than a small dissemination workshop as originally planned.
Key issues from our own and other pieces of research were tabled and discussed for
the first time, by actors ranging from village leaders right up to the Prime Minister of
Uganda, and with inputs from a large number of international participants. These
findings were juxtaposed with discussion of existing NGO activities and identification
of gaps. Public discussion of the issues was thus dramatically broadened and, it seems,
contributed to the creation of a wider political space than had hitherto existed. Perhaps
most importantly for the protection of researchers and respondents of my research, the
joint organisation contributed considerably to greater 'ownership' of results, and
demonstrated that the issues raised came not just from ACORD but from a wide range
of research activities by a number of concerned individuals and organisations. As such
it helped to put ACORD's research activities into a wider perspective, and contributed
to raising awareness of a number of issues which had hitherto received little attention
(such as investment in secondary and higher education, addressing gender
inequalities, promoting enterprise and employment, and investing in basic
communications infrastructure).
The importance of individual profiles in this should not be discounted; it was in large
part due to the intervention of two well-respected academics who had at one time
taught President Museveni at the University of Dar es Salaam, that it was possible to
broach the taboo topic of relations with Sudan. It became possible for everybody to
'hide' behind somebody else, and get that person to safely make a contribution which
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they themselves would have been unable to make for reasons of their own sense of
security.  Equally it served to de-mystify research, as it became clear that everybody,
from unemployed youth through to teachers and administrators, can do research. The
diversity and range of participants' profiles thus broke with traditional social and
political stratifications and demonstrated the need and value of doing so. The
combination of Ugandan and non-Ugandan participation gave the meeting
considerable power, as outsiders could ask questions which to an insider had either
ceased to be a points of discussion or had become ‘taboo’ topics. Outsiders also
brought comparative examples from other places to bear on the discussion. Bringing
together Ugandans from very diverse backgrounds was also useful: When a
fundamentalist preacher can challenge a minister, and an army commander can
question the Prime Minister, progress has been made towards critical analysis which
challenges existing frameworks rather than perpetuating them. Horizontal
stratifications were simultaneously recognised and cut across. As one participant
subsequently noted, ‘perhaps it is only across levels that the real questions which
contextualise the experience of war may be asked, the questions normally voiced
privately’.’19
Other than a number of presentations of findings given mainly in London, my next
attempt to put the findings into the public domain was through the publication of an
article under the title ‘Which children count?’. In this I focused on the politics of
humanitarianism as demonstrated through the question of abducted children
(ACCORD, 2002). I was in northern Uganda at the time the publication was launched,
and this coincided with a slightly shortened version being published in The Monitor as
part of Charles Onyango-Obbo’s regular opinion column. He subsequently reported
that, rather than provoking his readers into writing in with their comments, it
appeared to have shocked them into silence.
Within ACORD the research process informed and gave focus to the ACORD
programmes' subsequent non-research activities, indeed they led to a restructuring of
                                                     
19 I am indebted for these observations to Judith Large
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ACORD’s activities throughout northern Uganda.  Our experiences fed into an
ACORD-wide workshop on oral testimony and the development of guidelines for this,
and it also influenced the agency’s wider thinking about the role of research in
programming.
Discussion and Conclusions
Overall the methods adopted, often as a result of discussions with my co-researchers,
addressed the concerns I had; they allowed us to conduct field-work over nearly two
years without any security incidents; they embraced and reflected the subjectivity of
researchers and respondents alike and in the process took their viewpoints seriously
than attempting to suppress the reality of their influence; instead of pre-imposing
questions and analytical frameworks which risked channeling rather than opening up
thinking, they resulted in findings in which linkages were both implicit and explicit,
and which took me beyond documentation and into the analyses of dynamics over
time - informed by those most affected by the conflict.
Evidently these methods diverged considerably from more standard NGO driven
research, much of which focuses on very specific questions in order to inform what are
generally pre-determined intervention agendas, which in turn have been determined
by existing institutional niches and interests. There is little scope for what in industry
would be termed ‘blue-sky’ research which seeks to take a fresh look at situations. As
such I was fortunate in the space and time afforded me by my colleagues and the
project as a whole.  The methods adopted relied on the project being in place over a
long period of time, and having the capacity to return several times to any one person
or place. With the advantage of a number of follow-up visits I was ultimately able to
accompany the conflict for six of its eighteen years rather than creating a snapshot of
one year. As such I did not just talk about fluctuations in security, I lived them. I had
my own experiences of what it feels like to have the promise of peace held out (and all
the curiously mixed emotions which that brings with it) only to see it dashed again. I
observed the gradual accumulation of interest in the situation and the form that
interventions took.  This gave me far more confidence to talk about the dynamics of
social torture over time. In this regard I was fortunate to be able to make three follow-
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up visits in the course of which I was able to verify certain impressions or explore
issues further. This was particularly true of the question of suicide, a theme which had
not struck me particularly in 1999, but which jumped out at me when I looked at the
data in its entirety.
The methods adopted were also made possible by having an NGO base. The
integration of our research with the research needs of existing ACORD programme
activities provided a higher degree of security in that it allowed us to work with very
diverse groups of people with whom the organisation already had a long relationship
and to whom it had demonstrated commitment. In a sense it had created a
constituency. The active involvement of long-standing ACORD staff in these activities
added legitimacy, and gave access which would not have been possible if we had been
perceived as doing 'research for research's sake'. Undoubtedly this way of working also
influenced the methods adopted such that they diverged from a more purely academic
model of research. In particular the need to identify and implement research activities
in response to the agency’s emerging programme meant that research instruments,
rather than being pre-determined and piloted in advance, were developed on the spot.
On the other hand the experience highlighted some of the shortcomings of the agency
when it came to dealing with a complex research process. While they provided support
to the implementation of the research as outlined, they were less able to respond to the
processes which the research triggered. In particular, the momentum and political
support developed by the September 1999 conference was not capitalised on. More
generally there was no institutional capacity to deal with key issues which such
research can uncover; there was no specific budget for legal support, no staff to
provide psycho-social support, and no capacity to provide the kind of witness which
both respondents and our findings demanded.
Evidently there were also certain limitations to the methods adopted. One of these has
already been mentioned, namely the lack of women field-workers in the protected
villages. The already considerable diversity within the types of information given by
the male field workers would undoubtedly have increased had there been women
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represented as well.  Certainly were I to carry out another such project I would make
having a gender-balanced team a must. For while women’s voices were heard in many
of the reports, and in all the focus group discussions women and men were equally
represented, women’s subjectivity was not brought to bear on field-work in the
protected villages, and this would have added an important further dimension to the
findings.
A further limitation was that, while I developed an ear for quite a lot of Acholi, I did
not learn to speak it properly and this meant that some of my discussions were
mediated by the need for translation. Similarly, while all the field-workers wrote their
reports in English, this was considerably more difficult for some than for others, and
undoubtedly some detail and some nuance was lost in their English. I felt, however,
that because we were using several different methods of data collection, the short-
comings in language in one area would be made up for in another. When it came to
translating the transcript of the 1994 peace talks video, for example, the final version
was the result of several days discussion between the translator, myself and several
other colleagues, in which we compared the translated transcript with the video almost
sentence by sentence.  As such I was very aware of some of the ambiguities of language
used, and also of the particular force with which language was used in that meeting.
From a personal point of view the research process had a high psychological impact;
although at the time of collecting the data I felt well able to process it, I then found, for
more than a year after finishing the main period of field-work, that it was difficult if
not impossible for me to work on the data, and even now, some five years later, some
of the data still has the power to disturb me. I was somewhat reassured to find that I
was not alone in this, even though I had been given no warning it might happen. With
the benefit of hindsight I feel that the standard model of PhD research, in which a year
of field-work is followed immediately by a year of write-up, does not allow sufficient
time for the individual to process the kind of experiences and information which
conflict zones provide.
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Subjectivity and Objectivity
The question of subjectivity and objectivity is a vexed one. It could, for example, be
argued that, because the nature of the information collected changed over the course of
the field-work, it does not allow an objective analysis as the data collected at the end
was not directly comparable to that collected at the beginning. There are several
responses to this. Firstly, certain questions were repeated throughout the fieldwork in
the monthly questionnaire filled out by the field-workers. As such certain basic forms
of data were collected in a consistent fashion throughout the research. Secondly, what
would an objective account entail? It is clear when conducting field-work that nobody,
whether 'insider' or 'outsider', has the only description, the whole picture or the only
answer to a situation. The extent to which each of us saw the situation through very
different eyes was perhaps most evident in the fieldworkers’ photographs; the majority
of photographs of one fieldworker, for example, were of group activities and official
events, with most pictures featuring dozens of people against a wide backdrop. Those
of another fieldworker were nearly all of an almost exclusively intimate nature, placing
one or two individuals or objects right in the centre of the frame. This very diversity of
viewpoints was proof – if proof were needed – of the dangers of assuming any
homogeneity of perspective on many issues. The contradictions between different
positions (insider, outsider, local, national, regional, international, diaspora, refugee,
youth, women etc.) become a basis for dialogue within the team and with those beyond
it.  It is necessary on the one hand to be able to pin down some of what happens when,
while still keeping multiple interpretations of these events in consideration.
A further question is whether quantity of data on a narrow question is better than
quality of data on a diversity of issues. My own view is that, leaving co-researchers to
determine the level of risk they were prepared to take was methodologically powerful
in that it lead to findings on issues which could not have been pre-determined, such as
suicide.
As fundamentally, the changing nature of the qualitative data over time was to me an
indicator of the success rather than the failure of the methods, for I believed that
recognition of the subjective and its influence was essential to an objective
66
understanding. When as time went by the fieldworkers allowed their subjective voices
to become more visible, it was for me a case of objectivity through subjectivity.20
In particular it alerted me to the complex interplay between trust, time, memory and
disclosure; fundamentally research on sensitive issues requires relationships of trust
between respondent and researcher over time. The fact that issues could emerge which
would never have done so had a more rigid data collection strategy been adopted must
raise a considerable question-mark over the objectivity of any data collected without
taking the time to build relations of trust and without the engagement of the
researchers.
                                                     
20 I am indebted to Dr Thi Minh Ngo for this formulation
67
Chapter 3 - An overview of the situation
in northern Uganda
Right now the people of Acholi are in a dilemma. They are neither pro-government nor
pro-rebel, but they don’t know how to go forward. Once we have clarity about which side
will win, we can organise…  it is not possible for this war to end. It will cause a lot of
division among the tribes of Uganda. When it started people saw it as just Acholi. Now
they see Kony in Kasese, West Nile, Kampala… (Elder, Gulu district, 1998)
Introduction
It is never easy to know when a war truly began (Azar, 1986; 36). Was it when deaths
per year reached a certain level? Or the day the first shot was fired? Or before that,
when conditions of structural violence (Galtung 1969) were created which would
eventually lead to physical violence? Furthermore, what defines a particular period of
violence as a war in its own right rather than simply one more in a succession of phases
of violence? The so-called LRA war, after all, follows on from the violence of the Obote
and Amin periods, violence during the establishment of colonial rule, and the
depradations of the ivory and slave trade in the nineteenth century, to mention only
the most obvious. When the explorer Samuel Baker described the Acholi area as he
found it in January 1864, he drew a picture which was to be repeated over and over,
not least in the years since 1986:
For many miles circuit from Shooa, the blackened ruins of villages and deserted
fields bore witness to the devastation committed; cattle that were formerly in
thousands had been driven off, and the beautiful district that had once been most
fertile was reduced to a wilderness (16) (quoted in Gray, 1951: 125)
When Girling conducted fieldwork in the area in 1951, he described it as a ‘colonial
society’ and argued that ‘it is long since the political organisation of the Acholi… was
changed by the direct intervention of the British Administration’ (1960: 84).
When a war truly begins is thus not an academic question. It lies at the heart of
ambiguities about what it is that interventions such as conflict resolution, peace-
68
building, truth and reconciliation processes should actually be addressing. How far
back do they need to go? Is it sufficient to address the most recent period only,
particularly if that recent violence is a symptom of a failure to resolve grievances
arising from earlier violence and violations?21 Certainly many of the older people in
northern Uganda made connections between the LRA war and injustices of both the
colonial and post-colonial era, and when I visited the remains of Baker’s Patiko Fort in
1999, my guides could still show me the exact spot where the slavers kept their
captives more than one hundred years earlier.22
Notwithstanding these substantive reservations about the way in which choosing a
start-date risks pre-empting analysis of the current situation, 1986 offers a useful
starting point, as the takeover by the NRM marked a dramatic shift in power - and the
emergence of new non-state actors. Having recovered a degree of political strength
under Obote II (1980-86), the Acholi reverted to a position of relative weakness more
akin to their experience during the Amin years (1971-79). The national army, in which
30-40% of troops had been northerners, was routed and replaced by a rebel force
dominated by people many regarded as foreigners at worst and southerners at best.
Tutsis, who formerly had been their herds-boys, were suddenly the allies of the new
regime, and the Karimojong, who traditionally had sheltered their children in times of
adversity, were now said to be rustling away Acholi cattle. People’s sense of social and
cultural cohesion and material security was severely threatened.23 The decimation of
cattle stocks in the early years of the war echoed the thefts by the slave- and ivory-
raiders of the late 19th century, which had also resulted in ‘The destruction of the once-
large herds of Acholi cattle’ (Girling 1960: 14). Willet Weeks gives a figure of 123, 375
for 1983 dropping to 3000 in 2001 (2002: 4). Gersony claims a drop from 285,000 for
                                                     
21 For an exploration of these tensions with regard to conflict in East Timor, see Dolan, 2004.
22 Samuel Baker built Patiko Fort in 1872 on the former site of an outpost for slavers.
23 This is not to mythologise the past, for it is clear that subsistence in northern Uganda was always more
difficult than in what is now southern Uganda. R.M. Bere, one of the first British administrators of the
Acholi District, argued that ‘A struggle for existence has governed much of the tribal history’ (Bere, 1947:
5).
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1985 to 5,000 in 1997 (1997: 27).24 People’s principal asset base was stripped away and,
particularly post-1996, life in the protected villages further undermined peoples’
subsistence strategies. The period 1986-2004 thus marked a dramatic reversal in
fortunes for the majority of people in Gulu and Kitgum, a reversal within the lived
experience of a significant proportion of the population.
This chapter begins with a brief note on the place of northern Uganda in national
politics during the colonial and post-independence period, and then focuses on the
period 1986-2004. After setting out the situation in five distinct chronological phases, it
presents the history of the period as remembered by the women of a self-help group,
before closing by identifying some key issues and questions which lie at the heart of
subsequent chapters.
It is possible, as does Gersony (1997), to structure a post-1986 account in terms of the
different movements (UPDA, HSM, Severino Lukoya, Early Kony, Current Kony), but
this is problematic given that the movements did not constitute wholly distinct
chronological phases. It also narrows the conceptual framework to one in which
conflict between government and one insurgent grouping or another is the defining
feature of the situation. To avoid these shortcomings, I have adopted a structure based
on chronological phases of physical violence and relative calm.
Phase I: August 1986- May 88
Phase II: June 1988 - March 1994
Phase III: April 1994 - early December 1999
Phase IV: Late December 1999 – March 2002
Phase V: April 2002 – 2004
Each phase was characterised by a period of acute violence followed by lulls which
ended when a failed ‘solution’ unleashed a new wave of ever more intensive violence.
                                                     
24 By January 2002, the District Veterinary Officer reported that Gulu had 6,800 head of cattle, 2010 of
which came through the unpopular government programme of restocking, while others were bought from
neighbouring districts (KM e-newsletter no 5, 15 February 2002).
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Phase I ended after a Peace Accord was signed with one of the main insurgent groups
in northern Uganda, the UPDA. Phase II ended with the collapse of direct negotiations
between Government and LRA in early 1994. Phase III came to an abrupt close
following the signing of a peace accord between the Governments of Uganda and
Sudan at the end of 1999, and Phase IV ended following the failure of a massive
military operation code-named ‘Iron Fist’. True to form the violence which this failed
solution catalysed escalated the situation to previously unimagined levels of
humanitarian need. The overall trend, despite lulls, was one of escalation.
The build-up to war
Missionaries first arrived in the Buganda kingdom in the 1870s, and the area known as
Uganda became a British protectorate in 1894. Under British rule development was
driven by a divide-and-rule strategy whereby different ethnic groups and the regions
they hailed from were favoured for different areas of activity – southerners (notably
Baganda) for agriculture and the civil service, northerners (including the Acholi) for
the security establishment.25 As recalled by one Acholi elder (himself a former member
of the King’s African Rifles during World War II, and an elected chairman of a division
in 1952 under British rule);
The Acholi were promoted by the British Government to handle key administrative
positions because of their tolerance and honesty. For example, the leaders of the police
force and of the prison service were both Acholis. They would not steal anything and
showed a great interest in their work’
When asked if this was a divide-and-rule strategy on the part of the British, his answer
was that;
A father of many children will always develop a particular liking for one of them. The
Acholi were the favoured child of the British. For example, British bosses would test their
staff’s honesty by leaving money and things. lying around to see if it would still be there.
But to some extent divide and rule was manifested during the distribution of seeds to the
different tribes. The Acholi were given cotton seeds, compared to the Baganda who were
given coffee and tea which yielded a lot of money at that time. Even the bananas were
different, the Acholi received Jamaica bananas, the Baganda received [a type called]
Bayoya. This was a source of tension; when you went to Baganda you would find
                                                     
25 For discussion on the extent to which considering the Acholi as purely a colonial construct may itself be
a continuation of an ‘imperial dialogue’ which ignores pre and post-colonial identity formation processes,
see Finnström, 2003; ch 2.
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different seeds... The Acholi were told through agricultural policy that certain types of
seed were unsuitable. 26
As such no one group or sub-region enjoyed both military and economic power
simultaneously, and discourses were established which live on to this day. The
promotion of Acholi to major positions in the security establishment for example, was,
after independence, reframed as proving that they were militaristic, a notion which
many Acholi themselves bought into.
Colonisation by the Catholic and Anglican churches added further complexities, with
combinations of religious and ethnic divisions inexorably coming to underpin the
political parties formed in the run-up to independence. The Uganda National Congress
(UNC) formed in 1952 was predominantly Protestant, while the Democratic Party (DP)
formed in 1956 was predominantly Catholic. The Uganda People's Congress (UPC)
formed in 1960 opposed both the Catholic political movement and claims for an
independent Buganda state, while the Kabaka Yekka (KY) party created in 1961
represented the predominantly Protestant Buganda kingdom’s drive for autonomy.
As such, by the time of independence in 1962, the organising principles of ethnicity,
sub-region, religion and politics could only be extricated from one another with
considerable difficulty,27 but rather than creating a unified whole they had generated
what - in a reference to Winston Churchill’s description of Uganda as the ‘Pearl of
Africa’- has been described as a ‘fragmented pearl’ (O’Brien, 1997). Indeed, the
independence constitution reflected a hierarchy of different ethnic groups, granting
federal status to the kingdom of Buganda, semi-federal status to the kingdoms of
Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, and district status to Acholi, Bugisu, Bukedi, Karamoja,
Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei, Teso and West Nile (Mutibwa, 1992: 24). Following the
coup by Obote, a northerner from Lango, in 1966, this independence constitution was
                                                     
26 Gulu, 4 August 1998. He also reported that in World War II there were some 1600 members of the King’s
African Rifles from Gulu and Kitgum (at that time all Gulu district), of whom about 800 were still alive
and members of the King’s African Rifles Association.
27 One explanation offered to me for why the Catholic Church in Gulu was slow to set up its Justice &
Peace Commission (on 1 June 1998) was that ‘the Gulu church is more DP sympathetic, while Kampala
Peace & Justice is more NRM aligned’ (discussion with Pax Christi representative, 5 June 1998).
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suspended. The reformed constitution of 1967, which officially de-ethnicised the polity,
angered those who had been at the top of it (in particular the Baganda), aggravating
ethnic tensions and strengthening their importance as an axis of anti-government
mobilisation. The whole question of the status of ethnic kingdoms and leadership
remained live, resulting in concessions from the NRM Government such as the
reinstatement of the Kabaka of Buganda in 1990, followed by the Omukama of the
Banyoro, and the anointment of the Rwot Moo of the Acholi in 2000. However, these
ethnic structures were weaker than in the past - not least because they could no longer
collect taxes, this function having been taken over by county chiefs.
Ethnic/religious/sub-regional tensions increased incrementally over the following
decades, and not just along north-south lines.28 Examples included Idi Amin’s use of
soldiers from West Nile to persecute Acholi and Langi in the 1970s, the Karamajong’s
extension of cattle-raiding westwards to the Acholi sub-region in the early 1980s, and
the involvement of Acholi soldiers in atrocities in the central Luwero triangle in the
early 1980s.
Phase I (1986-1988)
For people in northern Uganda, the period immediately after the capture of Kampala
by Museveni’s National Resistance Army in January 1986 was a strange time of
holding one’s breath while preparing for the worst. Someone who was fifteen at the
time recalled how:
... When the news broke that the government… was overthrown by Yoweri Kaguta
Museveni… there were repeated calls in the form of public addresses and rallies for [the]
public to join the army of Tito Okello Lutwa to defend our land and properties from the
invading Banyarwanda led by MUSEVENI and others. The population were convinced
beyond doubt by the army that no one would escape death if the NRA rebels captured
Gulu district.
…Day by day the numbers of UNLA soldiers who were coming from Kampala increased.
Their arrival in town also meant increases in the numbers of vehicles as most of them
were able to come back with vehicles and other looted items. One of my uncles came back
                                                     
28 For discussion of the ways in which anthropology was used to legitimise regional differences, see
Finnström, 2003; ch3.
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with a lorry full of assorted looted items from Kampala…. There was no news of the NRA
advance. In reality they were closing in from various fronts, but had not yet reached
Karuma [where there is a key crossing over the river Nile].
He went on to describe how the UNLA soldiers forcibly rounded up civilians, took
them to the barracks and armed them with guns, pangas, spears, bows and arrows ‘for
confrontation with the NRA around Karuma bridge’.
By March 1986 the NRA had reached and taken Gulu town. After a brief and deceptive
lull came extreme turmoil marked by the formation of a number of different insurgent
groups. The Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), known as ‘Cilil’, was made
up of UNLA members who had fled northwards following the overthrow of Obote in
July 1985 and Tito Okello in January 1986. Having passed through Gulu on their way
north, they initially based themselves in southern Sudan, and made links with the
Equatoria Defence Force (Allen, 2005b: 4) but, following problems with the Sudanese
Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA), came back to Gulu district and began attacks on the
NRA.
In 1987 they managed to surround Gulu town, and people were not able to go more than
1/2 kilometre from the centre of the town… Life was so difficult in terms of food, feeding,
recreation, education-wise and in all other aspects …. The government soldiers were so
weak that the rebels could come to town and do what they wished to do without any
resistance ... The rebels could go up to the barracks and exchange bullets with the
government soldiers.
As well as the UPDA, a less conventional force, the prophetic Holy Spirit Movement
(HSM), was built up under the leadership of a woman known as Alice Lakwena, who
claimed to be possessed by a Christian spirit known as Lakwena (‘Messenger’). Its
associated military wing, the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces, began operating in August
1986, only months after the NRA had established control over northern Uganda, and
has been described in some depth by Heike Behrend (1999).
The NRA, after consolidating their position and reinforcing their numbers, responded
to these various insurgencies with considerable force and brutality. As they moved
outwards from Gulu town, their behaviour confirmed people’s worst fears, as they
‘started killing people, burning houses, looting food items and doing all other bad things to the
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local population’ (see Tables 1-5 below for examples). By December 86 the NRA were
seeking to capture ‘Cilil’ and ‘Lakwena’ and their collaborators. One respondent, after
hearing gun-shots, fled his home, but;
all our family members who did not hear the gun shot were captured and died very
terribly. The army moved into the whole area and captured every civilian within the
surrounding area and assembled them within the Divisional Headquarters. At about
10.00am out of 33 people who were assembled 28 were killed and left at the Division
along the road side. … From that day the Government army killed many people in
various places within the Division. I slept in the bush for one and a half weeks and later
on decided to move away to Kampala where I remained for three years up to 1989
November when I came back to Gulu.
Another respondent described how the army pursued them as they fled:
Now when we saw the smoke of our burning houses, we decided to run and hide in a
nearby stream called Lacwii. But as we were crossing …, it seemed the NRA realised
[where] we were hiding … because they started firing and bombing the Lacwii. This was
a day I knew God protects and preserves. Bullets were pouring in our direction like
drizzling rain, and their sounds were like popping simsim [sesame]…
Although NRA feature heavily in accounts of violence from that period, UPDA and
HSM were also guilty of much looting, killing and burning (see Tables 1-5). There was
also considerable destruction of infrastructure such as dispensaries and schools, and
the beginnings of large-scale internal displacement.
Having reached Jinja in a circuitous march on Kampala, Lakwena's HSM was militarily
defeated in October 1987. Lakwena fled to Kenya where she retained refugee status at
the time of writing (2005). When a peace accord with the UPDA followed in May 1988,
it seemed the worst might be over. However, it was an incomplete peace. Some
remnants of both HSM and UPDA fed into the developing strength of the Lord's Army
under Alice’s father Severino Lukwoya, and the Lord's Resistance Army under Joseph
Kony. Somewhat confusingly Kony's group began as the Holy Spirit Movement,
changed its name briefly to United Democratic Christian Army, before settling on the
name Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) which remains in force today. To add to the
confusion, Kony also claimed to be possessed by the spirit of Lakwena.
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Phase II (1988-1994)
By late 1988 it was clear that the war was far from over. In what Amnesty International
describe as
…one of the most intense phases of the war, between October and December
1988… the NRA forcibly cleared approximately 100,000 people from their homes
in and around Gulu town. Soldiers committed hundreds of extra-judicial
executions as they forced people out of their homes, burning down homesteads
and granaries. (Amnesty International, 1999: 11)
Behrend describes how
…in November 1989, Gulu, the capital of Acholi District, was a city ‘occupied’ by
the NRA. Trucks carrying soldiers and weapons careered down the main street.
Many respondents recalled 1989 as the year in which
The army’s second division used to do this male rape, known as Tek Gungu [bend over],
on any men who were arrested in the rural villages, over a period of six or seven months.
Many of them subsequently committed suicide. To be victim of Tek Gungu was regarded
as worse than being killed. There was a period when these events even entered into the
songs people sang. Eventually local leaders protested and the whole unit was
transferred.29
The toll on the economic and social fabric was beginning to be felt. Dowries were given
in cash as cattle had been rustled, sexually transmitted diseases were perceived to be
rising, the foam factory in Gulu relocated to Jinja, and there were repeated army
‘operations’ to identify rebel collaborators. Abuse of civilians remained the order of the
day. One respondent who lost 29 head of cattle in 1990 to soldiers, recalled them telling
him that ‘it was government policy to remove all the Acholi animals to be eaten by the army’.
1991 saw the beginning of LRA mutilations and maimings reminiscent of those of
RENAMO in Mozambique, including the cutting of lips and noses and the use of
padlocks on the mouths of people they thought might report them to the authorities. In
April a major four-month Government anti-insurgency operation known as Operation
North was launched under which travel was severely restricted and people were
                                                     
29 Gulu, 7 June 1998. When a local NGO, Peoples Voice for Peace, attempted to document the matter, they
found it almost impossible to interview the victims themselves, and were obliged to interview women
who were familiar with the cases instead (personal communication).
76
rounded up for screening. During this period a resolution that the population should
be organised into ‘bow-and-arrow defense units’ to fight the rebels was passed by 890
elders meeting in Viva Rest-house in Gulu, where they were fed courtesy of the 4th
Division Commander.30
1992 saw the launch of the first Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program (NURP I),
ostensibly ‘an emergency operation aimed at restoring basic economic and social
infrastructure as well as reviving economic activities in the northern region.’ This
targeted fourteen districts in total. While budgeted at US$600 million in 1991, only
$93.6 million would ultimately be disbursed.31
The tit-for-tat relationship between Uganda and Sudan, which was to become more
prominent in later years, was already visible at this point, with the bombing of Moyo
by the Sudanese in 1990, and sightings in Gulu of the SPLA leader, John Garang, in
1991. International interest was demonstrated when Pope John Paul II visited Gulu in
1993 to pray for peace from a specially constructed podium which still stands in the
centre of Kaunda Ground today.32
In 1992 and 1993 violence reduced, prompting several secondary schools displaced
from 1988 onwards to return to their original sites.33 A series of face-to-face meetings
between representatives of both Government and LRA in later 1993 and early 1994, led
by then Minister for Pacification of the North, Mrs Betty Bigombe, raised hopes in late
1993 that peace was just around the corner (see Chapter 4). 34 Instead, the collapse of
talks in early 1994, following an ultimatum from Museveni to the LRA in early
February to come out of the bush within seven days or be killed, led to a dramatic
resurgence of violence.
                                                     
30 According to O’Kadameri these were actually started in 1992 by Betty Bigombe (2002: 36).
31 COWI, 1999, 1.1.2 p20 – 28.
32 A wide open space near the middle of Gulu town, used for various public purposes.
33 Awere and Awac in 1993, Atiak in 1994 – all were displaced again (see Chapter 5).
34 The first major meeting was held on 25 November 1993 in Pagik parish, Aswa county, and a second
followed on 10th January 1994. A third meeting was held at Atoo Hills on 22nd January, and a fourth on 2
February 1994.
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Phase III (1994-1999)
This third phase of the conflict took place against a changing national backdrop.
Following the adoption of the 1995 Constitution, which limited the office of President
to two five-year terms, Museveni was elected for a first term under the new
constitution in May 1996 – effectively ignoring his previous ten years in power – and
he declared his intention to defeat the LRA militarily.
The Local Government Act of 1997 devolved many functions and powers previously
exercised by the Central Government, further deepening capacity problems in northern
Uganda. Two years later a report for the second Northern Uganda Reconstruction
Programme noted that ‘under current decentralisation, districts have a tendency to
compromise quality because of biases to recruit local ethnic personnel’.35
A further development after the 1996 elections was the formation of the Acholi
Parliamentary Group comprising all eleven elected Acholi MPs, a grouping which
would play some role in raising national awareness of the war, particularly in pushing
a motion through Parliament calling for a national investigation into the situation.
Phase III was marked by ongoing LRA insurgency from rear bases in the Sudan,
allegations of increased Sudanese support to the LRA, and a number of major LRA
atrocities. These included the Attiak massacre of 22 April 1995, the ambush of the
Karuma/Pakwach convoy of 8 March 1996, the Acholpi refugee camp massacre of July
1996, St Mary’s College abductions in October 1996 (the ‘Aboke Girls’), and the
Lokung/Palabek massacre of some 412 people in January 1997.36
People began ‘commuting’ into safer areas by night and returning to their homes
during the day-time. Places such as Gulu town and Lacor hospital were overflowing
with people sleeping in any available spot. One elder recalled;
Before the protected villages in 1997 everybody was forced to come and stay in town.
Some people sneaked back to the village because they had no money for food or rent. The
                                                     
35 COWI, Volume I, July 1999, 1.1.2 p21.
36 Gersony 1997: 38-44.
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churches were full, so was Kaunda Ground, Pece Stadium was full of tents, also Gulu
medical [hospital]. Food was supplied by Red Cross, World Vision, Church of Uganda
and Catholic Church. They [the displaced] were know as 'Oring Ayela', 'Those who have
run from the problem.37
By late 1996 the Government began a strategy of 'protected villages'. Located in pre-
existing hubs of local economic and administrative activity otherwise known as
‘trading centres’, to which now was added a military presence (a ‘detach’) for the
ostensible purposes of protection from the LRA, these brought people from widely
scattered small villages together into much larger aggregates ranging from a few
thousands up to tens of thousands. Although some people chose to move into such
camps voluntarily, others were forced by the UPDF.
Together with LRA atrocities, the formation of the protected villages was the defining
feature of phase III of the conflict, and in many respects remained so from that point
forwards. From late 1996 there was a flurry of screening exercises known as panda gari
(Swahili for ‘climb into the truck’). Whereas the one in 1991 included women and
children, most of the later ones focused on rounding up hundreds of men who were
then obliged to identify themselves to the army – failure to do so could result in arrest
on suspicion of being a rebel or a rebel collaborator. Examples included 11 August
1996, 29 August 1996, 4 September 1997, 4 July 1998, 16 January 2000 (see also
Finnström, 2003: 240).
External factors were increasingly acknowledged. In 1997, for example, The Monitor
reported that ‘President Yoweri Museveni, after years of denials, has finally
acknowledged United States assistance in its protracted northern war with Sudan-
backed rebels’.38 In June 1998, when the Uganda Young Democrats (with partial
sponsorship from the British Labour party) organised a seminar on the theme “Human
Rights and Democracy”, their vice-president argued that
“This war is not ours. It is a war of imperialistic interests; a war of mineral wealth
and oil in southern Sudan; it is a war of influence. That woman (Albright), who
                                                     
37 Interview with elder, Gulu 8 August 1998.
38 The Monitor, 11 December 1997, Museveni admits US help against Sudan.
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promised us nothing but guns to kill our own people and to protect American
interests in this region, is bad”.39
And in the conference on ‘Peace Research and the Reconciliation Agenda’ held in Gulu
in September 1999 the fact that the SPLA were hosted in northern Uganda was publicly
acknowledged, and both the Local Council Chairman and the Resident District
Commissioner argued that ‘the major stumbling block is the problematic relationship with
the Sudan’. An Acholi elder concurred:
The war is not between Kony and the government - it is between the governments of
Sudan and Uganda. The peace talks and conferences will not stop the war unless the
Sudan and Uganda governments understand each other and Sudan stop support LRA
and Uganda stop support SPLA.40
Chairing a debate on the Sudan the MP for Gulu Municipality asked:
Before I call on the first panelist, there are some questions they should address their
minds to. ‘What is Sudan’s government stands towards neighbours and their intentions
for the Region? What are the regime’s chances of survival? I mean the Sudan regime, not
any other regime.41 What are the strength and the weakness of SPLA and the Northern
opposition alliance? How are they affected by changes in tactics of those who back them in
the region, and globally? What is the form and extent of greater power involvement?
When we talk of the greater power, we mean those who have ever launched nuclear
bombs.42 And is the solution to the Sudan conflict a prerequisite for peace in Acholi Land
and Northern Uganda?
When the Minister of State for Northern Uganda addressed the Prime Minister at the
end of the same conference, he noted participants’ concerns that the Sudan could
continue as ‘the host and master of LRA and as the source of arms trafficking’ unless
diplomatic relations were regularised and ‘we address issues about the role of SPLA and
other rebel groups in the peace process in Northern Uganda’.43
UNICEF gave a taste of interventions to come, when in June 1998 it called for LRA
abductors to be tried at the International Criminal Court,44 and a UPDF helicopter crash
                                                     
39 New Vision, 8 June 1998, Kony: DP attacks Albright.
40 Gulu, 27 September 1999.
41 A tongue-in-cheek reference to the Museveni Government.
42 An allusion to the USA.
43 The issue of the SPLA included their mobilisation within Uganda, with support from the Ugandan
government (Professor Barbara Harrell-Bond, 30 September 1999).
44 New Vision, 26 June 1998 UNICEF condemns Kony.
80
in July 1998 offered a further glimpse of international involvement, as the Russian
made Mi. 17, commonly known as Sura Mbaya (Swahili for ‘Ugly Face’), had been
piloted by an Ethiopian.45 This prompted a statement from the LRM (Lord’s Resistance
Movement) that
We are deeply sorry for the deaths of foreign nationals being killed in an internal
war between Ugandans. We appeal to the Ethiopians to stop their nationals
fighting us.46
Three important civil society groupings emerged in this period, all calling for a
negotiated solution; the diaspora grouping Kacokke Madit, the Acholi Religious
Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), and the revived Acholi ‘traditional leaders’.
With financial support from the British Government, the diaspora grouping, which
describes itself as ‘a non-profit making forum dedicated to identifying and
implementing practical initiatives to end the armed conflict in Northern Uganda by
peaceful means’, organised several big meetings (Kacokke Madit), the first two of
which were held in London in 1997 and 1998 respectively. These were also attended by
the Ugandan Government, Acholi Members of Parliament, religious leaders and
district leaders. The third was convened in Nairobi in late 2000, but was terminated
due to fears that delegates might be harbouring the Ebola virus wreaking havoc in
Gulu at the time.
While the 1997 meeting was attended by LRA external coordinator, Dr James Obita,
rumours put out by the New Vision that Kony would ‘lead a delegation of his
supporters’ to the 1998 one 47 proved unfounded. One fieldworker reported;
Last month [June 1998] they [the LRA] were telling people that they are not going to
attend ‘Kacoke Madit’ in London since it is a waste of money. They want the ‘Kacoke
Madit’ to take place either in northern Uganda or Kampala.48
                                                     
45 New Vision, 11 July 1998, Ethiopian pilot killed in crash.
46 The Monitor, 14 July 1998, LRA claims it shot down chopper.
47 New Vision, 2 April 1998, Kony for London Acholi meeting.
48 Odek Pilot Report, 21 July 1998.
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The New Vision reported that in one preparatory meeting for Kacoke Madit 1998
Acholi exiles had ‘criticised President Yoweri Museveni for “not doing enough to
protect and feed the people of Acholi particularly those in protected villages.”49 A few
weeks later they reported the LRA’s refusal to participate, apparently because they saw
it as ‘the brain child of President Museveni’.50
The formation of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in May 1998
brought Catholics, Anglicans and Muslims from Gulu and Kitgum districts together
under one umbrella. The inaugural meeting named Bedo Piny pi Kuc (‘Let us sit down
for peace’), was attended by, amongst others, the Resident Representatives of the
World Bank and UNDP, the Minister of State for Northern Uganda, and the UPDF’s 4th
Division Commander, and signalled ARLPI’s commitment to a negotiated solution.
ARLPI’s membership was subsequently expanded to include religious leaders from
throughout northern Uganda, and over the following years they became increasingly
critical players in the anti-war camp, processes given extra impetus by the installation
of a new Anglican bishop of Gulu, Bishop Onono Onweng in May 1998, and a new
Catholic Archbishop, John Baptist Odama, in early 1999. ARLPI was to become
involved in trying to make links with the LRA, raising international awareness of the
situation, and confronting Government misdemeanours.
                                                     
49 New Vision, 11 June 1998, Acholi exiles criticise Museveni.
50 New Vision, 18 July 1998, Kony gives conditions for peace negotiations
Illustration 3.1 The installation
of the Catholic Archbishop John
Baptist Odama, Gulu, 10 April
1999.
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The third civil society voice to emerge in this period was the revived ‘traditional
leadership’. Although widely welcomed at a local level, their restoration, far from
being a purely local initiative, was in fact largely externally driven and enabled. The
then Minister of State for Northern Uganda, himself an Acholi, promoted it inside
Uganda with ideological support from a report written for a British NGO by a British
Government Social Development Adviser. Funding came from the Belgian
Government, and implementation capacity from the international NGO ACORD.
The rationale was that if traditional leaders were reinstated they could do two things.
Firstly, by virtue of their position they would be able to command the respect of the
‘boys in the bush’, who, it was asserted, would heed a call from the elders to lay down
their weapons. Secondly, and also by virtue of their traditional roles, they would be
able to effect cleansing ceremonies between returned rebels and their home
communities, processes without which reconciliation and therefore successful
reintegration could not take place. Although there was no noticeable impact on levels
of return from the LRA, the restoration did add another institutional voice in favour of
negotiation to counter the Government’s militaristic position.
There was thus increasing polarisation between the Government with its preference for
military solutions and civil society actors favouring a negotiated one. In 1998 the Dutch
Charge D’Affaires reportedly said that the war in the north was affecting Uganda’s
image abroad and undermining its attractiveness to foreign investment. He also
argued that “the army is draining Uganda’s sons in their prime who could otherwise
use their talents to build up the country”.51 Museveni remained adamant until mid-
1999 that the situation demanded a 'military solution', ruling that negotiations with
'bandits' were out of the question, a view echoed by his brother, Salim Saleh, who said
that ‘the conflict will be solved by military means, not dialogue’.52 When in 1997 the
Report of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs on the War in Northern Uganda was
published, it recommended pursuing the military option, obliging two Acholi
                                                     
51 New Vision, 17 July 1998, War damages Uganda’s image.
52 The Monitor, 3 February 1998, Saleh admits UPDF’s mistakes.
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members of the committee53 to append a minority report urging a negotiated solution,
as they felt this more accurately reflected the wishes of those consulted.54 As such
dichotomised positions regarding a solution became an extension of the conflict itself.
Foreign governments offered some financial assistance, but generally made little
(visible) strategic contribution to the debate at this stage. By 1997 the local organisation
working with returned abducted children from the LRA, Gulu Support the Children
Organisation (GUSCO), had established a reception centre with DANIDA funding.55
Following a visit by the all-party International Development Committee of the British
House of Commons, the British Government donated items valued at 44 million
Shillings to GUSCO (approx. £14,000), and these ‘included 80 mattresses, 40 double-
bed deckers, 15 sewing machines, a generator and computers’.56 Only a few weeks later
… Mrs Clinton also said her country through USAID will provide US$500,000
directly to local groups including Concerned Parents Association and Gulu Save
the Children Organisation to help them find abducted children and give them the
medical care they need to heal. She also said they will provide another US$2
million over the next three years for a new Northern Uganda Initiative that will
help people plagued by rebel activities get jobs, rebuild schools, health clinics
and their own communities.57
However, there was also a gradual increase in interest from international
organisations, with, for example, the establishment of a UN Disaster Management
Team (UNDMT) charged with developing a Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for
Displaced People in northern Uganda.58 In 1997, as well as Gersony’s report on the
war, UNICEF set up ACRIS – the Abducted Child Registration & Information System -
to record both ongoing patterns of abduction and return, and to build a retrospective
                                                     
53 Hon. Norbert Mao and Hon. Daniel Omara Atubo.
54 Parliamentary Buildings, Kampala, Uganda, January 1997.
55 The centre opened on 23 March 1997 with only 10 children. Designed to handle 75 children at a time, by
January 1998, when I first visited, it had 263, of whom 32 were girls. The most recent arrivals said that
once a girl has conceived she is taken to Sudan, from where it is more difficult to escape, hence the lower
number of girl returnees. Since March they had reunited 306 boys and 60 girls with their families. Some
children were directed to GUSCO by the RDC, most came from the military. GUSCO informed the army if
they had any weapons on them. UNICEF had provided a lot of mattresses and nominated the centre for an
award, WFP had given high protein biscuits, and the British High Commission had given 33 million
Uganda shillings.
56 New Vision, 3 March 1998, Kony victims to get sh 44m.
57 The Monitor, 26 March 1998, Mrs Clinton blasts Kony.
58 WFP, 1999: 20.
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picture. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International both produced reports
detailing LRA atrocities (HRW, 1997, Mawson, 1997), followed by a further one from
Amnesty International on Government abuses in 1999 (Mawson, 1999). In 1998 the
UK’s Channel 4 screened a film (‘The Mission’) about the 1994 peace talks and the
abduction of the Aboke girls in 1996. The Belgian organisation Pax Christi, made a
political decision when it decided to fund the travel expenses of the district chairmen
of Gulu and Kitgum districts to go to Nairobi in 1998 ‘to meet a delegation of Lord’s
Resistance Movement/Army (LRM/A) in a bid to initiate peace talks’.59
From early 1999 there was a noticeable lull in LRA activity. This, together with some
changes in the political climate, notably President Museveni's agreement to allow
people to talk with the LRA (though he himself refused to do so), created hopes that
peace was just around the corner. Several national and international NGOs moved into
Gulu district, eager to revive 'traditional leadership and reconciliation' mechanisms,
and to address the trauma of returned abducted children. The Belgian Government, in
addition to the small yet politically significant amounts it invested in 'traditional
leadership', put significant finance into upgrading the telephone system as part of
NURP I, and, from 1999, USAID channelled large volumes of aid through an array of
local and international NGOs, notably Red Barnet (Danish Save the Children).
The lull in LRA activity coincided with considerable UPDF activity in the neighbouring
Democratic Republic of Congo. UPDF forces had been involved in various ways in the
fighting in the DRC from 1997 (UN, 2001), and 1999 saw overt fighting there between
UPDF and Rwandan Government forces. Despite the Lusaka peace accord of July 1999,
fighting continued, involving some UPDF forces recruited from northern Uganda.60
District level consultations on NURP II ended with a national consensus workshop in
Kampala in October 1999. The District Profile for Gulu and Kitgum drawn up as part of
this process argued that
                                                     
59 New Vision, 4 July 1998, Acholi leaders to meet Kony men.
60 Correspondence on the diaspora listserve Acholinet estimated the figure at a questionable 25,000.
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The government must acknowledge the scale of trauma related problems as
underlying causes for conflict and underdevelopment. It is critical for all
concerned parties involved in the war in the Northern region to develop the will
to take the difficult political steps required to prevent further human rights
abuses. The continued plight of the lives of thousands of children and
individuals who are helplessly affected by the effects of the war, calls for a
strategy to resolve the war through peaceful means.
It also argued that if peace were to be attained, the underlying causes of the conflict
had to be addressed. It therefore stressed a need for ‘trauma support systems’ and a
need to identify ‘the interest groups causing insecurity’, and thus added weight to calls
for a non-military solution (COWI, 1999; 21).
Perhaps as a political concession to these pressures, the Government signed a Carter
Centre-brokered ‘peace agreement’ with the Sudanese Government in Nairobi on 8
December 1999. The LRA had not been involved in direct negotiation, and within just
two weeks of the peace agreement, the LRA re-entered Uganda from Sudan. Civilians
who over the previous six months had begun tentatively moving home from the
'protected villages' found themselves being herded back into 'protected villages' by the
army. Vehicles were ambushed and burnt on all roads out of Gulu except the Kampala
highway, and rebels mounted attacks on Government targets in the heart of Gulu
town. Phase IV had clearly begun.
Phase IV – Amnesty for ‘Terrorists’ (2000 – 2002)
In early January, people were again forced back into the protected villages in scenes
reminiscent of the late 1980s and mid 1990s (see chapter 5). On 17 January, having been
pushed for primarily by those interested in seeing a non-violent solution to the LRA
conflict, the long-awaited Amnesty Act was put in place. Many question-marks had
hung over its development: Could it work without direct negotiations – peace talks –
with the rebels? Would it be right to give unconditional amnesty, without ensuring
that the culprits admitted and atoned for their crimes and some guarantee that they
would not re-offend? What would be the implications for civil liability vis-à-vis Acholi
who refused to recognise traditional inter-clan reconciliation mechanisms such as mato
oput and compensation payments for damage done or lives taken (culo kwor)? How
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would it accommodate non-Acholi who might insist on enforcing their rights through
civil courts? The timing and actual implementation of the Amnesty law were also
concerns: should it begin before preparations to receive, demobilise and resettle
returnees were completed?
As finally formulated, the Act offered amnesty for ‘any Ugandan who has at any time
since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion
against the government of the Republic of Uganda’. Persons who voluntarily
renounced such acts were to be pardoned and excused from criminal prosecution. To
avoid the Commission having to deal with the large numbers abducted and returned
within a matter of days or weeks it was only available for former LRA members who
were above 12 years of age and who had stayed with the LRA for more than four
months. In all other respects it was a ‘blanket’ amnesty, open to all members of rebel
groups, including the leadership.  It was initially to run for six months, with the
possibility of extension by the Minister for Internal Affairs. Due both to lack of funding
(the Government provided the Commission with just under US $1 million annually for
administrative costs) and, some would argue, lack of political will, the amnesty process
took some time to be put in place, with the Commission officially appointed in July
2000, and the Gulu and Kitgum offices opened in February and July 2001 respectively.
In parallel with these processes in early 2000, a reasonable degree of security had been
re-established relatively quickly following the LRA’s angry outburst in late December.
By some accounts the LRA was under considerable pressure within Sudan in the wake
of the Nairobi peace accord, and was seeking to make links with the Equatoria Defence
Forces, a Sudanese rebel force operating in South Sudan. They finally met with the
Carter Centre in February 2000, and in July a ministerial meeting was hosted in Atlanta
at which the Atlanta Joint Action Plan for the Implementation of the Nairobi
Agreement was drawn up. A further meeting was convened in Khartoum in October
2000, and another in November, this time in Nairobi.
The UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that
‘improved security and access in northern Uganda encouraged many relief agencies to
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establish semi-permanent offices in Acholiland. The number of agencies involved with
relief assistance increased from five in mid-1996 to over 60 by end-2000’.61 A severe
outbreak of Ebola haemorrhagic fever in Gulu district in late 2000 (rumoured by some
to have been brought back from the DRC by a returning soldier) fuelled local and
international calls for the dismantling of the protected villages.
On 3 June 2001 the Carter Center hosted a further implementation meeting in Nairobi.
Gulu District’s LCV Chairman met with the LRA on 4 June 2001, and the Government
declared a demilitarized zone. In a further implementation meeting in Nairobi in
November 2001, a letter was written to Kony asking him to participate in the dialogue,
but to no avail. By late 2001, UNOCHA was reporting increased movement between
camps and home areas in both Gulu and Kitgum, and that
Although District authorities have not directed “decongestion” per se, there are
numerous reports of people responding to new deployments by UPDF and
creating settlements close to these. New smaller camps have been set up (from
large camps) throughout the sub-county, especially around larger camps like
Pabbo.  (OCHA  December  2001, reported in Global IDP database)62
At a political level, 2000 saw a contentious referendum on the continued viability of the
'movement' political system, and 2001 saw President Museveni’s re-election for a
second term, though with virtually no support in the northern districts. During this
period, the Amnesty Act which was primarily intended for the LRA, initially proved
more popular with non-LRA insurgent groups. When the Gulu diocese Justice & Peace
Commission investigated the fact that less than 400 LRA members had taken up
amnesty by April 2002, they concluded that;
Groups in Acholi civil society have always held that a blanket amnesty is a
crucial instrument in bringing a lasting peace to the troubled region. However,
two and a half years after being passed by the Parliament of Uganda, the effects
of the Amnesty Law in Acholi are not very much in evidence.63
Worse still, they found that over half of returnees were being pressurised to
incorporate into the UPDF.
                                                     
61 UNOCHA, 2001, p14.
62 www.idpproject.org: Profile of Internal Displacement: Uganda, 11 October 2002, p 78.
63 Justice & Peace News (Gulu Diocese), Vol 2 No 3, June 2002.
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Throughout this phase, religious leaders made attempts to meet with LRA members,
but these were generally disrupted by the UPDF. Meanwhile, pressure on the LRA
from both inside and outside Uganda appeared to be increasing. The EU drew up a
resolution in July 2000 calling ‘on individual EU Member States to ban LRA operations
and travelling of LRA representatives within the EU and between EU Member States
and non-EU Nations’ (2002, L12). In April 2001, the US Department of State included
the LRA on its ‘B-list’ of ‘other terrorist organisations’, and there was talk of using the
Terrorism Act of January 2002 against LRA members in the UK.64 UNOCHA reported
that:
With the development of the Uganda-Sudan relationship (by beginning of 2002),
Kony has become increasingly isolated from external support and funding;
especially as the UK has frozen bank accounts of known LRA and ADF
collaborators as part of the crackdown on terrorism’ (UNOCHA, 28 February
2002: 31-32).
In March 2002 Uganda passed its own Anti-Terrorism Act. This largely removed the
space for senior people to return from the bush and engage in reconciliation processes.
Conventional rules of legal construction stipulate that where two legal instruments are
in conflict, the later instrument, in this case the Anti-Terrorism Act, takes precedence.
Thus while the Amnesty Act granted amnesty for engagement in “war or armed
rebellion”, the Anti-Terrorism Act rendered punishable acts carried out for purposes of
“influencing the government or influencing the public ...and for a political or
religious… …or economic aim...”.65 It made no reference to the Amnesty Act, and
designated the LRA/M as a terrorist organisation, membership of which was a
punishable criminal offence. In principle therefore it effectively negated the Amnesty
Act,66 prompting one Amnesty Commission official to argue that “the reason why top
rebel commanders refuse to respond to the amnesty is because of the Anti-Terrorism Act”. It
                                                     
64 New Vision, 20 January 2002, Uganda Rebels Face UK Courts.
65 Under Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, these include placing explosive or other lethal device in
public places with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, direct involvement or complicity in the
murder, kidnapping or maiming or attack on a person or group of persons, and seizure or detention of
hostages in order to compel a State, an international or inter-governmental organ, a person or group of
persons, to do or abstain from doing any act. Persons found guilty of these acts “shall be sentenced to
death if the offence directly results in death of any person or… in any other case, be liable to suffer death.”
66 Ibid, Section 10, as well as the Second Schedule thereto.
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also put a serious damper on civilian attempts to make contacts with the LRA, as any
dialogue with them could be interpreted as treason.
The discourse of a global ‘war on terrorism’ generated by the US and its allies post-
September 11 2001, translated into very concrete anti-LRA actions on the ground which
previously would have been unthinkable. On 10 January 2002, Presidents Bashir and
Museveni, together with then UK Secretary of State for Development, Clare Short, held
bi-lateral talks while attending an Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD)67 summit in Khartoum. They agreed on UPDF incursions into southern Sudan,
with the stated aims of rescuing abducted children and capturing or killing Kony and
his key commanders. In other words, an operation to deal with the LRA once and for
all. UNOCHA reported widespread reservations about the operation’s feasibility, its
potential humanitarian impact and long-term political consequences, for it was seen as
jeopardising ‘long-term issues of reconciliation both within Acholi society and between
Acholi and the rest of Ugandan society’ (Weeks, 2002: 20-21).  Religious leaders stated
that ‘it seems as if the hawks are flying higher and higher. Although the doves are not
yet dead they are hardly heard’.68 Nevertheless, troops began massing in the border
areas known as Aswa Ranch from January 2002 onwards, where the US sponsored
‘routine training’ for 6,000 of them.69
Phase V – Operation Iron Fist and its aftermath (2002 - 2004)
Operation Iron Fist officially began on 8 March 2002, and a protocol was signed on 12
March with the Government of Sudan allowing the UPDF to attack Kony bases inside
Sudan – with a deadline of 2 April. Although 10,000 Ugandan soldiers were deployed
in south Sudan, and by the end of March claimed to have ‘captured’ all four main rebel
camps, this was at the cost of many UPDF soldiers’ lives and an escalation of civilian
suffering to new levels – seen from northern Uganda the only signs of military activity
were trucks carrying live soldiers northwards and corpses southwards. At the first
extension of the agreement in late May, the army spokesman reportedly said that ‘this
                                                     
67 IGAD comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda.
68 Justice & Peace News, May 2002, Vol. 2 No. 2.
69 Announced on 22 January by Army Commander Kazini (KM e-newsletter no 6).
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was "definitely the last phase" of the Ugandan army operation’… and that "Kony will
either be killed or die of hunger, or surrender, within the next 45 days"’.70 There was,
however, nothing to back up these claims, and by early June UNICEF pointed out that
‘Only two infants - of some 3,000 LRA abductees whose return had been included in
contingency plans prepared by humanitarian organisations – had been rescued by the
UPDF…’.71 Rather than capturing the LRA, Operation Iron Fist drove them into
northern Uganda. By May 2002 insecurity was again severe, the operation was
extended to 19 June and roads were built inside Sudan to facilitate the hunt for Kony,
who, in a striking parallel with Osama Bin Laden, was allegedly hiding in the Imatong
complex of hills. UN involvement increased, as UNOCHA reported on the IDP
situation, established new offices in the north, and began working on a Government of
Uganda policy on IDPs. The report was a first step in this process as it highlighted the
many points of the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement which were not
being addressed in northern Uganda (see chapter 5).
In June 2002, the Government signed a formal ceasefire with UNRF II, a splinter group
from the West Nile Bank Front formed in 1996. Some 2,500 fighters had taken up the
offer of amnesty some months earlier, allegedly because of the pressure created by
Operation Iron Fist.72At the same time, as the UPDF came under pressure, community
leaders in Gulu and Kitgum were ordered to recruit at least five men each from their
respective wards. 73 One extension of agreement followed another, and by late August
2002 an estimated 30,000 UPDF forces were deployed in northern Uganda. Gulu alone
was said to have contributed over six thousand home guards.74 In September 2002 an
agreement between President Museveni and President Kabila of the DRC committed
Uganda to withdrawing its remaining troops from the neighbouring DRC, in return for
action against Congo-based rebels hostile to the Ugandan government. By October,
long after the promised 45 days in May had passed, Museveni announced 25% cuts in
                                                     
70 IRIN, 25 May 2002, UGANDA-SUDAN: No rapid solutions in anti-LRA campaign.
71 IRIN, 6 June 2002, UGANDA: Little Acholi gain from anti-LRA campaign See also KM E-newsletter No
10.
72 IRIN, 19 June 2002, UGANDA: Government in peace deal with UNRF-II rebels.
73 IRIN, 6 June 2002, UGANDA: Little Acholi gain from anti-LRA campaign See also KM E-newsletter No
10.
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social services budgets in order to fund the building of roads for the military in
northern Uganda.75 In November 2002, President Museveni established a Presidential
Peace Team (PPT)76 comprising army officers, government ministers, and Acholi MPs,
and he called on the LRA to assemble in designated areas, a call which was ignored.
In December the pact with Sudan was extended again, to last up to the end of January
2003, and covering the same region as that covered by agreements on humanitarian
access between the Khartoum government and the United Nations.77
The PPT team was expanded in January 2003 to include representatives from all
districts of the Acholi sub-region. Led by Salim Saleh, it attempted unsuccessfully to
meet the LRA in March 2003. A second call from Museveni to the LRA to assemble in
designated “safe-zones” was also rejected, as they demanded that a cease-fire be
extended throughout the whole region. By April the GoU’s cease-fire offer had been
withdrawn, and the PPT’s efforts appeared to come to a standstill. In May the chair of
the PPT, Eriya Kategaya (formerly Minister for Internal Affairs), was dismissed from
Government. In the same month a ‘Dialogue for Peace’ workshop in Gulu resulted in
the formation of another peace team (Uduru Kuc), but this never made any serious
intervention. According to one team member, this was because the LRA failed to name
a corresponding team, but several individuals and organisations claimed to have made
offers to help link the PPT with the LRA, offers which were rejected.78
In 2003 the LRA took the war into eastern Uganda, reaching as far as Soroti and
Katakwi, as well as Lira district. As in the past, the LRA were not the only source of
violence, but they bore principal responsibility. Abductions increased dramatically,
with some estimates reaching as high as 5000 new abductions in the period June 2002 –
March 2003 alone.79 Nightly commuting, which had been one of the prompts to
creating ‘protected villages’ in 1996, re-emerged on a massive scale and featured
                                                                                                                                                           
74 The Monitor, 24 August 2002, Army deploys ’30,000’ troops against Kony.
75 IRIN, 21 October 2002, Budget cuts aimed at boosting war against rebels.
76 IRIN, 6 November 2002, President sets up team for talks with rebels.
77 IRIN, 3 December 2002, Anti-LRA pact extended.
78 Gulu, 19 January 2004.
79 HRW, 2003.
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prominently in drawing international attention to the gravity of the situation. Less
attention was given to an unprecedented escalation in militarisation. In response to the
LRA’s incursions, people in the Teso sub-region formed an ethnic militia known as
Amuka, a process speedily brought under government control. The government itself
then encouraged the formation of a similar militia in the Lango sub-region (Rhino
Boys) and ultimately in Kitgum district too (Frontier Guards), providing both arms and
some minimal training. By this process at least 25,000 men were brought under arms in
the space of little over six months, ostensibly to share the burden of protecting the
civilian population and allow the army to intensify its pursuit of the LRA (Dolan,
2004).
A further dimension was added in January 2004 when President Museveni made a
referral to the newly established International Criminal Court. His call for the Court to
prosecute the LRA for war crimes was welcomed by the prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, although most civil society organisations active in northern Uganda viewed it
with considerable scepticism, pointing out that it was at odds with the provisions of
the Amnesty Act of 2000.
By early 2004, the WFP were providing relief distributions to over 1.5 million internally
displaced people, a figure which reflected 80-90% displacement of the population in
the Acholi sub-region, and the addition of hundreds of thousands in Teso and Lango
sub-regions.
The war as people remember it
The broad outline given above focuses on what are generally regarded as key players,
events and processes. But within this there are numerous more personal histories
which easily slip out of our consideration, when they should in fact be central to it. A
sense of how the macro- and micro- pictures interact can be gained from the
summarised findings of a discussion held with thirteen members of a women’s self-
help group at ACORD’s offices in Gulu, 10 February 1999 (see Chapter 2 for discussion
of methods). The results were shocking in the extreme.
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Table 3.1: Incidents that happened to women and their immediate families (each
line represents a different person’s memory)
Year Incidents
1986 - 4 of my children were abducted by Lakwena. They returned after 4 months
- 2 of my  children died of a hand-grenade attack by the NRA
- 2 brothers were killed by NRA (1 with a molten jerry-can, the other
through beating)
1987 - My cattle (20 head) were taken, I was beaten and four girls were taken by
Lakwena
- Karamajong took 38 cattle belonging to my grandfather
- My husband was arrested by the NRA for 2 weeks, came back ill and died 3
years later
- 2 of my brothers were killed by Lakwena
- I was beaten, my son was abducted (returned after 1 year), and 5 goats
were taken by Lakwena
- My husband was killed, 28 cattle were taken, 4 huts and 6 granaries were
burnt by NRA
- My son, who was married with a daughter, was abducted and is still in
captivity (LRA)
- My brother drowned himself after NRA took 100 cattle
1988 - I was abducted and lived in captivity for 3 months. Some of my property
was taken, others destroyed, one child taken who returned after 6 months
- 3 of my brothers were killed by Lakwena & household property robbed
- 10 goats robbed by Lakwena, 50 cattle by cattle rustlers
- My husband was killed
- 8 sons of my brothers were killed by NRA, who also took 30 head of cattle
- UPDA burnt one hut, 2 sacks of millet, 8 sacks of sunflower, household
properties, 2 granaries
- 2 of my grandsons were abducted, one returned after 1.5 years, the other is
still in captivity
- My arm was shot by the NRA and had to be amputated
- My brother was abducted by the UPDA
1989 - 4 of my brothers were burnt alive in their huts by the NRA who accused
them of being collaborators
- NRA burnt property including 4 huts, 3 granaries, 40 iron sheets, because
the rebels had camped in the area
- I was hit by a mine and my leg was amputated
- My brother's son was killed by the LRA
1990 - 6 children killed by Lakwena (Bobi)
- 1 man was killed by the NRA
1991 - My sister's daughter was abducted by LRA, and died in Agweng, Lira
district
1992 - NRA took our maize mill
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- NRA took my brother's son's maize mill
- NRA took my uncles' maize mill
- My brother's house was used as an army office; to date there has been no
rent payment made
1993 - LRA abducted my brother-in-law's son from Sir Samuel Baker School, he
returned 1 year later
1996 - I was hit by an anti-personnel mine & lost my lower leg
1997 - I was hurt in the hip by a UPDF bomb
- My brother-in-law's son was shot dead in the market place by the UPDF
1998 - LRA took 2 of my sons,  they're still in captivity
- LRA killed my father while he attended some funeral rights
1999 - LRA abducted seven children (1 girl, 6 boys), the girl returned after 2
weeks
- LRA took  20 goats
- UPDF burned 5 huts
- LRA abducted 2 of my sister's child
The women’s dominant memories were around physical harm, killing and abduction
of relatives, and loss of properties. Telegraphic bullet points describe truly gruesome
events, reducing a book’s worth of personal tragedies to a page of code. People do not
forget – even after thirteen years the memory of loss was acute and detailed, down to
how many sacks of which type of grain were looted. And there was no closure – one
woman whose son was abducted back in 1987 still talked of her son as being ‘in
captivity’, as did the woman who lost two grandsons to rebel abduction in 1988. And
while the multiplicity of perpetrators was bewildering (NRA, Lakwena, UPDA, UPDF,
LRA), the practices were consistent. 1999 was in many respects as dangerous as 1989.
When memories of things which happened in the respondents’ home communities
over the same period were added in, the picture became even more distressing (Table
3.2).
Table 3.2: Incidents within the immediate community
Year Incidents
1987 - 9 women & children were killed by UPDA, left unburied & eaten by pigs
- Children were massacred while dancing in Lawiyeadul village
1988 - NRA killed 8 men and dumped their bodies in a stream
1991 - LRA kill 6
- Serious NRA operation with people taken forcefully to various places for
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screening
1995 - Brutal killings (Atiak, Palaro, Alero, Pabo, Paicho, Patiko, Acoyo, Pawere,
Awere)
1996 - 10 boys (10-12 years old) abducted by LRA, return after 2 weeks
- 2 school girls abducted by LRA
- 80 huts were burned by the LRA
- Neighbour's shop was looted 3 times by LRA
- 2 boys abducted but returned
- Individuals were displaced in Gulu town
1997 - 9 children abducted (1 girl, eight boys: seven boys return, one killed)
- 3 men killed by LRA
- UPDF shoot dead a man when he failed to give the money they demanded
1998 - After the LRA had passed through the UPDF destroyed tobacco being fire-
cured as well as other properties
- 7 boys were abducted, 2 returned (LRA)
- Dispensary looted (LRA)
- 2 boys shot but survived in hospital (LRA)
- 8 UPDF soldiers raped a woman in Laliya
1999 - February: 1 girl abducted and items looted by LRA
- LRA shot dead a catechist and his wife
The women’s own personal trauma was compounded by constant reminders of their
extreme vulnerability in their immediate community. People were caught between
army and rebels, with dozens abducted or killed by the LRA, and others rounded up
and taken away as a result of the army’s screening operations. It was a situation in
which there was no one to turn to for safety (see chapter 5).
This sense of vulnerability is deepened by an awareness of events in the wider war
zone, and at national and even international level. From the collective memory of the
thirteen women, five of whom had had no education at all, and only three of whom
had completed secondary schooling, it was possible to construct a time line of many of
the defining moments of the war at district and national level (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Incidents at district and national level
Year Incidents at a District Level National Level
1986 - People forced by NRA from Olwiyo
& Purongo to Karuma in Masindi
district
- HIV/AIDS in Gulu & Malnutrition
NRA/NRM took over power from
the Government
1987 NRA shot at children during Holy Spirit Movement attempt to
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confrontation with UPDA; 6 girls
die, as well as some boys
reach Kampala, stopped in Jinja
1988 NRA confiscated land without
compensation (100 homesteads)
UPDA & NRA sign peace agreement
1989 Presidential amnesty to followers of
rebels, not leaders
1990 NRA marched to attack Rwanda
1991 LRA maimings & mutilations Acholi students at Makerere shot at
by Uganda Police Force
1992 Landmines planted along roads
1994 NRA attack community in Atiak
market place
Peace talks led by Betty Bigombe
flop because some people
brainwashed Museveni and he gave
a 7 day ultimatum
1995 - LRA massacre in Atiak
- Meningitis outbreak
- Massive planting of anti-personnel
mines
1996 - 80 huts burnt by LRA in Pece and
Coyo
- Jago of Anaka killed by LRA
vehicle landmine
- People forced into camps by UPDF
- Scorched earth policy used by
UPDF on people of Purongo
- UPDF mobile raped women in
market in Palaro sub-county
- 2 elders killed by LRA (Okot Ogoni
& Lagony) while pursuing dialogue
for peace
Sudan Government said to be
supporting the LRA rebels
1997 - 82 huts of IDPs burnt in Limo by
LRA, 13 year old girl burnt & dies
- 99 huts burnt in Go-down, Layibi
by LRA
- SPLA hosted and seen in Gulu
town (Garang himself and various
vehicles)
- Uganda accused by Sudan of
hosting rebels
- Discussions on blanket amnesty in
parliament
1998 - UPDF shot people at funeral, 2 die,
others wounded
- Vehicle shot by LRA, medical staff
die
- Bishop of Moyo killed in ambush
on Gulu-Adjumani road
Outbreak of cholera in most districts
1999 - Vehicle shot/ambushed by LRA  in Wiayago river
- Houses burnt: Pabbo 70, Anaka 50, Parabongo 6
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This group of women were very aware of what was happening elsewhere in the
conflict zone – and often of who the perpetrators were. Maimings and landmines were
attributed to the LRA, people being forced into camps to the UPDF. That the SPLA
were ‘hosted’ and seen in Gulu town was noted, as were specific incidents such as the
killing of the Bishop of Moyo. They knew of the major peace initiatives, and of the
tensions with the Government of Sudan. The shooting of Acholi students in Makerere
University by Ugandan police force in 1991 was remembered, suggestive of the extent
to which Acholi see themselves as a devalued minority group under attack in Uganda
as a whole (see Chapter 7).
The exercise conducted with this group was repeated with nine other self-help groups
of youth, farmers, and People Living with Aids (PLWA). A total of 171 people were
involved (85 male, 86 female). 80% gave their educational status. 10.2% had no formal
education, 46.7% had 1-7 years of primary education, 25.5% had reached ‘O’ level, 3.6%
had ‘A’ level, 6.6% had further education, and 7.3% had some tertiary education. 82%
were married. Regardless of gender, age, educational or occupation, similar patterns of
traumatic experiences, together with similar levels of observation, well-guarded
memory and sophisticated analysis would emerge. Adolescent youth recalled as many
traumatic incidents as elderly farmers (see Chapter 7 for youth analysis of the actors in
the war).
Out of the 170 people in the focus groups, eight (4.7%) had themselves been
beaten/tortured by government soldiers, twelve (7.0%) by rebels. One had been
imprisoned by government, fourteen (8.2%) had been abducted by rebels. One had
been raped by government soldiers, while six (3.5%) had been shot and wounded
(three by government, and three by rebels). When the number of instances was
expanded to include close relatives, the extent to which the general population had
experienced violation was clear (Table 3.4).
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Table 3.4: Summary of experiences of individuals as drawn from timelines (1986-
1999) developed with 10 self-help groups, Gulu District, February 1999
Perpetrators CombinedDirect & Indirect
Experience
Government Rebels Total
cases
% of all
experiences
Beating/torture 10 16 26 12.8
Imprisonment 4 0 4 2.0
Abduction 3 70 73 36.0
Rape 4 1 5 2.5
Shooting 7 6 13 6.4
Killing of
immediate relatives
29 48 77 37.9
Other psychological
trauma
3 2 5 2.5
TOTAL 60 143 203 100%
As % 29.6% 70.4% 100%
Whereas abduction was clearly a rebel preserve, killing was not, with 29 out of 77
killings attributed to Government troops. Four out of five rape cases were also
attributed to Government forces. Thus although overall the rebels were responsible for
70.4% of major traumatic incidents to individual persons, the Government was
responsible for nearly one third.
When attributing responsibility for damages to personal properties, the picture was
more or less 50:50 (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5: Attribution of responsibility for 157 instances of damage to personal
properties by 170 participants in 10 self-help groups, Gulu, February 1999
Action Govt Rebels Total as %
Burning 19 20 39 25
Looting 45 45 90 57
Confiscation 6 10 16 10
Bombing 1 0 1 1
Displacement 11 0 11 7
Total 82 75 157 100
If one puts all these figures together, remembering that they are drawn from a fairly
representative sample of ordinary civilians in Gulu district, it becomes clear that the
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average civilian had, over the course of nearly two decades, experienced a relentless
series of violations.
Illustration 3.2 Re-roofing a hut, which was allegedly burned out by ‘NRA’ in 1996. Buu-Coro,
20 April 1999
Discussion
When the outline of the major phases of the ‘war’ is juxtaposed with people’s
memories, it suggests that, from a longitudinal perspective, the LRA, rather than being
the lead perpetrator, was one amongst many, including the UPDA, Karamajong,
Lakwena, and NRA/UPDF. The levels of brutality, displacement and impoverishment,
are extreme – and under-acknowledged. When Gersony argued that it was not possible
to compare the violence in northern Uganda with the ‘large-scale mass murder and
brutality that characterized UNLA operations in the Luwero Triangle in 1983/4’ (1997:
23), he seriously underplayed the devastation wreaked on people in Gulu and Kitgum
districts over nearly two decades (as compared with two years), as indicated in the
tables given above. Throughout my fieldwork I failed to encounter anybody who had
not either experienced extreme abuse and atrocities first hand or witnessed them being
exercised on immediate family members – often by government and rebels in quick
succession.
Although the death rate and other impacts should have placed northern Uganda
squarely on the lists of ‘deadly conflicts’ suggested by organisations such as the
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Carnegie Corporation in New York, it is not clear that the term ‘war’, as conventionally
understood, adequately described (let alone explained) what was happening. The fact
that the elder quoted at the beginning of this chapter described people of Acholi as ‘in a
dilemma’, a people who ‘don’t know how to go forward’, is not surprising. The defining
features were not the pitched battles between LRA and UPDF that conventional
notions of war might suggest, but rather the phenomena of inexorably escalating
displacement, dependency, debilitation, militarisation, geographic reach and
international involvement over time. Even humanitarians did not seem to grasp the
extent of what was going on. It was only in December 2003, when the UN’s Under
Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs saw fit to describe the situation as worse
than that in Iraq,80 that the gravity of the situation began to be acknowledged.
What the above account does demonstrate is that even by the late 1990s, President
Museveni and his government, although in some respects exemplifying an ‘African
renaissance’, in others remained in a weak position and faced a problem of control.
Internal divisions juxtaposed with the fact that over 50% of its budget came from
external donors, made their hold on power considerably more provisional than was
generally perceived. Nor could these internal and external pressures be dealt with
discreetly, as they were closely related both historically and in the present.
Back in 1986, with the memory of how post-independence political parties had been
overlaid with and become synonymous with ethnic and political agendas, Museveni
and the NRM made the achievement of national unity and the elimination of all forms
of sectarianism point three of their ten-point programme. This goal underpinned the
‘no-party’ system and continued to inform the Government’s doubts about the move to
multi-party democracy being urged from both inside and outside the country.81
Underlying the positive political project of national unity were very real military and
political imperatives. If the rebel NRM was to achieve any kind of national and
                                                     
80 IRIN, 28 January 2004, The 18-year old war that refuses to go away.
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international credibility as government of a country rather than merely being seen as
the occupiers of a nominal capital city, then it had to establish control of the north. As
described above, for some months following the taking of Kampala the NRA had no
presence in and therefore did not exercise control over those parts of the country north
of the Karuma Bridge (River Nile). Even once they did establish a military presence,
they were regarded by many as an occupying force rather than as fellow Ugandans –
not helped by the fact that many members of the NRA were Tutsis from Rwanda who
would eventually return to Rwanda as part of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in
1990.82
The real-politik objective of gaining control is suggested by Museveni’s appointment of
a Minister for Pacification of Northern Uganda (a term used by George Orwell to
exemplify political euphemisms, words which serve ‘to mask, sanitize and confer
respectability’ and to ‘insulate their users and listeners from experiencing fully the
meaning of what they are doing’ (Cohen, 2001: 107)). Even with the amendment of this
to Minister for Reconstruction of Northern Uganda, the implementation of the Local
Council system of non-party democracy, and the massive militarisation of the north by
the UPDF, the Government’s authority was not fully established in 1999 and the
relative importance of central and local government, members of parliament, religious
and traditional leaders, remained in flux. While the interventions of national level
church leaders, such as the call from the Archbishop of Kampala, Emmanuel Cardinal
Wamala, to Kony, ‘to stop fighting and accept dialogue with the Government’,83 posed
no challenge to the Government, those of Acholi religious leaders did, for they
… appealed to the Government to declare Acholiland a disaster area and
immediately enter into direct negotiations with Kony rebels. They have also
                                                                                                                                                           
81 As pressure grows for multi-party democracy in Uganda, Museveni continues to warn ‘against
pluralism based on ethnicity, religion and other divisive factors’ (New Vision, 9 June 2004, Museveni
advises on multipartyism).
82 This was also true of the NRA in Teso sub-region according to one respondent who had been tortured
there in the late 1980s: ‘Each of us was caned 12 strokes on the buttocks and then told to lie facing the sun for the
entire day. We had to keep turning so that we really faced the sun. Every two hours we were asked [various
questions]. .. At that time all the NRA commanders were Rwandese, and they were the torturers’ (Gulu, 7 June
1998).
83 The New Vision, 9 April 1998, Accept talks, Cardinal tells Kony.
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demanded that Parliament revokes its recommendation for a military solution to
the 12 year war which has devastated northern Uganda.84
Amongst Government representatives in particular, decentralisation raised numerous
questions about who had most power, despite the claimed complementarity of the
centre and the districts.85 These ambiguities further aggravated doubts about whether
the Acholi had ever been truly ‘pacified’ and brought under political control, doubts
which themselves were fed by the possibility that the LRA’s apparent resilience was at
least in part due to covert support from civilian Acholi.
Furthermore, despite a project of national unity, colonial discourses based on notions
of ‘tribe’ had been deeply internalised and remained an organising principle in many
peoples’ thinking. For example, one peace activist stated to me that his loyalties were,
in order of priority, to himself, his family, his clan, his tribe, his country, and to the
human race. Ethnicised thinking continued to pervade political organising and entered
into the literature of international agencies,86 creating an evident challenge for a
Government aiming at national unity. At a meeting convened by religious leaders in
1998, for example, one Catholic priest held that:
If the Acholis are united, who can come and separate us? If the Acholis are united, our
voice shall be heard. Before the Movement system, how did the Acholi live? If they unite
they will be like the Karamojong who responded to the raiders from Kenya by using
students in Makerere to threaten secession and as a result were given weapons. Let the
Acholi do the same.’
He continued
People in Acholi come together to dig a garden and successfully finish it. If they are
united they will be respected by other tribes. The tribe is something that comes from God.
To be peaceful we should accept God into our lives.87
In one short speech he thus clarified that his vision of ‘unity’ was of the tribe not the
nation, he also distanced the Acholi from the Movement, aligned them with the
                                                     
84 New Vision, 20 January 1999, Acholi Want Disaster Zone.
85 In late 1999, for example, the LCV Chairman of Kitgum district, without consulting the District Council,
closed down the ACORD programme in the district. The then Minister for the North was unable to call
this self-styled ‘President’ of the district to order.
86 E.g. UNICEF, 2001, 3-13
87 Bedo Piny pi Kuc, 27 June 1998.
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Karamojong and their approach to making demands on the state (including the threat
of secession), conjured up the promise of tribal identity as the basis for respect, and
brought God on side too.
This priest was part of a broader tendency to mythologising Acholi identity, as
exemplified in the religious leaders appeal for Third Party Mediation published in the
daily newspapers on 8 March 2004. This blended religious imagery with pan-African
and ethnic rhetoric:
We were moved by our moral and religious obligations as shepherds of God’s
people, especially of the weak and vulnerable. But we also found warrant for
such solidarity in our noble African tradition best captured by the Lwo saying
“oyoo opilo too ikom litinone” (The mother rat will die with her children).
The appeal describes how ‘the Acholi traditional, social and moral fabric that once
formed one of the most beautiful cultural tapestries in Africa is now in tatters’. It calls
for mediation from internationally renowned Africans, with only the San Egidio
community mentioned as possible non-African mediators.88 Somewhat perversely,
therefore, local ‘peace activists’ who claim to be seeking a way out of the situation do
so by appealing to the very factors used to divide and rule people in the first place.89
Ethnicised thinking was evident in the call of the former Minister of State for
Reconstruction of Northern Uganda for a conference which would
… include all the stakeholders in Acholiland and enable them to resolve the
contradictions between them, before bringing in the international community.90
It was also reflected in formations such as the Acholi Parliamentary Group, and shaped
donor and NGO interventions such as the EU’s ‘Acholiland Programme’.
Alongside the conceptual climate created by discourses of ‘tribe’ was the concrete
reality of a lack of military control. A WFP report of 1999 described how the
                                                     
88 For full text see KM E-newsletter No 47, 7 April 2004 (www.km-net.org) .
89 This exemplifies the (unconscious) collaboration of the oppressed with the agents of oppression and
domination discussed in Finnstrom (2003: 68), but contradicts his view that ‘secession of the north has
never been an issue’ (2003: 148, 160).
90 Hon. Owiny Dollo MP, Gulu conference, September 29 1999.
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organisation was adopting a partial approach and only assisting the population
‘already under firm government control’ (WFP 1999: 33), and one elder I interviewed
argued that ‘In the camps people are protecting government soldiers. People are failing to pay
taxes as they have no source of income, therefore we can say they are under rebel control’.91
There could be little doubt about the sentiments of most Acholi towards the
Government, as they pointedly refused to vote for Museveni in presidential elections in
1996 and 2001, and, in opposition to the Government, called for a negotiated rather
than a military solution to the conflict.92 Equaly in the Teso sub-region, the spontaneous
formation of ethnic militias there in late 2003/early 2004, and the speed with which the
UPDF moved to bring these under its own control (Dolan, 2004), was an indicator of
how fragile the government felt the earlier pacification of the sub-region to have been.
The most pressing reality, though, was the glaring inequality between the north and
south of the country, and the grievances this both reflected and gave rise to. As one
New Vision commentator observed:
Let us face it: life up there is what some defunct philosopher would call nasty,
short and brutish. And it is being lived in the same country and under the same
government with the rest whose most urgent problem is to cut down on the fats
in their bodies... Those fellows who did not know what their president looks like
live in the same country with several thousand who surf the internet and
communicate with friends all over the globe via email…93
The degree of inequality was beyond ready redress.  The task of holding together a
country which did not fully feel it was a country was not made easier by being
beholden to international donors for support.  Paradoxically, Uganda’s status as a
success story and show-case for international policies was also an indicator of the
extent to which its room for an independent development trajectory towards national
unity had been compromised. When as a student at Dar es Salaam University in the
late 1960s, Museveni wrote that he and his fellow students were ‘probably reactionary
                                                     
91 Interview, Gulu, 4 August 1998.
92 Perhaps this prompted the resolution passed at a meeting in Kitgum district ‘that if you want to bring a
solution, you have to accept that you are both an Acholi and a Ugandan’ (comment by participant at Bedo
Piny pi Kuc meeting, Gulu, 26 June 1998).
93 New Vision, 22 March 1998, Fats kill in Kampala as Kony kills Acholis.
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puppets of neo-colonialism in the making’ (Museveni 1970: 7), he was unnervingly
close to predicting his own future.
Under structural adjustment policies, state services and large-scale infrastructural
developments were cut back and the possibility of buying favour with the population
at large was reduced. Restrictions on military expenditure and demands for
demobilisation weakened the use of the military to keep a grip on power. Under an
internationally driven agenda of multi-party democratisation, Museveni’s ‘no-party’
system was coming under increasing challenge. And under de-centralisation policies,
power at a local level was re-ethnicised and the whole concept of national cadres of
civil servants was diluted. Indeed, even donor support for the re-anointment of
traditional leaders could be seen as undermining a national project of anti-
sectarianism. The development of a national IDP policy mentioned above involved
developing institutional mechanisms to ‘include direct participation of donors, UN
agencies and NGOs in all IDP planning…’, and the early warning system was to
involve an ‘interagency Vulnerability and Assessment Mapping Group consisting of
WFP, OPM [Office of the Prime Minister], SCF-UK, FEWS [Famine Early Warning
System] and IOM’. In short, the Government was becoming a minor player in its own
major issues.
That these frameworks imposed by the international donors were something of a
straitjacket for the Government is evident from many defiant statements made by the
President. An article in The Monitor, for example, went under the headline ‘I will not
kneel before donors, swears Museveni’.94 At times donor-government tensions over issues
such as levels of demobilisation, amnesty, and defence expenditure resulted in open
wars of words between them.  On 25 February 2004 MPs passed a resolution calling for
the north to be declared a disaster zone. In March, following attacks on IDP camps in
Lira district, tensions were such that the Donor Group on Northern Uganda, Amnesty
                                                     
94 The Monitor, 17 May 2004.
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& Recovery from Conflict95 issued a statement in which they endorsed Parliament’s
February resolution and rejected ‘the assertion that Donor’s restrictions on Defence
expenditure have impeded the UPDF’s capacity to defend citizens from such attacks’.
In May 2004 the donors rejected the proposed 2004/5 budget ‘citing excessive public
administration costs and unjustified increases in defence spending’.96
There were attempts to escape the straitjacket. The rapid subdivision of existing
districts into smaller ones (e.g. Kitgum district became Kitgum and Pader districts) can
be seen as a necessary ‘divide and rule’ tactic to counter the re-ethnicising influence of
decentralisation – if ethnic identities could not be overcome through a super-ordinate
national system then breaking them down into sub-ethnic groupings was an
alternative.97 Exercises such as mchaka-mchaka (political education – see chapter 5) could
be seen as an attempt at generating a national perspective; placing the President’s
brother Salim Saleh in charge of reserve forces could be interpreted as an evasion of the
constraints of demobilisation. All these, however, might be termed political bricolage,
making do with the little that is to hand.
The reality was that, with the de-fragmentation of the national pearl still unfinished
business, with externally driven agendas threatening a degree of re-fragmentation, and
lacking the resources to glue the ethnicised fragments together with large-scale
economic development, the Government was left with relatively few options. While
hard-won political independence demanded that the state control its own population,
it offered little in the way of economic power with which to exercise this control.
                                                     
95 This comprised the head of delegation from the European Commission, the ambassadors of Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway,
USA, Japan, as well representatives from UNDP, World Bank and USAID.
96 IRIN, 14 May 2004, Donors reject proposed budget on grounds of defence spending.
97 The relationship between what Girling terms ‘domains’ within Acholi is a historically complex one, with
the western domains (effectively Gulu district) more closely linked to the Bunyoro kingdom than the
eastern ones (Kitgum/Pader), and quicker to make alliances with the British (Girling 1960).  The reality of
divisions within the Acholi was apparent in the run up to the Betty Bigombe peace talks when elders from
Kitgum were pitted against those from Gulu (see Chapter 4).
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Some Concluding Questions
The above narrative provokes numerous questions which are addressed in the
following chapters. Firstly, about the nature and motivations of the ostensible
protagonists, the LRA and Government of Uganda, and indeed, whether they were the
only actors to be considered. Was the LRA much more successful than is generally
allowed, or was it a less important player than it was usually made out to be? Given
that it survived nearly two decades while numerous other rebel groups came and
went, was this due to a particular resilience on its part – or was it allowed to survive?
Equally, and related to this, was the Government serious in its stated intentions to find
a solution to the war? Given that non-military solutions (Pece peace accord 1988,
Bigombe peace talks 1994, Uganda-Sudan peace accord 1999, Amnesty Bill 2000) and
military ones alike (Operation Iron Fist 2002, ethnic militias 2004) resoundingly failed
to bring about any resolution to the situation and succeeded only in aggravating it, the
integrity of purpose of those who designed and implemented such ‘solutions’ was
open to scrutiny.
Particular questions also arose over the Government’s integrity of purpose with regard
to internal displacement. The increasingly destructive impact of living for extended
periods in ‘protected villages’ led to growing calls for decongestion and resettlement
but a complete absence of steps to do so. What then was the real function of a
phenomenon which most people at least purported to regard as having negative
consequences?
The escalation of non-military phenomena also prompts questions about the nature of
the relationship between long-term and severe impacts on civilians and the
perpetuation of conflict. Did the inexorable escalation reflect self-perpetuating, indeed
self-aggravating dimensions to the dynamics of the war? At times the conflict between
the Government’s stubborn adherence to seeking a military solution, and the equally
strong resistance to this from an increasing range of civil society actors (Acholi MPs,
religious leaders, traditional leaders, various UN bodies and NGOs), appeared to be as
important as the conflict they all purported to be seeking a solution to. Indeed, at times
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even the civil society actors seemed to be fighting over who would be the one to bring
peace. More importantly, perhaps, young men in their thousands were driven to join
armed forces, whether the UPDF, the various militias set up in 2003, or indeed the LRA
itself. What lay behind this phenomenon?
And what, given the evident involvement of international actors in various dimensions
of the situation, are we to make of their relative importance in resolving or
perpetuating the conflict? External involvement went beyond funding humanitarian or
developmental schemes to include military training and other types of ‘non-lethal
assistance’. External support was also critical to what initially appears to be a very
‘local’ initiative, namely the revival of traditional leadership structures. This initiative
was almost entirely driven by externally generated ideas and funding. Yet calls for an
explicitly political intervention by the United Nations were ignored.98 This prompts
many to ask ‘How bad does a situation have to get before action is taken?’, beneath
which lies a possibly more important question, namely what exactly is it that enables
decision-makers to excuse their own ‘inaction’? How was it that in an era of global
communications, there was so little international outrage over this situation which,
rather than being hidden away in torture chambers, could potentially be made visible
to the public eye through various media, with the threat of at the least possible
comparisons with the situation in southern Sudan, and at worst politically and
economically damaging charges of complicity in abuses and atrocities? Where, in a
world of ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’, were those with the
power to influence and intervene, and why were they not more active?
                                                     
98 This was in contrast to the steps taken with regard to the Darfur situation in Western Sudan from 2003
onwards.
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Chapter 4 – Reconsidering the LRA -
Government dynamic
‘People say that Kony is uneducated, but the uneducated man has killed people for the last
fifteen years; what have the educated done to solve the problem of war in Acholi land?’99
Introduction
The situation in Northern Uganda is generally presented as a war between two actors,
the LRA and the Government of Uganda. There is, though, little consensus on the
nature of the two parties, particularly the LRA, or the reasons for their involvement.
Under the various labels of ‘madmen’, ‘religious fundamentalists’, ‘messengers of
God’, ‘criminals’, ‘bandits’, ‘terrorists’ and ‘dogs of war’, at least four characterisations
of the LRA are discernible; the LRA as a an irrational organisation without political
purpose (e.g. Bramucci, 2001:ii, Weeks, 2002: 9), the LRA as seeking to install a
Christian fundamentalist government in Uganda (e.g. USDS, 2002: 124, IRIN, 12
September 2002), the LRA as a personality cult (e.g. Vlassenroot & Doom, 1999: 19-22),
and the LRA as proxy warriors for the Sudanese Government and thus as legitimate
targets in the wider ‘war on terror’ (e.g. Vlassenroot & Doom, idem, New Vision, 7
February 1998, The Monitor 11 December 1997).  What links these otherwise conflicting
representations is an implicit model of the LRA as the aggressor and of the GoU as
reacting to aggression, active in the search for solutions, and focused on the protection
of its citizens.
Looked at in quantitative terms alone, the UPDF should have been easily capable of
dealing with the LRA and protecting civilians. It numbered at least 50-60,000 troops
(excluding ethnic militias), of whom at least 20,000 were deployed in the north,
compared with the LRA’s guesstimated size of 1-5,000. It had its own track record as a
rebel group to inform its understanding of the LRA, and it had military successes
                                                     
99 IOM Needs Assessment, 2001; section 2.1.8.3. Men, Wira-Awora.
110
against other insurgent groups, most pertinently the ADF in western Uganda in the
late 1990s. At various times it had collaborative support for military activity inside
Sudan from both the SPLA100 and the Government of Sudan. And it had ‘non-lethal’
support from the US, including military training and information, as well as the room
for manoeuvre created by Uganda’s international reputation and the global ‘war on
terrorism’.
Notwithstanding all these advantages, it did not provide adequate protection to its
civilian population in the north, let alone route out the LRA. Museveni himself, on a
visit to Amuru protected village in 1998, reportedly said
“I am very sorry to find you in such a situation. I am sorry to find you not in
your homes. The fact that you are still suffering is the fault of the army and
government”.101
Explanations for such failures centred on a lack of resources (e.g. The Monitor, 3
February 1998, UPDF weak to fight rebels – Minister, see also Weeks, 2001: 32), to which
could be added context related question-marks over the UPDF’s capacities, including
the effects of HIV/AIDS, donor pressure to reduce defence expenditure, and low
morale reflected in what the UPDF refers to as ‘individual indiscipline’ and numerous
instances of drunken incompetence (see Chapter 5). Many saw the problem as one of
vested interests, ‘another case of the phenomenon identified by David Keen in the
“Benefits of Famine” – enough people do well out of the war that it continues until
there is nothing left’.102 As early as 1994, Betty Bigombe, in negotiations with the LRA,
warned that
There are many who do not want peace to prevail. There are those people who are
benefiting from the war. There are others who think that if this thing ends, they will have
nothing to lean on.(see Annex E)
                                                     
100 For an account of incursions into south Sudan in 1996 in collaboration with the SPLA see Annex B,
Section 3.5.
101 The Monitor, 18 March 1998, UPDF occupy hills at Sudan border.
102 ODI HPN Report, November 1997 http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ReportID=1686
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Gersony argued in 1997 that ‘Corruption at officer levels has also limited the army’s
commitment and morale and has filtered down to the enlisted ranks’ (1997;35),103
Behrend felt that, for Government and rebel soldiers alike, the war had become a mode
of production ‘which was more profitable than peace’ (1998; 116), and even NRM
members made allegations:
that the commanders who are sent to the regions are only interested in doing
business and not defending the people from Joseph Kony’s brutality.104
Specific instances of corruption were reported in both national papers. These included
embezzlement of monies intended for fuel ‘for military operations against Joseph Kony
rebels’,105 the diversion of supplies (including medicines) from the UPDF to the LRA,106
and the payment of salaries to ‘ghost soldiers’.
These various constraints on the UPDF’s capacity, however, could not explain why the
UPDF was only selectively unsuccessful, for they only appeared to be an issue when it
came to dealing with the LRA. For many people, Museveni’s apologies rang hollow
and the real question was not the Government’s military capacity to solve the situation
in the north, but its political will. In short, as the quotation with which I open this
chapter implies, the reality of a war in which the uneducated survive well beyond
expectations and the educated perform seriously below expectations, demands that the
standard presentation of the LRA-GoU war needs revisiting, starting with the nature
and motivation of the two parties concerned.
In this chapter I therefore first assess the extent to which my data supports the
characterisations of the LRA. I start with the considerable ambiguities about the LRA’s
composition, numbers and civilian support base, and then look at its modus operandi.
Survival strategies, internal organisation, and political messages are looked at, and the
1994 Peace Talks between the two parties are examined (drawing on an account
                                                     
103 My own fieldwork suggests that the lower ranks profited very little from being in the war zone and
often went hungry, knowing full well that some of their officers were building luxury houses for
themselves in Kampala using profits derived from the war.
104 The Monitor, 18 July 1998, Army abandons war for riches.
105 New Vision, 6 April 1998, UPDF officer charged.
106 New Vision, 11 April 1998 Two Kony bodyguards held in Kampala.
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developed from two primary sources (see Annex E)), for further evidence of the LRA’s
political position. The Peace Talks also exemplify the position of the Government,
which is further considered through a scrutiny of subsequent initiatives to deal with
the LRA, including the 1999 Nairobi Peace Accord, the 2000 Amnesty Act, Operation
Iron fist and the 2004 referral to the International Criminal Court.
I shall argue that the LRA did present a military challenge, indeed was more organised
than derogatory terms such as ‘rag-tag army’ would imply, but was a self-limiting
force which it should have been possible for the Government to deal with decisively; it
was resilient but not invincible. I argue that the 1994 talks demonstrate a power-play
between Government and LRA in which the LRA attempt to maximise the recognition
and validation given it, the Government makes strenuous efforts to minimise these by
seeking to humiliate and belittle the LRA instead, and the LRA eventually resorts to
violence. As such, the talks were an instance of ‘war talk’ rather than peace talks, and
set a precedent for subsequent initiatives and dynamics that, under the same guise of a
wish for peace, in essence created the space for further militarism and the dynamics of
Social Torture which this thesis explores.
The LRA’s ambiguities
Anyone attempting to assess the role of the LRA in northern Uganda is faced with a
number of ambiguities, particularly concerning its composition and the extent of
civilian support and links with the LRM. They are also faced with a media which fuels
rather than resolves these ambiguities.
Composition
Estimates of LRA numbers fluctuated considerably, from a high of 3-4,000 (Gersony,
1997: 35), through the US Department of State’s figure of 2000 (USDS, 2002: 124), to a
low of 1000-1100 (UNHCHR, 19 April 2001). A year after the latter figure appeared,
UNOCHA doubled the figure again, to some 2,000-3000 fighters, accompanied by a
further 2000 wives and children.107
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Within the question of numbers there was ambiguity about what proportion of LRA
fighters were children. The precise number of abductees and returnees was not known,
but there was a widespread belief that the LRA was largely composed of abducted
children. A BBC report that ‘More than 14,000 children are estimated to have been
abducted… since 1986… and taken to southern Sudan to fight or serve as sex slaves’
was typical in purveying and perpetuating such beliefs, as were its estimates that
‘nearly 90% of LRA fighters are enslaved children – nearly 6,000 are still missing and it
is not known whether they are dead or alive’.108
The fieldworkers’ accounts suggested that more than half of abductees were adults,
and thus did not confirm the image of an organisation which focused primarily on
abducting children. And when UNICEF published its findings in 2001 they indicated
that the 20,000 adults abducted up to that point represented two thirds of overall
abductions. They also showed that 77.7 % of the 10,000 abducted children returned
within a year and a further 15.9% the following year,109 significantly weakening the
possibility that 90% of the LRA’s fighters were enslaved children. When I compared
the numbers known to have been abducted, and the numbers GUSCO, World Vision
and Kitgum Concerned Women’s Association (KICWA) claimed to have reintegrated,
the results suggested that the number of children left in captivity was in the hundreds
rather than the thousands (Dolan, 2002).110
The vision of an organisation built on abduction of children was linked to notions of its
irrationality and lack of education. Yet some members at the LRA’s core had received
training in locations as diverse as Israel, America and Germany before ever joining the
LRA. Brigadier Kenneth Banya (‘Mzee Banya’ in the Organisational Chart, Annex B
section 9), captured by the UPDF in July 2004, had studied industrial chemistry
followed by seven years training in the USSR – in flying MIG-21fighter planes and MI-
                                                                                                                                                           
107 Weeks, 2002: 8.
108 BBC News Online, Appeal for Uganda’s abducted children, 8 December 2000.
109 UNICEF, 2001: 7.
110 Since Operation Iron Fist began in early 2002 the rate of abduction sky-rocketed, but it remains the case
that insufficient effort is made to maintain a balance sheet of abductions and returns.
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17 helicopters.111 And, for a minority of LRA recruits, the Government of Sudan
provided training opportunities ranging from security issues (Annex B, section 3.9), to
the politics of ‘globalisation, unity and diversity, achievements of the freedom fighters, the role
of African countries to the international community, Sudanese assistance to freedom fighters in
Africa’ (Annex B, section 3.11). The majority of recruits though were trained simply in
how to ‘dismantle and reassemble guns’ as well as target practice, and ‘field-craft’
training, such as how to parade, take cover, and assault the enemy.
The extent of civilian support
One of the biggest ambiguities related to the LRA was the extent of civilian support for
the organisation. While international observers tended to argue that there was no
longer any support base (Gersony 1997: 35, Global IDP database, Westbrook 2000:
section VI), within Uganda the issue was not seen in such a clear-cut fashion (see also
Finnström, 2003: 144). Some agreed with the respondent who argued that while there
had initially been sympathy between rebels and population, ‘…the relationship … has
been torn apart since the LRA changed its approach in around 1990’.112 But Government and
non-Acholi more generally harboured doubts about the extent of Acholi sympathies
with the LRA, fearing that an evident dislike of the Government, as expressed in voting
patterns, equated to passive sympathy for the LRA, or indeed to pockets of active
support. One commentator argued that
The solution [to the conflict] lies with transforming the attitude of the Acholi
populace from saying “Pa Ngeyo” (I don’t know) to any inquiry about the
whereabouts of rebels to “Angeyo” (I know). (Asowa-Okwe,1996: 26)
Government suspicions were evident in the various screening exercises known as
panda gari from 1991 onwards (Chapter 3), and in the whole policy of ‘protected
villages’ (See Chapter 5.1). Indeed, those who tried to resist going to the protected
villages were warned that they would be treated as rebel collaborators if they did not
move.
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The possibility of some civilian support should not be wholly discounted. In the 1994
Peace Talks, one of the elders in the Government delegation was a known co-ordinator
whose house was used by the LRA to store goods which were then taken to Kitgum
and sold for cash (see Annex E). LRA co-ordinators within the civilian population are
known to have at times provided shelter (Annex B section 1), carried goods between
LRA and UPDF (Annex B, section 3.17), and support the LRA in sick bays located
throughout the Acholi sub-region (Annex B, section 8). Furthermore, there were
widespread grievances and desperate circumstances, leading Norbert Mao, MP for
Gulu Municipality, to point out that,
Unless the government can persuade the Acholi people that they are part of the
new Uganda that’s being built, and that they are not just being left to suffer as a
punishment for their past allegiances, something bad could happen.113
And for increasing numbers of orphans, the LRA might appear a survival route when
all other options seemed closed. As one person commented in a discussion about AIDS
orphans; ‘Some of these children when abducted don’t come back, others join the rebels due to
poor care for them, some join the home guard’.114
While some were willing helpers, it is undoubtedly the case that others, as Human
Rights Watch argue, ‘collaborated’ out of fear and the absence of any feasible
alternative (1997; 36). Clearly there was no easy way in which to respond to
prohibitions and injunctions such as those outlined above. People were intimidated
and did not know what to do next. To disobey the LRA was risky, but so was leaving
the camps against Government orders. Many found themselves in an invidious and
unenviable position, not just caught between two forces, but in a very real sense ‘of’
them too, with numerous households having had some members abducted by the LRA
and others recruited into the homeguard or UPDF. As such, the question of civilian
support remained open.
Links with the LRM
                                                     
113 BBC News, 2 November 2000, Uganda’s rebel war.
114 Atiak, August 1998.
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A related ambiguity was around the nature of the relationship between the LRA in
Sudan and those claiming to be members of the Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM), or
the political wing of the LRA. Some people in Gulu certainly believed the links to be
close. One elder argued that, as some diaspora had fled in fear of their lives, they
would want ‘to do something to reverse that situation’, such as ‘giving direct support to
rebels or lobbying arms suppliers for arms and funds. Or by giving encouragement or morale’.
In his opinion ‘Divisions in the LRA/M are government propaganda. Those in exile will try to
get back to [be] the Government… How did illiterates manage to persuade a country like Sudan
[to support them]? The political wing plays a very important role115 (see also Finnström, 2003:
161-172). The media also at times suggested a strong connection between the LRM and
Joseph Kony (e.g. New Vision, 18 July 1998, ‘Kony gives conditions for peace negotiations’,
The Monitor, 28 April 1999 Kony shuffles top officers). Certainly materials emanating
from Acholi claiming to be members of the LRM (see Annex D for extracts) were
highly politicised, anti-government and anti-UN and NGO intervention. They showed
a strong awareness of the need to establish political credibility, returning repeatedly to
five major issues; that they were not Christian fundamentalists, that they did have a
political agenda, that there were many government abuses which were being covered
up, that western organisations were hypocritical and had vested interests in war, and
that the media, in particular the western media, were responsible for anti-LRA
propaganda.
However, it seemed to me there were fundamental ambiguities about the extent to
which the LRM actually linked with or had any influence with the LRA. In January
1998, for example, Dr. James Obita, a London-based Acholi claiming to be the LRM’s
spokesman for Kony, was reported as having been admitted to Juba hospital while
waiting to meet with Kony: ‘The security source said Kony’s reluctance to meet Obita
indicates that Kony owes his allegiance to the Sudanese government, and not to people
in Nairobi and London who claim to be members of his external political wing’.116
While this may be an example of anti-LRM propaganda as suggested by Finnström and
others, my interview with Jacob raised further questions: his account locates the LRM
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secretariat not in London but in Khartoum and Juba, and he narrates the development
of the LRA’s political side as happening inside Sudan, with considerable Sudanese
support – which might explain why people going to Nairobi to deal with the LRM
generally came away disappointed. This is perhaps why, when the Chairman of the
Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs was mandated in 1996 to
“inquire into all aspects of the war currently going on in northern Uganda with the aim
of bringing it to a speedy end”, he wrote directly to ‘Mr. Joseph Kony, Lord’s
Resistance Army’ rather than the LRM.117
The role of the media in creating ambiguity
Day-to-day national media coverage, replete with seemingly contradictory information
about the LRA, fuelled a sense of ambiguity. On many occasions the headline in one
paper (e.g. ‘UPDF traps Soroti rebels’)118 would be flatly contradicted a few days later
by those of its competitor (‘Kony has 800 men, beats UPDF trap’).119 At times the same
paper would appear to contradict itself in the same edition. Following LRA attacks on
three protected villages in May 1998, for example, The Sunday Monitor reported a
UPDF statement ‘that the LRA is now so incapacitated that they can no longer raid
UPDF positions’,120 and in the same issue detailed a deadly attack on a bus on May 6th
in which
…the bullets came in furious bursts as the rebels advanced shouting in crazed
voices: “Nek gino weng, nek gino weng (Kill them all, kill them all).” They were
many and in UPDF uniform.121
The paper may have juxtaposed the two stories as a way of signalling its reservations
about the UPDF position, but such reporting was disorienting. Its speculative nature
compounded the multiple ambiguities of day-to-day life in the war zone, creating – or
at least exacerbating - the LRA’s elusive quality, its apparent capacity to be both
everywhere when it came to explaining atrocities, yet nowhere when it came to dealing
                                                                                                                                                           
116 New Vision, 5 January 1998.
117 His letter of 21 November 1996 received a reply from Otii Lagony on 14 January 1997.
118 New Vision, 27 May 1998
119 The Monitor, 29 May 1998.
120 The Sunday Monitor, 17 May 1998, LRA raid three ‘protected’ camps during Carey’s visit
121 Ibid, Fire and death on black Wednesday
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with them once and for all.  It left civilians - whose major source of information was the
two daily newspapers - in constant doubt and uncertainty as to what was actually
going on, and wondering what, if anything, to believe. As one observer in the New
Vision wrote: ‘Joseph Kony and his ragtag Lord’s Resistance Army has been disturbing
Gulu and Kitgum districts for 11 years now, claiming to be waging a war. But, like
Hamlet’s ghost, “’tis here! ‘tis there! ‘tis gone!”: Where is Kony’s war?’.122 In the surreal
ambience thus created the questions sometimes went further; as when Gulu’s Resident
District Commissioner commented at a meeting in February 1998 that;  ‘This war cannot
be ended by guns alone. Dialogue will help, but whom do we talk to? I appreciate all attempts to
reach Kony. Who knows whether Kony exists? Maybe it is a mystery.
The LRA’s Modus Operandi
Notwithstanding the above ambiguities, there is considerable consistency of findings
about the LRA’s modus operandi, in particular its human rights violations. NGOs, 123 UN
organisations,124 and international media alike,125 have catalogued killings, maimings,
rapes, theft and looting, burning of homes, destruction of crops and, most notoriously,
the abduction of civilians, including children. Asked to describe LRA raids one
fieldworker simply said ‘RAMPANT’.126 The more than 200 accounts I received from the
fieldworkers in the protected villages for the period September 1998 – March 2000 (see
Annex C for two examples), as well as from various key informant interviews and
focus group discussions, confirmed this overall picture (see Chapters 3, 5-7) and also
indicated that raids were carried out in Sudan on both civilian and SPLA targets
(Annex B, section 3.2 and 3.17).
The picture of abduction was mixed: those taken to serve as temporary porters for
looted goods were at times released within a matter of hours or days. When twenty
schoolboys were taken in a raid on Awer in June 1998, for example, fifteen
                                                     
122 New Vision, 3 June 1998.
123 E.g. AVSI’s report by Bramucci, 2001: ii. (USAID funded), HRW (1997, 2003), Amnesty International
(1997).
124 E.g. UNOCHA’s report by Weeks, 2002: 9.
125 E.g. BBC News – Crossing Continents, 2 November 2000, Uganda’s rebel war.
126 Odek pilot, 21 July 1998.
119
…came straight back because most of them lasted [i.e. stayed with the LRA] for between
three days and one week, so they didn’t pass through World Vision or GUSCO. They
were welcomed with a lot of sympathy, but they have now gone to stay in town for
security.
Of eight people abducted from one fieldworker’s home in Odek in June 1998, five had
returned by late July. At other times though, very few returned. Of the eight people
taken in two separate raids on Palaro in June 1998, only one, a boy of 14, had returned
one month later.127 As Section 1 of Annex B reveals, those taken for induction into the
LRA faced a brutal process: abductees could be chained together, forced to carry heavy
loads, beaten, and made to march for miles. They frequently came under attack from
UPDF air and ground forces, and large numbers died of thirst or were killed, either
because they could not sustain the pace or because they were seen to be breaking
various rules. ‘Blocking forces’ would follow groups of captives and kill off any
stragglers (Annex B, section 5).
The LRA was also notorious for mutilations. One nun from northern Uganda testified
that ‘If any of the children try to escape and are caught, the rebels make examples of
them to discourage and prevent further escape attempts. These examples include the
mutilation of ears, noses, arms, legs, and even lips, or brutal killings while their peers
are forced to watch’.128 Most reports suggest such mutilations were done to civilians as
an example to other civilians, rather than to abductees as an example to other
abductees. They also suggest that, unlike abductions, which continued throughout the
entire war, mutilations were not a constant, with 1991 and 1996 standing out as years
in which such atrocities had taken place in large numbers. By contrast with raids and
abduction, there were no reports of mutilation during my fieldwork, though the
memory of earlier ones was very live and there were renewed reports in 2005 in the
wake of failed peace talks.
Administration & Control
                                                     
127 Palaro pilot, 30 July 1998.
128 Testimony of Sister Mary Rose Atuu of the Catholic Religious Congregation called Little Sisters of Mary
Immaculate of Gulu, Northern Uganda, before the Joint Hearings of the House Subcommittee on Africa
and the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, on the subject of Sudan and
Northern Uganda, July 29, 1998.
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Inside the LRA the exercise of control began with the initiation of recruits, and this is
prominent in Jacob’s account. Repeated brutal (and at times lethal) beatings, both
following abduction and upon arrival in the camps in Sudan (Annex B, section 2.1),
were a part of this, followed by more ritual processes, akin in some respects to age-
group initiation ceremonies, in which new abductees were ‘smeared with Ashes, shea nut
oil, and sprinkled with First Water’ and instructed on LRA regulations (Annex B, section
13). Given that there were numerous non-Acholi in the LRA (such as the LRA’s
spokesman at the 1994 peace talks, Kony’s Holy Spirit Secretary, and the WNBF
members who joined on 17 March 1996 – Annex B, section 3.3) these processes, which
echo the incorporation of non-Acholi into farm work groups known as Komponis in the
Sudanese Acholi area in the 1970s and 1980s (Allen, 1987), were no doubt intended to
help incorporate non-Acholi into the ‘New Acholi’ identity Kony sought to build in the
LRA. As Jacob describes it, ‘All the tribes who joined the LRA were termed to be the new
Acholi community, ‘Acholi Manyen’ (Annex B, section 2.3). However, it is clear that these
attempts were only partially successful. Nine non-Acholi commanders who escaped to
Juba and Khartoum in 2000 left due to feeling marginalised as non-Acholi (Annex B,
section 4.1).129
Control was further exercised through administrative mechanisms, religious ritual, and
various prohibitions, particularly relating to gender relations. The administrative
structure merged military and non-military models (see Annex B, section 9 for
organisational chart). Although the overall leader was referred to as the ‘chairman’, he
had under him four brigades (each with several battalions), a political wing, and
‘Control Altar’ which included administrative functions along with signals, air defence,
logistics and medical matters, religious matters and an intelligence department.
Details of all new arrivals were recorded and used for daily ‘Parade State’ or Roll Call.
At these information about ‘sickness, deaths, births, absence without leave, duties, loss of
weapons, food distribution would all be noted’, processed through first Brigade and then
                                                     
129 They were apparently all described as criminal/fraudulent Ugandans by Museveni in a paper sent to
Khartoum when they applied for amnesty in July 2001. The Carter Centre described them as ‘hardliners’
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overall Headquarters, to reach Joseph Kony by 10.00am. Information was thus
consistently channelled from the bottom of the organisation to the very top. There was
also radio communication between forces inside Uganda and headquarters in Sudan;
they were not operating independently as self-contained ‘bandits’, but were closely
monitored and controlled. This could not all have been sustained by one man. When
the Government delegation in the second talks of 1994 complained that Kony’s absence
showed a lack of commitment, his representative countered that the LRA was more
than just Kony:
…you should note that if we (the officers) were not there or the young soldiers were not
there, or if the officers who have come were not there, Kony would not be in the bush.
Notwithstanding these structures and mechanisms of control, however, the fact that
93.6% of recorded child abductees managed to escape within two years of capture,
indicates that internal surveillance was less than successful (or that other LRA
members were turning a blind eye more often than the choice of testimonies published
by child agencies would have us believe).
The LRA model diverges from more conventional command structures in placing the
spirits at the top of the organisational chart (see Annex B, section 9). Jacob’s account
identifies only four spirits (Juma Oris, Silindy Makay, Who are You?, Divo), compared
with the eight identified by Allen (1991: 374), but both agree that Juma Oris was the
principal one. These spirits were said to advise on a range of matters, including health,
military decisions, and ritual processes, and to communicate through the medium of
Joseph Kony, who is sometimes referred to as Laor (the messenger).130  The spirits could
visit at any time and send Kony into a trance, during which everything he said would
be recorded by his secretary and later used as the basis for decision making (Annex B,
section 10).
Spirit possession was integrated into and supported by a wider religious framework,
centred around the Yards, circular open-air spaces ‘with an altar in the middle and a
                                                                                                                                                           
because they were suspicious of the amnesty. Seven of the nine eventually came to Gulu in January 2002
under the Amnesty Act.
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thatched hut where clean water and shea nut oil is kept for anointing people’. These were
maintained by ‘controllers’ concerned both with preparing people for marriage and the
like, but also with influencing the course of battles (Annex B, section 11). On Fridays,
the Yards would be used for prayers lasting the whole morning, and also as an
occasion for Kony to ‘comment on the issues that have been happening during the week’ and
‘tell people some of the messages revealed to him by the Holy Spirit’.
Various prohibitions were laid out in Kony’s regulations, and resembled but were
more specific than those disseminated to civilians (see above). They included a ban on
alcohol, smoking and marijuana (see Annex B, section 3.4), and various foods such as
‘mango, oranges, lemon, edible rats, pork, honey,131 sheep, duck, eggs … and so on’ (Annex B,
section 2.3). They also extended into the area of gender relations.
Most descriptions of the LRA argue that abducted girls and women were then further
coerced into becoming ‘sex slaves’.132 As one account from Pabo shows (Annex C), raids
at times involved incidents of sexual violence (Annex C), and both the children that
abducted women and girls brought back, and their own medical needs, confirmed that
they did indeed become ‘wives’ to the soldiers. Allen argued that while Kony’s
followers were meant to keep to similar prohibitions to those of Alice (i.e. not to have
intercourse) in practice they did not (1999; 379), and Behrend also attributed large-scale
abduction to the removal by the spirit Silly Silindi of the interdiction on men and
women having sex.
However, the image of a free-for-all does not hold up. As in the broader society,
gender relations were used as a key instrument of control over both men and women.
Male-female relations were the primary concern in four out of the thirteen regulations
Kony lectured the newly arrived abductees on. Relationships had to be ‘authorised by
the military council’ (Annex B, section 2.3), and in point of fact ‘It is the chairman who
decides if you are ready for a woman; even if you don’t want you are given’ (Annex B, section
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131 Notwithstanding this, Jacob’s also recalls stealing honey during a raid on a village inside Sudan.
132 E.g. BBC News Online, Appeal for Uganda’s abducted children, 8 December 2000. IRIN, 24 May 2004.
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6). Marriages with foreign women were not allowed (Annex B, section 2.3), ordinary
soldiers could not talk to ‘any woman belonging to a commander unless authorised to do so’,
and women were obliged to ‘all go to collect water and firewood together. They would also
garden together.’
Men who were allocated women were then expected to perform sexually, and given
medical treatment if their women complained that they failed to do so. Interestingly,
‘Cases of bwoc (impotence) included both people who were already bwoc at home, and others
who became bwoc after abduction’.133  (Annex B, section 6. See section 8 for herbs used for
impotence). Women whose husbands were killed would, after a certain period during
which rituals were performed, be allocated to another man. The importance attributed
to fertility is demonstrated in pregnant women being placed in sick bays away from
military activity (Annex B, section 7), and the intricate linkages between questions of
fertility and the purity of the ‘New Acholi’ (Annex B, section 2.3). 134
Measures were taken to prevent ‘prostitution’, and homosexuality was punished with
execution (Annex B, section 6). In the 1994 Peace Talks, the LRA brought forward for
punishment one of their members who was caught defiling a young girl (Annex E).
Gender specific prohibitions to maintain ‘purity’ were visible in the structure and
operations of the Yard, with the sitting area divided into four discrete sections for
officers, men, young men and boys, and women and children respectively.
Furthermore, ‘a menstruating woman can never enter the Yard’ (Annex B, section 12),
and the jerrycans in which blessed water was stored, ‘are not touched by any women’
(Annex B, section 13).  ‘Controllers’ were men only, and they were also the only ones
wearing dreadlocks. The exception to this gender order is that Silindy Makay, one of
the four holy spirits said to guide Joseph Kony, was a woman.
                                                     
133 Male impotence in the war zone is discussed further in Chapter 7. The term bwoc seems related to the
myth of the Pabwoc lineage as told by Girling: ‘Bwoc their ancestor was being pursued by enemies when
he came to a deep river. A tree growing beside the bank bent horizontally to allow him to cross and stood
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134 Note also that when the children from the LRA and Government of Sudan camps mingled too much,
this was one ground for shifting camp.
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Once these internal prohibitions are understood, it becomes more comprehensible
why, by contrast with other insurgent groups, LRA abductions of women were low.
From 1986-2001 women and girls represented 20.8% of those abducted in Kitgum
district, and 16.7% in Gulu (UNICEF, 2001: 7).135 This was approximately half the level
of female abductions by the ADF in Kabarole and Kasese (42.9% and 38.5%
respectively).136
Survival and proxy warfare
A consideration of the LRA’s survival mechanisms, and the role which its relationship
with the Government of Sudan played in these, shows that while they clearly stole to
exist, they did not simply ‘exist to steal’. Although the looting of civilians was
important (and there were reports from returnees that they enjoyed better food while
staying in the bush than when living in the protected villages), the pickings inside
Uganda became ever poorer over time, and the amounts that could be carried on foot
back to Sudan were self-limiting. No amount of abduction could overcome this – the
more abducted, the more to be carried. The other two key elements of the LRA’s
survival strategy were a combination of self-reliance and external assistance from the
Sudanese government. Self-reliance included food production in and around camps in
Sudan, and the use of herbal/traditional remedies in sick-bays maintained throughout
Kitgum and Gulu districts. For Jacob, this indicated the extent to which the LRA had
become ‘blocked’, as ‘people were now returning to village life although we were in military
combat’.  In the sick bays, looted medicines were combined with remedies made from
roots, fungi, specific ashes, animal furs, skins etc. (Annex B, section 8). They could not
address all medical needs – many returnees required treatments, and there were
reports of cholera outbreaks resulting from serious food and water shortages (Annex B,
                                                     
135 This amounted to 2619 in total in Kitgum, or 175 per year over the same period, and 1971 in Gulu, or
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suggesting that over fifteen years a total of 2250 women were kept in the LRA.
136 International agencies also treated returnees in a highly gendered fashion. While waiting in Juba to be
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international agencies: ‘Children and women were handed over to the organisation called Save the Children while
men were to be kept by the International Organisation for Migration’ (section 4.3). The possibility that any
affective ties could have been established while living in the LRA was discounted without consultation.
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section 3 for example) 137 – but they do nuance the picture of gratuitous looting. Reports
of medical supplies being diverted from the UPDF to the LRA add a further twist.138
The characterisation of the LRA as a proxy force is supported to an extent by the many
forms of assistance provided by the Sudanese Government. When Jacob and other
abductees arrived in Issac they were collected in Government of Sudan trucks (Annex
B, section 1.3). When there were acute food shortages Government lorries brought ‘food
and other assistance to the LRA camp in Aru’ (Annex B, section 3.1). When combined
NRA/SPLA forces attacked the LRA, Sudanese reinforcements were sent to Jebeleen
(Annex B, section 3.5). They built a new camp there and remain for the next three
years, during which time, Sudan took a lot of interest in LRA, giving LRA the opportunity of
making a lot of ambushes and burning most of the SPLA vehicles which were supplying food
and arms brought from Uganda’ (Annex B, section 3.6). Sudanese officials informed the
LRA about the imminent arrival of a delegation in Uganda looking for the Aboke girls
(Annex B, section 3.8). Even when, in the wake of the Nairobi peace accord in 1999,
relations with the Government of Sudan soured and food supplies dried up, local links
were maintained with some Sudanese army commanders who exchanged LRA
produce for ‘ essential commodities like sugar, salt, drugs, clothing and fuel for their vehicles.’
However, the LRA were not entirely beholden. The relationship began to break down
when the Government developed doubts about the LRA’s use of donated materials
(Annex B, section 3.10), and when the LRA attacked Sudanese civilians in the vicinity
of their camp. These incidents, coinciding with the Carter centre negotiations in late
1999, led the Government of Sudan to give them just five days to shift camp from
Jebeleen to Nisitu. Although Government of Sudan representatives met with Carter
Centre representatives and Kony in Nisitu in 2000, when proposals to relocate the LRA
1,000km northwards were broached, the contact broke down; Kony lost trust and
‘decided to stop receiving supplies of food, arms and uniforms from Juba’, arguing that ‘any
food being brought by Arabs must not be accepted because they may be poisoned’. At this time
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from Juba, which ties in with Jacob’ account.
138 New Vision, 11 April 1998, Two Kony bodyguards held in Kampala.
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the LRA began making overtures to the Equatoria Defence Force to establish
alternative alliances (Annex B, section 3.18). Evidently it did not see itself as a
collection of ‘proxy warriors’ dependent exclusively on the Government of Sudan.
LRA motivations and politics
The political views of the LRA are at least partially discernible from its attempts to
communicate with the civilian population, and its internal workings as described by
key informants, particularly the focus on cleansing and purity along ethnic lines.
To communicate verbally with the civilian population the LRA would occasionally
gather people together in a particular village and conduct a meeting.139 More usual
methods included dropping letters on roads and paths, or nailing them to trees. At
times messages, which included prohibitions, commands, comments on political
developments, warnings of imminent attacks and taunts to the military to follow them,
would be given to people found outside the camps, or to released abductees,
sometimes with precise instructions about whom to give the information to (e.g.
security personnel).
Prohibitions designed to protect the LRA included telling people not to run or raise the
alarm if they see the LRA, as the LRA would otherwise attack that village, not to go
and hunt as they might come across the LRA’s hiding places, and not to ride bicycles as
these were a way of taking information to the government – the LRA could force you
to dismantle your bicycle or break your calves by hammering on them. Other
prohibitions appeared aimed at undermining the Government. In February 1996, for
example, they ‘issued an edict banning settlement within four kilometres of roads and
prohibiting the use of bicycles. Their intention was the tight control of a population
inaccessible to government troops which would provide cover and supplies for the
rebels’.140  They also told people not to stay near government soldiers or follow their
rules, and not to travel in vehicles – those doing so were said to be carrying produce
which would better be given to the rebels. A further set of prohibitions related to
                                                     
139  E.g. 19th –20th July 2002 at Okungu-Gedi camp, Amuru division (KM E-newsletter no22, 8 August 2002).
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religious beliefs, and included telling people not to work/dig on Fridays or Sundays,
not to keep pigs,141 and not to slaughter white chickens which were regarded as
something holy.142
Sometimes people were told to leave the camps and go home to dig, partly to
undermine the ‘Government’s administrative policies’, and partly to ensure they
would not get caught in the cross-fire (on the other hand people in one village were
told to stop gathering food from their abandoned lands). In some cases, the message
was one of blackmail: one returned abducted in Anaka was told to tell people that,
should the LRA come to the village and get no food items, they would react by
planting landmines such that the fields would be ‘locked by landmines’.143
Comments passed to civilians about the political situation in mid 1998 included that
they would soon oust the NRM government, that their rebellion should be seen as a
national struggle, and that they ‘don’t want killing of the local population for the Holy
Spirit has forbidden massacre’. There was also a message to ‘let all capable boys and
girls join the LRA so that they remove Museveni from the chair of Uganda’. In some
messages, they described themselves as messengers of God and stated that the
ideology of the LRA was based on the 10 commandments of God. They also they let it
be known that they were not going to attend the diaspora-organised Kacoke Madit (Big
Meeting) in London since it was a waste of money, and that they wanted it to take
place either in northern Uganda or Kampala. They accused the Government of ‘selling
the land of Acholi using the land-bill’, and said that ‘The poisoning of WFP relief
supplies is proof that the government wants to kill the Acholi’.144
                                                                                                                                                           
140 Jon Bennet, in Forced Migration Review, 7 April 2000 – http://www.fmreview.org/fmr078.htm.
141 In July 1998 people in Palaro slaughtered and ate their pigs because of this order. In one instance in 1996
the LRA forced a family to kill a pig and eat it raw. In others the threat was that if found the number of
people killed would correspond to the number of pigs found.
142 One respondent reported that on many occasions Kony’s army have been seen carrying a white sheep,
apparently because it would repel the Government soldiers. White stones, white ashes, white chickens etc.
all seemed to be attributed particular symbolism and powers.
143 Anaka, 28 January 2000
144 Camp pilot reports, June 1998.
128
For a few weeks in early 1999, before the signal was blocked, the LRA broadcast daily
from 5-6pm on 31 MB/SW, a station they called ‘Radio Free Uganda’. One fieldworker
described it as propagating ‘all kinds of aggressive languages … against the government in
Kampala.’  Another reported that ‘This campaign is causing fear. Because in their broadcast
they [LRA] talk of war. Yet people thought that normal life was coming in place’. 145  When one
fieldworker raised the issue of the radio with some soldiers he was drinking with, they
asked him why he was listening to rebel radio - was he a rebel collaborator? The
broadcasts, some of which were in English, included news, music and ‘commentaries’.
On 3rd May 1999, for example, a commentary entitled ‘Dictator Museveni is in
problems’, accused the president of ‘over-staying’ in power, and argued that
Museveni’s Government was coming under pressure for misuse of funds. It
demonstrated familiarity with a wide range of political and economic actors such as
the IMF, and with debates about the referendum and the Government’s overrun on
military expenditures. Other rebel groups, including the ADF, a rebel movement
fighting in western Uganda at the time, the West Nile Bank Front, the National
Freedom Army and the National Rescue Front, were referred to as the ‘Patriotic
Forces’. The Government was accused of laying 5,000 landmines on the Uganda-Sudan
border, and Museveni of ‘violating the bogus 1995 Constitution’ by sending troops into
Sudan without the approval of parliament for a ‘suicidal attack’ under the pretence of
‘containing the Karamajong warriors’. The broadcaster likened ‘Museveni’s efforts’ to
those of a ‘dying bull’, claiming that ‘new soldiers and the local defence soldiers which
have been amassed at the Sudan border are running away because they fear to face
battle that will cost them their dear lives’.  Some attention was also given to problems
with Uganda’s judiciary.
On 6th May Radio Free Uganda criticised the ‘NRM regime’ for ‘encouraging mob
justice in Uganda’ and argued that ‘Museveni’s regime can never stop inventing stupid
propaganda stories and lies to punish the image of the patriotic forces in its endless
attempts to undermine the popular armed struggle of Uganda’. In particular the
commentator denied stories that rebels were resorting to cannibalism as a result of
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hunger, and that the LRA was ‘involved in the slave trade in Sudan’. He gave
examples of where Government ‘propaganda’ did not correspond to reality, in
particular how government claims to have wiped out the rebels were untrue: ‘no
sooner had they said such lies than the rebels appeared again with the more
devastating fire power to destroy government forces’.
These broadcasts belie the claim that the LRA lacked any political position and had no
interest in communicating with the civilian population – clearly they did wish to, but
were suppressed at the first sign of success. This pattern was repeated with Radio
Mega FM, a community radio station established in Gulu with a turn-key grant from
DFID and a commitment to peace-building. Having first gone on air in October 2002 it
soon boasted 51% of the entire radio listenership in the northern region,146 but
following a call-in from Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti during a live broadcast in
December 2002, the station was prohibited by Central Government and local UPDF
from broadcasting further LRA contributions and warned not to discuss ‘contentious
or “emotional” issues (Dolan, 2004: 13).
Politics of rejection
Although the LRA did not eschew the use of modern technology, its political agenda
did not always fit readily into the conceptual frameworks of the institutions observing
it - for it was fundamentally rooted in rejection of those institutions and the
‘modernisation’/‘westernisation’ they represented.  To the extent that it emphasised
ethnic power transcending existing state boundaries, for example, the LRA in south
Sudan, particularly in areas occupied by Sudanese Acholi, would not necessarily see
itself as being outside its ethnic ‘home’. In 1960 Girling wrote that ‘they [Acholi in
Sudan and Uganda] are still one people and any change in the present situation might
lead to a demand for them all to be united under one political authority’ (1960: 1).
Writing in 1991, Allen argued that Kony was fighting for ‘judgement’, and that like
Alice, he felt he was ‘saving the Acholi “tribe”’ by cleansing it of bad people (1991:
379). Both he and Behrend comment on Alice and Kony’s attempts to cleanse their
                                                     
146 It broadcasts to Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, Moyo, Adjumani, Yumbe, as well as parts of southern Sudan.
Programmes are also available to the diaspora on the internet at www.km.net.org .
130
movements and the Acholi people as a whole of witches, witchcraft and pagan spirit
mediums (ajwakas).
Commitment to ‘cleansing’ the old is evident in Kony’s speech to the newly arrived
abductees in which he places emphasis on saving people from the evils of
contemporary life and from the Government’s ‘agenda’, and portrays the LRA as ‘the
only chosen people of God who are fighting using the assistance from the Holy Spirit’,
and one of the two elephants under whose feet the ‘elites of the Acholi tribe’ will be
crushed if they don’t stop supporting Museveni. As Jacob noted in an aside,
issues which made Kony unhappy with the Museveni government included the sale of
land, privatisation of industries, and the ‘spread of the Tutsi empire’ (especially the way
in which Acholi was being diluted by outsiders being brought in and marrying
Acholis…). 147
The emphasis on purification is also captured in reports that they describe themselves
as ‘God’s messengers’,148 and in the creation of a whole cadre of ‘controllers’, ‘“clean”
people who don’t quarrel’ and who ‘are ready to teach other people who fell into mistakes’
(Annex B, section 11).  When military activities are curtailed by the breakdown in the
relationship with the Government of Sudan in 2000, ‘they started traditional teachings
about village life in Uganda and differences in how people are undertaking culture these days’
(Annex B, section 3.18).
The attempt to build something new is evident in the integration of elements of Islam,
such as Friday being a day of prayer and rest, and the prohibition on eating pork, as
well as in the way aspects of the LRA’s own experience are formalised into annual
celebrations, such as Juma Oris Day on 7 April, and Whistle Day on 1 December.149 As
described above, new recruits were anointed  (Annex B, section 13), and in the process
recruits who were not themselves of Acholi origin were said to become ‘New Acholi’,
                                                     
147 The presence of large numbers of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in the NRM in the late 1980s (some of them
sent to northern Uganda as part of the pacification process), and the support given by the Museveni
Government to the Rwandan Patriotic Front in its return to Rwanda are no doubt part of this charge.
148 For example, Sunday Vision, 7 June 1998, The day Kony rebels eluded Salim Saleh inside Teso bush.
149 This commemorated a time when the LRA were being pursued inside Uganda and could only
communicate with each other using whistles. In December 1998 Joseph Kony reportedly used Whistle Day
to reshuffle his command structure.
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even if this was little more than a rhetorical acceptance. The emphasis on addressing
male impotence and female infertility can be seen as reflecting the desire to build up
the New Acholi, as can the apparent care to ensure that pregnant women were not
exposed to warfare. The ‘New Acholi’ could thus be described as a mythologised ‘Old’
Acholi, cleansed of the corruption of westernising influences, though building on
Christian messages about creating a new society.
The 1994 Peace Talks
Examination of the 1994 talks, often regarded as the closest the GoU came to seeking
peace with the LRA, reveal them as the template for subsequent GoU-LRA interactions,
in that the LRA sought recognition and control, while the GoU sought to humiliate and
belittle the LRA. Key Government negotiators included Mrs Betty Bigombe (then
Minister for Pacification of Northern Uganda), Colonel Wasswa (4th Division
Commander) and Colonel Tolit. On the LRA side the main speakers were Kony
himself, and Commanders Omona and Odego.
The LRA sought recognition through many sources; physical control over events (the
structuring of the meetings, the capacity to kill or not to kill, to eat or not to eat, etc),
but also in the terrain of tradition (who has a better grasp of it?), religion (who can use
the Bible to greater effect?), and ethnicity (who is a real Acholi?).
They chose the Atoo Hills as a venue, possibly for symbolic reasons as it was the
former base of Kilama, the UPDA commander who died shortly after coming out of the
bush in the 1988 peace talks, and was widely believed to have been killed by the NRA.
In refusing to allow the Government delegation to proceed unless they left their
weapons behind, in imposing multiple roadblocks and inspections, and in ‘cleansing’
the Government delegation with holy water, the LRA exercised further control.
In multiple ways they also determined the parameters of the discussions. They set the
Government delegation two key questions – which Kony himself then said he knew
they were not in a position to answer. They also drew heavily on discourses of
Christianity, tradition, ethnicity and race to argue their legitimacy.
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Kony’s speech makes it clear that he saw the traditional leaders as corrupted and
therefore neither legitimate nor credible negotiating partners: not only had they
blessed the rebels one moment and cursed them the next, but they failed subsequently
to carry out traditional cleansing ceremonies after cursing them. The elders were also
reminded that they had supported government-organised bow and arrow brigades,
and that, by entering the battle zone for the peace talks, they had broken with Acholi
tradition in which elders do not engage in the battle zone at all. The fear that these
comments, together with the LRA’s refusal to eat the food offered by Bigombe,
provoked in the elders, is suggested by the diarrhoea attacks some of them succumbed
to.
The emphasis on ethnicity, which is consistent with a concern for Acholi purity as
described above, is evident throughout the transcript of the meeting: the fact that
Odego, the LRA spokesman, was a Lugbara rather than an Acholi was emphasised, as
was the fact that Colonel Wasswa (the UPDF 4th Division Commander) was a
Muganda. In both cases their otherness was used to reinforce the centrality of Acholi
identity – Odego pointed out that he was convinced that the elders accompanying
Bigombe were ‘true Acholis because otherwise they would fear being killed’. Kony reminded
the elders that they had said in 1986 that a Munyankole cannot lead the Acholi, and
Tolit made much of the fact that he was himself an Acholi and that this gave him the
license to speak in the negotiations. This was not missed by Odego in his response to
Tolit (‘Son of Acholi and my brother, let me respond…’).
Race was also used to determine belonging and exclusion: ‘The white man’ was a
subtle presence at several points. At the second meeting Odego (LRA) suggests that
they should work towards a written agreement, a suggestions which Tolit (GoU)
questions on the grounds that they have successful used verbal agreements up to that
point and that if they were to ‘take it the white man’s way (munnu-munnu), ..then we must
know and see what you have written down. We have to look at it very carefully, because if
ceasefire is done the white man’s way then there are usually very many conditions!’. As such,
the white man became a metaphor for non-traditional approaches and for a failure of
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trust. By wanting something in writing, it was implied, the LRA were not just
questioning the integrity of the GOU, they were showing their own lack of integrity –
and a failure of Acholi authenticity. At a later stage Bigombe, in trying to smooth over
a difficult moment in the talks, said
we have not come here for a post-mortem, to dig for what has brought us problems, but
we have come to heal it. This is why I want us to start looking forward. The White Man
would say “we should start focussing on the future”.
She thus used the idea of the white ‘other’ as a mask behind which she could create a
shift in the dynamics, a task which would have been more difficult for her to do as an
Acholi woman, especially given that Kony regarded her as a mother who should be
looking after her children at home.
Both sides, in different ways, used an appeal to religion to justify not explaining
themselves: the LRA said they were guided by the Holy Spirit and therefore beyond
question, and the GOU said they were guided by the Bible verse which indicates that
Government authority is God-given - and that the LRA should therefore not question
them. The language of cleansing was used by the Reverend in the Government
delegation, but actualised in the process of sprinkling ‘holy water’ over the
Government delegation by the LRA before they would sit down for discussions.150
The use of discourses to mark belonging and exclusion was integral to the LRA’s
demands for recognition and validation, and to the Government’s refusal to give it.
One of the indicators of this dynamic comes in the second meeting when the LRA
opens proceedings by calling for the national anthem to be sung, a call which is usually
the prerogative of a government official (and from the video it appears that Bigombe
chose not to participate in singing the anthem). But it is the bitter exchange between
Tolit on the Government side, and Omona on the LRA side, over the use of the term
‘local’ to describe the peace negotiations, which brings this struggle into focus most
clearly.
                                                     
150 This is the ‘First water’ (Pi Kot Maleng ) described in Annex B, section 13.
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The term ‘local’ is heavily loaded in the context of severe under-development which
characterises northern Uganda. It is generally used to describe an object or process
used by people who have the aspirations but not the resources to be ‘up-to-date’. A
‘local’ car-wash, for example, is not an automatic machine with high pressure water
jets and soft brushes which pass over your vehicle while you sit inside it, but a team of
men with buckets and cloths who clean cars next to a pond or stream. ‘Local’ can also
describe an arrangement beyond official purview. The following is a pertinent
example:
If a rebel reports to the barracks and says he wants to be a homeguard there is a local
arrangement with the Intelligence Officer and Commanding Officer that they receive the
salaries of other soldiers who have been killed but are still on the payroll.151
In other words something ‘local’ is perceived as a second rate or unofficial substitute
for ‘the real thing’. Tolit’s description of the peace talks as ‘local’ suggested that it was
not necessary for the Government to invest serious resources into the process, and
seemed calculated to belittle the importance of the LRA. His subsequent stress on how
important the process was to Uganda as a whole, not just to the Acholi, is
correspondingly questionable.
Omona vehemently rejected any suggestion that the LRA had been defeated and
wanted recognition of the fact that these were negotiations, not surrender by the LRA.
The whole discussion about who was present and who was absent is evidence of the
importance of receiving and withholding recognition; Museveni never attended, and
Kony on the second occasion sent Omona as a representative, and both sides were
suspicious of the sincerity of the others as a result. O’Kadameri’s account suggests that
the LRA had reason to be suspicious:
It is imperative to note the ad hoc nature of this process. At no time were the top
army leadership including the President willing to tell Bigombe unambiguously
that she was doing the right thing and had their full support (2002: 38)
There was also a thinly veiled sense of superiority in some of the Government
statements, as when Tolit used Paul’s letter to the Romans to say that at the end of the
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day the Government knew what was best. The LRA reacted by pointing out the
Government’s attitude (for example, Omona said ‘let us stop despising one another’), and
by the use of irony. There was something of the velvet gloved fist in Kony’s comment
that from the SPLA-GOU relationship the LRA had learned the value of friendship,
and thinly veiled sarcasm in Odego’s reminder of the Acholi proverb that ‘doing things
in a hurry gave the hyena its spots – like an army uniform’.152
Whether or not Tolit’s personal animus against the LRA was allowed to prevail over
the government position is debatable. While the LRA played on Tolit in an attempt to
create divisions within the Government delegation, O’Kadameri’s account suggests
that Tolit did represent the more hard-line position in Government and that Bigombe
and Wasswa were more or less on their own. This view is supported by Museveni’s
repeated statements that he would never negotiate with the LRA.
Discussion
Overall the findings indicate that the LRA-GoU war is a real part of the situation in
northern Uganda, but the nature of both parties and of their involvement is
substantially different to the way they are generally portrayed, and the nature of the
war therefore also has to be reassessment. Although the findings confirm some
elements of what the LRA did which dominate most characterisations, they also nuance
the stereotype and in some regards diverge considerably. Similarly, the analysis of the
Government’s interventions indicates that beneath the appearance of taking steps to
end the war the opposite was happening.
Thus the LRA’s raids and abductions are confirmedly brutal, with no mercy shown for
those who could not sustain the pace, and killings a part of a process of deliberate
intimidation of survivors, as well as a security measure. However, child abduction,
while a reality, is shown to be the lesser part of a far larger pattern of adult abduction
and a degree of voluntary recruitment. And in terms of what the LRA was, it appears
that, rather than a somewhat chaotic and poorly organised bunch of bandits carrying
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out these acts without any purpose other than their immediate survival, it was
relatively organised, rational and motivated. Though it did engage in heavy looting
from civilians, this was a means to an end rather than an end in itself, and as such does
not support the implications of terms such as ‘bandits’ and statements such as ‘They
are not intent on fighting Ugandan government soldiers, they have come to steal’.153
Although the reliance on brutality and the centrality of Kony and the Spirits to the
organisation encouraged some observers to dismiss the LRA’s motivations as ‘vague’,
‘ill-defined’, and essentially unimportant, it was perhaps the juxtapostion of these
behaviours, and the incorporation of spiritual, religious and political agendas - in
disregard of somewhat euro-centric concerns with categorisation – which lay at the
heart of the LRA’s resilience. By playing them off against each other at different times
and for different purposes they allowed Kony, in his capacity as a spirit medium, to
maintain a tight grip and a degree of independence for himself.
The spiritual element is clear in the four controlling spirits for whom Kony is a
medium, and also in the use of non-conventional ‘weapons’ such as ‘first water’ and
‘white stones’. Whether he was a true medium for the spirits, or he used the spirits as a
medium through which to channel his own wishes, is impossible to ascertain. It
appears that, whichever is the case, many of his members had great belief in his
predictive powers, allowing him to command considerable respect - the fact that the
soldiers who had begun to dialogue with Government inside Uganda in 2001 went
back when called by Kony despite having been loaned equipment and granted safe
passage, is some indicator of the hold he exercised over them. Unlike the HSM, though,
some of whose soldiers stormed forward armed only with rocks and water, the LRA
was further armed with hi-tech equipment such as Geographical Positioning Systems,
radios and satellite telephones, as well as weapons captured during clashes with the
UPDF and SPLA.
The religious elements are to be found in Kony’s description of the LRA as a Godly
organisation on a mission to bring the ten commandments to Uganda, and in the
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existence of a whole cadre of ‘controllers’ whose functions in all aspects of the
organisation are akin to those of priests. As indicated by the day of prayer being Friday
rather than Sunday, this was more than Christian fundamentalism, it also
accommodated elements of Islam.
The political element, as evidenced in the wish to overthrow the Museveni government
(and the ‘Tutsi Empire’), was also unequivocal - as was the wish to deal with the
‘corruption’ of the present day. The LRA clearly attempted to communicate a political
agenda to the civilian population, unattractive though it was to the Government, state-
centric UN organisations, and NGOs embedded in western models of political systems.
There was thus no choice to be made between the LRA being a political, religious or
indeed animist organisation, for it contained elements of all three under a military
umbrella, and its members were both volunteers and conscripts, with correspondingly
heterogeneous motivations and grievances.  In its somewhat millenarian claim to be a
war against evil and its ambition to create a ‘new Acholi’ (Acholi manyen), carried over
from the earlier Holy Spirit movement, the LRA to an extent integrated the three
elements, and can be seen offering at least the appearance of an opportunity to pursue
one or other of them. This probably enlarged the pool of external actors who saw in the
LRA a possible vehicle for their own agendas – thus the Sudanese support for political
training for LRA members, the attempt by the WNBF to join forces in 1997, and the
EDF’s openness to overtures in 2000. That the organisation was seen as a potential
political threat by the Government is suggested by the rapidity with which at least two
avenues to communicating a political agenda to civilians were promptly shut down by
them. This was perhaps in recognition of the fact that key LRA members at times
enjoyed substantial inputs in the form of training, both in military technology and of a
more political nature, part of a complex relationship between the LRA and the
Government of Sudan which reveals neither complete dependence nor a position as
‘dogs of war’.
Within the organisation the three-in-one formula had its uses for both leaders and
followers. Leaders never needed to explain any action entirely in terms of one or the
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other of the three components. Decisions did not have to conform to the internal logic
of any one of the three strands, and ultimate explanations could always be attributed
elsewhere. But it was not just the leaders who could benefit from this fluidity of
emphasis. Although the psychology of LRA members is generally discussed in terms of
end-states such as ‘brutalised’, ‘traumatised’ and ‘fearful’, something rather more
complex probably happened over time, a necessary adjustment by abductees to their
new situation, however unwillingly they were drawn into it. Yes, they were exposed to
and forced to participate in brutal activities – but it is not clear that this turned them all
into brutes.154  Alongside the brutality there was an eclectic mixture of Christianity,
spiritualism, and politics to choose from for the purpose of explaining to themselves
why they were there. Abductees therefore probably came to a compromise with the
reality they found themselves in and ‘bought into’ at least one of the elements of the
LRA’s discourse (especially if their escape options were limited), pretending to believe
in the others as and when necessary for their survival.
Indeed, people would not necessarily see any tensions or contradictions between these
elements, for they are all to be found within civil society. It is notable that in the
speeches of Kony and Omona they make no attempt to explain them away. It is only in
materials of the London-based LRM, targeted at an audience in which politics has been
largely secularised, that we find the need to explain away the religious overtones in the
name Lord’s Resistance Army, and the vehement denial of a Christian fundamentalist
component.
Successfully containing such potentially contradictory elements within one body
appears to have contributed to the LRA resilience, given that the organisation survived
far longer than any other Ugandan rebel group since 1986. But the very complexity of
the LRA’s discourses and agenda was at times also a weakness. They enabled a rather
heterogeneous set of people to be accommodated within one organisation, but they
                                                     
154 There are several indicators that elements of solidarity did survive the ‘brutalisation’; new abductees
were warned by old hands to hide their feelings and intention, Jacob let his friends know his intentions to
leave, and the feelings described when they are leaving Khartoum for Uganda seem very normal.
Furthermore, people established families which, as Jacob’s account suggests, at times attempted to stay
together even when no longer under the compulsion of the LRA.
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could not create a homogeneous understanding of what they were fighting for, either
within the organisation or outside it. In addition, even where one or other element of
the agenda made sense, the ugliness of the LRA’s military tactics were an obstacle to
popular support. New recruits were told that ‘LRA as a rebel movement has no room to
spare for our enemies because whenever we go for battle we kill, we murder, we rob and loot
without being sympathetic to our enemies’. In other words, a virtue was made out of the
very feature of the LRA which most detracted from the possibility of winning wider
support.
A related weakness is that while all three elements of the LRA agenda co-existed, they
were not equal. The spirits appeared to be the core of Kony’s power base, and
individuals who attempted to ‘modernise’ the LRA through emphasising more
recognisably ‘western’ approaches did not fare well. Any ‘moderniser’ in the LRA was
confronted with the fact that Kony had made the creation of a ‘New Acholi’ the
centrepiece of the LRA’s vision, and was thus unable to climb outside an ethnic
framework. Although he tried to overcome this by declaring all newcomers as ‘New
Acholi’, in practice he failed, and non-Acholi who saw in the LRA a potential vehicle
for their political agendas, were frustrated by the ethnicised command structures.
Furthermore, the refusal of various political representatives to return from Khartoum
to the camps when called, can be read as indicators of a loss of control by Kony.
Given that many abductees were Acholi in origin, this might not have been a major
problem, but it is unclear whether the impact of decades of displacement on Acholi
culture (see Chapters 5-7), would increase or decrease the resonance of an appeal to a
mythologised past Acholi way of life - the more so when the LRA’s actions had
contributed to inducing dread, debilitation and disorientation in the population in
general.  Furthermore, internal grievances were created by the extreme degree of
control exercised over people. Even volunteer members could not always abide the
many regulations. People thus decided to appear to conform but were often just biding
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their time.155 The fact that Kony became involved in micro-managing processes such as
the selection of women for individual soldiers, when combined with its importance as
a form of regulation, strongly suggests that the LRA could never grow beyond a
certain size.
                                                     
155 The Nairobi agreement in December 1999 did create an avenue for escape, in that prior to that an
escapee could expect little sympathy if they headed north to Juba – indeed, even in early 2001 Jacob and
his colleague feared they might be sent back to the LRA by the Sudanese intelligence. Equally, to head
south was to face severe obstacles.
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Further nuancing the characterisations – local context
It is important in this discussion to also stress that, while the LRA may have been
‘among the most brutal [rebels] in Africa’156 they were by no means unique, whether in
their methods, world-view, or political agenda. There are clear historical precedents
both in northern Uganda and elsewhere, all of which allow its excesses and apparently
unique practices to be put in comparative perspective.
In northern Uganda points of comparison are to be found with the ‘Nubis’ of the turn
of the century and the Holy Spirit Movement of the 1980s. The former, a group of just
100 mutineers, kept the whole Acholi area in a state of unrest and turmoil, and were
regarded by the incoming British administrator, Delmé-Radcliffe, as the principal
obstacle to stability there. When he launched a campaign against them in April 1901,
the Nubis, as the LRA were to do nearly a century later, divided into smaller groups
and proved extremely difficult to track down, not least because they intimidated the
local population into keeping their location secret.
The worldview of the LRA, generally dismissed as obscure and irrational, is closely
related to that of the HSM. These include the centrality of spirits in decision-making
processes, complex initiation and cleansing rituals, various prohibitions, and the Holy
Spirit Tactics, which Behrend describes ‘as a way of combining modern Western
military techniques with ritual practices’ (1998: 115).
Although they differ in some details, the prohibitions documented here resemble those
documented by Allen more than ten years earlier (1991: 377). The admixture of
mystical (e.g. if you eat certain foods you are more vulnerable in battle) and obviously
pragmatic (e.g. no drinking or smoking), is strongly reminiscent of the HSM’s
prohibitions. Similarly, the way military success and failure alike confirmed Kony’s
predictions (if you fail it is because you have not obeyed the spirits or you are unclean)
is identical to the controlling behaviour of Alice Lakwena and processes of
                                                     
156 New Vision, 18 November 1998, Rebels pose as saints on Internet.
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culpabilization found in the HSM (Behrend 1999: 45). The prohibitions of the LRA are
also similar to those described by Lan (1985: ch 9) for ZANLA in Zimbabwe.
Practices of anointment, as well as resembling the HSM’s ‘Holy Spirit Tactics’, are also
to be found in earlier history. Anywar (1948: 75), for example, records how Nubis
stationed in present day Gulu in 1889, fled when they learned that Arabs were coming
from the Sudan, because they had heard rumours ‘that they [the Arabs] anointed
themselves with a preparation which rendered them immune from attack, even from
gunshot’. There is nothing new, then, in the idea that either the HSM or the LRA could
protect themselves from being shot by anointing themselves before battle. The
ceremonies in the yard for new abductees echo earlier Acholi ones for captives taken
from other clans during slave raids, wherein a captive would be taken to his captor’s
ancestor shrine, where ‘one of the old women sprinkled on him a mixture of flour and
water…’ after which he would be fed special foods for several days, have his head
shaved and his clothes changed (Girling, 1960: 108-109).
The use of gender as an internal control mechanism was derived directly from the
broader society. Although there were women soldiers, and although there was no
differentiation between men and women when it came to making them kill, or be killed
(Annex B, section 1.1-1.2), gender roles inside the LRA conformed closely to very
stereotypical ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ ones held in northern Uganda more generally
(see Chapter 7)  – and this is evident from the moment Jacob is abducted. Boys were
chained together, girls were not, being made instead to carry looted goods (Annex B,
section 1). Women were regarded as the property of men. Indeed, Kony’s attempts to
intervene in relations between men and women, an attempt to realise his commitment
to establishing a purity he felt had been lost in modern-day Uganda, would have
considerable resonance with Acholi traditionalists. His statement to Bigombe, during
the peace talks of 1994, that she has ‘a good feeling for a mother who should be looking after
her children at home’ (see below), makes his position clear. Somewhat ironically
therefore, he voiced the very concerns expressed by many Acholi about social
breakdown and the loss of their value system – concerns which have ‘uncontrolled’
(i.e. not controlled by elders) sexual relations at their very heart.
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The belief that it is possible (and important) to communicate with the spirits of ‘dead’
persons, and that they have a major responsibility for what befalls the living, is in no
way peculiar to the LRA, and would make sense to many Acholi, such beliefs having
been well documented amongst both Ugandan and Sudanese Acholi. Ogot (1961)
describes how ‘there is no direct personal relationship between God and man; and
therefore the only means of reaching God is through the prophets or ancestors’. He
argues that only those souls who are unable to communicate with the living are
‘completely dead’;
The other departed souls, that is, those who are only 'dead', are as much part of
the society as living members. They are 'fed', appealed to during hard times, and
at funerals, greetings are sent to them by the living relatives. (Ogot 1961: 128)
More than a decade later, a Norwegian Church Aid report considering the culture of
Sudanese Acholi similarly describes how ‘The spirit of the dead is believed to take a
profound interest in the activities of their descendants, and for being responsible for
most of the good – and much of the evil too – that befalls them’ (Storas, 1975: 7-8).
During my fieldwork the issue of spirit mediums did surface. At a meeting in 1998 one
pastor the medium for the Koch clan as In such a belief system, just as there was
nothing unusual about Alice Lakwena being a spirit medium (Allen, 1991), so Joseph
Kony was unexceptional. The Koch Clan was described to me by a pastor as having a
spirit medium who was ‘like a radio receiver’ with ‘ no memory of the messages she
transmits. …The problem was to inform the medium when she was not in a trance of the things
she had said when she was in the trance’.157   
Such comparisons suggest that the LRA’s politics are situated in and shaped by
reactions to far broader processes of social and political change, as were the HSM’s,
and should be understood in terms of their societal logic rather than the logic of the
individuals involved. Allen’s exploration of the response to outbreaks of sorcery and
witchcraft in the Madi area of northern Uganda in the 1980s is useful in this regard. He
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argues that these outbreaks, which themselves were in response to socio-political
changes and stresses, were dealt with by female diviners and healers who cut across
the authority of (male) ritual elders.  Paradoxically, therefore, their attempts to restore
order did not reverse social change, they established a new order which confirmed
some of the underlying social changes which gave rise to disorder in the first place.
The new was legitimated by integrating it with practices from the past, albeit
somewhat re-framed (Allen, 1991; 385).  In Madi the language of Christianity enabled
the practice of spirit possession to be re-legitimated under the new order; spirit
mediums claimed to be ‘prophets’ rather than ‘ajwaka’, they communicated not with
‘jok’ but with ‘tipu’, and (with the encouragement and collaboration of Resistance
Council leaders (and indeed the knowledge of the Church)) sought to cleanse ‘their
neighbourhood of lajok, ‘witches’, and lawol, ‘sorcerers’, some of whom might well be
their own competitors,’ thereby helping to establish ‘viable communities’ (Allen, 1991,
1995). In conclusion, Allen says
We begin to see why Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony were not just dismissed as
lunatics, and how resonant their ideas were when linked with long-term local
historical and cultural processes. (1991; 393)
Nuancing the characterisations –Comparative experiences
The LRA can be contextualised not just within northern Uganda, but within
comparative experiences of rebel movements elsewhere. As Kaldor notes in her
discussion of ‘new wars’, the fusion of guerrilla tactics of evading direct confrontation
with counterinsurgency tactics of promoting ‘fear and hatred’ rather than winning
‘hearts and minds’, were a characteristic of war in the 1990s. Most rebel groups enjoy
various forms of support from external sources, including taking refuge in rear bases in
neighbouring countries – indeed, the presence of the SPLA in Gulu and Kitgum
districts was testimony to this. The use of children is also widespread, and assertions
that ‘almost uniquely to this rebel group, [they, the LRA] abduct children to join their
forces’158 were patently untrue. Use of child soldiers was unusual neither in Uganda nor
in many other armies on the continent. The NRA itself was famous for its kadogos in the
                                                     
158 BBC News – Crossing Continents, 2 November 2000, Uganda’s rebel war.
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1980s, and in the 1990s UPDF instructors provided 3-6 months infantry and weapons
training for children recruited into rebel forces in the DRC.159 Rebel forces such as the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone are well known for having under-
age youth under arms. Even the use of mutilation is not uncommon, with clear
parallels between the LRA’s methods, those of RENAMO in Mozambique in the 1980s
(HRW, 1992:43), and of the RUF in Sierra Leone in the 1990s (Richards, 1996: 6). And
Girling describes how, historically, ‘the solitary killing from ambush of women and
even children of another domain’ was one means whereby an Acholi man could
acquire the nying moi, or ‘killer name’, the third of the three names he would acquire in
his lifetime (1960: 102).
When coming to the supposedly bizarre behaviours of Kony, close parallels can also be
drawn with the role of spirits in the guerilla movements in Shonaland, Zimbabwe, as
described by Lan (1985). He argues that the guerrillas gained legitimacy through
associating with spirit mediums whose own source of political credibility with the
peasantry was their rejection of colonial norms and structures.  In particular, because
under British rule the chiefs ‘had become minor civil servants with the power of
constables’ (1985: 137), the peasants were keen to shift allegiances to the dead (i.e. pre-
colonial) chiefs (Mhondoro) whose spirits they communicated with through the
mediums.  The guerrillas thus succeeded because of their capacity to be seen by the
peasantry as aligned with pre-colonial history and power structures.
In similar vein, Kony offered himself as a medium to spiritual authorities outside
unpopular terrestrial structures, authorities who, furthermore, as in ‘traditional’ Acholi
beliefs, were intermediaries between human beings and God/Jok. Kony’s Holy Spirits
correspond broadly with the mhondoro, though while the LRA spirits are eclectic in
their origins, the mhondoro were specifically the spirits of chiefs of the past. Joseph
Kony and the Holy Spirit secretary correspond closely to the spirit mediums and their
assistants, the mutapi:
                                                     
159 Amnesty International (Campaign against Child Soldiers), April 2001.
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The medium requires the mutapi because he needs help when he is possessed,
and also because he is a stranger within the province of his spirit, whereas the
mutapi is familiar with the area. (1985: 61)160
In this system, even if the medium is making conscious decisions under the guise of
being possessed, this cannot be acknowledged. Lan argues that the source of the
energy of the spirit/medium system lies in the ‘creativity of the medium’, but that this
has to be ‘successfully (though unconsciously) concealed and denied’ ... ‘consensus and
innovation must be delicately balanced if the medium is to survive. A successful
medium must develop great skills in leading simultaneously from the front and from
behind’ (1985: 67). It appears that Joseph Kony generally succeeded in establishing and
maintaining this balance. Having to refer all major decisions to Spirits was of course a
useful mechanism for making unaccountable decisions and thus made it difficult for
others to engage with. Allen notes that during the peace talks with the UPDA in 1988
attempts to negotiate with Kony’s group  ‘proved impossible, since so many issues had
to be referred back to the spirits.’(Allen, 1991: 374)
In sum, the LRA should not be considered as in any significant sense exceptional, and
interpretations of it which suggest that it is should be regarded with a degree of
scepticism. To the extent that it succeeded in accommodating multiple agendas, the
LRA acquired a certain resilience. It could both take passengers on board, such as the
WNBF soldiers, and it could itself become a passenger, as when it received support
from the Government of Sudan. This might explain the paradox that it failed to have a
decisive impact on the political landscape of Uganda on the one hand, yet it obstinately
refused to go away on the other.  It was thus both better organised and, in a sense,
more motivated, than it was generally made out to be.
However, it was also intrinsically self-limiting. When it failed to integrate its non-
Acholi passengers as full ‘members’ in its vision of a pre-modern Acholi future, they
fell away. Although tens of thousands of abductees passed through the hands of the
LRA over the years, the majority escaped, and many others were killed. The core was
                                                     
160 Paul Okodi, the Holy Spirit Secretary, was in the HSM under Alice Lakwena.
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therefore necessarily pretty small, though not without skills. And to the extent that
Kony insisted on micro-management, it had to remain that way.
When this fact is placed alongside the scale of the UPDF, particularly when operating
jointly with the SPLA and with ‘non-lethal’ support from the US, it seems improbable
that the LRA could have survived for so long had the UPDF really wished to deal with
them. If Delmé-Radcliffe could track down the Nubis at the turn of the twentieth
century, why could the Ugandan Government not do the same with the LRA?  When
reviewing the Government’s various military and non-military initiatives to deal with
the LRA, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that while they all bolster an appearance
of doing the right thing, there was little political will behind these appearances,
whether to bring closure to the situation or to generate support from civil society in
northern Uganda.
An appraisal of the Government’s initiatives
Although there were always individuals with good intentions, most strikingly
Bigombe, they worked without substantive support from their leaders.
Contrary to the view that the 1994 peace talks were a moment of real opportunity, they
effectively heralded a dramatic escalation of the scale of war, and are more aptly
described as ‘war talk’ than ‘peace talks’. Colonel Tolit’s provocations and President
Museveni’s ultimatum can be read as a microcosm of, and contribution to a wider
attempt by the Government to humiliate and discount the rebels which only served to
entrench them in an oppositional mode, and created the space for further militarism on
the part of the Government. The humiliation must have been the more keenly felt as,
contrary to portrayals of it as irrational, the LRA clearly had leadership elements who
could engage in intellectual sparring on equal terms with the Government
representatives.
The pattern of provocative belittling and humiliation by the Government, followed by
increased violence by those humiliated, appears to be a key dynamic in this war; it
seemed that the Government was bent on goading the LRA back to violence whenever
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they were quiet for too long. The signing of a Carter Centre mediated peace accord
between the GoU and GoS on 8 December 1999 was another clear instance. This failed
to incorporate the LRA, reinforcing the message that the LRA was not of central
importance and triggering a resumption of violence by the LRA. Only in February 2000
did Carter Center representatives somewhat belatedly meet Kony and other LRA
leaders in Nsitu, Sudan.
Attempts to belittle the LRA were evident not just at these key events, they were
ongoing and integral to the Government’s dominant mind-set. Although in 1998 the
then Minister of State for Northern Uganda, Owiny Dollo, obtained financial support
from the Belgian government ‘to help him pursue peace talks…’ along with other non-
military initiatives such as ‘granting amnesty to rebels and persuading the Sudanese
government to stop backing Kony’,161 the Government’s more usual argument was that
“There is no compromise with these terrorists and criminals…”,162 and that there was
nothing to negotiate with, ‘because their struggle is aimless….’.163 This position went
hand in hand with what Gersony described as ‘the NRA’s excessive confidence in its
ability to launch heroic efforts to quickly defeat its enemy’. In March 1998, for example,
during the same visit to Amuru camp in which he apologised for the army’s failings,
Museveni also
…gave fresh ultimatum to the LRA rebels whom he refers to as “bandits”.
“Either the rebels come out of the bush and live with you or we shall exterminate
them”, he said. He said he is in Gulu to see to it that complete security is restored
in Gulu and people return to their homes in a few months.164
A few months later, when the LRA carried out raids in Teso, the UPDF claimed to have
‘trapped’ them (see Chapter 3). Major General Salim Saleh, Overseer in the Ministry of
Defence (and the President’s half-brother) reportedly regarded the LRA’s move into
Lira and Teso as
                                                     
161 New Vision, 25 June 1998, Kony peace talks: Belgium to help.
162 New Vision, 20 June 1998, Museveni rejects rebel compromise.
163 The Monitor, 23 February 1998, UPDF boss says no peace-talks.
164 The Monitor, 18 March 1998, UPDF occupy hills at Sudan border.
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…a golden chance for the army to wipe them [the LRA] out. … He said the rebels
have now been blocked from retreating into Sudan and will soon be wiped out
from inside Uganda.165
In the event – as on so many prior and subsequent occasions - the LRA readily evaded
attempts to surround them.
The Government’s habit of talking peace while making war shaped its responses to
repeated calls for non-military solutions to be pursued. In March 1996 a group of
Acholi elders met with President Museveni and called for a non-military solution. In
January 1997 Acholi MPs on the Parliamentary Sessional Committee on Defense and
Foreign Affairs appended a minority report challenging the Committee’s
recommendation of the continued pursuit of a military solution. In April 1997, at
Kacokke Madit’s first meeting, the Government was urged to pursue a non-military
solution. In early 1998 the British NGO International Alert called on the GoU, Acholi
elders and LRA ‘to give dialogue another chance in order to end insurgency in the
north’.166 Numerous newspaper articles pointed out the hollowness of Museveni’s
military promises and urged him to engage in talks (e.g. East African Impact, Week
ending March 15 1998, The Monitor 18 March 1998 Offer Kony’s men a deal’, The East
African May 18-24 ‘Gov’t Should Talk to Rebels’)
The Government responded to such calls by adopting a compromise position in which
it pursued the military option while appearing to allow non-military alternatives to be
pursued in parallel by civil society actors. This position was captured in the New
Vision of 19 June 1998 when two articles were printed side by side on the front page.
One, under the title ‘Talk peace, Commission pleads’, reported the Uganda Human
Rights Commission’s appeal to the Government to hold peace talks. The other, under
the title ‘No Kony talks, Museveni insists’, reported that ‘President Yoweri Museveni
has vowed not to talk to the rebels. However, he said he had no objection to other
people trying to negotiate with them’.167 He thereby not only ignored an important civil
                                                     
165 Sunday Vision, 24 May 1998, Saleh blocks rebel retreat.
166 New Vision, 10 February 1998, UK group calls for dialogue on war.
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society voice, he also demonstrated the blurring of the line between his personal
animus against the LRA and the Government’s official position, a blurring which
remained a constant throughout the war.
What this meant in practice was soon found out by the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace
Initiative. Since its founding 1998, ARLPI had had some success in establishing
dialogue with the LRA. Its later meetings with the LRA, however, were disrupted by
UPDF attacks, as happened in Pajule on 26 April 2001 (ARLPI, 2002b). Such attacks
were explained away as being due to a ‘lack of co-ordination’ between the GoU’s
interlocutors and the UPDF, but dealt a severe dent to talks. The situation was further
aggravated when the Government banned all contact between the ARLPI and the LRA
for some time. These consistent attempts to undermine the religious leaders’ attempts
to act as go-betweens suggest that they represented something of a threat to the state’s
agenda, which increasingly appeared to be to ensure that non-military solutions would
fail.
It was not just religious leaders who were undermined. Over the years the pool of
people in a position to enter into dialogue with the LRA was progressively reduced,
with many key individuals coming under attack as ‘collaborators’ for their efforts to
support meetings. Yusuf Adek, the key link person for the Bigombe peace talks in
1993/4, was arrested and charged with treason in 2001 and detained for over a year. By
2004 he was, unsurprisingly, no longer prepared to act as a link person, despite
approaches from a range of interested parties. Offers to initiate contact made by
various other groups who felt they had some link with the LRA, appear to have been
turned down. For example, one fieldworker in Odek, himself an Internal Security
Operative, claimed that on 20th March 1999 a group of elders, local government officials
and relatives of Kony from Odek sub-county, went to Kampala but were unsuccessful
in seeing the President ‘just because their movement from Gulu to Kampala was not known
to any of the top government leaders in Gulu District like the R.D.C., LCV Chairman,
DISO’.168 I was also told in January 2004 that offers by Concerned Parents Association
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to make contacts with the LRA were ignored. For civil society in northern Uganda the
Government’s refusal to engage with these alternative proposals was alienating - and
also suggestive of more than a lack of political will on the part of the Government.
The same reluctance to engage seriously with non-military solutions was manifest in
the Amnesty Act of 2000. The development of the Act, while it to an important extent
captured civilian aspirations for a peaceful and non-retributive solution, again failed to
include the LRA, and was entered into and extended with visible reluctance on the part
of the President, who made repeated statements that it should not apply to the LRA’s
leadership. Its implementation with regard to the LRA was at best lethargic,
particularly when contrasted with how it was used with UNRFII. It was also a further
instance of uni-lateral decision making by the Government, with wording designed to
make very clear who the winners and losers were.169 Put in place in January 2000, it
was extended repeatedly. Prior to its extension on 17 January 2004, the Government
announced plans to amend it to exclude the top leadership of the LRA, despite the fact
that members of the Amnesty Commission, as well as civil society, remained keen for it
to apply to all members of the LRA.170 The extension was eventually made under
duress, as the World Bank threatened to withhold US $3.2 million for a Special Project
for 15,300 irregular forces in Uganda if there were no extension. Having begrudgingly
extended it by six months, the Government subsequently announced that the extension
would in fact only hold for three months.171 Just prior to its expiry, the British Minister
for International Development, Hilary Benn, encouraged the GoU to extend it
further.172
                                                     
169 In the event it proved of greater benefit in resolving other insurgencies than in helping to address the
war in the north. LRA reporters in the first three years accounted for only 39.6% or two fifths of all
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December 2003, reproduced in The Monitor newspaper 27th December 2003, p 4. See also  “Uganda to Step
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171 IRIN, 23 January 2004, Government curtails amnesty extension.
172 IRIN, 7 April 2004, Extend amnesty for northern rebels, UK minister tells
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152
The Amnesty process was never adequately resourced, and there were some doubts
about differential distributions of funding to different returnee groups.173  In theory
persons granted amnesty were to be offered a resettlement package including non-food
items and a cash payment of 243,000 Uganda shillings (approx £10).174 In practice, of
the 2600 reporters (term used to describe persons applying for the amnesty) registered
in Gulu as of 20th January 2004, only a small number had received kits.175   Similarly, of
the 1780 registered reporters in Kitgum district (1392 male, 388 female), 991 had
received their amnesty certificates, but only 222 had received their resettlement
packages.176 This lack of resettlement packages may have hampered the utility of the
amnesty for LRA returnees.177 It is also likely that news filtered back to the potential
amnesty seekers both of reporters being killed by the LRA itself (at least four cases of
reporters being killed by the LRA in Kitgum and Pader), and also of the UPDF coercing
reporters into joining them rather than allowing them to reintegrate into civilian life
(the LRA member whose account I present in Annex B, refused and is known to have
been killed as a result).
For higher-ranking members of the LRA – and those seeking to engage in dialogue
with them - the Amnesty Act was further undermined by the Anti-Terrorism Act of
2002178 and Operation Iron Fist which began at the same time (see Chapter 3). Yet more
evidence of the Government’s lack of commitment to non-violent solutions was
furnished by Museveni’s decision in January 2004 to refer Kony to the newly
established International Criminal Court for investigation. In making the referral he
had a televised meeting with the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, creating the impression
                                                     
173 Main funding sources were EU, DANIDA, Irish Government. According to one Amnesty Commission
official, the US did not give much because ‘they prefer the military side of the story’.
174 Payments were not standard. One group of 403 former WNBF members received Ush 500,000/= each
(The Sunday Monitor, 18 January 2004 Homecoming after 23 years).
175 Amnesty Commission, Kitgum 21st January 2004.
176 Amnesty Commission, Kitgum DRT office, January 20th, 2004, Projected Activities for the Kitgum DRT
office, January – June 2004.
177 On 3 January 2002 one of Museveni’s advisors, Kakooza Mutale, declared that returning rebels had no
right to receive resettlement packages from Government – ARLPI Chronology 2002.
178 Act number 14 of 2002.
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that the ICC was already working hand in hand with the government before the
decision to investigate had even been taken.179
For those working at the ICC this was a public relations blunder which they would
struggle to recover from. Although at a memorial service in Barlonyo IDP camp
following a massacre there in February, Museveni, said (in typically hectoring style)
that, ‘You [LRA] still have a chance to come out…[under amnesty] But if you do not,
you die’,180 the referral flew in the face of the principles of blanket forgiveness built into
the Amnesty Act, provoking considerable concern in civil society circles. In the view of
the Chairman of the Amnesty Commission a reconciliation process would have been
preferable, 181 and Acholi politicians warned that prosecution of Kony before the ICC
“is not healthy as it could scare Kony into killing more people”.182 Religious leaders
saw it as making dialogue even more difficult, and children’s rights organisations, such
as Concerned Parents Association, meeting with the ICC Prosecutor, expressed
concerns it would bring down even harsher punishments on abducted children who
might have witnessed atrocities. It also wrong-footed the US Administration, who had
begun calling for the GoU to negotiate with Kony and were even beginning to fund
their own ‘Northern Uganda Peace Initiative’.
Effectively, by making the referral to the ICC, the GoU had once again undermined
civil society calls for reconciliation, and directed the spotlight at the LRA as the cause
of all the problems. By accepting the referral with alacrity, the ICC played into this -
thereby reducing people’s confidence in the ICC as an impartial institution. These
dynamics prompted a public statement from Amnesty International which welcomed
the ICC Prosecutor’s announcement, but stressed that any investigation “must be part
of a comprehensive plan to end impunity for all such crimes, regardless of which side
committed them and of the level of the perpetrator”.183
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When Operation Iron Fist is added to this picture, the Government’s lack of
commitment to a solution seems further demonstrated. For notwithstanding their
serious weaknesses, at the time when the Operation was launched both the Nairobi
Accord and the Amnesty were beginning to show some beneficial consequences for
northern Uganda in the form of slowly rising numbers of returnees and tentative steps
towards contacts mediated through the religious leaders. Yet Operation Iron Fist,
rather than crushing the LRA, crushed these signs of hope. It aggravated the military
and humanitarian situation beyond anybody’s worst fears, bringing it to a point which
justified unprecedented levels of militarisation but still failed to bring a definitive
solution.  Furthermore, by obstinately declaring its preference for a military option,
despite the majority of actors calling for the opposite, the Government showed a
serious disregard for popular opinion in the north, thereby guaranteeing the continued
alienation of the civilian population whose support it could have been wooing.
One interpretation, as already referred to above, is that there were vested economic
interests involved. But by contrast with a situation such as DRC, where the economic
gains to be made were truly substantial, in northern Uganda they are better regarded
as the opportunistic exploitation of opportunities created by the Government’s (non-
economic) motivations for wishing the conflict to continue. As such, the vested
economic interests cannot offer a full explanation for the war’s continuation.
Another interpretation is that the Government’s behaviour was not so much a matter
of political will as political immaturity, and that key government members were
simply unable to rise above their personal animus against the LRA and respond to the
LRA’s demand for recognition without too high a political cost to themselves. The
LRA’s demands were after all fairly evident: Many of its actions, including the killing
of one of their own members in front of the peace delegation in order to show ‘that we
still have power’, the violence following Museveni’s ultimatum in 1994, the violence
following the 1999 peace accord in which the LRA had no say and in which it felt
betrayed by the Sudanese government, and the poor take-up of the Amnesty Act of
2000, can be interpreted as reactions to this combination of hubris and humiliation.
They all demonstrated that even if the Government refused to take the LRA seriously
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in talks, it would have to take them seriously militarily. They constituted a clear
demand for recognition and acknowledgement; from a psychological perspective
alone, it is clear why the LRA insisted emphatically that ‘we are not surrendering’.
Instead of finding a way to give such recognition, the Government’s actions seemed
shaped by a determination to humiliate the LRA. 184 Its appointment of a woman as
chief negotiator may have been interpreted as a calculated insult to the LRA’s
masculinity, and certainly some Government representatives (notably Col. Tolit) used
the peace talks of 1994 as an opportunity to seek to humiliate and belittle the LRA’s
representatives, thereby consolidating the LRA’s sense of grievance against the
Government (see also Finnström, 2003: 300-303). This dynamic of treating them as
marginal – or ‘local’ - was perpetuated in the build-up to the Nairobi accord of 1999,
and the attempt to belittle them verbally was kept alive not just by the Government of
Uganda, but by comments such as that of Hilary Clinton that ‘The LRA call themselves
soldiers but they are cowards’. 185
Many people believed that, had it wished to, the Government could have pursued a
negotiated settlement. It had done so with the UPDA in 1988, with the Teso insurgency
in the early 1990s, and with the UNRFII in the late 1990s.186 Museveni himself was
personally involved in mediating the Somali peace talks in Kenya at which he
reportedly ‘deployed the rhetoric of black African nationalism to call for an end to
what he termed the “slow genocide” in Somalia’.187 He was also praised by the Nobel
Peace Prize Committee ‘for his efforts in helping resolve regional conflicts and
combating the spread of HIV/AIDS’,188 acclamation which for those familiar with
northern Uganda seemed perverse in the extreme.189 The glaring divergence between
                                                     
184 In a New Vision article of 5 February 1998, it was reported that handwritten leaflets were distributed in
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talks).
185 The Monitor, 26 March 1998, Mrs Clinton blasts Kony.
186 African Rights, May 2002: 9.
187 The East African, January 12 – 18, 2004.
188 New Vision, 29 May 2004, Museveni possible Nobel candidate.
189 It was only one in a whole series of accolades for Museveni: in June 2004, for example, he was awarded
the ‘Golden Plate Award’ by the Washington DC-based Academy of Achievement Foundation, ‘for his
illustrious stewardship of the country’ (New Vision, 14 June 2004, Museveni receives award).
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the Government’s failures to achieve a solution for northern Uganda and these
apparent successes elsewhere, combined with a lack of consultation, a failure to
involve key players, a disregard of the wishes of the civilian population, and an obtuse
refusal to engage in a peace-oriented manner with the psychology of the LRA, were a
continuous reminder that, as the late Dr Lukwiya (Superintendant of Lacor Hospital)
put it, ‘The government is not very concerned about Acholis, is not concerned about
the words of Acholi, has no respect for them’.190  It seemed improbable that a
consummate politician such as Museveni was unaware of what he was doing.
Although Gersony sought to argue that Museveni dealt as he did in northern Uganda
because he was ill advised by his senior advisers (Gersony, 1997: 35), he spent enough
time with the UPDF in northern Uganda that he could hardly fail to be aware of the
impacts of his policies.
Conclusions
The LRA was more motivated and organised than it was made out, and the GoU less
committed to finding a solution than concepts of wars as something you fight to win
would have us believe. Indeed, for the GoU winning seemed to lie in keeping the
opponent alive for as long as possible, in particular by using humiliation tactics to
provoke him into reacting whenever the situation becomes calm for too long. In this
interpretation the Government’s behaviours, whether in military or non-military
interventions, were not driven by political immaturity, but rather aimed to achieve the
opposite of what was stated - namely to bring the situation back to the boil rather than
to find a solution.
This could be seen as simply a military tactic, for although its ‘peace initiatives’ lacked
integrity, the Government could claim that it had tried just about all non-military
approaches to bringing the war to an end, and that because they did not work it was
justified in pursuing a military solution. The subsequent military initiatives appear to
have been more useful for deepening the militarization of society than for bringing an
end to violence (see chapter 3).
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However, the LRA-GoU dynamic is more than merely military, for it contains many
elements which are compatible with the model of Social Torture. The abuses of the
LRA towards its abductees are those used by torturers to create dependency in their
victims. Its modus operandi during raids contribute to a sense of dread in the
population, especially as the extent of the threat, rather than being pinned down by
careful analysis, is shrouded in ambiguities created and perpetuated by Government,
NGOs and the daily media. The mixed messages sent by the GoU (it says it is seeking a
solution and is open to a ‘dual approach’, but this is contradicted by all its actions)
create a sense of disorientation in civil society. Its attitude towards the LRA is one of
devaluation and dehumanisation, and its wilful disregard of civil society is further
evidence of this. Indeed it could be argued that it was seeking to create disaffection and
the resultant ambiguities about levels of civilian support for the LRA, such that at a
national and international level it was not just the LRA but also the Acholi who were
seen as a dehumanised threat of undefinable dimensions.
For most people living inside the war zone, the failure of the various ‘solutions’ in the
face of the hopes invested in them, and the message of lack of political commitment
which these failures conveyed, were nothing new, they merely aggravated a conviction
that the Government was against them. They had, after all, first hand experience of a
lack of government commitment to them, particularly in the form of the so-called
‘protected villages’ and all that they entailed.
158
Chapter 5 - Protection as Violation
Introduction
Faced with a considerable gap between the Government’s stated intentions and actual
achievements in pursuing solutions to the situation in the north, many people sought
to read its underlying agenda from its actions rather than its words. The most telling
action was the Government’s ‘calculated enforcement of displacement’ (WFP 1999: 6)
into internally displaced camps described as ‘protected villages’.191 This began in
October 1996, the same month as the LRA’s notorious abduction of 125 school-girls
from Aboke School in Lira district.
The exact number of camps which had a military presence and were therefore
considered ‘protected’ fluctuated, as did the populations within them. The overall
trend though, throughout the period 1996-2004, was for numbers of displaced persons
to increase. The first WFP food relief was delivered under an emergency operation to
20 protected villages in Gulu in January 1997. It aimed to feed 110,000 people. Within a
year this had been revised upwards to 257,000, and by May 1999 upwards again to
325,000. To this were added 81,000 people in five villages in Kitgum. As such, by 1999,
they formed the vast majority of the 585,000 people at risk in Uganda as a whole, a
figure which itself placed Uganda tenth in the world in terms of ‘areas with the most
people in need of assistance’ (Jefferys, 2002: 5).192 By July 2000 the figure for northern
Uganda was 472,000,193 and by mid 2002 WFP’s working figure was 522,000. Of these
the 372,000 located in Gulu District comprised approximately 74 percent of the
district’s population, and the 150,000 in Kitgum and Pader Districts represented 28
                                                     
191 I alternate between referring to them as ‘protected villages’ and as ‘camps’. Although ‘protected
villages’ is such a clear misnomer that to use it risks making a mockery of people’s experiences, this
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Amnesty International 1999: 13).
192 UNOCHA used these figures in its 1999 Consolidated Appeal.
193 UNHCU 14 July 2000.
159
percent of their total populations.194 195 At this point WFP extended its relief operations
by another three years, to last until 2005.196
Chart 5.1 showing escalation in numbers of Internally Displaced in
Gulu/Kitgum/Pader, 1997-2003
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By March 2003, following large-scale incursions of LRA forces into northern Uganda as
a result of Operation Iron Fist, the number displaced had escalated still further, to over
800,000 people, or more than 80% of the total population of the affected districts.197
Numbers had leapt in Pader district, from 17,000 people in one camp in 2002, to over
240,000 people in 13 “major camps”, all in need of food relief from WFP. 198 The largest
camp in Gulu district, Pabo, whose population was well over 40,000 at the time of my
fieldwork in 1999, by 2004 was closer to 65,000.199
                                                     
194 FEWS 8 August 2002.
195 All these figures have to be treated as indicative rather than absolute. The last census in the north was
conducted in 1991. Even the figures of WFP, which keeps some record from its food distributions,
fluctuate month by month.
196 WFP, 12 March 2002, WFP Operations in Gulu District, Northern Uganda, p.4.
197 ARLPI, An Overview of the Situation in Acholiland, January 2003.
198 IRIN, 14 March 2003.
199 NRC figures were 47,170 for 2000 (Cited in ARLPI, July 2001, p28).
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Illustration 5.1 Zone F of Pabo Camp, 7 April 1999
The objectives were ambiguous. One camp leader, who witnessed his camp being set
up, remembered them as being; ‘To avoid abduction; to save the properties of the innocent;
to save the lives of people; to cut communication between the masses and the rebels’.200 This
juxtaposition of a concern with protecting peoples’ physical security and a suspicion
that these very same people might be supporting the rebels - and therefore in need of
containment - reflected fundamental ambiguities in the relationship between people in
northern Uganda and the southern dominated Government. For many people, the
formation of the camps reinforced the impression gained at the hands of Government
forces from 1986 onwards (see chapter 2), that they were believed to be rebel
collaborators. As one critic wrote:
One measure adopted by the government is particularly resented by the
population of Gulu and Kitgum: the institution of “protected camps”. These are
camps where the civil population is gathered “to be protected against the attacks
of the rebels”. In reality, the camps aim at preventing the population to give any
kind of support to the LRA. The fact is that, while staying, as prisoners, in the
“protected camps”, people can not cultivate, can not produce, become totally
dependent on aid.
He voiced further suspicions that, over and above a simple counter-insurgency
strategy, the camps were a form of comprehensive retribution for atrocities the Acholi
were alleged to have carried out in the early 1980s, particularly in the Luwero triangle.
For him the protected villages were ‘not very different from “concentration camps”’,
and he believed that
                                                     
200 August 1998 pilot, Cwero.
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Many Ugandans, especially in the south, dismiss this tragedy, just saying that
“… they are having what they deserve. It’s their turn now. When they have
enough… they’ll stop”. (Murru, 1998: 11)
Even from a less subjective perspective, the camps were shocking. Looked at
historically, the camps were a gross disruption of previous settlement patterns. Girling
identified 950 villages in Acholi District during his research in 1951, at a time when the
total population numbered only 215,000. Middleton, in his research amongst the
Lugbara at the same period, specifically contrasted their dense settlement patterns with
the more spread out ones of the Acholi (1970: 7). To put the majority of a population
now numbering over 1 million into less than fifty settlements was therefore a radical
measure, with radical consequences. At a rally in Gulu market in January 1999, the MP
for Gulu municipality reportedly described camp life as
…just like living in hell which is full of rape, torture, and other forms of mistreatment.
He also observed that staying in the camp is causing poverty since people have no space
for cultivation. [He said]  there is even no protection from the government as instead
civilians are used as human shield by the army. He said the camp life is violating human
rights which are too numerous to mention….201
For a long time though, despite attempts by Ugandans to draw attention to the
situation, the international community was silent. While the Aboke abductions gained
global attention and condemnation and became synonymous with LRA brutality, the
extreme deprivation and multiple forms of violence inherent in the camps, and the
mass social dysfunction which they generated, drew remarkably little international
reaction. Even when it eventually did, such as in a 2002 report by UNOCHA, direct
criticism of rights abuses by the Government were avoided, and the villages were
instead imagined as opportunities for the Government to consolidate its international
image:
…if the perpetrators of terrorist acts are allowed to keep a society paralysed, the
society loses and the terrorists “win”. The protected village system has
contributed mightily to putting the Acholi in the losing position. It is time for
Ugandan society and its political leadership, which in this generation have
shown themselves to be so creative and resourceful, to find ways of restoring the
proper balance. (Weeks, 2002: 5)
                                                     
201 Gulu market, January 1999.
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By this point though, as numbers had continued to escalate, the protected villages were
no longer just a feature of the war zone: for the majority of the population, they were the
war zone. Both the policy of internal displacement into ‘protected villages’, and the
manner in which it was implemented, had come to be seen as an unambiguous signal
about how the Government felt towards them. For as this chapter documents, the
camps were indeed sites of violation of rights ‘too numerous to mention’, sites of what
Finnstrom describes as ‘enforced domination’ (2003:197). Part I considers the formation
of the camps, Part II-IV the violation of people’s rights to livelihoods, health and
education services respectively, and Part V the violation of the right to protection of
physical security. These violations were fundamentally important to processes of
physical, psychological and cultural debilitation (chapter 6), as well as humiliation
(chapter 7), and form the foundations for the argument that this was a situation
primarily of social torture rather than war.
Part I: Formation and Organisation
From the very beginning there were reports of the use of force to get people to move,
and all the villages in which we worked had had some experience of this.202 In Awere,
for example, only a few hours after giving people four days notice to move to the
camp, the UPDF began shelling areas they wanted cleared.203  Similarly in nearby
Odek, where people were given ‘a four day ultimatum for people to leave the northern side
of the main road. The same evening at about 5-6pm they [UPDF] started bombing the area, up
to midnight, using Mambas.204 Nobody was killed, but property was destroyed and nobody was
compensated. People fear to raise the issue’.205 In Cwero ‘it was by military authority that the
exercise was carried out, following some atrocities carried out by rebels. The military personnel
ordered everyone in the village to come to the [trading] centre where the camp was established.
Many people did not obey the order but later were forced to come to the camp’.206 In Atiak a
                                                     
202 Our findings were consistent with those of Amnesty International (1999), Human Rights Focus
(February 2002, p18-23), and ARLPI (July 2001, p7) all of which documented methods of forcible
displacement including beatings, burning down homes, shelling villages, shooting and raping.
203Awere pilot, August 1998.
204 Armoured personnel carrier manufactured in South Africa, infamous for its use by the SADF during the
apartheid era.
205 Odek pilot, 1998.
206 Cwero Pilot, August 1998.
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first influx in 1996 of Resistance Councillors, teachers, parish chiefs and pupils from
surrounding areas, was followed in 1997 ‘when the UPDF started forcing people from
village to camp near the barrack. Thereafter, those who refused to come or follow their orders
had their houses burned’.207 For many, therefore, it was hardly a voluntary movement. As
one elder observed, once the army started firing artillery and using helicopter gunships
against those who refused to move, ‘It was worse than being in the protected camps’.208
In Anaka the camp was first set up in December 1996 and people were told to settle
within a designated area of 5km by 5km. The call was renewed in September 1997, but
an LRA attack on the camp on 9 October prompted people to return to their homes. A
few months later, in December 1997, ‘soldiers were scattered in all villages to go and tell
everybody to come and settle in Anaka, and [to tell them that] the move was to take only three
days’.209 In Awer similarly:
The first [phase] was when people were brought from all around. It was soon very
overcrowded and a lot of people started to go back to their villages. There was then a
second phase of people being rounded up, but this time they were put into a number of
new camps, namely Pagak, Parabongo, Kaladima, Olwal and Guruguru.210
As this shows, on occasion people became so overcrowded that they re-dispersed even
if this meant not receiving assistance. Other fluctuations in population and physical
size were the result of army orders. In October 1998, for example, following numerous
rebel disturbances, people living on the outskirts of Awer camp were compelled by
army and camp commanders to move closer to the centre, causing
…tremendous loss in terms of properties, transportation, destruction of the huts built
and additional expenditure to erect new shelters in a squeezed place. There is serious fear
of death in case of an out-break of diseases among the people - which may be worse than
the rebels’ atrocities.211
In Odek (which was neither protected by military forces nor provided with food relief
by WFP), people trying to minimise exposure to rebels and maximise access to food aid
and their own land, oscillated between their home areas and the camp in neighbouring
                                                     
207 Atiak Pilot, August 1998.
208 Interview with elder, Gulu 4 August 1998.
209 Anaka pilot, August 1998.
210 Awer, August 1998.
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Acet. As a result ‘… it looks as if all the camp population in both Acet, Odek and Awere have
huts in the camps and in their original home village to enable them to shift according to
situations and circumstances’.212 When, on 20 November, the LRA resumed operations in
Odek sub-county, ‘some of these displaced people who went back to their villages are again
coming back to where they were camping to reconstruct their temporary structures’. By 14
December,
Despite the presence of some pockets of rebels roaming around the villages no serious
atrocities have so far been committed on the people staying in the camp. However, 33
households have resumed staying in the camp out of those who had left for their home
villages’.213
Similar oscillations happened again in December 1999 following the Nairobi Peace
Accord between Sudan and Uganda and the LRA’s return to Gulu district. In Palaro,
people preparing large-scale Christmas celebrations in thanks for the prevailing peace
were suddenly ordered to hold them indoors with no noise. Anybody going to repair
their original homes outside the camp was ordered to return, only to find that their
home in the camp no longer fell within the reduced perimeters of the camp.214 One
woman and her child who were found outside the camp limits by UPDF were shot on
26 December 1999.215
In Pagak a meeting was called by the UPDF and camp leaders on 28 December 1999,
urging anybody who had left the camp to return, and requesting the community
…to reduce the rate of drunkenness so that at night they [the UPDF] can be able to detect
what is taking place easily. He also requested members in the camp to reduce making high
noise [levels] which can obstruct the army from detecting things which can disturb the
peace of people in the camp…[and] to stop moving at night after 7.30 pm. This is to
enable the security personnel to monitor the movement of foreign bodies in the camp.
Lastly, he instructed children from 7 years-13 year old to be protected by their parents
because these are the age range of children required by the LRA because training them is
                                                                                                                                                           
211 Visit to Awer, 17 December 1998.
212 idem.
213 Odek, 14 December 1998.
214 Palaro, 20 January 2000.
215 I confirmed this during a field visit to Palaro, 27 December 1999.
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simple and when taken far away they can forget about their parents and home and may
not be in a position to trace the whereabouts of their home.216
Physical layout and shelter
To make guarding the settlements with limited numbers of soldiers more feasible,
people were settled in very restricted spaces. Multiple villages were squeezed together,
generally on either side of a main road and with a pre-war trading and administrative
centre at their heart. Frequently the military ‘detach’ was located very near the centre
of the camp, surrounded on all sides by civilians, prompting one respondent to note
that:
They started the camp to be the ‘protected camp’ - but this camp should be called
Protected Barracks because they want people to build their homes/houses one square
mile around the barracks... The barracks has no free side without the civilians
surrounding it [i.e. it is not exposed at all].217
Illustration 5.2 Sketch Map of Pabo ‘protected village’, February 1999. The army is in the
‘reserved area’
                                                     
216 Pagak, January 2000.
217 Atiak, August 1998.
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Following multiple raids in October/November 1998, Awer camp, with a population of
3733,218 was reduced to 2 square km. In Pabbo there were over 42,000 people from over
120 villages, settled into eight zones of 2 square km; each was divided into sub-zones.
Huts were tightly packed, often with little more than one metre between each, unlike a
traditional homestead where huts would be widely spaced, traditionally around a
central fireplace, the wang-o.219 As the overwhelming majority of roofs were thatched
fires could consume dozens or even hundreds of huts in one go. In February 1999, for
example, 51 huts were burned in one blaze in Anaka. In March 2000, 728 huts in
Pabbo’s Zone C were burnt down in a single incident, leaving approximately 4000
people without shelter.220 A fire in June 2004 left at least 6,000 homeless.221 While such
fires were generally attributed to accidents with cooking fires, or to small children
playing with fire while their parents were away digging, the congestion also made the
camps vulnerable to deliberate arson; in March 2000, a rebel attack on Padibe camp,
which at the time hosted 30,000 IDPs, left between 400 and 800 huts burned.222
There were virtually no sanitation facilities. In June 1998 Pabbo had one pit latrine for
every 168 people. Of the total of 250 pits, 150 were built with slabs and roofing
provided by World Vision, but by the time they were finished half were already full.
Cwero had one for every 260 people. Odek, population 8,000, had only 3 pit latrines. In
several villages fines of around Ush 3,000/= could be imposed on people who refused
to build pit latrines, and in Anaka it was reported that the Local Councillors appointed
youth who could ‘with the permission of the LC1, put you in a house called a ‘tank’ [if you
refused to dig a pit]. You sleep there for one or two nights. Then you go and do what you were
refusing to do before’. The lack of functional pit latrines led to several displaced schools
being closed for weeks at a time while facilities were being built.
                                                     
218 Mendes, April 1998.
219 Girling still records these as a major feature of Acholi compounds in the 1950s (1960; 45).
220 26 March 2000.
221 IRIN, 30 June 2004, 6,000 IDPs homeless after fire guts Pabbo camp.
222 PANA, 23 March 2000, Uganda Gets Multi-Million Dollar Food Aid Programme. ARLPI, July 2001, p27.
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Illustration 5.3 Parents building pit latrines at Cwero (amalgamated) P7 School, 13 April 1999.
The bricks were made by parents, the cement bought with parent contributions to the Parent-
Teacher-Association (500 Shillings per child).
Administration
With populations numbering in the thousands rather than the hundreds who would be
found in a village under more normal circumstances, the administration of camps was
complicated by multiple and overlapping authority systems. Cwero, whose population
fluctuated between 3500 and 4700, had people from 34 different villages and at least 15
clans. Awach, population 10,300, had four parishes and 52 villages represented. In the
case of the much larger Pabbo, 9 parishes, 121 villages, and 28 clans were
represented.223
There was a correspondingly complex and disorienting web of overlapping civilian
authority structures, involving the ones which people brought with them from their
original villages (elders, Rwodi Kweri),224 the local council of the place they moved to,
and those elected to administer the camps (camp leaders).
                                                     
223 Pabbo, August 1998.
224 Girling describes the Rwodi Kweri themselves as a spontaneous innovation in response to the scattering
of kin groups under British Administration  in the 1920s and 1930s (1960: 193).
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Illustration 5.4 The office of the Camp Commander, Pagak Camp, 2 March 1999
At times it appeared that everything was everybody’s business, as all could attend
Local Council meetings. There was no standard procedure for these structures. In
Anaka the Local Council met twice weekly, in Pabbo twice monthly, and in Cwero
only once monthly.225 There was though a hierarchy. The Local Council had more
authority than the camp and zonal leaders/Rwodi Kweri, who had an advisory
capacity and were responsible for disseminating resolutions of the Council. In Atiak
the 8 camp elders (one from each parish) were chosen by the camp population and met
twice per month to discuss issues such as the relationships between the people in the
camp, the need for group farming to address the lack of food relief, and the protection
of ‘young ones from being abducted by rebels’.226 To clarify the roles of local councils from
LC1 up to LCIII the Deputy Speaker of Gulu District Council conducted a seminar in
Pabbo Camp. He informed participants that the LCs;
hold the right to make by-laws, including fixing rates for bride-price, taxation policies,
and initiation of development projects. They should avoid themselves implementing
decisions, this is the role of civil servants such as parish chiefs at Parish level and sub-
county chiefs at division level. The LC also holds the right to monitor non-governmental
activities in their area, and should ensure that corruption and bribery do not exist in their
mode of operation.227
Inevitably disputes would arise between the different types of administration, as in a
case from Pabo, where the Local Council
                                                     
225 Cwero Pilot, August 1998.
226 Atiak, August 1998.
227 Pabbo, 7 April 1999.
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… accused the Camp Commandant of frustrating policy on development of the sub-
county and of being disrespectful towards the council, including refusal to attend council
deliberations whenever summoned and arresting people without the authority of the
council.
Although ‘ … The District Speaker and the District Secretary for Education intervened over
the matter’ and the commandant was suspended,228 a further meeting was necessary in
March 2000. This time the Local Council Chairman came under attack for having a
vested interest in ‘subduing the power of the camp commandant’. When those running the
meeting
gave guidelines to the masses to talk they criticised L.C. III administration for wanting
the post of camp administration to go to his campaign manager. They wanted a vote of no
confidence on the division council but we advised them to be patient. Then camp
commandant Otim Thomas was reinstated after three months without operation.229
The confused relationship between Local Council and camp leaders led the District
Authorities to appeal to all NGOs, IOs and donors
to respect the legal basis of Local Council Government when working in or
visiting camps and always approach them first. In the past many visitors go
straight to introduce themselves to the camp leaders, which over time has proven
to undermine the position of the LC leaders. The camp leaders have no formal
power. Most of them were elected on an ad-hoc basis when the camps were first
established, but there is no system of rotation in place. … The general view
expressed by the District Authorities and partners on this issue is that there is
need for sensitisation of both camp leaders and of the international community
on the informal character of – and limitations in - the Camp leaders’ mandate.230
The military also became involved in camp administration. Sometimes they ordered
people to move closer together so they could be more easily protected. This extended
to appeals for co-operation and co-ordination between civilians and UPDF ‘in order as
to ease their work and for the sake of better survival in the camp’, and warnings to people to
consider environmental hygiene to prevent the outbreak of disease.231 In Awer in
November 1999, the military became involved in a dispute over the chieftancy:
                                                     
228 Pabbo, 11 December 1999.
229 Pabbo, 10 March 2000. For further discussion of perceptions of Local Councils in the camps, see
Finnström, 2003: 129.
230 UNOCHA Humanitarian Update – Uganda, January 2002, Vol IV issue I.
231 Awere, 17 January 1999.
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Very early in the morning Homeguards set up road blocks on every path to stop anyone
going in the field. People were forced to attend the meeting whether they liked it or not -
even some school children were forced by the homeguards to go and attend the meeting
instead of going to school. Many people were beaten by the homeguards on that day
irrespective of size and age and the nature of work one does.
In this meeting the camp officials and the LCs settled quarrels among certain people who
were rivaling to be elected as Parabongo clan chief [It was eventually settled on the basis
of heredity. The man “elected” was the son of a previous chief].232
Organigram 5.1 showing approximate positions of Government and ‘Traditional’
authorities
A further, but central, complication in the administration of camps arose from the
range of relief organisations, each with their own preferred manner of working and
choice of which of the multiple authority structures to work through. In Atiak-Biabia,
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LC IV – Municipality (elected)
Resident District
Commissioner
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for example, the World Food Programme, ICRC and World Vision, adopted three
completely different beneficiary registration procedures. WFP used camp leaders and
Rwodi Kweri to do door-to-door counts which were then compiled and sent to the WFP
for endorsement before registration took place. As the fieldworker noted, ‘it was not
effectively done, many people missed out’. ICRC, by contrast, used its own fieldworkers to
carry out registration, numbering each house and then moving door-to-door to register
inhabitants. Each household was subsequently given a card, and the distributions did
not cause much complaint, although in at least once case a distribution had to be
cancelled when it was found that the cards had been issued in a corrupt fashion. World
Vision, which was targeting malnourished children aged 6 months to 5 years, trained
parish councillors in measurement of Middle-Upper-Arm-Circumference (MUAC) and
weight-height ratios.233
Mchaka-mchaka
Overlaid onto this complex aggregation of disparate forms of authority, were political
training courses, commonly known as mchaka-mchaka. These were organised by the
NRM and held throughout Uganda, and in this regard northern Uganda was no
exception. Described by Human Rights Watch as serving ‘to rationalize the NRM’s
denial of political rights of freedom of expression, association and assembly’,234
attendance at such training was believed by many to be a pre-requisite for those who
wished to attend university, or work in Government service. A teacher from Gulu
High School who had attended a training held at Gulu airfield in 1994 described how
The instructors spoke in Swahili. If you spoke in English you got beaten. They would
start very early in the morning with military drilling, followed by politicisation (role of
army, history of Uganda). After lunch there would be further drilling and politicisation.
This lasted for one month. They were also trained to handle an AK47. At the end they
were given certificates.
Asked what he had gained from it, he answered
                                                                                                                                                           
232 Awer, 20 November 1999.
233 Atiak, October – November 1998.
234 http://hrw.org/reports/1999/uganda/Uganweb-02.htm
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how to dismantle an AK47. I didn't learn anything new about the history of Uganda. It
was a de-mystification of the gun and the creation of defence capacity’.235
Illustration 5.5 Mchaka-mchaka cadres, Gulu town, 12 July 1999
The Mchaka-mchaka held in Pabo camp in early 1999 (24 January – 5 February), under
the title ‘The Struggle for Peace & Development’, had a comprehensive agenda over
and above the morning drills and training in ‘military awareness’ and ‘personal
administration’. The historical element encompassed Uganda’s pre-colonial history,
political and economic geography, colonialism, backwardness and underdevelopment.
It then moved into post-independence politics, democratic process and
constitutionalism in Uganda, as well as decentralisation. Broad themes included
Human Rights ‘with emphasis on the civil, political, economic and cultural life of
women’, ‘regional cooperation and integration (Gov’t Policies towards its neighbour),
‘building an integrated self-sustaining economy, Privatisation & liberalisation’. There
was also a ‘Review of the Security situation & Methods of conflict resolution’, ‘Roles of
Security Organs (UPDF, ESO, ISO, Police)’, ‘Protection of National Independence and
National Unity’. Economic issues included the ‘Modernisation of agriculture’, the
‘Attention of Investors and good Economic policies’, ‘Poverty Eradication and
household role in it’. Social issues ranged from the ‘Government’s Programme towards
the provision of social services, improvement of the health sector’ through the
implementation of the Universal Primary Education scheme, the development and
improvement of infrastructure in Gulu district, and the inclusion of marginalised
                                                     
235 Interview with secondary school teachers, Gulu High School, 13 August 1998.
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groups in politics for development e.g. Youth, Women etc. Corruption and misuse of
office, the land reform programme, the role of district councils in Development (Local
Government Act), the roles of NGOs were also worked on, together with a discussion
about the ‘importance and need for a referendum’.
The passing out of 305 cadres on 14 February 1999 was attended by, amongst others,
the National Director of the Movement Secretariat, the Director of Mass Mobilisation
and Education in the NRM Secretariat, and various district officials. An army band led
the parade, followed by cadres dressed in white T-shirts bearing the slogan ‘Pabbo
Peace and Development’. In response to resolutions drawn up during the course and
read out by a Local Councillor (which touched amongst other things on the security
situation, social services, problems of ‘congestion and attitude of redundancy’), the
Movement’s Director responded ‘by saying that government will use every avenue possible
to solve these problems. People should have faith in the government and abide by the
constitution of Uganda’. The passing out ceremony, which ended at 1.30pm, then turned
into a big party: ‘Disco dance were conducted transnight whereby the cadres really enjoyed
themselves very much. Local brews were drunk as well as beers and soda. Pabbo trading centre
ran short of brewerages that day’. 236
The modernising thrust of mchaka-mchaka in 1999 went beyond the simple ‘creation of
defence capacity’; it also had a more concrete agenda, namely to determine who was
inside the national system, and who would stay outside. In this regard the symbolic
importance of having national level directors attending the passing out ceremony is
considerable.
Part II: Subsistence in the Camps
Notwithstanding the two body-blows dealt by the loss of cattle and forcible
displacement, there was an appearance of considerable economic activity, even when
insecurity levels were high. The range of goods for sale in Pabbo, as in Annex F,
although wider than that found in smaller camps, was not untypical. Many of the
                                                     
236 Pabbo report, 1 March 1999.
174
vegetables, grains, fruits were either grown within the vicinity of the camp, or
harvested from the home area (at considerable risk), or gathered in the bush (again at
considerable risk). There was also a degree of commerce with neighbouring districts.
Furthermore, some surpluses were still being grown, even once the majority of the
population were in camps, and were at times sufficient to merit transporting to
Kampala. In June 1999, for example, farmers from Cwero took 28 bags of sorghum to
Kampala where they sold it at Ush 125/= per kg. The more intrepid businesses/business
people at times also risked travelling to the villages to buy up surplus produce. In
March 2000, for example, Nile Breweries went to Cwero camp to purchase sorghum.237
Generally, though, surplus produce was bought by small-scale women traders known
as awaro. They would travel by boda boda (bicycle) from Gulu town to the nearer
villages such as Awer and purchase by the mug or the kilogramme. Crops purchased
and sold in this way included groundnuts, beans, simsim (sesame), maize, cassava,
tomatoes, sorghum and millet. They would then return to Gulu town to sell at a mark-
up. Some larger-scale business people would use an awaro as a purchasing agent – once
she had paid for the produce, the buyer would collect it with his truck.238 Individuals
with sufficient produce to merit the trip would take their own produce to town for sale
for the same price as that given by the awaro [i.e. without the mark-up the awaro would
put on].
                                                     
237 Cwero, March 2000.
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Illustration 5.6 Bicycles
‘detained’ [impounded] for
non-payment of bicycle tax
of 1000 shillings
(approximately £0.30), Gulu
2 June 1999
175
Trade flourished during Christmas periods. In late 1998, despite the relative unrest,
there was substantial commerce between Kampala and Gulu in the run-up to
Christmas, with up to fifteen trucks per day arriving laden with consumer goods and
departing again laden with produce for sale in the capital. At the same time
people from the village stepped-up the rate of bringing in their produce for sale in the
town and in turn purchase those items not found in the village such as executives
(expensive) clothes, shoes, Radio cassettes, tapes, fish, Bags, etc. All the vehicles coming
to the town or going outside to the villages or other neighbouring districts would be
overloaded with luggages of people. This caused a lot of accidents with reported cases of
overturning whilst on the road.239
For those with the necessary capital to invest in renting, clearing and ploughing land
and buying seeds, returns for some crops could be significant.
Table 5.2: Crop prices during fieldwork period, 1999-2000
Crop 100kg Sacks/Acre Price obtainable
per bag (Uganda
shillings)240
Value of harvest
from one acre241
Rice 25-30 25-30,000 625,000 – 900,000
Maize 25 12-18000 300,000 – 450,000
g-nuts (shelled) 7.5 18-30,000 135,000 – 225,000
Simsim 2-3 36-60,000 72,000 – 180,000
Sorghum 5-6 12-12,800 60,000 – 76,800
Millet 2-3 18-24000 36,000 – 72,000
Rice was easily the most profitable, followed by maize and groundnuts. By far the least
profitable was millet, a staple of the Acholi diet. Prices varied widely between places
and from season to season. A sack of groundnuts which cost 18,000 shillings in Awer in
August 1999 cost 30,000 in Pabo in November of the same year. Equally a sack of maize
which cost 20,000 in Pabo in October 1998 (a period of high insecurity), cost just 12,000
in Cwero a year later (low insecurity). Even within the same village, prices fluctuated
dramatically over time: whereas a sack of simsim cost 60,000 in Cwero in March 1999,
by March 2000 it had sunk to 36,000.
                                                     
239 Gulu Municipality, December 1998.
240 Monthly camp reports, 1999-2000. Prices were checked in camp markets every third month.
Fluctuations in price were by area and season. Inflation was very low over the period the data was
collected.
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Those with sufficient capital, storage space and connections, would buy crops when
they were readily available and then re-sell at a later date. For example, in April 1999 ‘a
businessman from Atiak … transported to Gulu town 12 sacks of green beans which he had
hoarded in his store at the camp after purchase between January-February’. Another
businessman from Atiak bought up peas in early 1999 and stored them for some
months, before transporting them to Gulu in May that year242 - using District Water
Development pick-up which had gone to repair boreholes in Atiak.
Some goods, such as shea nut oil, were processed in the camps, with a 300ml bottle
(old Fanta bottle) selling at Ush500/= in Atiak (August 1998).243  Yeast used in brewing
alcohol was made by taking unground millet (bought by the mugful) which, once
germinated, would be dried, ground and mixed with flour.
Items such as beef, pork, chicken and fresh fish, which in peacetime would have been
locally produced, generally had to be imported. Domestic produce and imports from
other parts of Uganda were supplemented with relief goods, such as cowpeas or
maize. Often these were sold by individuals in small amounts to meet a very specific
need for cash, but there also appeared to be organised scams going on. In some places
it was possible to buy relief goods originally intended for Sudan: a 20 litre drum of
American cooking oil from Operation Lifeline Sudan could be bought in Atiak for
25,000 shillings (Dec 1999) and re-sold in 1/2 litre units for almost double the money.
Access to land
Although the situation created opportunities for those with sufficient capital, for the
majority such activities were completely out of reach, and while there was a lot of
activity in the market, most of it was of a very marginal nature. This is suggested by
the very small scale of most transactions (basics such as maize and cassava flour,
beans, tomatoes, onions were sold in units of between 50/= to 500/=, equivalent to
                                                                                                                                                           
241 The lower value is the lower number of sacks per acre by the lower price obtainable per bag. The higher
value is the higher number of sacks per acre by the highest cost per bag.
242 Atiak, 11 May 1999.
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between £0.03 and £0.30). Relative to this other items were very costly e.g. a second
hand pair of trousers (5,000 shillings upwards (£2.27), or a trip to Kampala (+/-25,000
shillings (£11.36).  Even where people had sufficient surplus crops to make it
worthwhile taking them to Gulu to sell, they sold by the kilo, whereas business-people
bought by the sack. For example, in March 1999, the fieldworker noted three crops
being taken from Odek to Gulu: rice (620/= per kg), simsim (400/= per kg), and
tomatoes (25,000/box). This suggests that people were not really selling a surplus, but
rather in order to meet very specific expenditures requiring cash, e.g. medications,
school fees or dowries.244
When land usage is considered, the very marginal nature of agricultural activity is
confirmed. Figures for 1991 show that subsistence farming accounted for 77% of
economic activity and employed about 95% of the population. 245 By 1999, although
‘Arable land is very fertile and makes up 87.4% of the total land area’, less than 10% of
land was being utilised yearly.246 The issue was not lack of land, but access to it due to
displacement and the protected villages policy. Writing in 1999, WFP evaluators
argued that
The issue of land allocation for resettled and temporarily encamped IDPs is still
little understood, particularly in the north. Large areas of Acholi clan-held land
lie fallow, but its allocation to IDPs has not always been possible, leaving the
displaced dependent on international assistance beyond the acute emergency
phase. WFP needs to investigate the political and cultural roots of this anomaly.
(WFP, 1999: 31)
The reasons for lack of access to land were various. Although land is communally
owned in the sense that outside urban areas people do not hold individual land-titles,
it is nonetheless managed and used such that newcomers do not have automatic access
to their own plot, particularly in those areas closest to settlements. Whereas in their
home villages people were within easy distance of their land (referred to as ‘gardens’),
in the camps they were often very far removed from it. In many camps curfews were
                                                                                                                                                           
243 By May 1999 it cost 2000/= for a litre in Palaro.
244 Odek, 28 February 1999.
245 COWI, Volume II Part I, July 1999, section 6.1.1. p 50. Also Gulu District Development Plan, 1996/97.
246 Idem, section 6.1.1. p 50.
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imposed, limiting movement to daylight hours and making it difficult for people to
move back to their home areas to dig their land, or even forbidding such movement
altogether. Following the re-entry of rebels into Gulu district in November 1998, the
commander of the northern reserve forces, Colonel Oketta, issued an order that no
civilian should move more than 1km outside the camps. In addition to army-imposed
curfews, the LRA had also issued prohibitions on working on Fridays and Sundays as
Those two days are days of worships for Muslims and Christians respectively, and the
LRA has informed the population that if they work on those days they will be killed.
People go out to dig in the morning at about 7.00am and come back home between 10am
and 12 noon.247
Newcomers therefore were frequently reduced to farming any small plot they could
gain access to, frequently hiring land from an existing ‘owner’.
In 1999 the cost ranged from 20,000 shillings to 40,000 per acre per growing season,
changing little by 2001.248 Often the ‘owners’ would rent out a piece of land for one
season to get it cleared of shrubs and trees, and then, the hard labour having been
done, would use it themselves the following season. On top of rental costs, ploughing
ranged from 20,000-40,000 shillings per acre using oxen, and similar amounts using a
tractor. Since cattle stocks had been almost wiped out, there were very few oxen
available. Pabo, with its population of 42,000+, had only one pair of oxen available for
ploughing in 1999. Other villages had none.
Given unreliable and inadequate food rations, and notwithstanding UPDF and LRA
prohibitions, people continued to try return to their land cultivate. In December 2001
(before Operation Iron Fist), UNOCHA estimated that 25% of the IDP camp population
were accessing their gardens.249 It was always high-risk. Having been given pangas and
hoes by ICRC, for example,
those who went back home for cultivation at Pakwong Parish were disturbed by remnants
of rebels who demanded for their pangas and collected them on the 2/5/99 night (the same
                                                     
247 Awer pilot, August 1998.
248 Conflict & Means of Livelihoods research, 1999, also ACORD, February 2001, p11.
249 www.idpproject.org: Profile of Internal Displacement: Uganda, 11 October 2002, p 78.
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night the items had been distributed). This incident forced the cultivators back to camp
because they feared mutilation using the pangas collected from them.250
There was some danger of landmines planted by both UPDF and LRA. Lacor Hospital
had its first 26 landmine victims in 1995. In 1996 mine victims accounted for 126 out of
515 war-related injuries, and 19 of 318 in 1997.251 Of the 560 war-related amputations
dealt with in the AVSI centre for disability and rehabilitation in Gulu Hospital, 53%
were caused by landmines, 33% by gunshot, 7.7% by mutilation (e.g. with a panga),
and 6.3% by bomb-blasts.252
While 53% indicates the importance of land-mine injuries relative to other forms of
injury, it does not reflect the full scale of the issue – in many cases victims either died
on the spot or from shock and bleeding before reaching medical care. A conservative
estimate would be at least 100 victims annually, or two every week. Extrapolated
backwards to the beginnings of the war in 1986, this suggests a figure of at least
1,500.253 To this must be added the fact that such incidents almost always affect not just
the blast victim, but also their immediate dependants, as in the case of a woman who
stepped on a mine and whose child of six months subsequently died
…because there was nobody to breast-feed it and there was no money for milk and posho.
Opio went to World Vision for assistance but by the time he got back the child was dead.
The woman had walked over the place twice while going to her plot to collect food.254
Quite apart from the danger of landmines, people were liable to be abducted by the
LRA or arrested/attacked as rebel collaborators by the UPDF. In February 2000, for
example, five people were shot at by a UPDF helicopter as they returned to their home
village in an attempt to collect foodstuffs. One of the five was killed, the others taken to
Kitgum hospital.255 Further risks stemmed from leaving children unattended in the
camps – there are many stories of children burning down huts by accident.
                                                     
250 Pabbo, 2 September 1999.
251 Medical Superintendant, Lacor Hospital, 19 January 1998.
252 AVSI figures for the period July 1998-December 2001, 8 March 2002.
253 Estimates vary widely; WFP 1999: 10 quotes a UNICEF figure of 40,000 for 1988-1999, and an ICRC
figure of 4,000 amputees for the same period.
254 Atiak pilot, August 1998. For discussion of landmines as symbols of the global character of the war see
Finnström, 2003: 274.
255Awere, 20 February 2000.
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Asked to describe people’s cultivation, the fieldworker in Biabia noted:
They go outside [the protected village] starting from 7.00am and come back between 5
and 6pm (after which there is a curfew). Problems include starvation, rain, distance,
running the risk of meeting LRA, beating by government soldiers in other places where
they go to collect food stuff etc. Some are ploughing on land from local institutions and
relatives, others own their own land.  The children above 5 years old are sent to school
and those below are left starving.256
Reductions in hunting
Hunting had always been a component of livelihoods, used to enrich the diet of the
hunter’s household, as a source of cash, and as proof of masculinity.257 Hunters would
go deep into the bush and stay there for a number of days or weeks, accompanied by
their dogs, and curing the meat they killed before returning to the camps. It was
inherently risky, with reports of hunters being attacked by pythons and gored to death
by buffalo.258 Although it had always been controlled (in the pre-colonial era
designation of hunting grounds was a major source of inter-village conflicts, and in the
colonial period the authorities restricted communal hunts ‘in order to preserve some of
the game from too rapid extinction’ (Girling, 1960; 16)) the parameters of risk appeared
to have expanded as a result of war, wider processes of ‘modernisation’, and the
constraints of life in the protected villages.
                                                     
256 Atiak and Biabia pilots, August 1998.
257 Girling describes how a man ‘attains his maximum status… when he takes part in the hunting… This
was also an affirmation of his adulthood’ (1960: 161).
258 Awer Camp, 3 August 1998.
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Illustration 5.7 Hunter from Palaro displaying his catch, 20 April 1999
In western Gulu district, near the Murchison Falls National Park, many people would
leave the camps to hunt (see also Finnström, 2003: 211-212). Sometimes, such as in late
February 1999, following encroachment of buffalo from the park, this was authorised
and no participants came to harm. More often, gun-ownership and hunting were
banned, with severe consequences for those caught. From Anaka it was reported that
two men caught in the park with guns and ‘eight pieces of smoked hippo meat’ were
beaten by the UPDF after one of them confessed that ‘he had only wanted a balanced
diet’.259 They were lucky, for those who ventured into the park itself were liable to be
shot at by game rangers and/or UPDF when caught hunting. After one sixteen year old
who borrowed a gun from a home-guard stationed in Anaka went hunting in the park,
‘Some people heard of the sound of gun shots ringing from the park on Wednesday 21/4/99 at
about 10.00 a.m. - and that was it - the game rangers were busy with the poachers. Up to now
his dead body is not seen’.260 My respondent concluded, however, that such incidents
would not serve as a deterrent, and that although ‘many villagers lost their lives in the
National Park poaching, more people will still go to hunt’.
In Awac, soldiers arrested a group of about 40 men who had gone hunting for meat for
the Christmas celebrations. They were taken to Awac detach where they were
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tortured seriously and all their meat was removed. This left the families of the hunters to
celebrate Christmas with Beans and greens as their Meal for that day. And it was only
the dogs that were left untortured by the soldiers. Otherwise with the beatings some were
not able to sit upright.261
One group of hunters from Pabbo, having built a camp and put some of their catch to
cook, went to check other traps, before returning to find themselves under fire from
…rebels who took position before they arrived on the site [and] shot a lot of bullets on
these hunters. They all dropped away the meat and took off for their safety. Fortunate
enough no bullets hit any of the hunters. It was believed that these rebels were 19 in
numbers …262
Road-blocks set up to catch hunters selling meat on the black market, did not always
catch just hunters:
A staff member of Anaka hospital hired a Boda-Boda to transport a basin full of
drugs/capsules and thermometers to a destination I do not know. The drugs were the
property of the hospital here. The consignments were intercepted at Aparanga military
check point (the road block was set up in a wise way to screen out smoked meat
transported by hunters to black markets). The Boda-Boda on reaching the check point was
stopped and when his luggage was checked he revealed that it was the property of a staff
member of Anaka hospital. Some UPDF were sent to arrest him, and he was sent to Gulu
for further questioning. LCs here complained that UPDF should have informed the office
of the LCs before taking the offender to Gulu.263
Other alternatives to agriculture
For those without access to land, other activities had to be found. As the camps became
ever more entrenched, an uneven and shifting mixture of coping and survival
strategies emerged. For some, camp life created opportunities for a quantum and
permanent shift in their economic activities. UNDMT, for example, argued that, even if
free to do so, 28% of those residing in the protected villages would not return to their
home villages because ‘Many have resided in trading centres for six years and have
adopted new skills or occupations that are more lucrative than agriculture’.264
                                                     
261 Awac, 24 December 1999.
262 Pabbo, 2 April 1999.
263 Anaka, 10 July 1999 – Source LCIII office. (An example of the clash of authority systems)
264 UNDMT Technical Group Status Report – undated, early 2002.
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Youth frequently set up very small shops with investment support from those already
earning an income: ‘Some lock-up shops have flourished quite remarkably by some youths in
the camp. Income from LDU and teachers’ salaries are major contributions of the
investments’.265  Another option open to physically fit male youth was to set up as a
boda-boda (bicycle taxi). This involved either owning a bicyle or moped, or paying a
part of the daily takings to the owner of such a vehicle. For those with pedal cycles it
was taxing work - some were cycling up to 90 miles per day carrying both people and
their goods.
Illustration 5.8 Boda Boda [bicycle taxi], Gulu Town, 14 April 1999
Not surprisingly there were always people on the look out for a fast buck. During the
time I was in Gulu, my research assistants were on several occasions approached by
people wanting to sell me items ranging from leopard skins, which it was illegal to
hunt, to a drug known as Katube-Katube, which appeared to be a ‘local’ viagra. One
fieldworker reported how during traditional dances boys would trick girls by mixing
Katube-Katube with a sweet called ‘Bingo’, another how it ‘could turn you into a rapist –
you’ll want to fuck anywhere where there is a hole’. There were also reports of
members of the diaspora obtaining free drugs from the NHS in the UK and sending
them to relatives in Gulu to sell.
For most people, however, the only way to access cash was through various forms of
casual labour known as leja-leja. These included digging a strip of land known as katala
                                                     
265 Palaro pilot, 30 July 1998.
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or okori (the exact size and payment varied according to location), digging a pit latrine
(10,000/= per pit), cutting the grass in someone’s compound (500/=). Those ferrying
water got paid 100/= per 20 litre jerrycan (this could sometimes be as low as 50/= per 20
litre jerrycan carried for a distance of 1 mile266). Those making bricks received 50/= per
brick, while those transporting them received 100/= per 10 bricks (Awere). Collecting
firewood (high-risk due to insecurity) brought 600/= per bundle. Some people found
employment maintaining the roads for the government, or during feeder road
rehabilitation.267 For slashing grass and hoeing, and filling in small pot-holes they
received about 15,000/= fortnightly. A few found work on agricultural projects – the
maize plantation at Patiko prison paid people 500/= per 3 lines of maize weeded.
Others cut poles at 400/= each (Awere), and others wove mats. To make one mat, which
could be sold at 4,000/=, took about one week. Some young men would try to earn
money procuring women for soldiers, and in Gulu town there were certain places
where women could earn money ‘exposing their private parts’.
Illustration 5.9 Woman making bricks, Pagak Camp, 7 March 1999
Often the socio-economic differentiation in a camp was insufficient to generate many
opportunities for casual labourers. In Awach it was said that ‘there is no leja-leja in the
camp, except teachers can pay people to dig and heap potatoes’.268 And not everybody paid in
                                                     
266 Visit to Gulu, January 1998.
267 Pabbo pilot, 30 July 1998.
268 Awac pilot, August 1998.
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cash. People digging in the expectation of being paid cash could find themselves given
items such as soap, sugar, salt, clothes instead.
When they were paid, the amounts were marginal. 100 shillings bought one aspirin,
500 one 350ml bottle of Coca-Cola. When contrasted with the cost of health care, it is
even starker (15,000 shillings to be admitted to Lacor hospital, and considerably more
for some traditional healers). The inability of people to find the kind of sums needed to
rent a piece of land (at least 20,000 shillings per acre) and plough it (another 20,000
shillings or more) becomes evident. To earn 20,000 shillings would take 40 days at least
– assuming you could get 40 days consecutive work and that you did not have to spend
any of the money as you went along.
Many women resorted to brewing alcohol, a complex and labour intensive process.269
A still could in principle yield about twenty 750 ml bottles per day to be sold at 600
shillings per bottle. However, supply was at times greater than demand: ‘Many women
are brewing booze daily, however there is little market for the product. The price being charged
is 300 shillings for a certain bottle which is slightly less than one litre and 200 shillings for a
half a litre’.270 One type of wine required no distillation; maize or millet flour was
simply mixed with yeast and left to ferment for 1-2 days before being filtered. This was
not just done inside the camps - business people would also bring it by bicycle and
convoy from Adjumani and sell it at Ush 400 shillings per jug.271
                                                     
269 Visit to Coo-pe Kwene, in January 1998.
270 Atiak, 14 November 1998.
186
Illustration 5.10 Woman distilling alcohol, Awer Camp, 13 March 1999
Some people resorted to petty theft, and this became an agenda item in camp meetings,
as in Awere where ‘The chairman said he had got many cases of stealing in the camp…
mainly goats, foodstuff, clothes, money etc.’ 272
Group Formation
Some people addressed their individual lack of capital by forming into groups, of
which there were a startling diversity, especially amongst women and youth. In Atiak,
for example, the Catholic Women’s Group had 45 members engaged in ‘promotion of
agriculture, running a grinding mill, and protection of orphans as a result of instability
from 1986’, and had received external support with the donation of its grinding mill
from a local politician. Opit Kic Women’s Association, with 50 members, had similar
objectives but had received no external support. A further group, the Mother’s Union
Pupwonya Association, worked on promotion of agriculture, as well as cultural dances
like Apiti, and health education through drama.
In some places groups received training in management and book-keeping from
agencies such as ACORD, and this was intended to
‘ increase their bargaining power in case of loans advanced to benefit the rural women or
groups’.273
As such they were often associated with a modernising agenda and were reportedly
‘very organised in their structure of management’.274 As an interface between ordinary
peasant farmers and various external actors, such as NGOs and Government, they
provided a degree of protection to their members and for the external actors they were
easier to work through.
                                                                                                                                                           
271 Atiak, August 1998.
272 Awere, 27 April 1999.
273 Odek, 14 December 1998.
274 Pabbo, 30 October 1998.
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Food Aid
As access to land became more and more problematic, so people became more and
more dependent on food aid, despite their best efforts to find alternative sources of
income. WFP’s original Emergency Operation (EMOP 5816.02), which began in late
1996 when the camps were established, was replaced in April 2000 by the Protracted
Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO 6176). This benefited 340,420 IDPs in Gulu
district, and 2270 beneficiaries of micro-projects in different categories of vulnerable
groups (malnourished children, pregnant and lactating mothers, TB patients, orphans,
formerly abducted children). It went beyond simple food relief to also include
general food distribution, school feeding of primary school pupils; food for
work/assets; food for training projects; supplementary and therapeutic feeding of
moderately and severely malnourished children respectively; and provision of
food to other vulnerable groups. (WFP, 12 March 2002)
Under Food For Assets (FFA), WFP claimed that from 2000-2002
2.8km of community roads constructed by 6,820 beneficiaries, three-quarters of
them women; 137,000 bricks for school construction in Awer, Bardege and Atiak,
so far 4 blocks with a total of 19 classrooms have been constructed. Other projects
included fish farming and afforestation; women groups in Anaka have planted
about 15,000 trees. 50 groups trained in fish farming techniques. (WFP, 12 March
2002)
The WFP School Feeding Programme provided one cooked meal per day to 94 schools
in 46 centres, reaching 27,626 boys and 21,306 girls. Plans to expand to a further 32,000
children were to be supported by resources from the USA under the USDA Global
Food for Education Initiative.
The PRRO ‘anticipated a gradual return of IDPs to their original homes by the years
2000-2002 and therefore a phase down of relief activities matched with an increase in
school feeding and FFA’, but as displacement continued apace the majority of
programme resources remained focused on relief activity. In 2001 more than half its
total expenditure of $36 million was in the Northern Region. When PRRO 6176 ended
on 31 March 2002, it was replaced with a new one (PRRO 10121.0), under the title
“Targeted Food Assistance and Recovery of Refugees, displaced persons and
Vulnerable Groups in Uganda’. By this point the total population of Gulu was
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estimated at 469,700, of which an estimated 79% were in 33 IDP camps. 67% in 20
camps were being assisted with WFP’s General Food Distribution (GFD). The food
distribution, comprising cereals, pulses and vegetable oil was supposed to meet ‘about
a quarter of the daily kilocalorie requirements of the IDPs, and is distributed on a one
and a half month cycle, with NRC the WFP’s implementing partner’ (see chapter 6 for
case study).  The new PRRO envisaged ‘an increase in self-sufficiency of substantial
numbers of IDPs over a three-year period as they return to their original neglected
home areas’, reducing the load from 400,000 in Gulu and Kitgum to 115,000 in the third
year (WFP, 12 March 2002), though no explanation was given as to why this should
occur.
Problems with distribution
For the first two years food distributions assumed 5 people per household ‘irrespective
of the actual number per household’. This improved following a re-registration process in
May 1999, but rations were still not proportional to the number of people in a
household, and were thus still perceived as unfair:
The W.F.P. found that a household with few people should get less food than a household
with many people. That could have been alright - but look -…A family with two people
received 10kg of maize, 2kg of cowpeas, and 0.5kg of oil, [while] a household with six
people should have got more than that - say three times the item - but it was 20kg of
maize, 3kg cowpeas, and 1kg of oil.275
Complaints from Palaro were similar.
Here I would like to put some hints on the ways food is distributed by this World Agency
to the needy people. Firstly, the relief food is distributed on a household basis. This is very
much unfair since the ratio given doesn’t tally with the number of people in that
household. For example, a woman with eleven children and a husband is given 25kg
posho, 3.7 kg beans or cowpeas and two litres of cooking oil. Similar to a woman of one
child and a husband. Which means the number of hungry mouths is not being considered.
Secondly, the WFP workers are very unkind and untransparent when dealing
with the people. At times some households are not given their share because they
fail to identify their husband’s name or the number of children they have as some
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women get confused having seen food-stuffs. Lastly, the last food distributed
(30/06/98) was posho which was rotten and not fit for human consumption.276
There were inevitably some technical problems. Some were minor, such as asking
several households to share the contents of one five-litre can of oil.277 Others were more
serious, such as WFP setting quotas for how many people it would register in a
particular place,278 and the influence of the District Disaster Committee in deciding
which camps would receive food relief. In Awere, for example, people felt they were
being discriminated against because Kony originated from that area.279
The difficulties of maintaining an accurate register when the population and the
security situation were in constant flux, must have been considerable. In the 1999 lull,
for example, people returning from other districts and from the towns used the camps
as staging posts but were not registered: ‘WFP had fixed numbers: 2643. Anyone above that
got nothing’.280 At times rations would be reduced to make sure everybody got
something. In Atiak on 8 December 1998, for example, ‘People were combined into three
households for 50 kgs of posho in some parishes, mostly the last villages’ [i.e. under 17kg per
household rather than the 25kg standard ration].281 At other times the correct ration was
distributed until supplies ran out, leaving those at the end of the list empty-handed.282
Registration problems were compounded by the range of household arrangements,
including polygamous families in which each wife had responsibility for herself and
her children, but not for those of co-wives. Even where registration was reasonably
accurate ‘Some of the beneficiaries missed out – especially women - because of looting of food by
youths and men’.283  It was not uncommon for distributions to occasion fighting. As one
respondent noted,
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278 Awer, July 1998.
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280 Pabbo, 1 June 1999.
281 Atiak, 22 December 1998.
282 Palaro, May 1999.
283 Pabbo, 4 November 1999.
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In a society (community) – there are the privileged and the unprivileged – so unless
managers (WFP) can identify the two, there will be chaos…Names of beneficiaries should
be revised, so as to alleviate the abundant cry. If the names of the beneficiaries correspond
uniformly with the items to be distributed, and the staff are also polished [i.e. trained], I
hope the humanitarian support will endeavour to support those victimised but not the
opportunists...284
There were also confirmed instances of petty corruption by those responsible for
distributions. In Palaro ‘Business-men follow the convoy and buy from NRC staff at 18,000
shillings for a bag of soya beans’,285 and in Pabbo ‘There was mild selling of cooking oil by the
representative of World Food Programme to business people’.286 At times camp leaders
succumbed to temptation, as in the case where, following an ICRC distribution, the
‘Palaro camp leader had 100 hoes, 40 pangas, 40 axes and untold number of bars of soap. Local
councillors investigated and many others including the Movement Chairman were implicated
in the fraud’. Following a public meeting the corrupted camp leader was voted out and
‘a good number of parish representatives’ were sacked.287
When the commander of Acet camp stood for LCIII chairperson of Odek sub-county
and was unsuccessful, he took his revenge on the voters:
Those who did not vote for him in the LC 3 election do not get registered and missed the
items. Parishes of Palaro and Lamola are the most affected people for meeting the wrath of
the commander in not voting him into the office’.
Several other problems were noted:
The WFP maize flour distributed in the camp in most cases are expired so women are
using them to make local brew, this further causing the rate of drunkenness to rise up in
the camp.
The dispensary men have turned the food meant for the malnourished children to be their
own. They are now refusing to register other malnourished children as beneficiaries.
The relief items given by the NGOs to the camps, particularly the ICRC, is inadequate,
thus causing divisions between those who missed and those who benefited.288
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Apart from food relief, ICRC played a major role with occasional distributions of seeds
& tools, as well as household items such as blankets, soap and jerrycans.289 Matching
supplies to demand was easier for these. To ensure an up-to-date registration, they
would visit the camps about a month prior to the distribution: ‘households were grouped
in three classes A B C that is group A [1-4 people] 1 Blanket 3 bars of soaps 1 small jerry can.
Group B[5-7 people] 3 blankets 4 bars of soap 1 big jerry can. Group C [8 or more] 4 Blankets 5
bars of soap 1 big jerry can and 1 small jerry can’. 290 The same groupings were used for
distributions of seeds (e.g. beans, maize, millet, cassava, tomatoes, egg-plant, cabbages,
onions, rice, soy-gum, okra, groundnuts, capsicum) accompanied by planting advice
and a warning that ‘the seeds are dusted with poison therefore it should not be eaten’.291
Many of these crops were grown in the camps and were to be found on sale in the
camp markets (see Annex F), suggesting that they were a useful intervention in terms
of increasing range of foods available and also as a source of cash income.
Although humanitarian organisations were the primary distributors of seeds, there
were some smaller commercially driven initiatives. For example, in March 1999 the
Agricultural Extension Department gave 2 mugs of sunflower seeds per household in
Atiak, promising to later buy the produce for oil.292 On 30 April CRS also gave
5kg/acre/person of sunflower seeds: ‘The seed was distributed free of charge, but on
condition that after the harvest the outcome of it should be sold to them, i.e. to CRS Uganda’.293
Western Acholi Cooperative Union gave out 10kg cotton seeds per person, Odek camp,
31 May 1999, also in the expectation of buying the crop.294
NGOs occasionally made once-off distributions, such as when World Vision gave
school uniforms and blankets to orphans in Awer,295 and at times benevolent
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individuals made generous donations, such as in Palaro where somone distributed 24
hoes each to the six Lukeme groups in the camp.296
Demonstration sites
One of the more paradoxical NGO interventions into livelihoods – given that camp
dwellers clearly knew what to do when given seeds and tools - was to initiate so called
‘demonstration’ plots such as the World Vision-USAID Food Security Project
demonstration site in Pabo, where people were to be taught improved agricultural
techniques.
In practice these became integrated into the relief economy. When the World Vision
programme in Gulu and Kitgum produced 500Mt of beans and 37Mt of maize these
were sold to WFP for distribution to Sudanese refugees. In their press release of 7 May
1999, announcing the first deliveries of food from World Vision to WFP, they claimed
that ‘through this scheme and procurement, WFP and World Vision were able to inject
140,000,000 Ush [shillings] into the rural economy of Gulu district’. They went on to
say
WFP and World Vision would like to... encourage the people of Gulu and
Kitgum to follow this example that will lead to self-sustainability. WFP and
World Vision will continue supporting efforts of the Acholi people to develop
Gulu and Kitgum districts. Development that will help building peace and
understanding in the north and in Uganda.
The implicit message was clear; people’s impoverishment is their own fault – if only
they knew how to farm properly they would be self-reliant. The perversity of a
situation in which people in camps, who were themselves in receipt of food aid, and
whose problem was lack of access to land rather than lack of agricultural skills, were
producing food for donation to people in refugee camps elsewhere, was not alluded to.
The wilful blindness of such initiatives to the fact that, as UNOCHA described, this
was a population ‘accustomed over generations to a situation of relative self-reliance
and even prosperity’ (Weeks, 2002; 5), was striking.
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Calls to allow people to return home
Research findings consistently indicated that although people in principle wished to
return home there would be no immediate exodus from the camps whatever changes
occurred in the policy context. IOM found that 55.3% of respondents felt that insecurity
was ‘too high to allow for a safe return’.297 ARLPI found that although ‘the
overwhelming majority of the people… declared their wish to return back home as
soon as possible’, it was necessary to distinguish ‘those who would only go back after
they are assured of a minimum of protection and security at their villages, and a good
number of people who would be ready to go immediately at their own risk, whether or
not the rebels are still around’.298 UNDMT’s technical group noted in late 2001 that ‘the
Government has publicly declared its intention of seeing IDPs return home as early as
March 2002’, but argued that only about 72% of the populations of protected villages
would return to their original homes should the situation improve sufficiently to
enable them to do so.299 In early 2002, UNOCHA found an overwhelming desire to be
allowed to return home, but that if allowed to happen according to peoples’ wishes
and the guiding principles on internal displacement, this would be a gradual rather
than one off process. (Weeks, 2002: 33)
Despite the consistency of opinion of both local and internationally contracted
researchers that people would return home gradually if allowed to do so, the
Government of Uganda never gave the green light for dismantling the camps. The
nearest it came was in November 2000. Prompted in part by the outbreak of Ebola
haemorrhagic fever in Gulu district in September 2000 and fears that this could wreak
havoc in the congested camps, the 4th Division Commander began to talk of a
‘decongestion’ plan. Under this, people would be moved back to a specific area within
their parish of origin (but not necessarily to their place of origin), with some military
protection provided (as well as the promise of eventual electrification). As such, people
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would be ‘resettled’ into smaller versions of the existing camps, not into their original
homes.
The proposal was viewed with scepticism, as it did not offer a return to peoples’
original homes, and the most fundamental premise of a successful resettlement, peace
with the LRA, had yet to be achieved. In February 2001, ACORD researchers reported
that
most individuals … looked at this [decongestion policy] as a political move to
win votes since government and army officers strongly advocated for it. Many
also believed this policy was due to the responsibility they [the government] felt
they owed the people after bringing ‘Ebola’ from Congo into the district…300
Concerns were expressed that ‘When permanent resettlements are built and in
future peace returns to Acholi, who will own the area? How about those that
own the land that people are resettled on, where will they go?’
The researchers concluded that
With such perceptive questions and many more that continue to mingle in the
back of our minds, there is a need to see that this [decongestion] could be another
major source of ‘war’ and conflict after the current insurgency ends.301
Furthermore, as UNOCHA argued,
the proposals for so-called “decongestion”… would do nothing to remedy the
loss of economic autonomy and personal autonomy that is at the heart of the
problem. (Weeks, 2002: 26)
In the event, although some people were moved from Pabo to a number of smaller
camps in Kilak County, decongestion was never fully adopted as a policy, and those
who did move also maintained their homes in the original camps. The likelihood of
return diminished further on 1 December 2001, when President Museveni announced
in a meeting with the Sudanese charge d’affaires in Uganda that unless the
Government of Khartoum relocated Kony to the North of Sudan, the displaced could
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not go home.302 With the beginning of Operation Iron Fist in February 2002, all small
moves towards informal ‘decongestion’ came to a definitive end.
Block Farming
As the discussion of ‘decongestion’ suggests, one of the fears that camp dwellers had,
was that in their absence their lands would be taken over by other people. While this
did not appear to have happened on any large scale over the period covered by this
research, there were, besides the talk of building ‘permanent resettlements’, several
initiatives which fuelled such fears.
In March 1999, attempts were made in several villages to establish ‘block farming’,
schemes whereby groups of villagers would return to their home areas (but not to their
own land) to clear the land and farm on a commercial scale, with special protection
afforded by the army. Various elements of the army, including the President’s brother,
and the commander of the northern reserve forces, were centrally involved in these
schemes, at times in collaboration with international NGOs.303
In Atiak, for example, the Commander of the Reserve Forces came personally to
encourage people to form into groups of ten for the purposes of block farming in an
area at Adar, where they would reside with soldiers deployed to protect them. They
were told
They should aim for 40x60 metres for each person and place the plots together.  This is
called block farming…Furthermore, each group of ten should have production, finance,
mobilisation and public relations committees.304
He was accompanied by a Gulu based and university trained representative from
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) who said CRS would provide seeds and food for those
who registered in groups of ten.
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Another example was the Kilak Foundation for Rural Development. Set up in March
1999, with founder members including military personnel (including the Commander
of Reserve Forces),305 councillors from Kilak county, sub-county chiefs, movement
chairmen, LC III chairmen, as well as youth and women leaders,306 its members were
called to a security meeting in Pabbo Court Hall on 17 May 1999:
The purpose was to resettle people to Apar which is 30 kilometres away from Pabbo camp
on the west. The groups of 35 vigilantes … agreed to take off for Apar on Monday
24/5/99. The purpose is to resettle displaced persons in their original homesteads and
increase production. The UPDF gave them guns for their movement. They were warned
by LCs not to misuse the guns given to them for their own protection,[and that if they
did] the court of law will take action immediately…. By 30th May they had not yet gone
because they were waiting for food supplies from Col. Oketta.307
When in March 2002 I asked what had happened to the Block Farming initiative,
respondents in Pabo told me:
At the beginning it looked successful because World Vision also used it for the promotion
of food security (they had a big plot on the Gulu-Kitgum road). But mostly people have
come back to the camp. It became a scheme to eat government money; The Vice President
[Specioza Kazibwe] built a big hostel for students at Makerere [the most important
university in Uganda] out of some of that money…
Another block farm was started near Palaro in the grounds of Patiko prison farm. In
Awere Kal 150 homeguards set up a plot to grow rice. Hunger Alert – a local NGO of
which Janet Museveni, the First Lady, was a patron - encouraged a block farm in
National Teachers College Unyama in March 1999, another in Lamogi Division in April
1999, and one in Pabbo Palwong in June 1998.308
Fears that ‘protected villages’ had an ulterior motive were given sharp focus by the
publication in May 2003 of Salim Saleh’s proposals for a Security and Production
Programme (SPP).309 Although the scheme was not part of official government policy,
the fact that it came from the President’s brother inevitably raised fears. The more so as
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it envisaged incorporating all 800,000 people displaced in the Acholi Sub-region into 45
highly militarised production units, each containing 17,500 people, of whom 736 per
unit would be involved in civil defence. The Salim Saleh Foundation for Humanity
described the SPP as
a strategic plan for solving the insecurity in Acholi region. It will work through
beefing up local defense using community youth volunteers who are recruited
and trained specifically to secure the production areas in which they live. They
will train under the UPDF and be supervised by the local Uganda Police, under
the community-policing programme.
In what can be read as a criticism of Acholi failure to defend themselves it argued that
this would encourage the Acholi to become more pro-active in their self-defence:
The stakes of defence are even higher if the population is defending production.
For instance, the Kibbutzim system in Israel combined defence and production…
Some respondents believed that the SPP was in fact a ploy to take away land from the
Acholi and give it to western companies.  Many believed that British-American
Tobacco was involved in the ‘land grab’, as they were already operational in the West
Nile region and had a site in Gulu town.
Part III: Access to education
The disruption of education began long before the policy of protected villages was put
in place, and its consequences were already foreseen by Colonel Tolit in the 1994 peace
talks, when he warned that
…in 3 or 4 years time… even if Government said they wanted a son of Acholi to become a
doctor, there will be no suitable people because people are no longer going to school.310
When teachers found themselves a target of LRA killings and abductions, some took
refuge in towns. In 1998 thirteen of Awach’s seventy teachers rode to Awach daily by
bicycle: ‘They leave Gulu at about 5.30am, reach at 8.00. The parents [of the pupils] cook some
food for them, with support from UPE funds’. 311  For most, this was not an option. By
August 1999, the District Education Officer reported that 115 out of 176 primary
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schools in Gulu district were displaced. There were 137,000 pupils enrolled under UPE,
and 1800 teachers, of whom 500 were untrained.312
In the small camp of Attiak-Biabia on the border with Sudan there was one primary
school with 239 pupils, one qualified and seven unqualified teachers. Awach, with its
population of 10,300, had 8 primary schools with 3,311 pupils, 62 classrooms, 60
qualified and only 10 unqualified teachers.313
In Pabbo approximately half the teachers were qualified, the rest had completed
secondary schooling. Eight of the ten primary schools were housed in temporary
structures and giving classes outside under trees.
                                                     
312 Workshop on Primary Education organised by the Ministry of Education. Report from a participant
(Cwero).
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Table 5.3: Primary Schooling in Pabbo Camp, 1998
Name of School Pupils Teachers Pupil: Teacher ratio
Labala 544 9 60
Pabbo 1580 23 69
Pogo Okuture 187 4 47
Pawel Langeta 576 7 82
Lalem 506 6 84
Abera 668 4 167
Olinga 223 3 74
Mpala 196 3 65
Otong 156 5 31
Palwong Jengari 163 3 54
TOTAL 4799 67 72
Cwero’s one primary school had 411 pupils in four classes. One of the five teachers was
qualified. A further 11 teachers had moved to Gulu.314
In many places, such as Awer315 and Pagak,316 schools would be aggregated, with one
headmaster elected as the overall administrator, the other as deputy. Finances were
kept separate, in order to avoid problems in allocating materials if the situation
normalised and schools went back to their original sites.317
Much school building was done by parents. Red Barnet (Save the Children Denmark)
insisted that beneficiary parents mobilise local resources by making bricks, and
bringing river sand (for cement) and stone aggregates.318 The agencies provided items
such as cement, roof beams, roofing materials and window frames. In Awere P7, the
parents of 1700 pupils came under pressure to make and lay bricks from the chairman
of the school management and PTA, after he received a letter from Red Barnet about
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building classrooms. They even made a by-law ‘that if there is anybody who will refuse to
work, then the office of Jago must come in together with the office of LCIII Odek’.319 In a
meeting of the PTA for Abaka Primary School (Palaro) the 93 parents present were
asked to contribute 1000 blocks each for the construction of the school,320 a considerable
in-kind contribution given that casual labourers were being paid 50/= per brick and
that they had already cleared the site and started work on collecting the materials.
The shortage of structures and basic furniture such as chairs and desks was
demonstrated when pupils returned to school in January 1999. They found that they
could not re-start because both the buildings and the equipment were being used for
the mchaka-mchaka (political education – see Part I). The closure of schools due to lack of
sanitation has already been mentioned, and there were occasional closures due to
insecurity.
Universal Primary Education (UPE)
Universal Primary Education, which in principle gave four children per household
access to free primary education, was not as unqualified a success as was often
claimed. In 2002 the Gulu District Education Officer noted that it had resulted in a
doubling of class sizes from 50 to 100, and of overall enrolment from 70,000 to 140,000,
with resultant shortfalls in classrooms (500 still needed), pit latrines, and teachers’
housing, shortfalls which could only be met with donor support.321
Most fieldworkers felt that UPE had undermined Parent-Teacher-Associations’ role of
‘catering for the welfare of the students and teachers, promoting education, supporting in
cultural activities etc which are at a minimum today because of poor co-ordination right from
the grassroots’.322 Parents were also said not to want to buy school uniforms, ‘maybe
[because] they think it should come from UPE. [In Odek] Only 3 out of 57 pupils paid for their
mock exams (they cost Ush 1500/= for four papers)’.323
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Asked how Universal Primary Education (UPE) was being implemented, the
fieldworker in Awach replied ‘It is being implemented well. Many pupils joined school.
Parents send pupils to school due to good cooperation with teachers through the organization
from Uganda Government and materials for school reach for pupils’. However, ‘the problem is
the teachers; many are ‘ghost’ teachers. If you go, you find only 25-32 [out of 70 on the books]
actually teaching’.324 By March 2000 various schools were receiving Classroom
Completion Grants intended to meet some of the deficit in classrooms resulting from
increased enrolment.
UPE appeared unable though to address the issue of orphans whose parents died due
to war or HIV/AIDS. Most camps had no clear figures. As one camp leader
commented;
It is difficult to tell the number of AIDS orphans as there is no programme for them here.
Also people are very reluctant to admit to having AIDS, you can only guess due to
slimness… If at all they are there then the AIDS orphans are being looked after by their
relatives and kind friends as their guardians. To make the decision about who looks after
which children, family members gather to discuss. Those with least children take more,
and there might also be an attempt to address gender balance. … It is as well difficult to
assess the number of orphan children with the case of their parents killed in the war. They
are actually many in number. 325
When taken into other households (generally of extended family), such children often
fell outside the UPE’s quota of four children per household. The Social Services and
Economic Development Department of the Diocese of Gulu and Kitgum sponsored a
small number of primary students,326 but this was an under-researched area. The scope
for organisations concerned with children’s rights should have been considerable if the
following description from Atiak is any indication:
Some of these children when abducted don’t come back, others join the rebels due to poor
care for them, some join the home guard. Some of these children suffer a lot because they
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hold their own house and when registration for food is done they are not registered.
However, three households of such kids were registered for WFP.327
All the above suggests that UNOCHA’s assertion that ‘Access to universal free primary
education has been one of the brightest successes of this period of displacement among
the Acholi’ (Weeks, 2002; 29), should be qualified, particularly when primary school
drop-outs and teacher de-motivation are considered.
Drop-outs
The 4799 enrolled in Pabo’s displaced primary schools in 1998 represented
approximately 25% of 5-14 year olds, even worse than that WFP’s 1999 report that less
than 30% of that age group were enrolled in full-time schooling (1999: 18). It was not
just a question of enrolment, but also of how many dropped out (see Table 5.4.).
 Table 5.4: Primary School enrolments in Palaro, Abaka, and Odek P7 Schools
M F TOTAL Year as % of
total
enrolment
Male as % of total
by year
Palaro P7 School
P1 119 157 276 42.7 43
P2 43 48 91 14.1 47
P3 47 31 78 12.1 60
P4 37 25 62 9.6 60
P5 35 24 59 9.1 59
P6 46 6 52 8.0 88
P7 25 4 29 4.5 86
352 295 647 100 54
Abaka P7 School
P1 68 40 108 39.3 63
P2 24 18 42 15.3 57
P3 30 15 45 16.4 67
P4 18 9 27 9.8 67
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M F TOTAL Year as % of
total
enrolment
Male as % of total
by year
P5 14 13 27 9.8 52
P6 9 7 16 5.8 56
P7 10 0 10 3.6 100
173 102 275 100 63
M F TOTAL Year as % of
total
enrolment
Male as % of total
by year
Odek P7 School
P1 106 96 202 23.3 52
P2 77 88 165 19.1 47
P3 60 52 112 12.9 54
P4 60 60 120 13.9 50
P5 72 35 107 12.4 67
P6 58 37 95 11.0 61
P7 37 28 65 7.5 57
Total 407328 396 866 100 51
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This shows, firstly, the falling off in enrolment in later years. In Palaro P1 accounts for
around 40% of total enrolment, while those reaching P7 account for around 4%. In
Odek the reduction is less extreme, but follows the same pattern - of 65 enrolled in P7
in March 1999, only 23 sat for Primary Leaving Exams on 2 November the same year.
Secondly, it shows the male-female imbalance, with male students predominating in all
years above P2.329
These snapshot figures are born out by the findings of a large scale quantitative survey
conducted in 2001 by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). This showed
that primary completion rates were lower than the already low enrolment rates. Of 813
men and 677 women surveyed, IOM found that only 17.86% of men and 16.14% of
women had completed primary school. 1.74% of men and 0.68 of women had
completed secondary. 0.38% of men had achieved A-level, 0.13% of women. No
women had attended university, and only three of the 813 men.330
Of those taking Primary Leaving Exams in 1997, only 48 pupils achieved Division 1, a
figure which declined to 26 in 1998.331 In short, lack of access to education was
perpetuating disadvantage across the board, as well as perpetuating gender
inequalities. However, according to one fieldworker with three brothers aged under
eighteen, all of whom had left school, there was considerable apathy:
They have lost interest completely. One was sent but left after one year, saying he would
be late to marry (tradition is on his side as parents would want you to marry as many
wives as possible).332
Teacher Motivation
In January 1999, following the Christmas vacations, the majority of Cwero’s teachers
failed to return to school, prompting the school management committee and parents to
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complain to the Chairman LCIII. He in turn sent their message to the District
Education Officer, who then threatened them with dismissal unless they returned by
19 April (i.e. after missing a term).333 Problems of teacher motivation were not unique
to Cwero. In Odek the inspectors found teachers:
very reluctant in making schemes of work and lesson plans and many of them miss
coming to school - including the headteacher of Odek P7 school. They then concluded by
giving serious warning to teachers to improve on their duties for the well being of the
pupils and they said they will frequent their inspection to schools this year.334
In a visit to Awere, the Minister for Education and Sport reportedly accused some
headmasters of misusing UPE funds for drinking, and threatened that
any Head teacher who will be caught misusing the UPE will be arrested and sued to
Court. He advised the teachers to work very hard so that the standard of education must
up-lift.335
Secondary Schooling
Whereas in each camp primary school students numbered in their hundreds if not
thousands, secondary students were counted in dozens. In 1998 in Atiak there were 15
secondary school students, of whom 10 were studying in the adjacent districts of
Adjumani and Moyo. Cwero had only 13 secondary school students, of whom eight
were actually studying at the time of the report.336 From Awach, 30 of the 50 secondary
level students were said to be studying.337 By 2002 the Gulu District Education Officer
estimated the overall enrolment in secondary schools (public and private) at about
5,000, compared to about 140,000 in primary schools.338
This was due in part to high drop out rates at primary level, but also to a dearth of
opportunities for secondary studies in the rural areas. At one point or another, as a
result of the conflict, and without direct orders from the district education office, all of
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the district’s village secondary schools had been displaced into Gulu town.339 For most
this first happened in the late 1980s,340 well before the establishment of the IDP camps.
Some schools had suffered multiple displacements. Awach Senior Secondary School,
for example, had moved site six times between 1988 and 2002. By 2002, only two
secondary schools operated outside Gulu town. One was Pabo Secondary School (SS),
which had re-opened in the protected village in 1998 and had 150 attending students
(less than half of those enrolled were in a position to study, due to financial problems),
the other was Keyo SS, which had re-opened in 2001 and had 23 students attending.
All other secondary students wishing to study in Gulu district had to go to Gulu town.
There they could join either the displaced state controlled secondary schools, or,
money permitting, one of twelve private secondary schools. These provided stiff
competition for the state run schools. As one headmaster of a private school said
‘Obviously we play a very big role in the district. Without them the government headed schools
cannot accommodate all of them. There is no expansion in their infrastructure’. This included
establishing a ‘school dependents’ scheme open to disadvantaged students from S1-S6.
During their free time they do some work at the school, e.g. helping as worker’s
porters on construction during the vacations. In the headmaster’s opinion ‘This also
sends a message that the school minds about children’.341
For boarders, conditions were basic. As one headmaster exclaimed; ‘hostel? More like a
real camp. Students carry foodstuffs from home, they pay money for grinding [of grains],
cooking, firewood etc. There are currently 69 in the camp, all boys’. 342 In Awac Senior
Secondary School, where over 50% of the students (i.e. approx 100) came from Awac,
the hostel for boys could accommodate 40. There was no provision for girls because
‘there was no adult to look after them’. Pabo SS, with students from Pabo, Atiak and
Lalogi, had no hostels. Most students stayed with relatives or in rented huts - often up
to four sharing one hut.
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In terms of feeding, the headmaster of Awac explained that the students normally
brought 38kg of maize per term and 25kg of beans, and contributed Ush11,000/= to pay
the attendant who cooked for them, as well as the cost of salt, onions, and firewood,
noting that ‘The fees are low because most of the parents are displaced’. In the case of
neighbouring Lukome school, they had tried to provide feeding once, but most parents
couldn’t pay the extra 30,000/=, so no food was being provided at the time of the
research. As Pabo’s headmaster noted, WFP had turned down requests to supply food
for lunches in secondary schools. The students at St Joseph’s Layibi were quite
fortunate therefore:
I wouldn’t say it [the diet] is good, but we follow government recommendations, basically
posho and beans. We give them meat twice weekly on Wednesday and Sunday, we give
rice on Fridays. During harvesting time we add potatoes and cassava, some vegetables.
Breakfast is maize porridge.343
In early 2002 most displaced secondary schools were in the early stages of re-
establishing a presence on their original sites. In some cases this involved re-building
infrastructure prior to moving any students back: Atiak had been putting up a
classroom block and workshop, but still had no windows, doors or floor. Awac SSS
was constructing classrooms and latrines on its original site, and in 2001 had put up
two classroom blocks with help from GUSCO. Awere SS, along with Opit SS, Omoro
Memorial SS and St Thomas SS benefited from a fund-raising event held on 27
November 1999 in Opit P7 School, organised by the Omoro County Development
Association. The objectives of this were to raise funds for building 8 science laboratory
rooms, buying apparatus for the laboratories and thereby ‘uplift the standard of practical
science education in these 4 schools’. All people of Omoro County and other donors were
expected to contribute, the head teachers of the 56 primary schools in Omoro County
were summoned to pay 5,000/= each. An estimated 2500 people attended (including 21
MPs). Although certain key people, such as the Resident District Commissioner, were
notable by their absence, which was taken as an indication that they viewed the event
as multi-partist rather than movement, Ush 15-20 million was raised. By January 2000
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rebuilding was well underway, with parents collecting building materials and
preparing bricks.344
Koch Goma SS had also been re-constructing back in the village, again with
…the parents doing the construction. They have roofed, floored and plastered. We now
need 3 more classes and one office to be roofed. We had planned to do S1 there this year
but now it is impossible. The preparation was too delayed and there is renewed insecurity.
We found it would be difficult for teachers and students to stay there’. Similarly, on 1
March 2002 the Lukome PTA chairman and his vice proposed that they go back to site,
but the headmaster told them that it was still too risky.
It was not a decision to be taken lightly. Apart from refurbishment and rebuilding, the
issue of security was far from resolved. Furthermore, the composition of the student
body in each school had changed over the years, such that many students in a given
school no longer originated from the home area of that school, and so would be
unlikely to wish to move to that village should the school return. Similarly the teachers
– in Lukome SS for example, only 2 of the 13 teachers were from Lukome. As such it
was logical to move back in stages, setting up a 1st year class only to begin with, while
keeping their more senior classes in Gulu town. 345
The problems facing schools which returned were significant. Pabo SS, with a
catchment extending from Atiak to Lalogi and an enrolment of over 300 students, was
located 2 miles from the centre. It lacked water (students brought it from over one mile
away), classrooms, accommodation, and protection:
The soldiers promised protection and they are there at the site the whole day. However on
24 February rebels crossed the Gulu-Atiak road and fired some shots to scare the soldiers
away. We have now sent a request to the 4th Division requesting for a small detach to be
located there permanently.346
Keyo enrolled 20 students in 2001 and ended up with 15. In 2002 they had ten pupils
aged 14-18 in S1 (they had given admission letters to 16), and 13 aged 15-18 in S2 who
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were continuing from the previous year. There was only 1 girl in S1 and two in S2. As
the headmaster explained, poverty was the major obstacle:
We have some very bright students but we are unable to push ahead. At times schools try
to assist such students but they cannot go far. Sometimes they pay ½ fees, sometimes they
are given manual labour – for example two students built a kitchen and will not pay fees
for one term.347 There was also a suggestion made in a meeting of the PTA that if students
could lay bricks they should be allowed to do so; none has responded so far. Students are
also able to pay by instalments. A good number have paid a first instalment of Ush
35,000/= plus the Ush 10,000/= for feeding (normally the food is beans and posho).348
To stay in school required considerable levels of commitment. When we interviewed
the 23 students of Keyo SS, they told us that they came to the Keyo site because it was
near to their homes, allowing them to do domestic and agricultural work before school
– 17 of the 23 had been digging that morning. They also chose it for its relatively low
fees of 61,000/=. That said, only two of the 23 had paid the full amount, eight were
paying by instalment. 13 of the 23 were raising their own school fees through planting
rice and groundnuts, and quarrying stones. 5 were paid for by parents/guardians. 4
were not taking any lunch in order to save Ush 10,000/= per term (approx £4.00 at that
time).
The headmaster of St Joseph’s College Layibi noted a marked shift in the composition
of the student body:
The problem now which needs research is that the majority of Acholi are from Kitgum
and Pader, not Gulu. It has been the same for the last 2-3 years, possibly due to higher
levels of displacement in Gulu. Also there are more functioning primary schools in
Kitgum and Pader…349
The problem of girls dropping out of secondary school was dramatically illustrated in
Pabo, where girls entered with worse scores than boys, before allegedly eloping with
                                                     
347 Termly fees were Ush 57,050/= to which you had to add an optional Ush 10,000/= for lunch in schools
and Ush 18,000/= for school uniforms.
348 Keyo SS, 13 March 2002.
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businessmen whom they don’t end up marrying. So we get 30 girls entering S1 but only
5 finishing S4.350
All these factors suggest that displacement in the name of ‘protection’, which was far
higher in Gulu than in Kitgum or Pader, was directly correlated with a violation of the
right to education.
Part IV: Access to health care
Health service provision varied. In several camps some form of clinic was available
(whether government-run dispensaries or NGO and church-supported clinics). Some
had community based health workers, and in most there was a range of small ‘drug
shops’ and traditional healers. One Community Health Worker I interviewed was
selling Panado, Junior and Real Aspirin, Chloroquine (she could not afford to buy
Quinine), injections for Malaria and Pneumonia, Vermox and Mebendozole for
intestinal parasites, Gentian Violet for fire burns, disinfectant, Metronizadole for
diarrhoea, Penicillin for chest pains. After her original stocks from the Ministry of
Health were raided by the LRA the Ministry refused to replace them and she had to
buy her own using money from her husband. She had very tiny amounts of each
medicine.351
In Awach with its population of over 10,000, there was little more than an empty shell
of a building with a couple of iron bed-frames in it (personal observation). In 1998
Anaka hospital boasted one resident doctor and a number of medical assistants. This
was in principle free of charge, though in some instances, for example the removal of a
foetus from the womb of a woman who had committed suicide (see Chapter 6), they
demanded exorbitant payment. In addition, Anaka had two clinics run by the Church
of Uganda and the Catholic mission respectively, and numerous traditional healers.
Pabbo, population of 42,000-plus, had one health centre providing drugs, but on an
irregular basis, and five privately owned drug shops. Awer had an emergency
                                                     
350 Pabo SS, March 2002. National enrolment figures in Government Secondary schools for 2004 show
males 211,244 (56.9%) and females 159,563 (43.1%) www.education.go.ug?final%20Factfile%202004.htm
351 Visit to Coo-pe, 19 January 1998.
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dispensary established by the government. Awere had no clinic; immunisations by
visiting health teams were the only health service provision.352
Those with acute conditions would, security situation and finances allowing, seek
attention in the nearest hospitals. For some (e.g. Atiak) this meant travel to Adjumani,
but for the majority it involved travel to Gulu – often strapped into a wicker chair tied
to the back of a bicycle, or, finance allowing, by paying a passing vehicle to carry the
sick person.
Standards of treatment varied dramatically between the ‘free’ government run Gulu
medical hospital and the mission based St Mary’s Hospital Lacor. The former was a
run-down institution with poor facilities and staff seeking to supplement their salaries
elsewhere. Doctors opened privately owned clinics in town, while nurses would
siphon off some of the limited medical supplies for sale in the ‘drug shops’ in the
villages.
Lacor hospital, by contrast, had a very high standing nationally. After the conflict
began in 1986 the hospital found difficulty keeping staff: by mid 1987 it had lost its
senior staff and was left with the Superintendant, one other doctor and the founding
couple. Most nursing staff had also left. They had since been able to recruit new
doctors and nurses, but their average stay was just 1.5 years, making the development
of services problematic. Nonetheless, by 1998 Lacor had 23 doctors and 460 beds, still
insufficient for in-patients numbering around 650, with the extra patients generally on
mattresses on the floor. The hospital compound was full of relatives providing care
and attention to in-patients. Further thousands slept in the compound every night in
search of shelter from the LRA, on average some 4,000 ‘commuters’ per night, along
with about 3000 permanently displaced who had established themselves in one corner
of the compound following the Atiak massacre in 1995. The rebels entered the hospital
quite frequently, with the Superintendant himself abducted for a week in 1989.353
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212
Lacor Hospital was for most people quite expensive (though cheap relative to
‘traditional healers’). Outpatient treatment for malaria cost Ush 500 for a child for the
whole treatment, and at least Ush 2000 for an adult. For those admitted as in-patients
there was a standard bed-fee of around Ush 15,000, which covered bed and medical
care.354 The church-run clinics in Anaka charged Ush 200 for children and Ush 500 for
adults, while in Awer the cost of treatments varied depending on the type of disease.
The flat rate in Pabbo’s clinics and drug shops for consultation and treatment was Ush
800 per head. In the drug shops an aspirin tablet cost ten shillings per tablet and
chloroquine cost twenty shillings per tablet. An injection in a drug shop for children
cost Ush 250, but for an adult it cost Ush 500. For those going to Adjumani hospital a
blood test cost Ush 500, stool test Ush 700, and x-ray Ush 5000.355
People obtained the necessary funds in a number of ways. In Pabbo ‘people obtained
[money] by selling firewood, wild okra, and hiring out their labour’ (see Part II above for
examples of casual labour), while in Awer it was said that
Some sell foodstuffs given them by the World Food Programme, others engage in local
trading, i.e. buying essential commodities from town and taking it to the village. Others
sell crops produced in their small plots within the camps.
In addition to curative services, some camps had Community Based Health Workers
trained by the District Medical Office in Gulu. Their primary roles included
immunisation, education on issues of personal hygiene and environmental cleanliness
(‘Along this line they advocate for proper spacing, adequate ventilation, clean water services
using protected springs. Their working policy is “prevention is better than cure”’.),
midwifery, and the sale of medications. In some places women were trained as
Traditional Birth Attendants by the District Medical Office, with funding from
UNICEF,356 and in one instance the Family Planning Unit of Gulu Hospital ran a three
week training for eight people (seven men, one woman) to distribute medication (the
                                                                                                                                                           
353 Medical Superintendant, 19 January 1998.
354 Ibid, 19 January 1998).
355 Atiak-Biabia pilot, August 1998.
356 Odek, 14 December 1998.
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Pill) ‘and to teach people the importance of family planning to make them not to run into
problems of feeding and medical care’.357
Perhaps the most concrete preventive health interventions were the National
Immunisation Days.  For example, on 7-8 August 1999 and 25-26 September 1999, 5700
children under age 5 were given drops of polio vaccine at seven centres in Anaka sub-
county.358 In Acet 2,048 were immunised, with the LC1 chairpersons responsible for the
mobilisation of parents.
In Anaka, dental and sight problems were addressed through occasional visits by
doctors from Gulu hospital. When in late June 1999 there was an outbreak of cholera in
Biabia Elegu parish during which three people died, staff from the District Medical
Office went to Atiak for two weeks starting on 24/6/99. They closed the school down,
brought tablets for treating drinking water (ten tablets to each household), and took
specimens for laboratory analysis.359
Other problems such as river blindness were addressed through occasional visits from
the District Medical Office and Ministry of Health officials.360 There were also various
public health ‘education’ or ‘sensitisation’ initiatives, such as the celebration of World
AIDS Day in Anaka on 1 December in 1999, which involved some 3,500 people (see
Annex G for account). The educational content of such events was restricted to the
biological aspects of HIV transmission, rather than sociological and economic factors.
Other health education initiatives had an even greater element of the surreal: a
nutrition sensitisation workshop held on 30 November 1999 by Ministry of Health
Nutrition Unit, and headed by a doctor from Entebbe, attracted 54 community leaders
from the six parishes in Pabo who were told that kwashiorkor in children was a
symptom of too much carbohydrate and too little protein. The message was that
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… the target now is to feed our children on protein food and the diet must be well
balanced. Child spacing was very much emphasised in the workshop since Pabbo is noted
for early marriage which might lead to defilement and early breakage of marriage.
In light of most camp dwellers’ economic circumstances and the clear relationship
between camp life and malnutrition, this message seems particularly inappropriate.
When combined with the message about child-spacing, it exemplified a wider
tendency to blame the victims.
Infestations were dealt with in various ways. In early 1999 free-roaming pigs and goats
were held responsible for an infestation of jiggers in Anaka. The fieldworker described
the solution;
On Saturday 24/4/1999 at about 1:34 pm, I witnessed one mother pig hit with spears to
death and her pork divided between north, east, south and west - to the loss of the owner
of the pig who got no share at all. The pig had six youngsters in the womb. It had nearly
harrowed off the germinating ground- nuts in the field of one hospital nurse here…With
such a tight rule on pigs and goats the camp looks clean. So you see that the authorities
are fighting for health and sanitation.
In some places NGOs became involved in the delivery of basic services. World Vision,
for example, delivered medicines to Acet village on a bi-monthly basis, but also
worked on ‘(I) sanitation (ii) drug distribution to other dispensaries (iii) malnutrition cases
(iv) latrine work shop and water quality protection’. Health messages and instructions were
delivered in collaboration with local councillors. At a meeting called by World Vision,
for example, the women’s councillor for Odek
said if there is no latrine in the trading centre Acet, then the centre is going to be closed;
even in the market places there must be latrine of nearly eight doors. She added that
government policy states that in the trading centres there must be one latrine for each
shop.361
Abortion, which remains illegal in Uganda, was nonetheless a major health issue. In
September 1998, there were at least four attempts at abortion in Anaka. One fifteen
year old succeeded by taking ‘a mug full of crushed cassava root juice’. Another aborted
after washing pesticide-treated bean seeds and drinking the water. A third took over
twenty choloroquine tablets; ‘She aborted but she almost lost her life. She was taken to Lacor
215
hospital for treatment. On learning that she had made an abortion, the doctors in Lacor fined
her thirty thousand shillings for attempting to lose her life and in addition she paid fifteen
thousand shillings for bed fee’. Another fifteen year old was not so lucky, and died after
an overdose of chloroquine.362
HIV/AIDS was addressed in diverse ways. Some urged the use of condoms. The
Officer in Charge of Awer detach, for example, used the opportunity of a meeting
about reducing the size of the camp ‘to appeal to the parents to sensitize their children on
Aids awareness. He added that boys and girls should use Life Guard or Protector [brand-names
for condoms], should they have need for sex with their opposite partner’. He appeared
unaware that condoms were not available in the camp, whether in the shops or clinic.363
UNICEF sponsored a programme of HIV/AIDS awareness raising known as PEARL
(Programmes to Enhance Adolescents’ Reproductive Life), and ACORD was involved
in distributing an HIV awareness publication ‘Straight Talk’ and the co-ordination of
HIV testing in Gulu district. The churches, by contrast, condemned the use of
condoms.
Most military wives we interviewed had very little education and awareness-raising on
HIV/AIDS – and even if they did, it did not help them much. Asked whether they had
ever been given any training about AIDS, they answered
No, only the soldiers were sensitised – and they don’t pass on the information to their
women... If you as a wife insist on talking about HIV and AIDS, the soldiers become
angry and threaten to beat you up on account that they say you are stopping them from
loving your co-wife.
Soldiers and ‘wives’ also had problems accessing medical treatment, particularly in the
more remote rural detaches (military camps). Asked if they ever got blood tests, one
woman in Gwengdia answered
Recently my husband told me that he was going for a blood test in town, but ended up
spending two nights with prostitutes in Kasubi – is that what is called blood testing?
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The vacuum created by weak health services was partially filled by traditional healers,
who were popular but not legally recognised. As a result ‘Their numbers are not well
established. They do not usually accept to be counted for fear of being prosecuted’.364 They used
herbal remedies for physical symptoms such as snake and scorpion bite, Buruli ulcer,365
wounds, tetanus, dental diseases, nasal bleeding, diarrhoea, headache, cough etc. They
also addressed a major gap in the ‘modern’ services;
They actually treat people affected with devil spirits, casting them off. They also treat
barren ladies to bear children, [and do the] same to boys who fail in playing sex. If a boy is
impotent he tells his parents (there is a belief that if a mother touches her new born son’s
private parts before he is more than three days old he will be impotent).366
In August 1998 Awere and Palaro had women healers only, Atiak had five women and
three men, Cwero had eight women and only three men. Some felt this was changing,
arguing that ‘They used to be largely women, but with increasing poverty men are joining
in’.367 Certainly relative to the ‘western’ medical services the traditional healers could
be very expensive – in 1998 the average cost in Anaka and Pabbo was from Ush 5000/=
upwards. People found this money from a variety of sources, including ‘selling the
property they own, selling food-stuffs, chickens, and other produce from their fields. Some
treatment hangs on credit...’ ‘hiring labour, selling firewood to the employees (teachers etc) in
the camp, and selling wild okra and spinach’.368 Alternatively they paid in kind, as in Biabia
and Atiak where payments ranged from ‘1 chicken to 1 cow’. Payment ‘Depends on type of
diseases. For example for dental cases you pay one chicken or 1,500/=, while Ghost cases are
20,000/= - 50,000/=’.369
In Awer, where there were about eight traditional healers, the cost was even higher:
Minimum cost is 15,000 Ush up to 50,000 Ush or even 100,000 USh. People pay this in
terms of domestic animals like goats, sheep, pigs and chickens. Sometimes family
members contribute the money from the various activities they do like farming, working
                                                     
364 Pabbo, August 1998.
365 This was described as ‘very deep and near the bone. When you press the skin it doesn’t jump back. It is
not treatable in hospital - if you take it there either you get sent home or the hospital calls a traditional
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366 Anaka, August 1998.
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368 Pabbo, August 1998.
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for leja-leja for rich people. At times the people may fail to pay the amount demanded and
for that reason may be detained at the traditional healer’s place until the cost is met - or
else they make you die.370 Some people get money by making local beer.371
An important element of traditional medicine was that ‘It is relatives who decide whether
to take someone to the witchdoctor’. However, some clearly regarded ‘witch doctors’ as a
major problem. Following the death of seven children under the age of 10 in the Bibia
Barracks, the Political Commissar [– liaising between UPDF and community] asked an
ACORD fieldworker to sensitise the community on the need to take children to
hospital rather than the witch doctors in order to reduce child mortality.372 Some
Christians regarded the traditional healers as ‘witchdoctors’ (the LRA also had a
prohibition against the use of witch-doctors), or accused them of being quacks, as
suggested in the report of a healer in Gulu town ‘who used even to say he had a cure for
AIDS; you had to buy jerry cans full of a liquid he prepared. Of course if you died he said you
hadn’t been following his instructions correctly’. 373   
This brief overview of health-related activities indicates the paucity of free provision,
the way this strengthened the market for traditional healers, and the accusatory tone of
much of the public health education; minimalist assistance (e.g. provision of vent pipes
for latrines) went hand in hand with implicit criticism. People with no access to
resources were told that they were having sexual relations too young, not feeding their
children a balanced diet, not planning their families well and having too many children
they could not feed properly as a result. They were also told they should be building
latrines immediately otherwise the government would close down their market place,
and so on. Problems which were essentially related to a situation over which people
had little control, were portrayed as issues of personal moral responsibility. Once again
it seemed to be a case of blame the victim.
                                                     
370 For many illnesses the traditional healer keeps the patients in his compound until they are cured –
and/or have paid.
371 Awer, August 1998.
372 Atiak, 11 May 1999.
373 Awer, August 1998.
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Part V: Access to protection
The failings of the ‘protected villages’ in protecting people’s access to subsistence
opportunities, education and health services, might have been excusable had their
stated purpose, the physical protection of their inhabitants, been assured. But it was
not. Rather than protecting people from physical violence the villages contributed to its
generation, and the supposed protectors were themselves often the violators.
The paradox began with the phenomenon of ‘protected barracks’ described above, in
which the soldiers’ quarters were often at the centre, surrounded on all sides by
civilian huts. In Pabo, population 42,000+, there was at one time a detach of 1500
soldiers. Gwengdia detach near Awac (population 13,613 in early 1998374) had at least
800 soldiers. In many camps, though, the numbers were far smaller. Protection was
provided not only by UPDF soldiers, but also by Home-guards and Local Defence
Units.
Some homeguards were former rebels. In Awere there were
120 homeguards ... About 15 of them are known to be former rebels. They are good
fighters. If a rebel reports to the barracks and says he wants to be a homeguard, there is a
local arrangement with the Intelligence Officer and Commanding Officer that they
receive the salaries of other soldiers who have been killed but are still on the payroll’.375
As such some of the people who were being demonised as perpetrators of atrocities
were at the same time being given the responsibility of providing protection.
Although there were reports of truck-loads of youth arriving from Adjumani district
too, 376 the majority of Home Guards were recruited among local youth, both
voluntarily and by force. In Awer in September 1998, people were first requested to
join the home guard,
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Later on, the message was left with the LCs to recruit people forcefully into home guards
so that they could be trained to become soldiers…. Some boys on seeing that they were
being pressurised, decided to join the home guards voluntarily...377
From Atiak it was reported how
…at first the Government said they needed 10-20 people from each parish to be
homeguards. They worked for 1-2 years then were changed to Local Defence Units. From
LDUs they were changed to UPDF. This month they are training more homeguards as
old ones are now UPDF/LDU. They want 80 from each sub-county, aged 18-30. To get
these they divide by the number of parishes. In Atiak there are eight parishes, therefore
each should give 10 people. The recent recruitment drive asked for those who were
willing. The previous time you were forcibly collected and then screened. This time you
register with the LC1, get sent to the LC3, then go for training. Payment for food
allowance is 35,000 every two weeks, i.e. 70,000/month, but it is not regular, that is why
they sometimes misbehave.378
In Palaro the UPDF were stationed some 4km away, and in the camp there was a group
of about 100 home guards who had been recruited in the area:
This started in 1989 with forcible recruitment. These homeguards stay in their barracks
during the day and sometimes guard the inlet roads at night. When LRA movement is
reported, they go to the area and sometimes follow them. But in many cases if the rebels
raided villages for food and so on at night, the people of the village have to persevere or
are on their own until morning when the government come in. These soldiers get very
little posho after many months. Mainly they rely on their salaries/wages which are not
punctual. As they are children of the area they also get relief supplies from WFP, and the
camp leader collects food for them. I have also seen plots around their barracks, it seems
they have started self-help projects to generate food. These soldiers have not been trained
(they get two weeks training). As such their mood or characters change with the
situation. Sometimes they are not appealing, sometimes they co-operate with the
people.379
Given divided loyalties, forcible recruitment, and poor levels of training and
equipment, the Home Guards’ unwillingness to put themselves at risk was
understandable. There were consistent reports of the UPDF and homeguards/LDUs
failing to respond to LRA raids (see Chapter 3 for example). It was common practice
for the UPDF to respond only hours after first being alerted to the presence of the LRA,
by which time they were long gone. Following an LRA attack on the edge of Gulu
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town on 8 August 1998, for example, LCs who went to alert the UPDF soldiers
stationed a few hundred metres away were threatened with being beaten up if they did
not go away. The soldiers eventually arrived some four hours after the rebels had
already left. UNOCHA similarly reported that
Residents consistently complain that when they are under attack, the military
detachments in the adjacent barracks fail to respond effectively or in a timely
manner, and that these units (many of which are in fact under-paid and under-
trained Local Defence Units, not regular UPDF troops) are in fact themselves
often the source of violence and criminality. (Weeks, 2002, p18)
Response depended on the nature of the military forces; mobile forces were thought
better than ‘those who are stationed in the barracks they just say they are waiting from their
side only’.380 When the threat level to soldiers was low, as when a rebel called Lutip was
discovered trying to visit his mother in Acet camp by himself, the response was robust:
Having looted one goat and obliged someone to cook it for him,
…one of the villagers who knows him very well rushed to the camp and tipped off the
army at the detach. The army rushed to the place and found him seated outside waiting
for the food to get ready. Sensing danger he fled away into the bush, all attempts to shoot
him by the army were fruitless. Instead only the chair on which he was sitting was
destroyed by the bullets. The army did not disturb the person in whose home the food was
being cooked.381
Often there were simply inadequate numbers, obliging the UPDF to ask people to
move closer and closer together, as noted above. The LRA made a point of highlighting
the lack of UPDF reaction to them. On 1 January 2000 they invaded Awer and let
villagers know ‘that Awer is a good place because it did not give them any difficulty. There are
no soldiers who could chase them away for that reason they will come back for a second time’.382
These failures of military protection had high costs for civilians. Gersony was certain
that
the LRA has shot, knifed, hacked and bludgeoned to death thousands of
unarmed Acholi civilians during the past two years in the absence of armed
persons, opposition or challenge of any kind. (1997: 44)
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In Atiak in mid-1998 the LRA were said to ‘raid people mostly three or four times a week. It
depends on the insecurity of the week.’  Raids often followed directly on the delivery of
food relief by WFP, but could also involve far more than looting of foodstuffs. At
midnight on the 14 February 2000, for example,
L.R.A really attacked Pabbo camp … whereby six innocent people were killed, including
one soldier. One soldier was abducted alive and was still in captivity. 41 huts were burnt
leaving out 210 people homeless.383
Constant pleadings of insufficient manpower were difficult to understand in the face of
evident militarisation, forcible recruitment of homeguards, and military adventures in
the DRC. It was also frustrating for civilians to feel that they were supporting a force
which did not do its job. When the LRA infiltrated Otuke county, Lira district,
The unhappy people complained to the Sunday Monitor that on several
occasions they have alerted the UPDF of rebel presence but have instead been
rewarded by a slow reaction. “They wait until the rebels have gone then they go
and eat our chicken,” they said.384
The petty spoils of war extended beyond livestock:
..undiscriminating cutting down of mature trees by the UPDF/ Home Guards had arose
bitter feelings on the camp population since they were doing it without even consulting
the landlords [with whom] ownership of those trees rested. Secondly, the forest
department in town were not aware business of timber is being carried out by the army.
But then there was also fear on the Camp population to come openly and criticise the
behaviour of the army.385
There were also reports that UPDF soldiers in Gulu had earned money hiring guns out
to thugs to rob civilians with.386 To add insult to injury, civilians were often the victims
of UPDF violence, making them feel caught between Government and LRA. When one
29 year old man went 4km outside Palaro camp to collect materials for his hut,
Government soldiers mistook him for a rebel: ‘They fired at him causing serious injuries on
his left hand. He has been taken to Gulu hospital. People are now in a fearful state about any
encounter with both UPDF and rebel soldiers’.387 People travelling by road were often
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stopped by UPDF soldiers and forced to conduct manual labour along the roadside,
clearing high grass and cutting down trees, sometimes several times on one journey.388
There were innumerable accounts of rape by soldiers (see also chapter 2). In Awach in
July 1998, for example, after three women were raped
The first culprit was sent to Gulu police but they dropped the case. In the second case the
soldier grabbed the woman while she was making beer at night. The soldier was collected
by the mobile unit. He has not been seen again, though the case was sent to their boss.
The third case was a 45-50 year old woman, living alone. The soldier came, arrested her
and raped her in her room. She made an alarm, but the soldier escaped without
identification.
The respondent argued that
This issue [of rape] will not finish in our area because of women selling beers to soldiers
at their times, not following home regulations. In addition to that we have young boys
who have interest to drink, but no money. Soldiers give them money to look for a girl for
them. Failing to do this he [the boy] is just appointed a woman immediately [i.e. the boy
is used for sexual purposes]. Un-understandable.389
Often action was only taken when it became clear that important people were giving
attention to the case. In the case of a twelve year old girl who was raped at night by a
homeguard and who was able to pick him out in an identity parade the next day, the
soldier concerned was stripped of his uniform and gun and detained for a day. It was
only when a councillor arrived from town to conduct some training and took the case
up that the man was taken to the police and charged.390
Some individual commanders evidently terrorised the local community. At one point
in Palaro, ‘the commander of the local defence unit,… widely known as Lotoo-Ngang (‘Many
Deaths’), had been pursuing his duties all along his days. Unfortunately, what he was doing
was contrary to the authority conferred to him’. His actions included taking the salaries of
Home Guard deserters and leaving them only with a token amount, using re-captured
deserters to work the ten-acre farm he established near the barracks, and authorising
individual civilians ‘to kill domestic animals which went [strayed] into his farm – a source of
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meat for him. I was told he killed more than 70 head of sheep, cattle, etc’. Eventually ‘All these
evidents and many others including rape and defilements were cases reported against him and
some of his juniors. Now he has been transferred with his best supporter’.391 Transferring
soldiers away from the scene of their crimes rather than any kind of judicial process
seemed to be the army’s way of dealing with such cases.
When was the LRA the UPDF?
Against this back-drop of UPDF violence, it was not always clear that the LRA really
was the chief protagonist in any given incident. It was not uncommon for people in
protected villages to claim that they were raided by Government soldiers in rebel
disguise. This was already a problem in the late 1980s. Behrend writes how in 1989
Especially at night, ‘rebels’, militiamen, and government soldiers moved about in
small groups plundering farms. Since they all wore the same uniforms, one could
never be sure who the plunderers were. (1999: 7)
In one account of the 1995 Atiak massacre, an incident in which a minimum of 200
people were killed, the leader, a former NRA soldier who had been retrenched in 1992:
joined the Home Guard but collaborating with his brother who was in the LRA. They
agreed to kill the commander of the Home Guard, who used to be his friend but had
become more successful career-wise. At five am, when the rebels came to attack Atiak, he
went to meet them. Before that he told his other brother (who was also a home guard) to
leave the barracks.392
In another incident a homeguard from Odek detach took his gun and returned home
where he joined up with Okot to rob people. Okot had been an LRA but escaped and
returned to their home and didn’t report to World Vision trauma centre. So the habit of
robbery still sounded nice for him as he used to do that under the leadership of L.R.A.
Commanders.
This pair proceeded to rob clothes and money, to rape a woman who had given birth
two weeks earlier, and shot one man in his left upper arm, breaking the bone.393
                                                                                                                                                           
390 Acet, 7 June 1999.
391 Palaro, 1 April 1999.
392 Atiak, August 1998.
393 Acanling, 24 September 1999.
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The blurring of identities was often down to individual initiative:
On the 12/07/98 at Awer camp in the night at around 11.30 a government army soldier
came and entered the camp in the name of the LRA, well armed, demanding for money
from those he found.394
The government position, as stated by the Minister for Northern Uganda at the
ACORD peace conference, was that;
It has never been government policy to harass civilians – any cases have been due to the
indiscipline of individuals and should always be reported to the authorities.  The military
and security forces must stay within the law and observe human rights.  The government
is striving to improve, (it should be recognised that we started from a position of complete
chaos) and we commit ourselves to ensuring that the changes will be real.395
In one incident where soldiers had beaten up villagers and burned down 16 houses
after one of their colleagues was killed in a bar brawl, the Fourth Division Commander
offered himself to be beaten by the affected villagers, saying
“What I want you to understand and accept is that the acts of the soldiers was on
their individual capacities but not that it is a UPDF policy to cause destruction to
civilian property”.396
Somewhat paradoxically, by offering himself to be beaten, he was in a sense accepting
responsibility for what had happened – and almost certainly relying on the fact that
nobody would dare to beat him for fear of subsequent retributions.
It was not always a matter of individual responsibility. Often commanders themselves
appeared to be involved in passing their troops off as LRA rebels. One respondent
described how people were disturbed by ‘poor administration of UPDF commanders who
use the soldiers to behave as LRA’. He went on to specify that this included ‘beating people’
and ‘robbing food stuff during the night and day time. For example on 24/07/98 they came to
Pupwonya side of the camp and looted hens, ducks, goats and posho given by WFP, plates,
saucepans for cooking, raping girls etc. This was under the command of Captain O___  from
Palukere Barracks (home guards)’. In this particular instance action was taken and ‘He was
sued in LC3 court. He had no clear explanation, but people attributed it to irregular salaries.
                                                     
394 Awer report, 12 July 1998.
395 Gulu, September 1999.
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Their detach was very small and far from Atiak trading centre. His rank was stripped, he was
transferred to Patiko, also obliged to pay back to those he stole from’. Further problems
included ‘road-blocks on the road, taking civilian bicycles for their own moving, without
compensation for the bicycle. When you try to resist you will either be beaten seriously or given
gun fire around you.’  The respondent noted that ‘All these problems were forwarded for
consultation in the LCIII office. When he called for the army official to come for security
meeting, [he] refused to meet the civilian population’.397
When civilians in Awer questioned the order to move their houses closer to the detach,
the Officer in Charge warned them that
people must know that they [the UPDF] can change themselves under the umbrella of the
rebels and then kill the civilians and no-one will be in a position to distinguish whether
that act was done by the government soldiers or the rebels.
His intimidation worked:
From that time many more people are being displaced. People have started erecting
shelters for themselves in the new marked areas.398
Accusations that some attacks which were blamed on the LRA were in fact perpetrated
by UPDF occasionally received press coverage. On 28 February 1998, the Monitor ran
an article under the title ‘UPDF, not LRA rebels ambushed Gulu bus.’ This was later
refuted by the UPDF Public Relations Officer, prompting an editorial comment that
the fact that the ambush took place only 300 meters from a major UPDF detach
doesn’t help the army’s case. This is not the first time the army has been blamed
for attacks on civilians in the North, where it is supposed to be battling rebel
Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and protecting the people.
Numerous times, the UPDF and its officers have been accused of carrying out
acts of retaliation against suspected rebel accomplices, and for attacking civilian
settlements.399
An opinion piece the following day argued that
                                                                                                                                                           
396 The New Vision, 11 April 1998, Wamala offers to be caned for Zeu.
397 Atiak, August 1998.
398 Awer, 3 December 1998.
399 The Monitor, 1 March 1998, Time for UPDF to come clean.
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it will remain very hard to deny the possibility that disgruntled elements in
uniform are engaged in crimes against humanity up north…400
With soldiers failing to provide protection, and themselves involved in much of the
day-to-day violence, there was constant tension between civilians and military. When a
soldier in a local disco in Awer was hit by a stone he shot his gun in the air and the
disco was closed down.401 When Home Guards shot their guns into the air to scare the
birds from their newly sown seeds ‘people again imagined rebel invasions’.402 When a
house was burgled in Paromo village and residents argued that boot-prints found in
the compound indicated that soldiers might have been responsible
the soldiers rejected completely these claims and warned the civilians never to continue
with making those statements otherwise the end result would be worse. This gave a lot of
fear to both civilians and the Local Councillor making everything come to a stop.403
At times tensions exploded:
On the 9 October 1999 at Olwal [located 22 km northwest of Gulu Town] five people died
and eight others were injured … when a home guard sprayed bullets when the youth were
for Aguma dance celebrating Uganda’s independence anniversary day…The Home
Guard who sprayed the bullets was not found. He escaped and up to date nobody knows
where he is. He is a man from Atiak. The reason [he] sprayed bullets at people was that he
quarrelled with one civilian - a resident of the camp… because he wanted the wife of that
civilian man. After he was fought, he ran to the barracks and collected a gun.
As the profile of the northern Uganda situation increased, so too did steps to be seen to
be doing something about failures of protection. In June 2004 two detach commanders
in Apac and Kitgum districts faced court martial ‘for failing to protect the lives of
civilians in displaced people’s camps’.404 Such steps, however, were in many respects
too little too late.
                                                     
400 The Monitor, 2 March 1998: UPDF, Kony: Who is burning out?.
401 Awer, 14 December 1999.
402 Awere, 25 October 1999.
403 Awac, 20 July 1999.
404 New Vision, 14 June 2004, Commanders to face court martial over massacres.
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People’s responses
One response to the lack of protection was to obey the commands to move closer to the
military,405 another was to sleep in the bush surrounding the camps. Each household
made its own temporary hideouts known as alup, keeping their locations secret and
alternating between them frequently. When I began fieldwork in mid 1998, most of the
fieldworkers were sleeping in the bush with varying degrees of frequency. The
fieldworker in Atiak reported:
I slept in the bush three times in July when the rebels came and abducted some people to
carry some food stuff. I did not leave any person [of my family] sleeping [in our house].
… When it is insecure every time/day you have to sleep in the bush. It is agreed by the
camp residents that whenever you hear about rebels you have to notify others even during
night-time, this process continues all through the camp. We use a different route to our
shelters every time. They are very small. Some people just have polythene sheets.406
In Odek it was worse, the fieldworker had slept in the bush ‘throughout last month
[July], leaving nobody sleeping in the camp. We shift every two days. Only the family
knows where the place is. We go about 10pm, all at once, taking only a bedsheet and
papyrus mat’.407 This movement did not reflect unreasonable paranoia - the
fieldworker’s 4 brothers, 2 sisters and 2 nephews had all been abducted in June that
year (see Chapter 3). In neighbouring Awere the fieldworker had slept in the bush
twenty nights of the month preceding his report. It was not, however, without risks:
‘because when you are got [i.e. if you are found] either you are abducted, beaten or killed’.408 In
Palaro ‘The camp residents normally prefer sleeping away from the camp for fear of being
attacked or abducted by rebels’.
It was not just the threat of abduction by the LRA:
boys in the camp have resorted to sleeping in the bush at night in order as to avoid the
forceful recruitment in to home guards by the UPDF. Thus both government and the
rebels are now a threat to the camp population particularly the youth.409
                                                     
405 Pagak, February 2000.
406 Atiak, August 1998.
407 Odek pilot, 21 July 1998.
408 Awere pilot, 29 July 1998.
409 Notes on visit to Awer, 13 October 1998.
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What was by and large absent from people’s response was visible organised protest, a
point which is returned to in Chapter 6.
Discussion and conclusions
Regardless of who did what in the mid-1980s, whether the Government had a
retributive ethos, and if so whether they could sustain it more than a decade after the
events which gave rise to it, the objective and sustained reality of life in the camps
appeared to many a clear indicator of the Government’s present and ongoing lack of
commitment to protecting the rights and interests of the civilian population. For from
the day they were initiated in the name of protecting the civilian population, these
villages instead became sites of their abuse, and this did not change over the course of
eight or more years.
The process of forming the protected villages, which resulted in the fusion of dozens of
villages into single units, reversed the fundamental principle of Acholi settlement
patterns described by Girling (1960: 56-57), namely that of fission, the splitting off of
sub-units from a village to go and establish new ones as a means of dealing with ‘a
fundamental tendency for a state of imbalance to be set up in the village’ (e.g. resulting
from population growth, competition over resources).
When people’s subsequent lack of access to livelihoods, education and health services
is considered, it is clear that their enjoyment of rights in all these areas was severely
curtailed. This could not be excused on the basis that the camps did at least guarantee
Illustration 5.11 Night
hideout, Ajulu, June 1999
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physical security, because they did not do that either, at least not to any meaningful or
consistent degree. All domains of peoples’ lives were characterised by an extreme lack
of certainty. Food aid was sporadic and the amounts given fluctuated, schools came
and went. Messages from Government were inconsistent, and authority structures
were multiple, such that lines of authority and accountability were unclear. Instances
of this included different relief service providers using completely different
registration mechanisms, as well as parallel justice systems.
In fact, the ‘protected villages’ violated all major categories of rights, and just about all
the UN’s “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”. UNOCHA argued that they
were established without due consultation with the people affected (Guiding principle
7.3), lasted longer than required (6), failed to recognised peoples’ dependency on their
land (9), failed to achieve basic standards of living in terms of shelter, water, food,
sanitation, clothing, medical care (18, 19), and infringed on the right “to move freely in
and out of camps or other settlements”(14). Furthermore, people had not been
protected against ‘rape, mutilation, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment and other outrages upon personal dignity, such as acts of gender-specific
violence, forced prostitution or any form of indecent assault” (11), their properties had
largely been destroyed or looted (21), and they remained liable to attack by the UPDF
under suspicion of being LRA (10.2). (Weeks, 2002: 22-25)
This policy which failed to protect, and which was implemented by representatives of
the state who were themselves active perpetrators – the picture, in short, of protection
as violation – escaped close international scrutiny. Veiled by pressing humanitarian
needs and the more self-evident atrocities attributed to the LRA, it was possible for the
political nature of the almost total disregard of people’s rights as citizens, and the
insidious consequences of this disregard, to be consistently downplayed in national
and international coverage of the situation. Yet it fundamentally alters the parameters
of the analysis of the situation in northern Uganda. From one in which LRA atrocities
are taken as the beginning and end of the problem, the Government’s violations move
to centre stage. Not only did people live with fear of abduction from the LRA, but they
lived with fear of the lack of a future.
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It is not a simple matter of comparing like with like, of arguing that looked at
quantitatively the picture of violations is far less one-sided than it is generally
presented. It is even more serious than that. The violations perpetrated by the civilians’
supposed protectors are double violations, in that the act of violation, when
perpetrated by a protector, is also a violation of the duty to protect. In some important
senses these double violations are liable to have even more disastrous social and
psychological impacts than the ones perpetrated by a clearly identified enemy, for they
breach a relationship of trust which is cardinal to the healthy functioning of society. In
abusing persons who, by the very nature of the contract between state and civilian,
have subordinated themselves to the power of the state for the purposes of physical
security, the impact of the abuse is multiplied, particularly as the victims are generally
silenced as a result of their powerlessness. To the extent that the perpetrators are
drawn from the local population (as were members of the Home-guards, Local Defence
Units and some UPDF) it becomes a triple-violation in that people are turned against
their own (see chapter 7 for further discussion).
In this respect, violations perpetrated by the state are akin to those perpetrated within
a family. When rape is incestuous it can be more damaging to the victim than rape by a
stranger, as the perpetrator is the very person whom the victim would usually turn to
for support and solace. In incest there is no-one left to turn to. The victim is often
dependent on the perpetrator and therefore in no position to report the perpetrator
(even if someone were prepared to listen). The violation is frequently submerged in
silence. Similarly when a soldier rapes a civilian in a highly militarised zone, the victim
is left with no channels through which to pursue accountability, justice, or redress -
particularly where the army carries as much political weight as in northern Uganda,
and where those who should be prepared to listen are not.
To make matters worse, the person best placed to call the perpetrators to account, the
President, was himself, as Commander-in-Chief, part of the institution from which the
perpetrators emerged. When the personalisation of politics in Uganda is considered, in
which individuals such as the President assume a disproportionately important role
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akin to that of a father figure in the popular imagination, then the fact of being violated
by one or more representatives of the institutions which are an extension of this
figure’s power does indeed seem analogous to a form of incest. If on top of this, those
representatives are co-opted from the victim’s own clan or ethnic group, as was
generally the case with Home Guards and some members of the UPDF, then the
incestuous nature of the act, and its psychological consequences for the victim and
society/community, are further aggravated.
Protection as violation is not without political repercussions. IOM argued that;
while the government’s efforts in deploying soldiers in Northern Uganda may
have been done in good faith, the people’s ‘protector’, the UPDF, are instead
perceived to be causing more harm than good. The popular opinion is that with
soldiers being relatively rich they have used this position to lure young girls into
sex, break up families by seducing poor desperate women and then harassing the
husbands. This is an important stumbling block in the peace process as these
actions malign the well-intentioned government intervention.410
As UNOCHA noted, ‘The sense of alienation from the central government is already
very high’. Echoing Behrend’s portrayal of Gulu as ‘a city “occupied” by the NRA’
UNOCHA continued that ‘The UPDF has in many ways comported itself as an
occupying force in hostile territory’ (Weeks, 2002: 12). While UNOCHA was not
categorical that the protected villages had violated principle 6 (“The prohibition of
arbitrary displacement includes displacement (a) when based on policies of apartheid,
“ethnic cleansing” or similar practice… (e) when it is used as collective punishment”),
neither did it wholly exclude the possibility. Instead it noted that
it will be important for the government of Uganda to require a high level of
accountability from its civilian and military officials, to ensure that matters of
ethnicity do not per se impinge on decision-making regarding the Acholi
displaced. (Weeks, 2002: 29)
Coming in 2002, this latter recommendation could not undo years of damage to
individual and collective psyches in northern Uganda. The Government’s failure to
deal with the high levels of impunity enjoyed by the UPDF seemed to many people in
northern Uganda to be an implicit authorization of that abuse, further proof that the
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Government shared in the devaluation of the Acholi. The impact on the political
stability of the area of the double and triple violations which took place under the
guise of protection was in this regard more grave than the atrocities of the LRA. It was
an entirely logical (though not necessarily correct) step for people to conclude that the
Government’s intentions were dark, if not genocidal. This was simply and starkly
captured by a youth who, at a youth conference held in Gulu district, argued, 'we live
by chance, die by design'.411
                                                                                                                                                           
410 IOM study, section 2.2.6.
411 'Youth at the Cross-Roads: Which way forward?' Youth Conference, District Council Hall, 22 January
1999.
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Chapter 6 - Protection as Debilitation
Staying in the camps is a miserable life. Actually you are in prison within your own
country. Have you been to a camp? They are so congested. Sanitary provisions are not
adequate. People are from different places resulting in immorality, drunkenness’.412
Introduction
The violation of a wide range of human rights resulted in such a ‘miserable life’ for those
in the ‘protected villages’ that the question inevitably arises as to why people put up
with it rather than returning to their homes at the earliest opportunity. For the number
in camps always increased when security deteriorated, but when the security situation
improved dramatically (January-late December 1999, for example), the camps
remained congested. A baseline survey of Awach conducted in November 1999, after
nearly a year of relatively good security, found that in one parish only ten households
– all elderly people - had returned home.413 There was thus a time lag between
improvements in security and peoples’ decision to return to home areas.
One factor holding people back was the lack of a clear signal from Government. As
UNOCHA reported ‘There is no clear sense on the part of the displaced population of
its official status, and in particular of whether it is authorized to return home’.414 In
meetings between military commanders and camp residents ‘…the local community
asked the commander of the homeguard, Pagak detach, to tell them about the security situation
in the area and when people would be allowed to go back home’.415 To return home without
such authorisation was to risk coming under suspicion as rebel collaborators and suffer
the consequences. Having experienced military force in the process of coming into the
protected villages, few were willing to incur similar force by trying to leave
spontaneously.
                                                     
412 District Education Officer, Gulu, March 2002.
413 Ongiertho Emmanuel, November 1999: 2.
414 Weeks, 2002: 19.
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People were also held back by uncertainties about the broader security situation, and
by the practical need to have a base in the camps while rebuilding in their home area.
This was partly to minimise risk, partly to maintain access to the albeit basic services
available in camps: to the extent they existed at all, food relief, education and health
were directed towards the protected villages. UNDMT reported in late 2001 that:
With few exceptions, no significant assistance is presently being provided to
rehabilitate roads, schools and other infrastructure in sub-counties or parishes or
between these and the main trading centres. Several months would be required
for agencies to re-orientate their assistance strategies and to shift personnel and
resources away from care-and-maintenance to return and resettlement.416
Furthermore, as described in Chapter 5 Part III, parents had been obliged to invest
their own labour in building up a key element of the infrastructure of the camps, the
schools.
However, these factors do not adequately explain why people did not return home
when circumstances improved. This chapter considers the nature of the immediate and
cumulative impacts of war, displacement and their associated violations, and argues
that people became too debilitated, physically, psychologically and, ultimately,
culturally, to break out of the situation and go home. In short, they really were ‘in
prison’ in their own country. A key to the complexity of these different dimensions of
debilitation is that they did not simply happen to people. Through their choices of
short-term survival strategies people damaged their own longer-term prospects, and
thus became implicated in their own debilitation; impacts did not just happen to them,
but also through them.
                                                                                                                                                           
415 Awer, 20 November 1999.
416 UNDMT report, undated, point 5.1.  Whereas when people moved to the camps they could sometimes
return home to recover crops which were still developing when they left, by the second year of camp life
the fields had not been ploughed or planted and had reverted to bush, requiring considerable labour to
clear it again.
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Physical Debilitation
While needs have significantly increased, overall resources have remained at
their pre-2000 level, resulting in sizeable shortfalls, a lack of basic services and
undue human agony.417
At its most basic, displacement into protected villages caused hunger and malnutrition.
An ICRC study in 2000 found that the longer people stayed in camps the less food they
had. The hunger gap increased from 2.7 months for new residents to 3.49 for those who
had stayed over two years, and while new camp residents averaged 1.93 meals per
day, this fell to only 1.6 for those resident more than two years.418
WFP rations were supposed to provide 25% of cereal needs, and 30% of pulses and oil.
In practice deliveries were erratic, as in the example of Cwero (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1: Food Relief to Cwero Camp, September 1998 – March 2000
Date Days since
previous
ration
Oil
(ltr)
pp/day
419
Maize
(kg)
pp/day Beans
(kg)
Cowpeas
(kg)
04-Sep-98 0 5.1420 0 3
13-Nov-98 70 0 0 5.1 0.078 4 0
10-Feb-99 91 1.5 0 5.1 0.060 3 0
23-Apr-99 72 1.5 0.0045 5.1 0.075 0 0
14-May-99 21 0.3 0.0155 4 1.190 1 pp 0
15-Jun-99 32 0.3 0.0020 3 0.027 0 3-8kg
16-Jul-99 33 0.3 0.0091 3 0.091 0 1.2
26-Aug-99 41 0.3 0.0016 4 0.073 3 0
                                                     
417 UNOCHA, February 2001, Secondment of NRC standby staff member to UN OCHA in Uganda.
418 ICRC, June 2000.
419 Calculated as 4.6 persons per household on the basis of camp population figures and household
numbers provided by one of the camp leaders involved in food distributions in Cwero. This gives a
slightly higher ration per person than under the WFP’s own calculation which, until May 1999 was of 5
people per household, regardless of the actual number.
420 = 25/4.9.
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07-Oct-99 42 0 0.0016 2.5 0.095 0 0
08-Nov-99 32 0.3 0.0000 3 0.078 0 2.5
Mar-00 105 0 0.0006 10.5 0.029 0 0
Average 53.9 0.45 0.0035 4.58 0.180 1.111 0.411
The average period between deliveries of food aid was 54 days. The longest wait was
105 days, the shortest 21.  This hardly meets one of the Minimum Standards for
delivery of humanitarian relief set by Sphere Project, namely predictability and
consistency. Furthermore, content and amounts fluctuated dramatically. Over the
period 4 Sep 98 - 14 May 99 the maize delivered equated to approximately
0.3kg/hh/day or 0.08kg/pp/day, or 20% of the minimum requirement (a caloric intake
of 2100Kcal/day requires approximately 70g of beans (+/- 250kcal), 50g of oil (+/-
420kcal), and 400g of maize (+/- 1500kcal). With hugely irregular supplies there were
long periods in which food aid did nothing to solve peoples’ problems. Even when
supplies did arrive, crude registration mechanisms (see Chapter 5 Part III) resulted in
large households receiving less per person than small ones.
3-monthly nutritional surveys conducted in the camps by ACF and Oxfam from
November 1996, revealed that, despite the efforts of WFP and its implementing
partners ‘to ensure displaced persons are provided with access to a basic diet’, 50% of
children under 5 were stunted, and 30% were wasted or underweight for their age.
That malnutrition was exacerbated by displacement was clear. An ACF-USA
nutritional survey in Kitgum in December 1999 found that global malnutrition rates
among children aged 6-59 months differed between the non-displaced, who appeared
to benefit dramatically from the relative peace of 1999 (levels dropped from 6.7% in
March 1999 to 3.5% in December), and those living in the camps (whose levels dropped
only from 7% to 6.6% over the same period).  The consequences for the displaced were
also clear. In 1999 WFP reported that
In the camps corneal ulceration and childhood blindness caused by Vitamin A
deficiency is widespread, as are deficiencies of Vitamin B and iron. Both have
contributed to growth retardation, mental as well as physical, with women and
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girls being especially prone to malnutrition as a result of household food
allocation patterns favouring males. (1999: 17)421
Following renewed insecurity from February-March 2002, malnutrition rates soared: a
nutritional survey conducted by WFP and its implementing partners,422 found global
malnutrition rates of 32 and 18 per cent among children under 5 in Anaka and Pabo
respectively,423 further confirmation of the extent to which the camps created both
malnutrition and dependency. This exacerbated the already serious problem of mental
and physical growth retardation noted back in 1999 – effectively a whole new
generation was being physiologically ‘dumbed down’.
Illustration 6.1 Children at door of hut, Pabo, African Child Day, 3 July 1999. Note the door
made from flattened oil cans given as part of relief assistance
                                                     
421 Prolonged vitamin and iron deficiencies (as opposed to inadequate calories) are believed to have serious
effects on mental capacity.
422 Ministry of Health, Action Against Hunger US (ACF), and Norwegian Refugee Council.
423 FEWS NET: Uganda – Monthly Food Security Update, 27 February 2003.
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One response of the relief agencies was to set up supplementary feeding schemes. ACF
did so for 13,000 children in 19 camps in 1999. In Atiak, they had 560 children on their
register, and a small number of adults:
The dry ration they give to these children are ground soya beans mixed in the ratio 1 jug:
1 mini Plastic cup (LAPWOTI in local language) of sugar and in addition to that they
give one piece of soap. They give these once a week... Action Faim have their staff with
white T-shirt with writing “Action against malnutrition” and the abbreviation “SFC”
meaning Supplementary Feeding Centre. Among the adults found are mostly females
some with the cases of T.B. which made them to lose appetite.424
World Vision also had schemes in several camps, including Pabo and Atiak.
Illustration 6.2 ‘Malnourished children and their mothers being displayed before the Vice
President of World Vision Africa during his visit to Pabo Camp on 7 July 1999. In front of them
are samples of food for children’s diet’
In Pabo Oxfam operated a centre for malnourished children – ‘but only on Fridays and
Saturdays. World Vision Gulu branch also carried out similar tests on malnourished
children three times in July 1998 and the worst affected children were transported to
Lacor hospital in Gulu’.
It was not just the young who were malnourished and in poor health. As the late
medical super-intendant of Lacor Hospital noted, ‘there has been a serious rise in malaria,
partly due to breakdown in public health services, partly as people are sleeping in the bush (see
                                                     
424 Atiak, 25 March 1999.
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Chapter 5 for discussion of such temporary shelters).425 …  In addition to malaria,
malnutrition, TB and trauma have all increased over the last 5 years’.426 There were also
outbreaks of cholera (see chapter 5). IOM found in 2001 that 30% of a sample of 3769
Gulu IDP camp residents, irrespective of sex and age, reported being sick during the
month before their survey, suggestive of the general state of (ill) health of the
population.
A more qualitative insight into peoples’ major health concerns can be gained from a
workshop I conducted with 14 male and 23 female traditional healers in Gulu in June
1999. In a ranking exercise conducted as a group they suggested that they dealt most
frequently with (in order of perceived priority): Pelvic inflammation, Upper
Respiratory Tract Infection (URTI), Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs) and AIDS,
TB, Miscarriages, Convulsions & Malaria, Impotence/Infertility and Mental problems.
When each healer was subsequently interviewed individually and the cases they had
dealt with in the preceding week were listed, a somewhat different ranking emerged
(Table 6.2).
Table 6.2: Ranking of illnesses treated in 961 patients by 37 traditional healers in
Gulu district in the week 14-20 June 1999
Illness Ranking Number of cases
(m = 416, f = 545)
As % of total
Pelvic Inflammation 1 186 19.4
STIs & AIDS 2 146 15.2
Impotence & Infertility 3 137 14.3
Convulsions & Malaria 4 131 13.6
Upper Respiratory Tract
Infection
5 115 12.0
TB 6 79 8.2
Herpes Zoster 7 67 7.0
                                                     
425 A report from Patongo Health Centre in Pader district showed that between December 2001 and
January 2002 80 people had died of malaria in that health centre alone. KM E-newsletter No 5, 15 February
2002.
426 Interviewed in Lacor Hospital, January 1998.
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Miscarriages 8 53 5.5
Mental Problems 9 34 3.5
Induced Abortions 10 13 1.4
TOTAL 961 100.00
Herpes zoster and induced abortion had not been mentioned when discussing as a
group, and impotence and infertility, which collectively the healers had ranked almost
bottom, emerged as the third most important issue they dealt with when questioned
individually. It is also striking how many of the issues appeared to be related to sexual
health and/or to be symptoms of HIV infection. Pelvic inflammation, the number one
complaint, is frequently a symptom or after-effect of the STIs which are ranked number
two. Whereas impotence has many possible causes, female infertility is also often
linked to a wide range of infections, including STIs. TB and Herpes Zoster are both
closely associated with HIV. Miscarriages are also at times linked with STIs. From this
point of view, nearly half of the cases seen were potentially related to sexual health
problems – and while not all these sexual health problems are necessarily evidence of
HIV, having an STI can increase vulnerability to HIV infection.
Physical injuries were also very evident. IOM found in 2001 that of 3769 Gulu IDP
camp residents surveyed, 282 or an extraordinary 7.5%, had suffered an injury in the
month prior to the survey. Of these, 161 were caused by gunshots (IOM 2001, table 11).
Landmine incidents were ongoing during the period of the research, as were cases
where children picked up unexploded ordinance which then blew up and killed them
(chapter 5).
While there is no systematic data on deaths in the camps where we conducted
fieldwork, anecdotal evidence suggested that deaths amongst children and young
adults were high (Table 6.3).
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Table 6.3: List of deaths recorded by fieldworkers in Awer & Pagak camps, July 99 –
March 00, sorted by age of deceased
Date Sex Age Cause of Death
17-Jul-99 F 0.66 Sickle Cell Anaemia
28-Dec-99 M 0.66 Malaria
15-Jan-00 ? 0.66 Malaria
14-Aug-99 ? 1.5 Malaria
27-Mar-00 ? 2 Malaria
06-Jul-99 ? 2.5 Malaria
14-Aug-99 ? 3 Malaria
12-Dec-99 M 3 Malaria
07-Jan-00 ? 3 Took poison left in house by parents
14-Aug-99 ? 5 Malaria
09-Mar-00 ? 5 Malaria
25-Sep-99 ? 7 Malaria
10-Oct-99 M 15 Poison (Suicide)
24-Jan-00 F 25 Died in child birth (as did the child)
13-Jul-99 ? 30 Continuous vomiting of blood
02-Sep-99 M 31 Pneumonia
17-Dec-99 M 31 TB which lasted long
18-Sep-99 M 33 Died after long illness
27-Jul-99 F 35 Died in Lacor Hospital, cause unknown
11-Mar-00 F 37 AIDS (Died in Gulu hospital)
06-Jul-99 F 40 AIDS
30-Aug-99 M 41 Unknown
03-Sep-99 M 41 Given poison in the local drink (lujutu)
25-Dec-99 M 42 UPDF Soldier killed in Bundibugyo, brought to Pagak for burial
13-Sep-99 F 45 Hit on head by falling branch
10-Oct-99 M 45 Poison
17-Mar-00 M 52 Poison (old mzee, died in Lacor Hospital)
07-Oct-99 M 56 Poison
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Date Sex Age Cause of Death
15-Dec-99 F 63 AIDS
Such a list does suggest that people were dying very young, with malaria a major killer
among small children, and TB, AIDS and poisoning major causes of premature deaths
among adults.
Illustration 6.3 Mother of ten children sitting at the graves of eight of them, Gulu town, 12 July
1999
While deaths and injuries did not compare to situations such as the Rwanda genocide,
they were nonetheless significant relative to the size of the population. Gersony
records about 1,000 war injuries leading to hospitalisation over the period January 1996
- March 1997 alone. And contrary to his estimate that deaths throughout the war
‘would be measured in the tens of thousands, rather than in the hundreds of
thousands’,427 the EU in its resolution of July 2000 estimated the total number of deaths
at over 100,000 (point E).
Psychological Debilitation
The debilitation caused by the impact of the war and camp life was not just physical
but also psychological. Numerous indications of psychological ill-health emerged
during the course of the fieldwork, ranging from complaints seen by doctors and
healers, to a number of behaviour patterns, many of them self-destructive. The medical
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superintendent of Lacor Hospital, for example, reported seeing a marked rise in the
number of women with symptoms of anxiety, such as lack of sleep, loss of appetite,
and palpitations, some of which he attributed to their having to shoulder greater
responsibilities. Traditional healers identified mental health problems as 3.5% of their
case-load – a level which rises substantially if some of the physical symptoms they deal
with, such as impotence (Table 6.2), are regarded as somatic symptoms of
psychological stress. The most dramatic indications of psychological stress found in
fieldwork were, however, high levels of suicide and poisoning, as well as alcoholism
and interpersonal violence.
Suicide
Information on suicides emerged in three stages. Over the main data collection phase
(mid 1998-Mar 2000) thirty-six accounts of attempted suicide were collected, of which
twenty-one were successful and fifteen failed. The predominant method used (17
cases) was to swallow pesticides or insecticides, either straight from the bottle or pack,
or by washing seeds which had been sprayed with pesticide and then drinking the
water.428 Hanging was also common (5), with overdoses of medications (2) and
swallowing watch batteries (2) less common. Although fifteen attempts failed, this was
generally because other people realised what was happening and were able to
administer a combination of raw eggs and cooking oil which would force the person to
vomit up the poison.
We added to this data with figures from Gulu Police Station. For the period 1998-2001
they had records of 27 cases of successful suicide, of which we were able to analyse 25
(m=15, f=10).  There were noticeable gendered differences, with 12 men hanging
themselves compared to only 2 women. On the other hand 4 women took poison
compared to only 1 man, and three women swallowed batteries compared to only 1
man
                                                                                                                                                           
427 Gersony, 1997: 48.
428 In Chapter 5 it was noted that seeds handed out in the camps were accompanied by a warning that ‘the
seeds are dusted with poison therefore it should not be eaten’.
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Such findings prompted further discussions in Pabo and Acet camps in March 2002.
Additional examples were put forward and respondents identified an upwards trend.
Officials in Pabo informed me that ‘Suicide cases are very rampant. People use sibacol
pesticide and watch batteries. Yesterday a woman swallowed two cells [watch batteries] and was
admitted to Lacor… it is something which can happen anytime’.429 Five members of the self-
help group Can Deg Kolo in Acet were able to give accounts of four attempts which had
taken place in the weeks immediately preceding our discussions.
It might be suggested that suicide is not frowned upon in Acholi culture, but there is
much to indicate otherwise. When I asked ‘what happens if someone kills themselves?’
the answer was that
if you hang yourself the tree will be cut down. There is also a law remaining from colonial
times that the police are supposed to beat the body of the deceased person. Traditionally, it
was also believed that suicide was a bad omen and could result in many spirits haunting
people. The first person to see the body after the person has died has to go through a
cleansing ritual. They will also put a piece of grass or a leaf on the body to symbolise
burial.
It was also the case that, traditionally, the family of the deceased had to be
compensated by whoever was believed to have triggered the suicide, and that,
notwithstanding the punitive approach introduced by the colonialists, funeral rites
would be performed normally. The fact that few of these traditions appeared to be
operating would suggest that these mechanisms had either been overwhelmed by the
rising levels of suicide, or had become irrelevant given the changing causes of suicide,
or a combination of the two.
With few exceptions, reasons for attempting suicide appeared to relate to
intergenerational tensions and an inability to meet gendered expectations,430 which in
turn were linked with the dynamics of war and mental health problems. Amongst
adolescents in particular, suicide seems to have been perceived as the only escape from
                                                     
429 Sibacol is used against worms on crops such as onions, tomatoes and cabbages, also around banana
trees. Some people use it to try and catch birds and edible rats, but of course this is dangerous as the
poison is then inside the meat.
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domination by adults. One young woman killed herself because her family were
forcing her to get married to someone against her will. They were intending to use the
bride-wealth which would be paid for her to enable their son to pay bride-wealth for
his wife-to-be – a process sometimes referred to as ‘recycling’. In another case the girl
was two months pregnant by one of her teachers (as shown in Chapter 5, adolescent
girls would often take poison in an attempt to abort children they had conceived with
their teachers).
Many women appeared to reach a point of desperation at their economic situation,
often aggravated by their husband’s behaviour (using money for alcohol was
frequently mentioned), as in the following account;
Patricia Atim committed suicide …at around 1:00 am in the morning… According to the
witness she was six months pregnant. Patricia picked a quarrel with her husband with
bitter words inclusive (The husband's occupation is transporting people on bicycles to
their different destinations for money and such a man is described as a boda boda man.
His bicycle is also termed as boda-boda). After the exchange of words, her husband
removed some of her money and yet she (Patricia) had actually decided she would use that
money when she gave birth to her new born baby in the near future. When she found out
that she wouldn't be able to handle the situation any more she decided to go and borrow
money from one of her woman friends in the pretence that she wanted to buy some
medicine from the clinic.
Well she was offered a little money all right, but instead of using this money on what she
had requested it for, she bought chlorophinical capsules and swallowed all that much at a
go. The medicine in return started affecting this young lady and she was then taken to the
hospital - but the medical personnel could do nothing to rescue her life and in the end she
passed away.
Afterwards the medical personnel demanded twenty thousand shilling (about £9.00) for
removing the dead child inside her womb.  The parents of the deceased refused to pay the
money demanded by the medical personnel saying that after all ‘Patricia is already dead
and so is her child so paying that money wouldn't be worth it’.. The relatives of Patricia
took her body for burial in a village outside Anaka. My wife was there in the funeral rite
                                                                                                                                                           
430 Girling noted that ‘Several of the rare cases of suicide of which I heard occurred among childless wives’
(1960; 27) which both suggests that there has been an increase in rate, and further supports a close
relationship between suicide and inability to meet gendered expectations.
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on the 27/10/98. She told me that the child was removed from the mother's womb by a 72
year old woman.431
Another ‘successful’ suicide had been caught stealing from her step-sister’s granary
and was expected to replace the stolen sesame and to slaughter a goat in compensation.
When a group of seven women in Pabo camp all tried to commit suicide by
swallowing Furadan, a pesticide, in late November 1998, they were found in time,
‘rescued’, and asked to explain themselves. They stated that their husbands were
drinking away all the money realised from selling rice, leaving them in abject poverty,
and that their husbands were bringing co-wives despite the first wife already living in
appalling conditions. This spate of attempted suicides led to a ban on the sale of
Furadan in Pabo camp in early December 1998, but this did not prevent another
woman in Pabo from attempting suicide about a month later. She also failed, and when
asked to explain herself stated that she had tried to kill herself ‘because of the husband
drinking 10 bottles of beer daily and leaving her to starve together with her children’.
Often the visible prompt to the women’s suicides is something men do to women. The
invisible underlying theme is a frustration at their resultant inability to meet their
gendered expectations of themselves. Women taught to nurture their children, cannot.
Women taught that when their husbands take a second wife, they as the first wife will
be able to sit back a bit, cannot when the household economy is in tatters. And so on.
Similarly, for men, the majority of suicides are explained in terms of an inability to live
up to gendered social expectations. Just how important this is as an explanation for
individual and social dysfunction, and how closely this is related to the dynamics of
war, humiliation and militarisation, is explored further in Chapter 7.
Heavy drinking
Suicides are just the sharp tip of an iceberg of psychological symptoms arising in part
from the war. Heavy drinking was much more widespread. Although the connections
with war-related stress are less immediately discernible, one professor attending a
peace meeting in Gulu in 1998, placed alcohol at the very heart of his analysis, arguing
                                                     
431 26 October 1998, Anaka
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that ‘To bring peace we need respect for one another, to drop the use of alcohol, and to stop
aiming to go into the army or into exile’.432
While few people gave alcohol such a central place in their analysis of war, it was
widely recognised by soldiers and civilians alike as a factor in the spread of HIV. When
discussing the rise in HIV rates in Gulu district non-commissioned officers rated
alcohol as the sixth major risk factor. Soldiers’ wives rated alcohol as the seventh major
cause (Table 6.3), and traditional healers also saw alcohol abuse as a major factor. It
was an obvious nexus for soldier-civilian relationships. In Awac, with the detach of
Gwengdia nearby, boys who wanted money for drink would seek to get girls for
soldiers. The Awac Parent-Teacher-Association (PTA) wanted to stop young girls from
going to the market to sell home-brewed alcohol as it exposed them to the attentions of
soldiers. And as already mentioned, men’s drinking was seen as the cause for many
women’s attempted and successful suicides.
Drinking was also regarded as a threat to education. When a police liaison officer
addressed a mass meeting in Attiak-Biabia, he listed ‘drunkenness among men and
women’ as one of the main problems confronting the education sector.433 When Awac
Displaced School PTA met their Local Councillor they identified ‘over-drinking’ by
teachers (along with the problem of soldiers taking pupils as their wives) as a cause for
poor performance by the pupils, and proposed that ‘Any teachers found drinking during
lesson hours must be handled before the court’.434 Similarly, when the Minister for
Education and Sports addressed people in Awere he made a point of stressing that
‘some Headmasters are really misusing the UPE funds … [they] are drinking, anyhow, without
thinking that this money is given by the Government for uplifting the standard of education’.435
One secondary school teacher described how ‘Some of the teachers take alcohol too early in
the day, resulting in disciplinary cases regarding neglect of duties. The rate of drinking has
gone up’.436 The District Education Officer implicitly acknowledged the problem when
                                                     
432 Bedo Piny Pi Kuc,26 June 1998, Gulu.
433 Attiak-Biabia, 21 September 1999.
434 Awac, 9 July 1999.
435 Awere, 1 October 1999.
436 Awac Senior Secondary School, March 02.
248
he argued that ‘We need inspectors’ houses, stores and offices in every county. … [this] would
lead to drunken teachers and teachers who have not prepared [their lessons] being caught in the
act’. 437 The problem was seen to lie not just with teachers. At a Parents’ Day at Acet P7,
13 December 1999, the headmaster pleaded with them because he felt that ‘..some
parents have left [neglected] teaching their children from [at] home because of drunkardness,
and lack of seriousness in teaching children’.
The impacts of alcohol featured heavily in many of the fieldworkers’ reports. There is
the case of the government official who attended ‘a grand end of year party’. When he
was going back home after taking a lot of booze at the party, he rode his motorcycle and
when he reached the junction near Co-operative Bank he failed to make a bend at the
corner. Instead he crashed at a commercial building in front of him - and died instantly.438
Another story involves a man aged sixty-five who was drunk.
When he was walking towards his house [in broad daylight], he came across a woman
aged about 54 lying down resting. Without any exchange of words, K___ kept standing,
unzipped his trouser and began urinating over the woman! Finished. No fight erupted.
Elders ruled that K___ should pay three bars of soap for the woman to clean herself of
urine.439
Cultural Debilitation
Although psychological debilitation is a more complex expression of the impacts of the
situation than a simple concern with physical impacts, it still focuses on the individual
rather than on the society more broadly. Yet many saw links between the two.
Teachers, for example, would argue that:
…the war has led to moral disintegration and lack of moral discipline. The students are
more and more difficult to handle. Partly because class sizes have increased. [Partly
because] Those who have been abducted may have spent two or three years in the bush,
[and] some have lost interest in studying - it depends on the individual. One child may be
willing to learn but have no sponsor, some see only black clouds. Also there are many
                                                     
437 It is important not to assume that it is because they are teachers that some are drinking heavily – one
headmaster interviewed noted that one of his teachers had started drinking heavily only after his wife had
been killed in cross-fire.
438 Gulu Municipality report, December 1998.
439 Anaka, 27 February 2000.
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non-educated role-models, such as business men. Also the government is planning to cut
grants and look at loan schemes instead.440
An ACORD report described how
…there is cultural demoralization of the displaced living in the camps:
prostitution, divorce and early sexual relationships among young children have
become another way of earning an income to survive in the camp. (2001; 17)
The Acholi Religious Leaders talked of a ‘collapse of cultural and moral values’ and of
how:
as one moves through any of the displaced camps, one of the most depressing
sights is to see scores of unattended children everywhere, idle youth loitering
about and men drinking alcohol…
They went on to argue that ‘Cramming together people in a small space is seen in all
camps as another main reason for the lack of respect that children show towards their
parents…’ (ARLPI, 2001: 17).  IOM reported that people in three focus group
discussions believed it was ‘loss of parental control over children [which] resulted into
prostitution, child pregnancy, drunkenness and theft’. Furthermore, they consistently
reported a loss of parental control over children ‘who end up learning bad behaviour
like theft, disrespecting elders and general indiscipline’ (IOM, 2001: 1). Such
assumptions pervaded public discourse:
On the 22/12/98 WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL organised an end of year party
for traumatised children, street-children, and other school children supported by the
organisation. The party was at Boma ground near Acholi Inn with the RDC being guest
of honour.
Food, drinks, biscuits, sweets was served to more than 4000 children who were in
attendance. During the party the LCIII chairperson appealed for respect from the children
especially in the form of greeting the people whenever they meet them. He further stressed
that these days children ignores advice from the elderly people and thus do the wrong
things instead of the right ones.441
Ironically, even the supposedly idle youth brought the question of prostitution into the
lyrics of lukeme songs composed while ‘loitering about’:
                                                     
440 Interview with secondary school teachers, Gulu High School, 13 August 1998.
441 Report from Gulu Municipality, December 1998.
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Min Akello Muhora (The mother of Akello is a slut)
Min Aumony Malaya (The mother of Aumony is a prostitute)
Oh Latuiri Muhora (Oh that child is a slut)
Discourses of breakdown thus resonated with a wide range of people living inside the
war zone who saw overcrowded living conditions as vectors not just for bacteria and
viruses, but, insofar as they resulted in various practices which would not have been
tolerated under other circumstances, as a vector for social breakdown and moral
disintegration. It was duly echoed by external observers. UNOCHA argued that
Displacement has put social relations and basic cultural values under severe stress’,
and that ‘the socialization into violence of young people has grave implications for the
future of the society as a whole’. Like the Religious Leaders, they found that ‘The
conditions of destitution and the idleness to which young people in the camps are
subjected are also having a profoundly disruptive influence on the society’ (Weeks,
2002: 28).
In effect, an unacknowledged consensus emerged that there was a breakdown going
on, though perspectives differed on what exactly was getting broken. Teachers saw
moral breakdown in the youth, youth saw it in women, parents saw it in teachers (and
their own children), and religious leaders noted it in ‘men drinking alcohol’.
Some of the fears such discourses reflected were belied to an extent by observable
behaviours. There was, for example, a widely prevalent belief that returned abductees
were wild and disruptive as a result of their traumatic experiences, as in the following
statement by a headteacher:
We have quite many abducted students. They are very difficult to handle because we have
to make sure other students don’t call them ‘rebels’. If they become annoyed they can be
very dangerous. Last year we had to dismiss one. When he came here he was annoyed by a
friend. Peace was brought but an hour later he took a knife and cut his friend on the
throat (both were from Kitgum). He ran away into the bush. We called the parents and
had to dismiss him.
However, when pushed on the number of returnee students currently attending his
school, the same head-teacher had no idea, suggesting that few returnees warrant
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particular attention, and that they were not as ‘difficult to handle’ as first suggested.
When pressed on this he admitted that:
We don’t have figures for the overall number, they fear to be identified. In the first place
they sneak back and go to private schools, then they get admitted here. I think the entire
population is traumatised, psychologically some see violence as the solution to the
problem.442
This belief that returnees were a problem coupled with an inability to identify who the
returnees actually were was common amongst the head-teachers we interviewed. It
was just one of numerous examples of a disjuncture between discourse and reality. If
there were total social breakdown, why would people attempting suicide be rescued -
and reprimanded for trying to kill themselves? If students were truly de-motivated,
why would they bother to come back from suspension in order to take their exams?
Why would some steal in order to pay their school fees? 443 Why would seventeen of the
twenty-three students in the newly re-opened Keyo Secondary School (see Chapter 5)
have been digging in the fields on the morning of the day we interviewed them in
order to raise their own school fees? Four of them were not eating lunch - in order to
save money. They also had dramatic aspirations, which included being teachers,
doctors, a minister for education (f), an army major, and Secretary of the OAU.444  How
could teachers complaining of youth idleness and lack of motivation explain such
behaviours, let alone the burgeoning of private secondary schools to meet the demand
the public sector could not deal with?445 Furthermore, if there really were ‘idleness’
among the youth, what accounted for the range of associations formed by those unable
to attend school? Or for the numerous Lukeme groups with their spiky commentaries
on current social and political problems? Why was this practice such a threat that
attempts were made (unsuccessfully) to bring it under the control of the Movement?
Why was there such a range of goods for sale in the market, however pitiful the
                                                     
442 St Joseph’s College Layibi, March 2002.
443 Gulu Municipality, September 1999.
444 Keyo SS, interview with students, 13 March 2002. Whether these aspirations should be interpreted at
face value, or as indicating a dark sense of humour, or poking fun at the researchers, is an open question.
Whichever of these it is, when combined with the other indicators of initiative, it does not correspond to
the vision of apathy and demotivation portrayed by many teachers.
445 This is not to deny that many potential students, particularly those living far outside the district capitals
where the secondary schools are all located, are faced with insuperable practical difficulties which make it
impossible to pursue secondary schooling.
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amounts may seem? (chapter 5) These are all indicators of initiative which somewhat
belie the preferred account of the camps as sites of idleness and breakdown. As
Finnström also observed, they demonstrate ‘the younger generation’s unconditional
struggle for a comprehensible life in the midst of war and displacement’ (2003: 15).
Nonetheless, if asked to be specific, people could point to a long list of concrete
indicators of breakdown: living in camps, many norms no longer held sway and
people were doing things which would not have been accepted under other
circumstances. Physical segregation of the sexes, as practiced in traditional
homesteads, had largely broken down and there was a serious lack of privacy.
Whereas in normal times boys would building their own huts from the age of 11 or 12,
in the camps whole families lived in one hut, resulting in exposure of children to their
parents sexual activities.446 Parents taking refuge in the bush at night no longer had
oversight of their children, who as a result were:
…faced with various ways of behaviour from different peers. The children find a place to
hide [at night] and spend time in each other’s company, rather than sitting around the
household fire being educated by the parents (they separate in this way because of
different levels of risk of abduction).447
Those able to send children to school had far less say in their children’s socialisation
than would traditionally have been the case. Informal socialisation mechanisms, such
as the household hearth (wang oo – see Chapter 7) were blocked, and traditional
authority systems were overlaid with those of the Local Council system, camp
administrators, and military structures. Parents were unwilling or unable to help
young people to marry in the way they would have done in the past (see Chapter 7),
yet young girls were at times being turned into camp followers by their own parents.
Children were being abducted and forced to kill, girls were committing suicide
because their teachers had made them pregnant, under-age boys because they had
made under-age girls pregnant. Teachers were drinking too early in the day, women
were swallowing pesticide in protest at the untenable positions they were left in by
                                                     
446 Notes from visit to Coo-Pe, 19 January 1998.
447 Atiak, August 1998.
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their husbands’ over-drinking, and fear of HIV created a climate of inter-personal
distrust.
In effect, the various discourses of moral, social and cultural breakdown (which were
very similar to the concerns expressed by the LRA), although at times exaggerated,
sought to do justice to a level of complexity and breadth of impact not captured in
individual physical and psychological debilitation. For the sake of clarity I shall group
what these discourses sought to capture under the concept of cultural debilitation. I
shall use this to refer not only to the weakening or disappearance of what people
considered their traditional practices, but also to the adoption of new practices which
were at odds with and made a return to pre-conflict social relations more difficult.
Examples of practices under threat included burial and funeral rites, restorative justice,
and various song and dance forms. Examples of new practices ranged from changing
economic roles arising from external interventions, to changed relationships between
the military and civilian populations.
Burial and Funeral Rites
Conflict and displacement had created many obstacles, such that relatives could rarely
bury their deceased in the due manner. From Awer it was reported that
The system of funerals before we came to the camp was that if a person dies s/he is left to
remain for three to four days depending on sex. A man would remain for three days and a
woman for four, with people gathering to mourn and give their condolences to the family
of the deceased. They would converse and eat and drink. Then later on the last funeral is
organised where many relatives are invited to come and attend. That will be the time
when many animals lost their lives. People eat and drink for at least two days, and this
would mark the end.
Since we moved to the camp this has changed. When a person dies, religious leaders are
invited to come and conduct prayers. Everybody within the surrounding area gathers to
pray and food is organised for those who attended the prayer and that normally marks the
end of the funeral rites.448 Not too much food and drink are taken.449
                                                     
448 Last rites could be conducted long after the death and burial of persons. Thus the funeral rites of one
fieldworker’s wife and daughter, both of whom had been killed by fire from a UPDF mamba, took place at
least two years after their actual deaths (Awere, 6 April 2000).  Given the importance attributed to
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Displacement and insecurity meant people could not travel to attend burials and
funeral rites. Previously such rituals ‘involved all relatives, but now not all relatives are
involved because they are scattered’.450 For similar reasons it was at times difficult or
impossible to bury the bodies in the original homestead:
When someone dies the body is quickly taken to the deserted home and buried and the
people have to come back to the camp for mourning. That is when news of the rebels is
consistent. However, when the situation allows, then the people can stay for a while.451
A further obstacle was economic – people simply did not have the means to host the
large gatherings which had previously been the norm;  ‘we don’t have the material to
prepare a funeral, so it is not organised these days’.452 Most complex was where a person
had been killed by a known person, for then the funeral rites would not be organised
until compensation (culo kwor) had been paid by the offender’s clan.
Breakdown of Restorative Justice
According to ‘tradition’, as reported by an elder,
If a crime is committed, the guilty party sincerely acknowledges responsibility for the
crime in public and repents without fear or shame.  Paying compensation is the
responsibility of the family and the clan of wrongdoer, therefore discipline is a collective
responsibility and the whole family and the clan expect, and demand it.453
 In one instance where a powerful clan member attempted to pay a contribution on
behalf of his entire sub-clan, this offer was rejected:
Omwony-Ogaba tried to pay the whole 28,000 for Parwach sub-clan for the culo kwor of
Puranga clan. However, it was rejected by the sub-clan leader who said it is not the
rightful procedure. As it is a clan issue even a rich person has to allow the clan to pay a
contribution.454
Thus if a person was killed intentionally, then the perpetrator’s clan traditionally had
to pay compensation (culo kwor) to re-establish communication between the clans of
                                                                                                                                                           
performing this symbolic laying to rest, it seems likely that last rites will be a significant feature of any
post-conflict context.
449 Awer, July 1998.
450 Atiak, August 1998.
451 Palaro pilot, 30 July 1998.
452 Awach, August 1998.
453 28 September 1999.
454 Odek, 9 December 1999.
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victim and perpetrator (see also Girling, 1960: 66, Finnström, 2003: 290-296). By
involving not just the offender but also his/her family and clan members,
compensation thus also served as a mechanism for the restoration of social cohesion.
Even if the killing were accidental, such as in a traffic accident, lim kwo would be paid.
Lim Kwo could also be done if important animals had been killed. This would be in the
form of goats, cows or cash equivalent. 455 The exact amounts would be specified by
local elders.
The Local Council system introduced in 1986, which extended from village level (LC 1)
upwards and in which local councils and local courts were linked, in principle
superseded such traditional justice.  Appeals were supposed to move upwards, from
the LCI to the LCII to the LCIII courts, through the Grade II and Grade I courts to the
Chief Magistrate and on to the High Court, the Court of Appeal/Constitutional Court,
and finally the Supreme Court.
In practice, the new system had partially displaced but not satisfactorily replaced the
old, leaving something of a vacuum, the extent of which differed from place to place.
In Palaro, a camp in a very rural setting, the response to the theft of a goat was to take
the culprit to the council of elders and make him pay compensation. In Gulu town, by
contrast, the theft of a bicycle from a market place prompted an outburst of mob
justice:
Then people took off after the man and he was caught in about one mile from the market.
When he was arrested people beat him from there up to the market. After that the LC of
Vanguard ran and invited the highway police to prevent people due to their shoutingness.
When the highway police came, they grabbed the thief and took him to the jail and he died
from police there because people had over-beaten him.456
Such mob-justice was a far cry from the idealised vision of Acholi restorative justice
put forward by various actors in northern Uganda (see below). Another example from
Gulu town suggests that mob violence could be provoked by a number of issues. One
day there was considerable commotion opposite my flat in Gulu, and I saw that one of
                                                     
455 Notes on traditional dances, Gulu, 12 March 2002.
456 3 July 1999.
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the small eating places opposite my flat had been torn down. Thinking that it might
have been knocked down on grounds of hygiene control or some such, we went and
asked what had happened. As I noted afterwards
It turned out that a man and woman had been caught having sex inside the restaurant, at
around midday. Not only that, but they were doing it on the very table which customers
eat their meals off. Even worse, the back of the hut faces over the Muslim cemetery, and so
it was the Muslims who were most irate, this being the second time it had happened
apparently. So the place was ripped down completely. As we were standing there the local
councillor, a short man, came up and said 'you see, these people, just fucking at midday!'
I had to laugh, it is so funny to hear people here saying 'fuck', cos the language is
generally so very correct. As we were standing contemplating the scene three women
came towards the place, one of them I was told was the woman who had been caught in
the act - 'you see, these Baganda, they like a lot of sex, anytime, anyplace.. Really!’457
When local justice was discussed at the ACORD conference in September 1999, some
felt that the LC system did not work well and that the traditional system was more
appropriate and should be revived. Some saw LC courts as an abusive imposition on
the people of Uganda, which merged political and judicial establishments.  Some
argued that the Acholi system of social reconciliation was superior, since a murderer
could not simply pay his way out of a charge but had to reconcile with the victim’s
family. It was noted that the modern and traditional structures operated on different
value systems (for example the respect given to age) and had different functions which
are difficult to align with each other.
However, reviving traditional processes of compensation in a context of displacement
was also somewhat unrealistic. Many forms of compensation (notably cattle) were no
longer feasible, at least not in the form set out by the elders. For cash-strapped camp
dwellers seeking to earn money through leja-leja the likelihood of raising the cash
equivalent of cattle was very small. In 2002 a cow cost 20,000/= in Kitgum, and 50,000/=
in Gulu. Furthermore, as described in Ch 5 part I, in the process of displacement most
clans were significantly dispersed and thrown together with other clan groupings,
making it very difficult for the collective processes described to take place.
                                                     
457 5 February 1999.
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Dance and Song
Dancing and singing, which many saw as cornerstones of Acholi culture, were not
uniformly affected by the conflict. Larakaraka, a courtship dance for youth, traditionally
performed in large gatherings, with men grouped by clan, and women able to circulate
from group to group, was still very popular, although cardboard was being used
instead of skins for the costume (see also Girling, 1960: 68).
Illustration 6.4 Kids practising Larakaraka, Awer Camp, 7 March 1999
Dingidingi, performed by young people to entertain visitors, had not been very affected
either. Apiti, a dance of married women performed to praise someone, for example at
election time, was still in use by women’s groups (Chapter 5 Part II).
Others were more affected. Bwola, the royal dance, supposedly performed for the chief
by older and more skilful dancers, was increasingly used to celebrate non-Acholi (e.g.
visit of Archbishop of Uganda, 2002) and danced by younger people: ‘there is a fear
because of the problems of the last fifteen years that older people might die and younger people
be left without the skills’. In the villages its use was very limited. ‘Major costume parts such
as the ostrich feathers are very difficult to get, even the skins, because the wildlife authorities are
now very hard on hunting’. Otole, a war dance involving both men and women, had
become uncommon and costumes had changed: ‘culturally women used to put on ceno, a
piece of thread to cover the private parts, but their chests would be bare. But now, with
modernisation, they can even wear T-shirts’.
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One type of performance affected by political changes was Aguma. This involves
groups of youth playing home-made finger-pianos (Lukeme) and stringed instruments
(Adungu) to accompany their own lyrics. Different groups come together for sessions
which go throughout the night (‘transnight’). Aguma thus has the dual function of
creating opportunities to meet members of the opposite sex, but also to pass comments
on topical social and political issues. As one respondent noted, ‘it is also used to make
people aware of issues, so if [for example] someone is caught having sex with animals it will be
sung [about]. It should shape youth in appropriate morals and life skills as an adult’. Often
songs are irreverent and poke fun at the authorities, and could include topics such as
the UPDF’s failure to respond when the rebels came.458
While this local musical form remained popular in the camps, the authorities, perhaps
inevitably, sought to bring its potential for articulating subaltern viewpoints under
their control (El Bushra & Dolan, 2002). In 1998, it was reported from Palaro that
Lukeme dance was prohibited, ‘as it was detrimental to school regulations’. In July 1999 a
competition was organised with sponsorship from the chairman of Laroo Division and
the NRM Secretariat. While all lukeme groups were free to enter, they could only sing
on four topics selected by the organisers - including either a praise song for Museveni,
or a song in praise of Universal Primary Education.
Overall, people noted: ‘there is no serious cultural dance taking place…  In general,
cultural dances have been halted because of insecurity’. Typically, dances such as apiti
for women and lukeme for the youth would only be performed ‘when government
officials come to the area’.459 Respondents in Awer felt that ‘The Acholi culture is dying
and diluted’. They argued that
                                                     
458 In this context Okot p’Bitek’s Song of Lawino is pertinent. Lawino contrasts her experience of formal
education, which made her feel like ‘stale bread on a rubbish heap’,  to how she felt when dancing with
her peer group;
‘We joined the line of friends
And danced among our age-mates
And sang songs we understood,
Relevant and meaningful songs,
Songs about ourselves (1985; 79)
459 Palaro pilot, 30 July 1998.
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The true Acholi culture has changed in so many ways from the original one which was
known by our fathers and grandparents. Say for instance, when we consider cultural
activities normally the present generation are not completely interested in the culture.
For many cases you find very few people participating in cultural dances, they are
considered to be useless, instead people go for discos and those who go for the cultural
dances are said to be backward. In this way you find the culture is dying and diluted…
Most of the elders today do not know what these cultural activities are. So instead of
directing the children correctly, normally the children do what they think can satisfy
themselves.460
In practice
The only source of learning to dance now is through schools and participation in music
festivals. Some primary schools cannot even perform, even though the curriculum states
that it should be done. There is in fact a fine for schools which do not send a team for the
district competitions. As far as secondary schools are concerned, only two schools have
participated in the last few years. It is though part of the extra curricular activities.
It was felt that there had been a decline in interest. Asked how teams for such
competitions got chosen, it appeared that
…when a circular comes then those interested are asked to register with the concerned
person, they are then trained and a selection for the team is made. Much less than 25%
will register. For example, in Gulu High School there are 600 pupils, but only about 60
will register, of whom 45 will finally participate. If it continues like this for a number of
years then our culture will continue dying. There is also the fact that the styles have
become more varied over recent years, partly because of some element of modernisation.
In summary, dance as a repository of cultural identity came under a number of
pressures. Some of these were part of wider processes of ‘modernisation’, others were
very northern Uganda specific. Turning them to use in ceremonies to welcome
outsiders meant that they partially shifted from being a marker of Acholi identity to
becoming a vehicle of incorporation of the outsider. In doing so they simultaneously
symbolised the assimilation of Acholi with the ‘outside’. When incorporated into music
competitions they were part of a much wider cultural syllabus, which included:
Original composition, Sight singing, Drama, Traditional dance (Bwola, Lyel,
Larakaraka), Traditional folk song, Instrumental composition Adungu/Lukeme (Aguma),
Creative dance, Solo involving Nanya and flute.461
                                                     
460 Awer, June 1998.
461 Awer, 6 June 1999.
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By taking dance out of informal spaces and bringing it instead into the school
curriculum, it was becoming less and less available to non-school goers, who, as shown
in Chapter 5 Part III, formed the majority of young people despite the introduction of
Universal Primary Education. It was perhaps not surprising that some people felt that
their culture was being ‘diluted’.
External Interventions which ‘diluted’ culture
This was further aggravated by the introduction, through NGO and Government
interventions, of new practices and forms of organisation into people’s lives. These
seemed to work actively to challenge existing modes of organisation and thereby to
constitute a form of ‘re-socialisation’. For impoverished displaced people, they were
difficult to resist.
At times this was an inevitable outcome of the ‘humanitarian imperative’; people were
in camps so that is to where assistance went. However, even service provision was
structured in ways that would have a longer-term influence on social structure and
practice. Thus WFP gave food assistance for primary schools, but none for secondary
schools, a decision which could not be justified on numeric grounds – there were after
all only about 5,000 secondary school students in the whole district, and even if the
availability of free food had made it feasible for more students to study at this level,
that would have meant fewer mouths to feed in the villages.  The schools, which would
inevitably hold people in a particular area, in an important sense gave the seal of
approval to the camps. HIV/AIDS education was targeted at youth, not their parents.
As shown in Chapter 5 Part II, people in the camps were ‘learning the importance of
working in a group rather than in isolation as an individual’,462 and they were notably more
organised where NGOs were present to catalyse the process. Some interventions, such
as the distribution of assistance, obliged people to organise themselves in certain ways,
ostensibly for ease of administration:
                                                     
462 Odek, 14 December 1998.
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Before seed distribution takes place, the agency group the people in groups of 12 people
from the different parishes. They therefore give plots to the groups. The groups identify
the seeds they are interested to plant. Fund for the purchase of the seed is therefore
awaited; then seed procurement takes place. This has even been the working logistics of
World Vision and Catholic Relief Services. People are taught how to plant seeds in line,
use of how to apply pesticides in case of pest outbreak. The procurement of the pesticides
is all carried out by the NGOs.463
Where people were able to farm, they risked losing control of their own produce:
Despite threats of insecurity, the camp population were able to carry on with other
activities such as digging in the long distance places. The beans harvest has been very
high in the camp. World Vision International has embarked on purchasing beans from the
farmers at 250 shillings per kg and maize at 45 shillings per kg. They are convincing the
camp population that if the insecurity persists then those food stuffs will be looted from
the camp population by the rebels, and yet the World Vision's main intention is to ferry
those items and store them in town and then later distribute them to the camp population
in the form of relief.464
NGOs’ emphasis on teaching people how to survive on very little land, rather than
helping them to get back onto the land they already knew how to manage (Ch 5 part
II), suggested an underlying ‘modernisation’ agenda, and a preparedness to sanction de
facto land alienation. In at least one place WFP intervened to form a so-called ‘primary
grouping’ of farmers to pool their produce before selling it. WFP subsequently
purchased a total of 600 tonnes of food for distribution. The relationship between this
ostensibly pragmatic arrangement, and the wider re-shaping of the rural economy, was
identified by WFP, who believed that
The creation and encouragement of primary societies [farmer associations] to
pool agricultural produce may be made easier by the gradual urbanization  (or,
more accurately, peri-urbanization) around trading centres, including IDP
camps. (1999: 22)
Even the re-stocking of cattle, which initially appeared to be in support of a revival of
traditional ways of life, in fact further subverted them. There were various small cattle-
stocking schemes, sometimes combined with micro-finance. Under many such schemes
cattle were given to women. In March 1999, 45 head of cattle were given to three
women’s groups in Acet. As the fieldworker explained it,
                                                     
463 Pabo, 30 October 1998.
464 Awer, 3 November 1998.
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These cattle were given by the government under the policy of restocking the cattle raided
by Karamojong. The Women’s councillor for Odek sub-county, was the one who brought
the cattle to these women’s groups.465
In Pabo, NSARWU, an organisation headed by Janet Museveni, the President’s wife,
organised to donate 45 head of cattle to Pabo Combined Women’s Group, as part of a
NURP exercise to re-stock northern Uganda. At the beginning of August 1999 the
District Veterinary Officer organised the group ‘to build a kraal for keeping the 45 cattles to
be given to them soon…’. The women contributed 10,000/= per member, to serve ‘for
buying of spray pumps and veterinary drugs for handling the animals in question. Part of the
money will be used for catering for the services of the Veterinary doctor who inspects these
animals. Mr. Okupot who represented the office of the First Lady was there physically and
confirmed the above requirements. The beneficiaries therefore responded well in raising the
money’. Some three weeks later the coordinator of NSARWU returned to oversee the
distribution of the cattle, which this time were not ‘long-horned Ankole cattles but local
breeds being purchased from Adjumani district. 3 bulls are meant for running the 45 heifers. If
the heifers give birth to female calves, they should be given to the next household in order to
reach everybody in the sub county’.
The direct connection between the donations of cattle and key individuals (in one case
the relevant women’s councillor, in the other from the President’s wife herself) is
striking, as is the fact that the cattle are given primarily to women, who traditionally
would not have been in charge of cattle. This ignored the increasing economic
desperation of men, as evidenced by, amongst other things, the trend of men moving
into what had previously been women’s areas of work, notably traditional healing
(Chapter 5 Part IV), and contributed to a larger dynamic of externally encouraged
shifts in gender relations.
Although this may have been an attempt to win support for Museveni through
patronage to women, it is doubtful whether people’s loyalty could be bought through
such methods. When the MP for Aswa County toured his constituency from 3rd-6th
                                                     
465 However, the necessary support was not given and by August of the same year the 45 cattle given in
March had all died.
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March 2000, and aired a Government plan to restock the Acholi with cattle ‘robbed off by
the Karamojong and NRA in the past’, most people saw this as an attempt to buy peoples’
votes:
 There is nothing much the people want other than peace for they have been in problems
for so long and if the war has not yet ended having cattle is still useless. They [people
listening to the speeches] said the cattle they had was not given to them by any previous
government instead their own works as a result of peace prevailing by then [i.e. at that
time].466
As the cattle restocking exercises exemplify, NGO and Government interventions were
not just of an economic nature, but extended into the cultural domain. At times this
included consolidating a particular view of history. A good example of this was the
commemoration of the Atiak massacre, an incident in which several hundred technical
school students had been killed in 1995.  In 1999 a memorial stone was built and the
Anglican Bishop was invited to celebrate mass. A major event was developed, which
also served as a highly successful fund-raising exercise for a new technical college
(Lwani Memorial College), with contributions in cash and kind received from local
government officials, NGOs, embassies, and local groups.
Changing military-civilian relationships
Many people saw relationships between soldiers and civilian women as a major
indicator of cultural debilitation, and as an explanation for the spread of HIV and
resultant physical debilitation. For Gulu district did not appear to be enjoying
Uganda’s much hailed success in controlling the spread of HIV/AIDS.467  Although
some figures suggest that overall rates declined in Gulu in the mid 1990s, the sharpness
of the drop (from 25% recorded amongst pregnant women in Gulu district in 1993 to
13.6% in 1997) raises questions about the solidity of the data. Furthermore, perhaps the
more important indicator was that the figures for Gulu district had risen from among
the lowest to the fourth highest in the country.468 Whether in discussion with soldiers’
                                                     
466 Awach, 3 March 2000.
467 An article in The Lancet in July 2002 questioned the empirical basis for such a success claim and warned
against extrapolating policy lessons from the Ugandan case to other countries facing high HIV levels
(Parkhurst, 2002).
468 UNAIDS/WHO Epidemiological Fact Sheet, 2000 Update, p12.
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wives in Gulu Barracks, HIV positive women in a self-help group, or traditional
healers, ‘war’ emerged as their overall explanation for this.
With the soldiers’ wives this was then further broken down, as set out in Table 6.9
below. 469
Table 6.4: Explanations given by soldiers’ wives in Gulu barracks in answer to the
question ‘why do you think the HIV infection rate in Gulu has risen to be one of the
highest in the country?’
Ranking Explanations
1 Crowding of people in urban areas due to search for security
2 Confining people in camps
3 Many soldiers from different parts of Uganda
4 Abduction
5 Many people passing through Gulu on business
6 Economic pressure due to violence (e.g. if your father gets killed and you
become an orphan you have to get a man to look after you)
7 Alcoholism and discos
8 Ignorance about the dangers of HIV/AIDS
9 Many war widows
10 Older people having sex with young people by promising to pay school
fees
The linkage with the war is unambiguous in the top four reasons. Taking the others in
turn it is possible to link them in also. People passed through Gulu on business which
was not necessarily to do with the war, but many of the business activities were in fact
part of the war economy – building roads for military patrols, boreholes for displaced
camps, marketing produce from block farms etc. Many people would argue that an
increase in availability of sexual services was a symptom of the economic pressures
which themselves arose from the violence of war. Even ‘alcoholism and discos’ may
                                                     
469 Research conducted by the COPE team in collaboration with the ACORD HIV/AIDS prevention
programme in Gulu. Reported on at the September 1999 conference.
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not be unrelated, with both offering a form of escapism from the otherwise unrelenting
pressures of the war situation. Ignorance about HIV/AIDS was at least partially due to
the lack of sensitisation by government and NGO workers, which in turn was at least
partly attributable to insecurity preventing travel. War widows were obviously a result
of war, and while the practice of older people using economic power to obtain sexual
favours was not peculiar to war, the poverty which made this an option to be
considered by young people had undoubtedly been aggravated by the war.
The HIV positive women explained their own infection in a number of ways (Table
6.5).
Table 6.5: Women’s stated reasons for their own infection with HIV, as given by 116
members of an ACORD assisted Support Group for People Living With AIDS
Women’s stated reasons for HIV
infection
Number %
Polygamy 31 26.7
Displacement 23 19.8
Inheritance 14 12.1
Cross-Infection 8 6.9
Prostitution 7 6.0
Separation 6 5.2
Rape 6 5.2
Peer Group 6 5.2
Multiple Partners 4 3.4
Husband 4 3.4
Unknown 3 2.6
LRA 2 1.7
Casual Sex 2 1.7
TOTAL 116 100
The belief of 20% of respondents that ‘displacement’ was the cause of their infection is
broadly shared with the soldiers’ wives, who see urban overcrowding and people
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being confined in the camps as two of the major explanations for the rising rate of HIV
infection.470 Although large numbers blame polygamy and wife-inheritance for their
own infection, suggesting ‘cultural’ factors as the major explanation alongside
displacement, when the data used to compile the table is further examined it also
points to a strong relationship between militarisation and the spread of HIV. Of the 116
women, 48.3% had had soldiers as their former partners or were in relationships with
soldiers. Of the seven who stated rape as the reason for their infection, four had been
raped by soldiers. Two of the four husbands who were blamed for their wives’
infection had been soldiers. Three of the six who believed they had become infected as
a result of ‘separation’ from their partners [i.e. because their partners had become
infected while away from home and then brought the infection home] had been
married to soldiers. Although such figures cannot replace epidemiological surveys,
they do suggest further avenues of enquiry.
Traditional healers in Gulu, who claimed to have seen an increase in STIs and AIDS
cases over the years, attributed this to:
• rape by soldiers
• too many mobile soldiers [i.e. soldiers who were not based in one barracks for a
longer period of time]
• confinement in camps
• poverty/hunger leading to prostitution
• redundancy leading to alcohol abuse and careless sex
• rape by other civilians
• having to sleep in many different places in search for security increases chance
of sexual encounters (e.g. alup, night commuters)
• low morals during discos
• only soldiers having a sure income, which is something women look for
• infected people deliberately setting out to infect others
• resistance to condom use/ignorance about need for condoms
                                                     
470 Kitgum district, which, at least until 2002, had far less displaced camps, did not experience a similarly
severe rise in infection levels.
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Although the military are by no means the only cause identified, the connection the
healers make between between rising levels of STIs/HIV and the military is very
explicit, and echoed the words of the late medical superintendant at Lacor hospital;
There are also a lot of sexual health problems from rapes and from young girls going with
soldiers to get food and money.471
Although at times based on rumour (such as the one that soldiers who were known to
be HIV positive were instructed to rape), the connection was not without grounds.
Even if there were no rape or intention to spread HIV involved, the military would be
an obvious vector as their mode of organisation and operation created both incentives
and opportunities for multiple sexual partners. Despite UPDF official policy being that
no soldier was allowed to have a wife while on mobile duty (i.e. when stationed
outside the main barracks), in practice they could take wives with them when
deployed to rural detaches, or take local women there. Indeed, many rural detaches
had small settlements adjacent to them where sex and alcohol were sold. These
consisted of a mixture of local women and women who had been left behind when
soldiers were re-deployed elsewhere – these latter being known as ‘camp followers’. In
discussion at one such detach, the soldiers described how when they were first
deployed, those who had no wife with them would stroll through these settlements,
and choose themselves a woman whom they would then take to stay with them as
their ‘wives’ inside the detach until they were transferred elsewhere. This included
getting an identity card issued to show that the woman was the ‘wife’ of the man
concerned.472 Thus military strategy intersected with the policy of moving people to
'protected villages' to increase contacts between military and civilians as most had a
detach stationed within them or nearby. In the larger camps, when insurgency levels
were high, such military units formed an important addition to the population.
                                                     
471 Lacor Hospital, Gulu, January 1998.
472 Gwengdia detach, 7 June 1999. One widow of a deceased soldier explained, ‘they give them the
identification letter called ‘Kihali’. … It is just a small card with the numbers of your husband. So when for real you
are married they give you that card with the army number of your husband. If you are somebody who was not
married you can also stay there [i.e. live with the soldier] but there is no help that they give to you [i.e. you will get
no financial compensation if the soldier dies for any reason]. (99 06 21 PLWA T1sa.doc).
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There was generally a financial transaction involving not just the soldier and the
woman, but also the woman’s parents. According to the soldiers in Gwengdia detach,
‘Parents normally follow their daughters to the barracks just a few days after you take her
inside. Some of them keep coming back for more money’. Their wives gave the example of
one woman from Gwengdia who was herself in Gwengdia detach and had six
daughters spread around other detaches. The soldiers’ wives reported that
Sometimes old soldiers bring young girls of 16 years as their wives: their boss (the
commander) just said that if they have brought in their wife then it is not his business to
interfere with it.
Although the average age of our focus group respondents was 28.5, and the average
age of marriage was 21, six of the fifteen women had themselves been married below
the age of 18 (12, 13, 14, 14, 15 and 17 respectively). 473
Evidently, for women in the desperate circumstances created by the war and life in the
camps, becoming a ‘camp follower’ may have been the only realistic option – and a
decision in which not only were they at times encouraged by their parents, but in
which the wider community was believed to have a vested interest, despite the loud
discourse of moral disapproval. Indeed, in a day-to-day sense the small settlements on
the edge of military barracks served as a buffer between the soldiers and civilians in
the village as a whole, although in the longer term they were clearly a potential vector
for HIV transmission between the two, as women moved in and out of them. Asked
whether the commander of the detach was making any effort to stop the women
staying on the fringes of the detach, the soldiers’ wives said the civilians living nearby
had told the commanding officer not to chase them - because if the prostitutes were not
around the soldiers would disturb their women. As one argued, the prostitutes were
there ‘to assist those soldiers inside who don’t have wives’.
Many civilians feared the presence of soldiers. One field-worker wrote, ‘I believe and
have seen beyond doubt that being wives of soldiers doesn’t create a sense of security
instead it worsens the affinity [likelihood] of catching Aids. This is because soldiers are
                                                     
473 Gwengdia detach, 7 June 1999.
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care-free people in society’. Many were deeply concerned to try and limit the exposure
of young women to soldiers. When the Local Councillor for Awac paid a visit to Awac
Displaced School in July 1999, the Parent-Teacher-Association identified (amongst
other things) two major problems relating to the soldiers in the area, namely ‘Soldiers
taking pupils for being house wives and not being followed up by Law’, and ‘Parents
sending school girls to sell local [alcoholic] brew in the Market thus exposing them to
the soldiers’.474
Similarly, when the Minister of Education and Sports addressed the people of Awere
camp in October 1999 he was reported as saying that ‘homeguards … are now spoiling the
women of civilians. If any commits himself to taking the wife of the civilian, he must be taken to
court. Not only homeguards but soldiers must respect civilians’. He also made much of the
fact that even soldiers (along with teachers and businessmen) would be taken to court
if they ‘played with school girls’.475
Our discussions with soldiers and their wives in Gwengdia did suggest that civilian
concerns about the military had some basis. They presented the need for men to have
an outlet for sexual frustrations as natural - and therefore undeniable and to be
accommodated. This discourse was also evident in Gulu barracks, where many soldiers
kept their official wives. Both men and women argued that separation in the course of
duty resulted in sexual frustration for both. Soldiers dealt with this by opting for
prostitutes or taking other partners, as described above, and their women also
described taking other partners – sometimes to satisfy sexual needs, but also to find an
alternative source of economic support if their partners were away for a long period.
Further reasons given by the women for changing partners included ‘misunderstandings
and indiscipline’, the death of a husband, tribalism by in-laws (i.e. they tell their son to
get a wife from his own village), status of husband, barrenness (the husband takes
another wife to give him a child), and change of place of work (mobility). Men were
believed to change partners similar reasons: indiscipline, admiring ladies of a lighter
                                                     
474 Awac, 9 July 1999
475 Awere, 1 October 1999
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colour, tribalism (get someone from your own tribe), the need for children, and ‘being
seduced by civilian women’.
Despite the considerable frankness with which respondents described behaviours and
motivations, at another level their interpersonal relations were far from
straightforward. As well as HIV promoting patterns of multiple partnerships and
short-term sexual relations based on physical and economic needs, it appeared that
normative discourses of marriage and fidelity were a further obstacle to HIV
prevention. Condom use would be taken as evidence of mistrust – in both directions. If
the wife asked the husband to wear a condom it could be because she did not trust him
to have been faithful to her, or because she herself had been unfaithful to her husband
in his absence. Compounding these factors was a lack of medical information or
treatment (chapter 5), and the fact that HIV was only one risk amongst many facing the
soldiers. Both commissioned and non-commissioned officers ranked HIV/AIDs as less
of a risk to their health than the risks associated with being a soldier (Table 6.6).
Table 6.6: Ranking of risks to health as given in two focus groups with members of
the UPDF, 3-4 June 1999
Ranking Commissioned Officers Ranking Non-Commissioned Officers
1 Illnesses such as malaria 1 Landmines
2 Landmines 2 Gunshots
3 Gunshots 3 Ambush
4 Fighting/Combat 4 Accidents
5 Ambushes 5 Thieves
6 HIV/AIDS 6 Alcohol
7 Accidents (e.g. road
accidents)
7 AIDS & ‘Bad Friends’
8 Snakebites while in the bush 8 Indiscipline
9 9 Poor Command
10 10 Poor Hygiene
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The threat of death through HIV infection appeared to play a much smaller part in the
imaginings of many soldiers than did the more immediate threats of war related
injuries and death.
The central role of money in military-civilian relationships was clear. As recipients of a
monthly salary, the military stationed in such rural areas – where the majority of men
had no source of income at all due to their displacement - occupied a particular
position in the sex-money nexus created by the acute impoverishment of the war zone,
especially within the camps. Civilian men would complain that there was no market
for them (i.e. women were not interested in them), and the soldiers reported that unlike
many civilian men, who were described as ‘mukono gamo’ (literally ‘hands glued’, i.e.
tight with money), they could provide for their women, even if only on a temporary
basis while stationed in the area. Furthermore, the soldiers argued that ‘Soldiers are not
very economical, they use money on women anyhow…  Civilians don’t have money because of
this type of war; people have been chased from villages to these types of camp’. They noted that
when waiting for their crops to mature civilians did not have any money, whereas as
soldiers, they had a regular monthly income, whatever the season. Thus, ‘whereas a
civilian wife at this point can be seen buying only greens in the market, a soldier’s wife will be
out buying meat on a daily basis. It therefore becomes very easy to woo a woman’.476 When the
time came for the soldiers to be transferred, they would leave many of the local women
behind in the settlement adjacent to the detach, to await the next set of soldiers to be
posted. Asked how they felt when they had to leave these ‘wives’, one soldier said ‘it is
very painful because you have dropped money there’.
For some civilian men it was less a question of soldiers’ money than of women’s
(im)morality. As one argued:
To get a wife by civilians despite the presence of [an] army detach depends on the morals
of women in an area. Normally, a well sound economical man just disputes [competes
                                                     
476 The image of soldiers’ women leading a life of relative luxury was countered by civilians who, when
asked ‘what happens to women who marry soldiers?’, answered ‘they want women to build for them (Mama
Nwoya huts), carry luggage, provide sex. Some get taken up to the DRC, some get abandoned along the way. Other
women will follow their husbands from place to place’. One respondent knew a woman who had tried to follow
her husband, but had eventually given up and found him, a distant relative, to help her resettle. She was
now in the terminal stages of illness. (Discussion in Pabo, 5 March 2002).
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with] soldiers easily and defeats them. Culturally, rural women don’t have the affinity of
loving a person of unknown destination. It is only immoral ones that switch to
consumption of soldiers.
Another observed that
Normally wives eloped by soldiers are abandoned in case of [the soldier’s] transfer to
another station. Very few cases lead to permanent marriage. One must note that women
who go to soldiers are prostitutes.
The question of what was actually happening in Gulu in terms of HIV prevalence and
incidence rates, and the place of militarisation in these, is an open one. On the one
hand the literature about HIV indicates that militaries tend to have higher levels of
HIV infection than the general population (Foreman, 2002: 1-3), and as has been
explored, there are numerous points at which the Ugandan army intersects with
civilians, whether through voluntary encounters or in instances of rape of the civilian
population. On the other hand, figures from the sentinel sites in Gulu show a drop in
prevalence throughout the 1990s. However, it should be stressed that the actual
epidemiology of HIV in the war zone, although important in terms of physical
debilitation, is not the central issue here. What is key to the discussion is the evidently
wide-spread perception of linkages between HIV and changing social practices, the
central place of militarisation within this, and the way military-civilian relationships
were seen as indicative of cultural debilitation. This latter is particularly important
given that militarisation is offered by the government as the solution to the problem of
war.
Discussion
The picture which emerges thus far is one of various degrees of physical and
psychological debilitation, linked to discourses - and to a certain degree realities – of
cultural debilitation. Acts of war obviously had an instant impact in terms of physical
injuries such as gun-shot wounds, mines, bombs and miscarriages as a result of bomb
blasts, and the state of displacement resulted in malnutrition and related illnesses.
There was also a direct relationship between physical and psychological debilitation.
Clearly physical ill-health (or the threat of it) caused psychological stress, which in turn
was somatised into more physical symptoms and behaviours. For example, people
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committed suicide not because they necessarily were HIV+, but because of fear that
they might be (see chapter 7). The stress of the idea alone was enough to prompt
drastic steps. Physical hardship, loss of livelihoods, loss of relatives, shelter, livestock,
repeated displacements, sleeping in the bush, constant fear of abduction and
landmines, trying to buy security by selling children to soldiers, were other self-
evident psychological stressors.
Many impacts, which looked like the result of a discrete incident (Patricia Atim kills
herself because her money is taken), were in fact not. Rather they were the outcome of
an accumulation of traumatic experiences which, for most people, continued over the
entire period of the war (see chapter 2). This was further complicated by the fact that
the actions people took in response to such cumulative debilitation, while at times
successful, at times contributed to further debilitation. Thus one person brewing
alcohol in order to feed her own children, could meet the needs of an alcoholic man
who as a result would not have money to feed his own children. The account of
Patricia Atim’s suicide, given above, offers a subtle example of such complexity. The
loss of the money she had saved up was almost certainly not the only cause, but rather
the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. Having had her money taken by her
husband, she has to borrow the very tiny amounts needed to bring about her own
death, an indicator of her desperate economic situation. Her actions undoubtedly
threaten her family with further debilitation. Once she is dead, the medical staff refuse
to remove the foetus from her womb; not only has poverty reduced the scope for
compassion (the medical staff are unwilling to do the operation without additional
payment), but it has removed the space for her parents to grieve. At the very moment
of their loss, they have to make an economic calculation. There is no space in the
poverty of camp life for grief to override the day-to-day concerns of the living.
The relationship between militarisation and the risk of HIV further exemplifies the
ways in which debilitation was not just about the physical environment created by war
and displacement, nor was it simply about the cumulative impact of multiple instances
of war-related violence, important though both these were. It also related to economic
strategies which served short-term survival needs, but made the medium to long term
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terminally insecure. Marrying a soldier could potentially give the woman a more
reliable economic base, and also reduce the number of mouths her own family had to
feed, but also carried increased risks of becoming HIV positive. Where HIV/AIDS did
occur, it was the result of a complex interplay of conflict, displacement,
impoverishment and militarisation, a whole range of economic, physical, psychological
and emotional needs and imperatives which arose from this over time, and the way in
which these eventually altered patterns of behaviour, thinking and self-perception in
ways which actually accelerated debilitation, and which continued to inform the shape
of life inside the war zone even once the primary victims of violence were long gone. In
other words, the implicit assumption that impacts happened to people, rather than
through them, simply did not hold.
Another coping strategy, the necessary internalisation and hiding away of grief (rather
than its overt expression) which occurs in the face of a relentless stream of traumatic
incidents and circumstances (experienced first hand or witnessed second hand), also
seems likely to have negative consequences. In my own fieldwork I developed a very
‘thick skin’ within about three months, but my subsequent experience of how difficult
it proved to be to even just to go over data I had collected with the protection of a
seemingly thick skin, suggests that this emotional numbing was illusory. All the
experiences heard about or witnessed, even if barely acknowledged at the time,
seemed to have been deposited somewhere in the memory, able to foreground
themselves when the absolute need to suppress them was no longer there. And this
was just when witnessing at second hand. For people who are unable to escape the
relentless accumulation of such experiences, and who have little occasion on which
these things can be vented in some relatively harmless way, it seems probable that
another means of expression will eventually be found. When traditional healers in
Gulu and camp officials in Pabo were asked ‘why do men overdrink?’, they used
almost identical language:
Firstly, redundancy, feelings of powerlessness, they cannot live as they used to do when
they had full control… Powerlessness is based on the fact that men cannot cope with what
happened whereas they used to be fully occupied. They find that people who were beneath
them socially are now above them.
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Asked whether this sense of redundancy was more of a problem for older or younger
men, the camp officials answered ‘it is common to all age brackets - because the children feel
the powerlessness’.477 In a sense this transfer of impact across generations epitomises the
complexity of impacts and the extent to which they become self-perpetuating.
Signs of resilience?
At one level, as I have argued, beliefs about social and cultural breakdown or dilution
were not always fully supported by the evidence, or at least there was evidence to
qualify the picture painted. At another these discourses were shorthand for the
complex interaction between people’s debilitation and their adaptive responses to it,
the broader impact of this on society, and a sense of its irreversibility. They reflected a
loss of social predictability; people were breaking a range of social taboos, whether in
the interests of survival (e.g. the mother who placed her six daughters in six different
detaches), or in the interests of taking their own lives in suicide attempts. The
discourses thus served as an indicator of fear of loss of control – for example, by adults
over youth and by (male) youth over women – and of fear that the changes were
irreversible. They can thus be read as the closest most people could come to admitting
their own personal sense of failure or psychological distress.
At yet another level, these statements and discourses could be read as symptoms of
resistance to social breakdown which qualify the very picture of absolute collapse
which they purport to portray. The key feature in this regard is that they locate
responsibility for what has gone wrong within the people most affected by what has
gone wrong. The assertion is made, for example, that it is parents who have lost control
over children – rather than an alternative explanation, namely that soldiers have taken
control of those children. Women’s decision to become prostitutes is seen as moral
weakness rather than as a personal sacrifice made to prevent their children starving.  It
is children who are said to be disrespectful rather than adults who are abusive.
                                                     
477 Pabo, 5 March 02
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While such assertions were disempowering for those being blamed, they were
empowering for those doing the blaming. Whereas focusing blame on the LRA would
at least partially externalise blame,478 and thereby lessen the possibility of addressing
the situation, the language of moral, cultural and social breakdown, by internalising
responsibility, allowed some sense of control, or at least the possibility of regaining
control over a chaotic situation. Reversing moral collapse, re-instilling traditional
values, re-integrating traumatised youth, picking fallen women off the floor, all are
within the realms of the feasible – unlike other aspects of the war situation, such as the
rebels, or the army, or the food distributions, which were externally controlled, and
therefore, in a literal sense, out of control.
Conclusions
This chapter began with the question of why people did not take advantage of long
lulls in the armed violence to return to their homes, and I proposed that, having been
forced into the camps in the first place, there would have been risks in leaving them on
an unauthorised basis. There would also have been no access to the assistance needed
to tide people over until they could begin harvesting again. Furthermore, to move back
home would have been to lose the benefits of the considerable amounts of energy they
had been obliged to invest in consolidating the protected villages. As such, it was
scarcely a choice between two more or less equal options, and it could be said that
conditions in the protected villages created a metaphorical prison.
But in addition to these considerations, something far deeper had happened. In the
name of ‘protection’, people actually underwent a gradual process of ever more
complex forms of debilitation. Physical debilitation presented some very practical
obstacles to returning home. The physical capacity and strength to re-open fields that
had lain fallow for several years was diminished in many households. Thousands of
children had suffered permanent physical and mental damage due to malnutrition,
and premature deaths had left some households without a provider. The intellectual
and physical bases for reconstruction were thus compromised. In many instances this
                                                     
478 This can only be partially successful insofar as many of the LRA are drawn from the same population,
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was worsened by the effects of psychological debilitation arising from multiple
violations over time. Although often hidden, these were at times externalised, as in the
case of alcoholism or even suicides, whether of heads of households or of youth. At an
even more profound level, various institutions had been undermined and people had
adapted their behaviours to their circumstances in ways which contributed both
further physical and psychological debilitation, and to a sense of cultural debilitation.479
Although these processes of debilitation were not necessarily as sequential as this
articulation makes them appear, each of them made the other less reversible. When
physical debilitation was compounded by psychological problems both became more
difficult to deal with. When the cultural context within which such issues would
otherwise be dealt with was debilitated, they became still less amenable to solutions.
The longer these processes continued, therefore, the less reversible they appeared to be
and the more they militated against the possibility of return. Living under a situation
of protection which was a form of violation in its own right thus created further
metaphorical chains which people could not shake off.
From this perspective, many of the interventions in northern Uganda were wholly
inadequate, for they tended to break down violations into discrete acts (e.g. having
been raped) or issues (e.g. lack of sanitation) which could be quantified, thus allowing
the illusion that their impacts could also be managed, addressed and reversed. Physical
debilitation, in particular, was targeted through various forms of assistance, such as
food relief, supplementary feeding, seeds and tools, demonstration plots and
prosthetics, and thus made to seem at least partly reversible (even if physical stunting
and mental retardation were not).
This simple and fundamentally static humanitarian model of the people affected - they
were OK before something bad happened to them, they would be OK again after the
damage has been fixed - could not bring people’s health back to the status quo ante, to
                                                                                                                                                           
described as ‘our children’, and as such, in a moral sense, ‘within’ that population.
479 I would thus suggest that the diminution of cultural and social agency which Finnström argues will
eventually happen (2003: 191), had already begun to do so.
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life as it was before, because it could not accommodate the reality of truly relentless
processes of physical and psychological violation, in which there was no time for
recovery from discrete incidents. Most interventions – notwithstanding some very
limited attempts at trauma counselling - failed to conceptualise, let alone address, the
self-reinforcing interplay of physical, psychological and cultural debilitation which
relentless violation provokes.
Many people in the camps were therefore not only themselves debilitated to a point
where it became very difficult to return to their homes even when the opportunity to
do so presented itself, but they were unlikely to receive assistance of a kind which
adequately addressed the complexities of this debilitation. Notwithstanding the fact
that the very discourses of breakdown could be interpreted as signs of resistance to the
changes wrought by debilitation, for some the situation seemed irreversible.
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Chapter 7 - Protection as Humiliation480
Introduction
Up to this point I have argued that under the guise of protection civilians in the war
zone in reality experienced massive violation of rights, and resultant physical,
psychological and cultural debilitation. I have also suggested that this debilitation, and
people’s adaptive responses to it, militated against their return from displacement to
their homes. This chapter takes this analysis further, by illustrating how violation and
debilitation were also a form of humiliation which further contributed to the
perpetuation of the situation.
It is argued that in this context of violation, debilitation and humiliation, masculinities
collapsed in two senses. Firstly, a hegemonic masculinity emerged in the face of which
the space for alternative masculinities largely disappeared. Secondly, although the war
consolidated expectations of hegemonic masculinity, it simultaneously undermined
men’s lived experiences of their own masculinity, thereby aggravating a process set in
motion by colonialism.
Unable to live up to the model, which involved particular relationships of power over
women and youth, but neither offered nor allowed to develop any recognised
alternative, men’s aspirations and expectations were thwarted, and they experienced
social and often physical impotence and resultant humiliation. In the face of this
collapse of their own masculinity, some resorted to acts of violence. This could be
against themselves, in forms such as alcohol abuse and suicide, but also against others,
as seen in domestic violence, mob justice, and joining armed forces, whether
government or rebel.
                                                     
480 Many arguments in this chapter were first developed in Dolan (2003)
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The model of masculinity that men ascribed to also made them more vulnerable to
violence meted out by other men, in that it created incentives for armed forces to
exercise violence on the civilian population in ways which actively undermined
civilian men’s sense of self. The state shared an interest in allowing these processes, as
they generated a sense of control over both civilians and army, both of which were
necessary for national and geo-strategic purposes. This unfortunate synergy of the
psychological needs of individuals and the political needs of the state, reinforced the
dynamics of conflict and violence and also propped up what was in some key respects
a weak state, notably through facilitating ongoing militarisation and creating obstacles
to the pursuit of non-violent solutions.
The hegemonic model of masculinity
To make the case that there is a relationship between a hegemonic model of
masculinity and the self-destructive behaviours outlined in the previous chapter, I
draw initially on the findings of a workshop which considered various forms of
discrimination and social exclusion in northern Uganda, and their relationship to
conflict.481 This brought together the staff of the ACORD Gulu office, the COPE
fieldworkers and research assistants. From the 19 male and 5 female participants it was
apparent that a powerful admixture of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial
messages had led to a normative model of masculinity which combined a range of
characteristics and behaviours, primarily defined by the extent to which they differ
from stereotypes of women and youth. These polarised stereotypes of what women
and men are like then inform what they should do, how they should relate to one
another, and what their respective positions and roles in society should be.482
What women are (supposed to be) like
Workshop participants argued that it is generally assumed that women differ from
men, that they are weaker, incapable and a burden, a position legitimised by the
Biblical story in Genesis that man was created first, woman from his rib, and the saying
                                                     
481 ACORD 2000.
482 These generally confirmed my own observations, and were subsequently affirmed in further research
on Gender and Conflict in 2001 (ACORD 2002: Annex 1).
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that women are the ‘weaker vessels’. The assumption that women are therefore more
controllable is reflected in the account of abduction given in Chapter 3, in which boys
were chained together whereas girls were not.
Participants had been brought up to believe that women cannot perform to the level of
men, and must conform to the culture of their husbands. Women are regarded as unfit
for formal education, and it is argued that education of women is a waste of family
resources because they get married and move elsewhere. Technical institutions are
regarded as being for men only.
Women are often portrayed as being like children, without knowledge or skills, or as
jealous gossipers and busy bodies who are not to be trusted and who are unable to be
in solidarity with one another. There are sayings in Acholi that ‘Women are always cats
who seek sympathy’, and that ‘when there is constant drizzling it is like women quarrelling’.
They are also likely to be blamed for domestic wrangles and misfortune in the family
and organisations – as noted in chapter 5, one cause of male impotence is believed to
be a mother touching her son’s private parts within the first three days of his life.
Once bridewealth has been paid and a woman marries, the woman is supposed to
leave the parental home and move to the husband’s home, where she is considered the
subordinate and the property/asset of the husband.  She loses her own clan identity on
marriage but does not fully assume the clan identity of her husband, and is viewed as
an outsider and therefore not to be trusted. (Girling noted in research conducted in
1951 that ‘until her children have grown she has few rights and apart from her
husband has no close relationships with members of the village’ (1960: 25)).
Women do the domestic work for the family and can be beaten if they do not show
respect to men. (Girling wrote that ‘The beating of young wives to train them is
regarded as the duty of the husband’ (1960; 32)). Historically, women were not allowed
to eat certain foods (eg. chicken), and, according to WFP, women and girls remain
“prone to malnutrition as a result of household food allocation patterns favouring
males” (WFP, 1999: 17). They are not supposed to initiate divorce, which is seen as the
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prerogative of men. Women tend to be regarded by men as there to produce children,
which then belong to men; if a woman divorces she has to leave any children behind.
(Girling describes how, if after some time a woman failed to produce children, she
‘may be returned to her father and another must be provided in her place’. He also
argues that ‘As a mother of a child and as the mistress of a household she [a woman]
achieves the highest status possible for a woman in Acholi society. The more children
she bears, the greater the respect she will enjoy…’ (1960: 21-24)).
Women’s voices are often ignored and they are denied ownership of family assets. To
this day women do not participate in clan meetings or the traditional leadership, which
is all male, and if they do the elders will ask ‘what are women doing here in our meeting?’.
(see chapter 4 for Kony’s view of Betty Bigombe’s participation in the 1994 peace talks).
That women are to be put back in their place if they overstep their limits is clear from
an Acholi saying which translates as ‘when the hen crows it must be slaughtered’.
What youth are (supposed to be) like
Workshop participants noted that ‘Unmarried young people are perceived as UNABLE to
participate in political life’ and that whereas ‘all adults are responsible (because they have
children and houses and run homes)’, youth are stereotyped as ‘irresponsible, disrespectful,
impatient, extravagant, arrogant, fun-lovers who are ineffective at work’  and who ‘like leisure
at the expense of work’. Such stereotypes were evident at a seminar on Human Rights
and Democracy organised by Uganda Young Democrats (see chapter 2), where the
vice-president of the Democratic Party was reported as saying that ‘since independence
the youth have not been prepared to use their resources for the nation’s benefit…The youth have
power but need tuning. If they are not utilised, they can run amok”’.483
Stereotypes were further demonstrated in a speech given in Awere by the Minister for
Education & Sport:
He told the youth to be active. They must not be sitting free without work. They must
start projects which the government will help them with. They must not be wasting time
                                                     
483 New Vision, 8 June 1998, Kony: DP attacks Albright.
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dancing disco. They must see that they are studying very well at schools. They must be
careful with AIDS.484
Unmarried participants in the ACORD workshop, who according to this model were
still youth, felt that these stereotypes were used to ensure that ‘development is the domain
of adults alone’, in other words that youth had no access to power. Adults claim their
experience counts more and tell youth “Don’t start climbing trees from the top.’ Youth
ideas ‘are not listened to’ and they are ‘kept in limbo about vital information’. ‘Youths’
complaints and requests are ignored’, and ‘adults are slow to react on decisions important to
the youth’.485
Given this tendency for adults to look down on youth, it was therefore probably no
accident that when the LRA representative welcomed the delegation led by Mrs Betty
Bigombe in 1994 he stressed that it was as young people that the LRA were ready to talk
with Government representatives and elders to reach a compromise which would
enable them to come out of the bush (Chapter 3).
A strong youth voice was generally absent in the major civil society groupings which
emerged over the course of the war, but when given a voice, as in the Uganda Young
Democrats seminar, young people appeared to have more radical critiques of the
situation than their elders. When we asked young people to identify the main actors in
the war, they were able, despite having no access to media other than the radio and the
occasional newspaper, to identify both actors and their interests in the conflict, as
shown in the findings from one such group discussion with eleven youth (average age
22) as set out in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Actors identified by 11 members of a youth group in Gulu district, 8
February 1999
ACTOR/
PLAYER
Actions keeping war going Actions to bring peace
Sudan - supporting rebels through giving
                                                     
484 Awere, 1 October 1999.
485 ACORD 2000.
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Government weapons and things like transport, food,
training
UPDF - need war allowances
- delaying tactics (no immediate response to
rebel attacks)
- contracting individuals to finish the war
(e.g. Salim Saleh)
- fight with the rebels if
they come across them
- protect civilians and their
properties
- escort vehicles
- rescue abducted children
from LRA & hand them
over to World Vision and
GUSCO
Rebels - forced recruitment of children
- looting food to allow survival
- prefer to die fighting than surrender due
to the many atrocities they have committed
- target civilians, dodge government troops
President &
other
government
officials
- underestimate the rebels strength
- president refuses peace talks with rebels
Collaborators - benefit from materials & goods from
rebels
-  feed rebels with information  on
strategies and deployment of Government
soldiers
- provide material support to rebels
Weapons
manufacturer
s/sellers (e.g.
Britain,
South Africa,
Americans)
- encourage war in order to create a market
for their manufactured weapons
- have double standards; they sell weapons
to one side and the antidote to the other
Uganda
Government
- Unequal treatment of different categories
of soldiers by the government, for example
better treatment (e.g. prompt payment of
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salaries and allowances to mobile troops
and not to the militia)
- Weak security arrangements in camps for
displaced people exposes them to
abduction by rebels
- support to SPLA
While this table shows considerable insight into the complexities of the situation, very
few of the youth’s insights would be carried to a national level, as chapter 5 indicates.
While the members of the group involved in the above discussion were unusually well
educated (nine of the eleven had attained Senior 4 (‘O’ level)), none of them was likely
to go any further (see below).
What men are (supposed to be) like
As men are defined in part by how they differ from women, it is clear that they are
supposed to be richer, stronger, more capable, knowledgeable and skilled, trustworthy,
and able to work in solidarity with one another etc.  As they are also defined by how
they differ from youth, they should also be responsible, respectful, patient, moderate,
humble, serious, and effective.
Males are supposed to take priority in education and all other benefits. Boys are
regarded as better and brighter - indeed, traditionally a man may take another wife if
the first only delivers girl children. Having paid bridewealth, men - who are richer,
more educated and own other assets as well - are able to exercise power over their
wives.
Masculine Roles
The three main strands of the masculine role are marriage, followed by provision for
and protection of the household thereby created. While socialisation into masculinity
begins at a very early age and relies on creating difference between men and women,
its full achievement is impossible without making the transition to adulthood by way
of marriage and thereby marking the difference between youth and adults. It is not
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sufficient to be an economic provider, a man has to be a married provider. Although
any young man who has a source of income will come under heavy pressure to
support members of his immediate and extended family, he will continue to be seen as
a youth or ‘boy’ - and as such not to be taken seriously - until he has married and
fathered children (see also Finnström, 2003: 309). Marriage is therefore the key to the
other two, and it cannot take place without payment of bridewealth.
Its importance in defining these power relations is brought into sharp focus by the fact
that when the head of one major Acholi clan, Rwot Achana, died in 1999 and was to be
succeeded by his unmarried son, this could not take place without the chief-to-be’s
sister playing the role of surrogate wife. Symbolically, at least, he had to be married to
be regarded as an adult worthy of assuming the responsibilities and powers of a chief.
Having achieved this position of husbands and fathers (preferably educated, to
confirm the idea that men are more knowledgeable and skilled than women), men are
expected to exercise considerable control over wife and children, their right to do so
based on successfully making material provision for them, as well as protecting them.
They are also entitled to control the youth. Thus attaining adult masculinity gives men
power over other (unmarried) men as well as women.
This normative model of masculinity is therefore inherently relational. Connell has
argued that ‘masculinity’ does not exist except in contrast with ‘femininity’ (1995: 68), I
would add that it is only brought fully into focus through the contrast with ‘youth’.
Although the experience of being subordinate to men is shared by women and youth
alike, the nature of the relationship is quite different. Whereas men are supposedly
powerful by contrast with women, they cannot have the power without the women as
the primary markers of masculinity centre around their relationship with women. The
power over other men, by contrast, rests in excluding them from the equation on the
basis of their not being married.
In summary, the hegemonic model rests on a clear distinction being drawn between
male and female characteristics, as well as between ‘youth’ and ‘adults’. It is also
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entirely dependent on marriage, the only possible way to transition from youth to
adult status. At its simplest it can therefore be described as based on sexist,
heterosexist, ethnocentrist and adultist premises, and as entailing considerable
economic responsibilities and a particular relationship with the state.486 The model of
marriage-provision-protection is hegemonic in that it largely precludes alternatives
and is buttressed by major forms of social and political power. It is normative in that
men are taught they should aspire to and judge themselves by it, and state and society
in turn judge and assess them against it - before either validating, or belittling and
punishing them.
The gap between model and reality: Inability to fulfil
external and internalised expectations
That the model of masculinity still held sway was evident from various indicators,
including access to secondary education. In 2001, Awac Secondary School had 36 girls
and 151 boys. In 2002, Awere Secondary School had 123 girls and 273 boys, while
Lukome had 32 girls and 70 boys. One teacher explained these differentials as the
product of parents’ attitudes, which he claimed resulted in girls being ‘given less
material support and more domestic work (e.g. collecting water, grinding, cooking)’. Another
felt that
On average the boys perform better than the girls, especially in science subjects… There
is also the problem of drop-outs; for girls this is firstly due to pregnancies …, secondly
school fees, thirdly elopement. For boys it is firstly due to school fees, secondly domestic
problems such as being orphans who are also trying to take responsibility for siblings,
thirdly fear of defilement cases.487
Despite such biases in favour of men, they were by and large unable to live up to the
hegemonic model. There was a large and growing disjuncture between men’s lived
expectations of masculinity, which were contained in the hegemonic model, and lived
experiences, which, in the context of ongoing war, heavy militarisation and internal
                                                     
486 I do not attempt to explore the historical development of this dominant model, though the Christian
influence is clear. For a discussion of how western ideals of masculinity ‘have been exported through
colonialism to mingle with local notions of masculinity’ (Oxfam 1997: 4), see Cornwall & Lindisfarne
(1994).
487 Gulu Central High School, 6 March 2002.
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displacement, were largely of a failure to come close to that model. The key disjuncture
was between the lived expectation of marriage, and the lived experience that it was
very difficult to do so, but it extended to all the other expectations outlined. Along with
marriage, the acquisition of knowledge and skills, and the provision for and protection
of wife/wives and children, all became increasingly difficult.
Acquisition of knowledge
The prospects of becoming ‘knowledgeable’ were limited. Both formal and informal
education were severely affected by the war, with no secondary schooling available
outside district capitals, and extremely limited access to tertiary education (Chapter 5
Part III). Indeed, the statistics for people from northern Uganda attaining tertiary
education are an extra-ordinary indicator of the extent to which they, and therefore
their region, had been marginalised from the national mainstream: university students
from local secondary schools from all fourteen northern districts amounted to only 120
out of a national total of 20,000.488 With such low involvement in tertiary education and
the resultant exclusion from employment opportunities, their critical voices were
unlikely to be heard at a national level. For the very few who succeeded in completing
secondary education, the job opportunities were limited, the more so as policies of
decentralisation had ethnicised government positions at many levels. For those who
failed to get tertiary education, this could be a source of tension with those older
people who perceived themselves as better educated because they ‘grew up when
education was at its peak under the British’.
On the other hand, it was also possible that those who did acquire some formal
education would find tensions with their elders, for formal education was by no means
universally regarded as a ‘good thing’. Indeed, in the eyes of one respondent - himself
a teacher in a local primary school - it undermined processes of informal socialisation
and therefore contributed to the cultural dilution discussed in chapter 6:
The formal education has brought a lot of changes on the culture in all aspects. The
informal education was concerned with true cultural activities. All the boys’ education
                                                     
488 COWI, Volume 1, July 1999, pp94, 207-209. This figure does not include students from those districts
who have completed secondary education elsewhere in the country.
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was left with their fathers. In order to become a man a boy must go through that. All
girls’ education was left with their mothers. Any girl to become a woman must pass
through that. But now the formal education has taken over the education of children from
their parents. It talks of the curriculum, syllabus and in an organised institution of
learning like schools. This has made our culture dying and diluted.489
From this perspective, wherein education, culture and masculinity are seen as
interdependent, the rise of the formal education model made it difficult if not
impossible for a boy to become a man. This resonates with the writings of Okot p’Bitek,
an Acholi writer whose Song of Lawino, first published in 1966, is in many respects a
commentary on social change. In describing her husband Ocol’s extensive formal
education, Lawino, a rural woman whom he has left behind as he goes to travel,
concludes that all the reading has ‘killed’ her man ‘In the ways of his people’. Worse
still
‘..his actions and behaviour
Are to please somebody else.
Like a woman trying to please her husband!
My husband has become a woman!’
Lawino regards education as a wilderness, a ‘Dark Forest of Books’, and she makes an
explicit connection between education and the loss of masculinity, not just of her
husband, but of youth in general:
For all our young men
Were finished in the forest,
Their manhood was finished
In the class-rooms,
Their testicles
Were smashed
With large books! (1985: 116-117)
                                                     
489 Report from Awer camp, June 1998.
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In short, p’Bitek, through Lawino, articulated the concerns of those who felt that young
men seeking masculinity through formal education was a misguided enterprise, as it
effectively destroyed their independence and therefore their ‘manhood’.
Logically, given that one component of the adult man’s roles is to educate and socialise
his sons, when ‘organised institutions of learning’ take over these roles for a large part
of every day, they also undermine the masculinity of adult fathers. This is perhaps
most pointedly the case where schools become the only place in which cultural dances
are taught (see chapter 6).
Most respondents did not make such explicit connections, but nonetheless lamented
the loss of one of the focal points of informal education, the household hearth (wang oo)
around which old and young would sit in the evening, exchanging information and
knowledge. Under curfew or when hiding in the bush in an attempt to avoid
abduction, there was no prospect of this taking place (chapter 6). Even if there were no
curfew, it was very difficult in the more congested camps to sit around an open fire
when there was barely space to walk between closely spaced and thatch-roofed huts
(chapter 5). Similarly for the thousands of children who ‘commuted’ into the major
towns every night this route to socialisation had been cut off.
It appears then that both formal and informal education were drastically curtailed,
particularly from 1996 onwards. The ‘informal’ route to masculinity was gone, and the
formal one had not replaced it, leaving youth unable to pursue either route towards
adult masculinity.490
Marriage
Although there had long been men too poor to pay the bride-wealth (Girling, 1960:
167), this was now the case for the vast majority. As Finnström also reports (2003: 24), I
neither heard of nor witnessed a single wedding inside northern Uganda throughout
my fieldwork. The economic basis for the hegemonic combination of marriage (the
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essential passage to adulthood), and the subsequent provision and protection of the
household, was substantially worsened by the war. Marriage based upon payment of
bride-wealth, hitherto a key mechanism for the creating social cohesion, was felt to
have changed considerably.491 With very little access to subsistence farming, education,
employment and cash income opportunities (chapters 2, 5), the possibilities of making
bride-wealth payments necessary for marriage were seriously curtailed, not least by
competition from the military who had more money (chapter 6). Whereas prior to the
war many families held wealth in the form of livestock, this economic guarantee of
marriage had been largely removed by cattle rustling and raiding (chapter 2),
prompting one youth to write:
‘Shall we marry
Really when our animals
Scuffled their ways
To the so-called strongmen
With dry woods on their shoulders
That burnt the whole village fallowland
Even introduced us to beg
For the mouths from neighbours?’
The removal of cattle would have been less of an issue had it been possible to produce
and sell surpluses for a cash dowry. However, as described in Chapter 5, subsistence
and cash-crop farming were drastically curtailed by the military situation and the
protected village policy. Although curfews and restrictions on movement were not
applied consistently in these villages, people were generally unable to return to their
own lands to farm and able to use only lands immediately around the protected village
itself. Hunting and gathering of wild foods, a further source of food and a fall-back
position for generating cash income, was frequently outlawed and always dangerous
(chapter 5).
                                                                                                                                                           
490 In one instance where a Functional Adult Literacy Campaign was launched in Bungatira sub-county,
only one of the 122 participants was a man (KM E-newsletter 15, 23 May 2002).
491 Only one of 10 fieldworkers claimed there had been no change (Odek pilot report, 21 July 1998).
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The picture was therefore bleak, as captured in the following fairly typical responses to
the question of whether marriage practices had changed; ‘There is a totally great change.
Mostly there is no marriage these days just because of money in addition no respect for parents
and no proper land for cultivation.’492 The Atiak fieldworker described how before the
camps the suitor would pay bridewealth before the woman moved in with him:
Now people first collect the girl from her parents illegally, then pay for the dowry later
on. [in the past] Most of the girl’s relatives would be invited to come, while nowadays it
is done secretly as if buying something from the shop. If people [LRA] hear about dowry
they will organise to come and loot it. So they [the parents] just take money, depending
on the girl’s education, family status, e.g. 850,000 for an S4 lady. Payment for
interrupting education by getting a woman pregnant is called ‘Obal Kwan’ [Spoiled
Studies i.e. the woman’s education is terminated or interrupted as she is not allowed to
attend school while pregnant].
It was not just a matter of bride-wealth, but also of parental involvement. Girling found
that as early as 1951 this was an area in which parents in theory had considerable
control over their children’s marriage (1960: 70) but in which in reality ‘about 50 per
cent of all Acholi unions, excluding widow inheritance’ were ‘marriage by elopement’
(1960: 74). Nonetheless, the perception that parents should control marriage remained
prevalent;
…Marriage ceremonies is completely changed from the ones of the past. It was the duty of
the two parents from both sides to accept first before a boy and girl were allowed to get
married493. Both families must be well known to one another for the good things that they
do, like a home with a lot of food, animals (goats, cows etc), hard-working and are not
wizards. With all that good things mentioned above one is allowed to get married. But
now a girl may decide to be eloped to a boy without the prior knowledge of their parents
and the same with a boy.494
In camps where dozens of villages had been brought together (chapter 5 Part I) parents
often simply did not know the prospective in-laws. Without the involvement of the
wider family in the marriage arrangements, the obligations which went with such
involvement could be sidestepped. Thus
                                                     
492 Awach, August 1998.
493 Girling writes ‘Fathers have the right to control the marriages of their children… A son may not marry
without the consent of his father’ (1960: 33).
494 Awer, June 1998.
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…the soldiers could go with your daughter without fulfilling the needs of the parents of
the girl. Many girls got pregnant and go to the would-be husband. The parents of both
the boy and girl would just allow their son/daughter to marry and stay together without
dowry, for fear of AIDS epidemic.495
In short, both young men who could not get married, and older men who could not
control their children’s marriage choices, felt their masculinity was undermined. Even
where the match was between two civilians, some regarded it bleakly;
In the end you find that these kind of family does not last longer, it has resulted into a
very high level of prostitution. A boy and a girl may decide to come together when they
are below the expected age of maturity and this kind of family ends up by not being in a
position to maintain themselves properly and eventually they separate.496
Provision
As the last quotation suggests, for those who managed to marry, the prospects of
providing adequately for wife and children were eroded. Economic context and lack of
schooling available made it very difficult to pay school fees and associated costs, thus
undermining one of the key responsibilities of the ‘masculine’ role. Even more basic,
ensuring their dependents’ health and nutrition became impossible. Fathers could only
watch helplessly as a whole generation of physically, mentally and psychologically
stunted children was created in the camps (chapter 6). The psychological impact on
men was captured graphically in a New Vision report, which, under the headline of ‘A
camp of living dead’, described how
… repeated humiliations of camp residents have contributed to loss of pride and
self-esteem. How can such residents be expected to assert their dignity when they
must bend knees in order to collect 16 kilograms of posho? How can a husband
speak with confidence before his wife when other men provide his daily
sustenance? How can parents discipline children when the little ones’ distended
stomach and sunken eyes speak of meals eaten five days ago?497
                                                     
495 Palaro pilot report, 30 July 1998. When two people stay together without the man paying bridewealth it
is known as Poro (see also Girling, 1960: 70).
496 Awer, June 1998.
497 New Vision, 25 February 1998.
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Physical protection
The third key aspect of the masculine role, physical protection, was largely taken out of
the hands of individual men and placed in the hands of the state. Men were now
supposed to earn protection for themselves, their wives and children, by relating to the
state as loyal citizens who put their trust in the state to protect their interests and were
themselves prepared to take up arms whether as soldiers in the army, or as members of
local defence units. Participation in mchaka-mchaka, or political education courses, was
one means of demonstrating loyalty to the state (chapter 5).
Yet this contract between state and citizen, never firmly established in the first place,
was seriously undermined by the context of war and violation. Despite a military
presence in many of the ‘protected villages’, rebels raided with impunity, seizing men,
women, children and properties at will (chapters 2,3,5). While the state still denied the
individual the right to protect his own family (for example by refusing to allow people
to leave the protected villages and move back to their home areas), it failed to provide
a satisfactory substitute. There was often no response to civilian demands for
protection, and even where rebel raids could be predicted, such as after relief
deliveries, adequate protection was rare (chapter 5).
Although men could become directly involved in providing physical protection
through joining the homeguard or local defence units, and there were periodic
recruitment drives to bolster the home-guards, there were also widespread fears that
young men recruited as home-guards would be forced into the army and sent far
afield, for example to the DRC or Sudan (chapters 2, 5).
Further threats to sense of masculinity
To this very simple picture of how the basic parameters of masculinity became
impossible to fulfil, it is important to add some more insidious ways in which men’s
self-esteem was undermined. Some of these were products of immediate
circumstances, others were rooted in a much longer history.
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An immediate problem for many men, was that while the protected villages with their
high population densities may have increased sexual opportunities for some, they also
created a number of obstacles aside from the economic ones outlined. At a most basic
level accommodation in protected villages was overcrowded and did not allow the
privacy which characterised pre-war settlement and accommodation patterns. For
male youths who engaged in sexual activity with female counterparts there was, over
and above the risk of HIV/AIDS, a high risk of being accused of defilement (sex with
an under-age female) with the risk of a six or seven year prison sentence if convicted,
and very costly out of court settlements to avoid such a sentence.
One of the more historically rooted threats to men’s self-esteem came from external
and internalised ethnocentrism and racism. A long history of north-south opposition,
British divide-and-rule tactics of singling out Acholi men for service in the military,
and widespread perceptions of Acholi involvement in extreme violence and brutality
under Obote II, contributed to a reputation for militarism and violence played upon by
southerners to justify the imposition of harsh military control on northerners.498 As
described in chapter 3, it was also part of the portrayal of the LRA.
While the national reputation for militarism sat uneasily with elements of Acholi self-
perception such as being well able to reconcile with others and resolve differences
through discussion, it blended almost seamlessly with wider ethnocentrist and racist
discourses equating northerners with primitivism and backwardness. It is not
uncommon to meet people in Kampala who will explain how they have overcome their
belief that northerners are ‘less than human’ – or who still retain it (see also Finnström,
2003; 112-116). Given that many continue to see Acholi and the LRA as synonymous,
and that the LRA is regarded as crazy and dehumanised, the prompts for such beliefs
are far from disappearing. As some Acholi youth recounted,
if you are in Kampala you get a lot of names. For example, if you lose your temper
someone might say “Kony is cross”.
                                                     
498 Finnström explicitly writes ‘against the claim that the Acholi are more prone to war than other people’
(2003: 35).
296
Among the negative messages workshop participants had heard as young children,
were that northern Ugandans were ‘primitive’, ‘backwards’, ‘poor', ‘illiterate’ ‘swine’.
This fitted into a wider colonial racist discourse under which people recalled being told
as children that black people were viewed as ‘evil’ ‘animals’, ‘cannibals’, ‘monkeys, ‘devils’
and ‘spirits’ who ‘don’t have souls or feelings’. Furthermore, that ‘they are dark and ugly’,
‘smell bad and dirty’, and are ‘jealous’, ‘uncooperative’, ‘backwards’, ‘unintelligent’ and
‘associated with disease’. Some were told they were ‘supposed to be servants’ who were ‘not
entitled to anything’, and ‘should be puppets (to be used and thrown at will)’ (ACORD 2000).
As in all such cases of widely prevalent discriminatory stereotypes, it is difficult to
identify individual sources of such statements. Some are clearly linked with the
colonial period. Written in 1966, Okot p’Bitek’s Song of Ocol is at one level a treatment
of exactly these issues. Having been accused by his wife Lawino of having lost his
manhood as a result of the white man’s influence (see above), Ocol responds in a way
which demonstrates the extent to which he has internalised those influences. He
disparages ‘Africa’, as the ‘Idle giant’, which is ‘Diseased with a chronic illness,
Choking with black ignorance… Stuck in the stagnant mud Of superstitions… Timid,
Unadventurous’ (1985: 125-126). It is noteworthy that Ocol talks of Africa as a he (1985:
125), whereas European commentators, in a further emasculation of ‘Africa’ (and by
association ‘Africans’), generally talk of the continent as feminine. The editor of the
1985 edition of Song of Lawino, for example, writes that ‘Traditional remedies should
have some place in Africa, but they cannot solve all her medical problems’ (1985: 30).
The parallels between p’Bitek’s words of 1966, and what the workshop participants
recalled in 2000, suggest that, once internalised, such negative imagery has a life of its
own. And as the feminisation of Africa demonstrates, the sources are often barely
visible. In a sense they become less of an issue than the question of how the underlying
and tenacious legacies of ethno-centric and racist discourses compound the more
immediate causes of suspicion and hostility at group level, destroy self-esteem and self
respect at individual level, and how these in turn feed violence and conflict.
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‘Gender’ discourse and practice
That the parameters of models of masculinity and femininity had long been in a state
of flux is suggested by Girling’s observation from fieldwork conducted in 1951 that ‘the
status of women has increased in relation to that of men. Women own property of their
own, including livestock… They manufacture distilled liquor and pots for sale…
Women beaten by their husbands have the right of appeal to the Government Chiefs’
(1960: 194). That rights-based discourses, such as the notion that women should be
educated, were still trickling down nearly fifty years later, was clear. Although a major
male-female imbalance remained at secondary level, there were efforts to address it at
primary level, with reports of visits to villages specifically to promote Universal
Primary Education and within that, girls’ education.499 In a speech given by a district
school inspector in Cwero, the fieldworker noted that:
On gender balance he mentioned that a female child’s education must be considered
important as those of a male child… He went on to say that in the past girls’ education
was ignored and he used an Acholi proverb [to prove that this should no longer be the
case] “Gwok ma dako bene mako lee” [Even the female dog can catch an animal].500
However, although more subtly than the racist and ethnocentric discourses, this more
modern rights-based one of ‘gender’, when over-simplified into a zero-sum game of
women’s rights vs. men’s rights, paradoxically also served to undermine men’s sense
of masculinity. Sometimes a ‘gender perspective’ could lead to a near blanket dismissal
of all men, as in the following description of the impacts of war in Gulu, given by a
Kampala based women’s organisation:
One indicator of women’s economic initiative is the number of activities being
undertaken by individual women or groups of women in the form of self-help
projects… The majority of men on the other hand have failed to cope with the
rapidly changing situation. In situations where farming cannot be practised like
in Gulu town, many men have failed to find alternative economic survival
mechanisms and have taken to heavy drinking out of frustration. Some have
resorted to performing previously despised jobs like general sale of labour to
perform menial tasks.501
                                                     
499 Odek, 31 July 1999.
500 Cwero, 23 July 1999.
501 ISIS-WICCE, 2000, p1.
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Men are implicitly labelled as having no economic initiative, in contrast to the women,
and are explicitly described as ‘failing’. There is no praise for those who have eaten
humble pie and taken on menial tasks. Rather it is presented almost in the same breath
as heavy drinking. And there is no discussion of men who have moved into what were
previously regarded as women’s areas of activity (such as traditional healing), nor
about the numerous male youth groupings seeking to create some economic enterprise
against all odds - boda-boda cyclists, agricultural groups etc, as documented in Chapter
5, groups which belie the dual stereotype of idle men – and idle youth.
When the Government’s political education course (mchaka-mchaka) talked about
human rights (Chapter 5), the emphasis was on the rights of women. In the interests of
the project of ‘equality’, some interventions showed a lack of understanding for the
relational aspects of gender and effectively emasculated men. As documented in
chapter 6, many of the cattle restocking initiatives similarly furnished women with
heads of cattle, regardless that this was traditionally a masculine area of activity. WFP
at one point had a policy of distributing food exclusively through women, but then
found that men controlled the food’s distribution at home (WFP 1999: 21).  Such
interventions almost certainly worsened day-to-day relations between men and
women – thus detracting from any positive impact they may have had on the supposed
beneficiaries, the women.
Militarisation
A further thorn in the side of men unable to achieve the model of provider and
protector was the large military presence, a constant reminder of civilian men’s
failures. As discussed in chapter 6, Government soldiers were present in all protected
villages and were economically powerful by comparison with the majority of civilians,
whose ‘hands are tied’. They also exercised visible control over their women, as in
Gulu barracks, where soldiers’ wives were not free to move in and out of the barracks
except at very limited times of the day, while their husbands could move in and out
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relatively freely.502 Some parents encouraged their children to become soldiers’ wives,
(Dolan 2000) and some believed that youth were attracted to joining the army in order
to get ‘free women’ (ACORD 2000).
In these circumstances, joining the government forces represented a dramatic shift in
power relations in favour of militarised men, and probably a significant incentive for
the continuation of the conflict. For male recruits to the LRA, on the other hand, access
to women was closely controlled (chapter 3). Indeed, the establishment of a controlled
sexuality and thus ‘purity’ in response to the breakdown of ‘traditional’ morality, was
a stated concern of Joseph Kony and part of the wider project of establishing a ‘New
Acholi’. As such, joining the LRA was less of an assured route to satisfying this
particular dimension of a thwarted masculinity.
The impacts of the emergence of a hegemonic model
In northern Uganda civilian men’s ability to achieve key elements in the normative
model of masculinity into which they had been socialised went into protracted crisis.
With their capacity to create a family and then provide for and protect it much
reduced, they experienced a loss of domestic and political power, and also could not
exercise military power. Given that many of the features of this model were sexist,
patriarchal, and  adultist, this may at first glance seem a good thing, but it had
numerous negative ramifactions, both for the immediate individuals and their families,
but also for the wider society.
However difficult to attain, the model was strongly self-reinforcing, and precluded the
development of alternatives. The more people struggled to attain it, the less open they
were to non-patriarchal, non-oppressive alternatives. In this sense there was a
                                                     
502 The soldiers’ wives reported being largely confined to the barracks in Gulu. There is what is known as
'small gate' through which they can pass, but the times were very restricted:
Monday 1-5 pm
Tuesday 1-2 pm
Thursday 1-2 pm
Saturday 1-2 pm
Sunday 7am -1.30 pm
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‘collapse’ of multiple masculinities, mirrored by the emergence of a single hegemonic
one.
The second area of impact was on individuals who sought and yet failed to live up to
the model. While men who were able to conform to the model did benefit to an extent
in terms of the power they could wield over women, children and youth, it is as
important to see that the expectations (particularly economic ones) were onerous and
indeed many men expressed a sense of being oppressed by them. Not only were they
almost impossible to meet in the northern Ugandan context, but the struggle to do so
left men with little possibility of pursuing individual aspirations.
To break out of these expectations was not really an option: men were unable to
achieve the model, but they could not afford not to try to live up to it. The social and
political acceptance which came from being seen to conform to the norm, and the
access to a variety of resources which this facilitated, was critical. As Kabeer has
argued, access to intangible resources (solidarity, contacts, information, political clout)
‘is likely to be particularly critical in situations where market or state provision of
social security is missing or where access to these institutions is imperfectly
distributed’ (1994: 280).
Trapped by the model, and by their inability to achieve it, there was inevitably
considerable frustration. There is much evidence that this ‘thwarting’ of aspirations
and expectations can result in various forms of violence against the self and others.
Moore defines thwarting ‘as the inability to sustain or properly take up a gendered
subject position, resulting in a crisis, real or imagined, of self-representation and/or
social evaluation’… ‘thwarting can also be the result of contradictions arising from the
taking up of multiple subject positions, and the pressure of multiple expectations about
self-identity or social presentation’ (1994: 66).503 Foreman makes the same argument
when he argues that ‘fear of ridicule, of being seen as ‘less than a man’, lies behind
                                                                                                                                                           
Women trying to enter outside those times would have difficulty being allowed in. Soldiers were free to
rent houses outside but were supposed to sleep in the barracks where they could be on-call for active duty.
503 For a similar use of the term some thirty years earlier, see John Griffin (1964: 109-110).
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much of the violence men inflict on strangers or their wives’ (Foreman 1999: 20).
Equally, he argues that resentment is often manifested in anger and violence towards
women and other men’ (ibid, 1999: 14). Zur argues that in the Guatemalan context ‘The
humiliation of not being able to protect and provide for their families… led to anger
and resentment, which some men took out on their wives’. She further argues that
these processes ‘contributed to a loss of identity as a male’ (1998: 103).
The belittlement felt by men is evident in the statement from a group of teachers, that
'As teachers we are just like kids, you just cry while your parents are fighting. You can make a
noise but you won't be heard by anybody’.504 If teachers, despite their education and
position, felt unheard and reduced to the status of children, how much more so the
average and poorly educated civilian living in a protected village?
Many symptoms of ill-health documented in chapter 6, notably impotence, heavy
drinking, and cases of suicide, can be interpreted as related to a loss of masculinity. In
the overall ranking, impotence and fertility together were the third most important
illnesses treated. When the data was disaggregated by gender, however, male
impotence emerged as the number one complaint.
Table 7.2: Ranking of illnesses treated in 416 male patients by 37 traditional healers
in Gulu district in the week 14-20 June 1999
Illness Ranking Number of cases As % of total
Impotence 1 81 19.5
Backache 2 66 15.9
Convulsion/Malaria 3 60 14.4
STDs/AIDS 4 57 13.7
Upper Respiratory
Tract Infection
5 50 12.0
TB 6 49 11.8
Herpes Zoster 7 28 6.7
Mental Problems 8 25 6.0
TOTAL 416 100.00
                                                     
504 Interview with secondary school teachers, Gulu High School, 13 August 1998.
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The healers suggested that impotence had increased as a result of fear of STIs/HIV,
increasing alcohol abuse, and increasing redundancy, and that returned abductees
were often impotent due to their experiences (see chapter 3 for LRA treatment of
impotence). Impotence was also explained as due to ‘women's curses’. Because the
population was scattered in the camps they were unable to perform clan rituals, but
their use of Tedo Bwoc, which was specifically for impotence, had increased in recent
years. When asked again why they thought this was the case, confinement, lack of
food/money, pressure by army, loss of social norms, and increased levels of violence
were added to the above list. (Tumu Kir, a cleansing ritual conducted after a domestic
dispute, was said to have increased for the same reasons)
The identification of ‘increasing alcohol abuse’ as one factor in impotence adds a
further twist to the discussion of psychological debilitation. It was noted in chapter 6
that ‘redundancy’, ‘powerlessness’ and an inability to ‘live as they used to do when
they had full control’ (in other words, social impotence) were factors leading to over-
drinking. Here it is seen that alcohol is regarded as causing physical impotence,
suggesting a direct link, indeed a vicious circle, between men’s social and physical
impotence.
It is striking, given the apparent prevalence of male impotence and attempts to cure it,
that in group discussion of the major health issues (before each healer was interviewed
individually to establish his or her caseload in the preceding week) impotence was
ranked as one of the least important health problems. This suggests a collective shame
regarding this symptom – and symbol – of the emasculation of men in the war zone.
(Girling, after all, described how sterility for men and barrenness for women were
regarded as ‘the greatest afflictions any person can suffer among the Acholi’ 1960: 160)
Whereas explanations for over-drinking embrace the loss of masculinity in the widest
sense of a loss of social power and control, explanations given for men’s suicides are
much more directly focused on their unsatisfactory relations with women (Table 7.3)
Table 7.3: Methods and reasons for suicides/suicide attempts among men
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Age Method Succeed/
Fail
Reason
Unknown Furadan S Feared that his wife had slept with his uncle who
was suspected to be HIV positive
Unknown Batteries F Not known
Unknown Furadan S The wife of the deceased indicated that the late had
had a love affair with a woman who was an AIDS
victim
Adolescen
t
Cibacol S Unrequited love
18 hanging from
mango tree
S Feared paying 100,000/= fine and 7 year prison
sentence for defiling 15 year old girl
27 poison in food S Had been infected with syphilis by wife when she
returned after having left him for two years – he
killed her with the same poison he used to kill
himself
Adult Insecticide S He was ill with AIDS, not able to stay with woman
he was in love with as her relatives prevented it
Adult Batteries S Felt he was not taken seriously by his wife
20 Cibacol S Parents would not pay his school fees but paid
those of his siblings
42 Hanging S His wife committed adultery, he beat her nearly to
death and then hung himself
36 Rat poison F He is lame, frustrated because he felt his disability
prevented him from getting a wife
15 Poison S Feared  7 year prison sentence for defiling 13 year
old girl
Adult Poison F His wife was barren - he wanted his sperm back. He
threatened to cut her open with a panga in an
attempt to recover his sperm.
Boy Hanging F He had been arrested by UPDF because of lack of
ID card
Adult Hanging S Mental health problems – he thought his brothers
and wife wanted to kill him
In only three of the above cases is there no obvious connection with the person’s
relations with a woman/women. Twelve of the fifteen cases were directly attributed to
a failure to achieve the hegemonic model of marriage and of control over women.  In
three cases relations were complicated by HIV infection. In two the youths killed
themselves rather than face seven years in prison for sleeping with an under-age
woman. In the remaining five cases the person seems not to have felt validated; the
woman either rejected his advances, did not appear to take him seriously, cuckolded
him, infected him with an STI, or did not bear children. In one case the man felt unable
to attract a wife due to his disability.
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For young men in particular, the question of defilement was a central factor in suicide.
One fieldworker described the case of an 18 year old male who committed suicide by
hanging himself after being caught having intercourse with his niece, a girl of 15 years
old. He told his friend that he feared that
he was going to be put to prison for seven years and paying 1,000,000 shillings for the
spoiling of the study of Alice. Hence he thought locally to hang himself from a mango tree
at 6.30pm on the 8/5/99 very close to his house.
That failure to achieve the gender norms was a central cause of suicide was also
confirmed in various group discussions in Pabo and Acet camp (March 2002). In Acet
the group recalled four recent cases of suicide, all connected to inter-gender tensions –
and respondents agreed that if you cannot marry you also cannot get taken seriously,
and that this resulted in psychological problems.505 The first case concerned a father of
five who
had fought with his wife and gone to stay with his uncle. Previously he had been abusing
the wife and the uncle had tried to stop him. Eventually the uncle beat him with a panga,
causing him a dislocated shoulder and knee.
The second had taken place the previous night:
Last night a man was to inherit his brother’s wife.506 His own wife didn’t want this to
happen and quarrelled a lot, so he took Ambush (a pesticide for termites). He threatened
to beat the wife if she raised the alarm and he disappeared into the bush. She did though
raise the alarm and he was captured.
The third example was of an old man of some 80 years, whose wife had died some time
back:
He brought another woman. There were some quarrels in the house. The woman left him.
The same day he took poison (also Ambush). He was rescued by being fed raw eggs and
oil which made him vomit. … His reasons are that the second woman took all his money,
he feels he cannot survive without that money.
The fourth concerned a mature woman who:
                                                     
505 Acet Camp, 1 March 2002.
506 This refers to the practice of wife inheritance, whereby in the event of a man’s death, his wife is
expected to become the wife to her deceased husband’s brother. With the rise of HIV/AIDS this was
coming under increasing question.
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… drank poison in October last year. People were rumour mongering that she was being
run by a young man.507 Her own husband was in Kampala and he had sent her back to
cultivate and was supporting her … The LCs and elders decided to counsel the woman
and the young man. People were seeing the way they behaved. It reached a time when the
boy started to talk with a young girl and the woman was enraged. … Now she knew
people knew, so she drank poison, but she was rescued and did not die.
The last case is interesting in that it again simultaneously confirms and yet qualifies the
picture created by discourses of breakdown. While the ostensible reason for the
woman’s suicide was jealousy, it was also linked to the intervention of the wider
community. To try and control this couple’s behaviour which ‘people were seeing’, the
LCs and elders ‘decided to counsel the woman and the young man’, an intervention which
prompted the young man to make sure he was seen talking with a young woman more
in his own age group. The fact that ‘now she knew people knew’ is part of the reason the
woman drank the poison.  Clearly the elders had not lost all their authority for they
took it upon themselves to speak to a young man who was ‘running’ a woman old
enough to be his mother – and he listened to them. Paradoxically, therefore, the
relationship could be a symptom of the breakdown of social controls, but the suicide
was a symptom of an at least partially successful attempt to reassert them.
Following this exposition of recent cases, the discussion in Acet Camp moved on to
possible explanations for what was perceived to be an increasing suicide rate. The
primary argument was that ‘frequency has increased due to the frustration of living in the
camps.’ At a practical level the fact that cotton and tobacco growing had been
reactivated meant that more pesticide was available, making it ‘easier to commit suicide’
(see chapter 6), but upon further discussion it became clear that living in the camps
created very specific problems. It was felt that suicide attempts were predominantly
amongst youth and young women, in part because camp life had shifted the
parameters of relationships:
Very few people are able to marry, there is no means. Also staying in the camps has led to
promiscuity, therefore people don’t think of permanent partners. High levels of
promiscuity leads to distrust, you don’t know the other person’s HIV status.
                                                     
507 I.e. was having a sexual relationship with.
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In the past every home had elders and parents. Now they don’t have that. There is no
sitting together to provide corrective measures. So you get a combination of frustration,
pleasure in sex, and lack of correction. This minimises the potential to create families.
In the past it was the responsibility of the father to help organise marriage. Now the
father will refuse to waste resources (for example, if he does not approve of the proposed
wife), this also creates frustration leading to suicide.508
A good example of the complex HIV-trust-suicide nexus comes from a case in Pagak
camp in July 1998:
A man called Simon committed suicide from Pagak camp on 07/07/98 in the evening after
quarrelling with the uncle that his uncle was in love with his [Simon’s] woman. Later
they fought seriously and he went and bought Furadine which is a poison and took it that
evening. He did that because the uncle was a suspect of AIDS virus.
Officials in Pabbo confirmed the broad picture of adolescents reacting to excessive
attempts at control: in their opinion suicide among young people was mainly caused
when a parent corrected or reprimanded a child - especially in the case of girls – and
they gave the example of a girl who killed herself when her father stopped her from
marrying a close relative she was in love with. They also argued that it was not just
youth; ‘Even men [can commit suicide] when they quarrel with their wives’. Asked why
elderly men would kill themselves, they answered ‘in one case he was quarrelling with one
of his wives and she was quarrelling and insulting him – he killed himself’. In another case
One man suspected his wife was running [having sexual relations with] another man.
Once he came home and heard her talking to a man inside the house. Instead of checking
who it was, he picked a rope and hung himself.509
In short, many suicides are either a reaction to attempts by others to exercise control
over the suicidee, or to a failure to achieve control by the suicidee. For men, the
question of masculinity is at the core of the matter in both cases. And the destruction of
men’s sense of their masculinity, and the behaviours which result are also implicated
in women’s suicides, as they in turn undermine women’s sense of their femininity. If
the explanations for women’s suicide attempts are recalled (chapter 6), it is clear that a
self-perpetuating dynamic is set up: men’s aspirations are thwarted such that, for
                                                     
508 Acet, 1 March 2002.
509 Pabo, 5 March 2002.
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example, they turn to drink to drown their sorrows, as a result their wives’ aspirations
are also thwarted, causing them to swallow pesticides and watch batteries as their final
solution.
Domestic violence
Further evidence of a sense of loss of control, and therefore of masculinity, can be seen
in high levels of domestic violence, and in the treatment of youth. In one incident a
non-Acholi businessman
…went to his mother-in-law to demand for refund of his money since the wife had become
pregnant with another man…  but the mother-in-law said there was no money for refund.
He later returned with a panga and attacked her and her younger daughter, inflicting
injuries of which they both later died.
When the woman’s son arrived on the same day that his mother died he rushed to the
house of his mother’s attacker and immediately began to attack young children in revenge
for the death of his mother and sister…
It would be hard to find a clearer example of the causal relationship between
humiliation and domestic violence than this explosion of inter-personal violence by a
man who was humiliated both by his wife becoming pregnant by another man and by
his mother-in-law’s refusal to repay the bridewealth. In one somewhat unusual case, a
man was believed to have acted out his humiliation and anger by raping the nephew of
the woman he thought had infected him with HIV, an extreme example of a wider
tendency for adult men to take out their frustrations on youth and children.
That the psychological dynamics go beyond the arena of domestic violence and into
the social and political arena is suggested not just by instances of mob justice (see
chapter 6, for the case of a man being beaten to death after he stole a bicycle), but by
workshop participants who argue a link between the experience of humiliation and the
perpetuation of war: ‘the local population lose their human dignity; they feel unprotected by
the national army and or rebel forces and that their lives are not valued. They become aggressive
in self-preservation’. Furthermore, ‘people who get victimised take sides in the war with the
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spirit of revenging the atrocities against them or their families’.510 That they also made a
connection between individuals’ frustrated aspirations and decisions to join armed
groups is clear from the discussion about discrimination against youth: ‘they defy
culture by joining war in order to achieve what they have been denied’, and ‘since they are
denied economic opportunity by elders the youth take short cuts through taking up arms’.511
And as the comments of one female respondent in Acet camp suggest, it is the denial of
marriage, that core element of adult masculinity, which is at the heart of many
frustrations:
It is very difficult for attitudes to change regarding the importance of the status of being
married. As a result some youth migrate to urban centres. Others join the military forces,
they fight and die there. My fear is that because of this attitude and the fact that many
remain unmarried, what kind of future are we looking at? Attitudinal change is very
important. Unmarried persons must be accepted. They should be appreciated as having
potential.512
Increased male vulnerability to violence
The discussion up to this point has emphasised how the thwarting of the aspirations
and expectations created by the model of masculinity is itself a form of psychological
violence which in turn produces a reaction in the form of violence against the self and
others, and that this thwarting can be considered a factor in perpetuating the dynamics
of conflict insofar as some men seek to overcome it by joining military forces.
It is also important to look at the situation the other way round and demonstrate how
the model also makes men more vulnerable to physical violence by others. Paradoxical
though it may seem, the closer a man comes to achieving the model, the greater his
vulnerability to violence at the hands of other men – particularly at the hands of men
whose own masculinity is in need of a quick fix. Because men’s sense of achieved
masculinity is so fragile in the war zone, it is an ideal target for military violence,
notably in the form of violence against the women and children from whom the man is
                                                     
510 ACORD 2000.
511 An argument also made by Large (1997).
512 Acet Camp, 1 March 2002.
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supposed to derive his own sense of masculinity. Direct attacks on men’s ‘achieved
masculinity’ include rape of women (their wives, daughters and sisters), rape of men
(themselves, brothers, fathers, sons), and abduction of their children.513
While rape occurs at the hands of all parties, it is particularly bitter when the rapists
are the very men supposedly protecting civilians. One fieldworker reported how on 7
February 2000 members of the UPDF entered a village in his area and raped a 70 year
old woman. On the 8th a 29 year old was raped, on the 9th a 43 year old and a 30 year
old. In the latter case
The husband tried to boycott the wife [i.e. not have intercourse with her] but his parents
advised him not to beat the wife because it wasn’t her need (wish) to meet the soldier. In
conclusion, people in the camp and the few who go to collect food are really very worried
and not happy because these (soldiers) are more harmful than rebels.
In some instances the army did discipline soldiers (see Chapter 5), at times provoking
the guilty party to extreme steps, such as a home guard who, having raped a civilian
woman, shot himself rather than face military discipline. More usually when soldiers
guarding civilians broke discipline, there was no redress. As one fieldworker reported,
The UPDF soldiers based at A__ detach are giving a lot of embarrassment to the people in
the camp by beating and raping. On the 10-2-00 a UPDF soldier came to the place of
Agnes at night and hid himself behind the house. When Agnes was asleep he opened the
door and flashed a torch. He then landed on the neck of the women and wanted to have
sex with her forcefully but Agnes began to shout loudly for help. Then Ay- who is the
cousin sister rushed to find out what was wrong with Agnes. On hearing foot steps
coming from the neighbouring houses the soldier ran away.
The following morning the LCs followed the case up to the barracks and the woman
identified one of the soldiers named O. But the Commanding Officer …argued that the
statement given by the woman was wrong because O did not go out that day. The case
ended there just like that.
When in February 1999 a young woman was raped and shot dead by an army soldier,
her relatives (impoverished subsistence farmers) were told by the army’s public
relations office to obtain a signed statement from the soldier’s commanding officer
                                                     
513 The term ‘victim’ here is used in the sense adopted by the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, namely to include relatives and dependants of victims of direct abuse and violence
(Goldblatt & Meintjes, 1998: 34).
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before they would take action. Faced with this intimidation they were unable to take
action, and by August there was still no progress on the case (personal interview with
the relatives).
As workshop participants noted, ‘when a woman is raped, the husband feels inactive to
stand up and bring change (disempowered). He was supposed to protect her, but soldiers
continue raping’.514  While rape of men was less common, it had occurred, with
particular prevalence in the early 1990s, when respondents reported an increase in
STDs, allegedly due to 'indiscriminate rape of men (tek gungu) and women by NRA' (see
Chapter 2, see also Finnström, 2003: 252). The stigma attached was even higher than for
female rape, and workshop participants described how ‘when a man is raped it takes
away his manhood and he fails to act to bring change’.515 The late medical superintendant at
Lacor hospital pointed out that
It[male rape] was used by the Government soldiers as a weapon. The anger goes very
deep, the men cannot talk about it, it is the women who bring it up.  Male rape is a major
cause of people's anger against the army.516
Overall, then, the army, while ostensibly responsible for the protection which the
civilians were no longer allowed to provide, in fact attacked women, children and men
and allow them to be attacked – and civilian men could do little or nothing about it.
The model of masculinity made non-combatant men vulnerable to the use of violence
by combatants, and the process of undermining men’s sense of masculinity became a
key channel for some men to exercise power over other men. Interactions between
combatants and non-combatants around masculinity became something of a zero sum
game; the civilian’s loss in masculinity was the combatant’s gain.  In short, it was
possible for particular tactics to simultaneously reinforce the sense of masculinity of
the perpetrator and undermine that of the victim.
                                                     
514 ACORD 2000.
515 ACORD 2000.
516 Lacor Hospital, Gulu, January 1998.
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State benefits from the hegemonic model
The above discussion of hegemonic masculinity illuminates the complex interaction
between individual behaviour, social norms and group intentions. It is highly unlikely
that individuals involved in acts which undermine other men’s sense of masculinity do
not understand this impact of their actions. But what is the role of the state? Is it
plausible that the state, through military and other channels, deliberately manipulates
the hegemonic model, and the vulnerabilities it creates in many men (civilian and
soldier alike), as a means to military and political ends?
Several major elements of the state’s behaviour in northern Uganda suggest this may
be the case. Certainly militarisation of the north (chapter 2) can be seen as
consolidating the model. The state’s own behaviour consistently modelled
‘masculinity’ in its crudest sense, promoting a militarist approach to dealing with the
LRA, certainly in terms of its rhetoric and visible militarisation, and in its belittling of
attempts to model alternative forms of masculinity based on practices of negotiation,
reconciliation and non-violence (chapter 4).
At the same time, the creation of the camps – for which the state was also responsible -
made the model of masculinity less and less possible to achieve. The state therefore
had a central role in creating the conditions for thwarting and humiliation. To the
extent that it did not deal with numerous acts of violence and abuse against civilians,
including rape, abduction and looting, and was itself a frequent perpetrator of such
acts, the state actively contributed to this thwarting (Chapter 5).
There are several perceptible benefits to the state from simultaneously promoting a
model of masculinity and undermining its achievement. Given a belief system which
portrays the north as a threat to the south, the state may see benefit in the creation of a
disempowered male population which turns violence on itself rather than against the
state, and in the maintenance of a context of violence which justifies military
intervention and the strengthening of army control over the civilian population in the
area (explored further in chapters 8 & 9).
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From a more strategic perspective, the Ugandan state may have seen benefits in
sustaining a context of conflict which helped to justify the maintenance of a large
military force for deployment in other regional theatres of war (most recently the DRC
and South Sudan). From such a perspective, addressing the situation of northern
Uganda was not a relevant consideration, indeed, the creation of a context which
empowered military and disempowered civilians may have been seen as strategically
justified. Having once created large military forces, it is also necessary to control them.
The selective way in which discipline was applied to soldiers who engaged in acts of
violence against civilians suggests that playing on soldiers’ sense of masculinity was
used both to reward and control them. This parallels in many respects Zur’s findings
from Guatemala that
Having set in motion the conditions to create patrollers’ feelings of alienation, the
army and its local cohorts proceeded to manipulate them, promoting the patrols,
with their emphasis on violence, as a new space for the reassertion of male
dominance. (1998: 103)
Discussion
This chapter has used a psychological model of thwarting to elaborate on some of the
behaviours documented in preceding chapters. Individual psychological debilitation
and behaviours are shown to be not just a symptom of individual weakness, but a set
of reactions to the thwarting of aspirations for which there are many parallel examples.
The chapter has also linked this thwarting to the wider social and political dynamics
within the war zone, and shown how thwarting itself contributes to the perpetuation of
the dynamics of violence.
It has shown that lived experiences and lived expectations are two very different
things. To conflate the two is to miss a psychological dynamic which is profoundly
important to understanding of violence and conflict, as it is in the disjuncture between
the two that the seeds of violence are to be found.517 Whereas in a peacetime context it
was possible for a majority of men to attain a reasonably close match between
                                                     
517 The implications of this for theorising masculinities are explored further in Dolan 2003.
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expectations and experiences, war sees an increasing heterogeneity of experiences and
growing polarisation between those who are able to attain the markers of masculinity
and exercise the power which these bring, and those who are unable to fulfil
expectations and are thus deeply disempowered. Some (most clearly the youth) have
little power whether in the domestic or the political/public sphere; others exercise
considerable power in their domestic sphere over their wives and children, but little
power over other men; others (notably military) exercise power in all spheres and over
both men and women.
Paradoxically the increasing heterogeneity of experience goes hand in hand with a
further homogenising of expectations; while marriage and fatherhood, provision and
protection become harder to achieve, they become more rather than less desirable as
they appear to provide anchors and points of leverage in the midst of economic, social
and political disorientation created by war. Attainment of different components of the
model creates a hierarchy among men – and a man’s position in this hierarchy is not
completely fixed. Although it has become ever more difficult to do this in a civilian
context, and levels of domestic violence bear witness to this, it remains possible in
principle to attain a full masculine identity, and social expectations remain fully in
support of this. Individuals subscribe to the model for economic and psychological
survival reasons, and their families have a vested interest in ensuring that they do so
for economic security reasons. Militarism provides a route for some, with full support
from a state policy of increasing militarisation and associated recruitment drives into
home guards, militias and the army itself.
Under these circumstances the space for multiple masculinities largely collapses. The
destruction of education opportunities removes one avenue for alternative forms of
achievement, as does the destruction of an economic environment in which it is
possible to become somebody through wealth. Attempts to promote alternative visions
of how to resolve the situation are ridiculed both implicitly by policies of non-
protective militarisation, and explicitly by the utterances of various key leadership
figures. With this ever narrower horizon and ever smaller windows of opportunity,
what people are left with as sources of identity and power is each other.
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For this model of masculinity is inherently relational, not just between men and
women, but between men and men, particularly between ‘youths’ and ‘adults’, as
differentiated by marriage. While masculinity is articulated in terms of how it differs
from femininity, between men it is lived as a zero sum game which allows power
differentials to be established between them, notably between military and civilian
men. Whereas women cannot be removed from the achievement of a masculine
identity, the removal of other men is a key part of that process. The very sources of
power for men contained in the prevalent model of masculinity are also the roots of
their vulnerability, generating the possibility of any man being both a perpetrator and
a victim of violence. It is therefore not surprising that the bundle of ideas which goes to
make up masculinity exercises such a hold over men – sufficient to prompt many into
acts of suicide when they find that they cannot succeed within the only sphere of
influence which remains open to them, and to prompt others into acts such as rape and
pillaging which they imagine demonstrate their power relative to other men.
Within the civilian population it is the thwarting of men’s wish to achieve masculinity
which appears to reduce them to acts of domestic violence; violence becomes a last
resort of those who are unable to achieve ‘masculinity’. Within the military on the
other hand, the institutional framework and the removal of soldiers from more general
social networks to an extent promotes the use of violence as an easy route to
masculinity. Those in the military gain in domestic power over women as they are in a
stronger position to provide economically and to protect militarily, and they enjoy
military power and social status over other men at the same time. The resort to
violence by the military can be seen as a conscious or subconscious strategy to exercise
control over civilians which is effective in that it strengthens the perpetrator’s
masculinity through weakening that of the victim. That this vulnerability is
deliberately targeted is clear from many descriptions of rape in war situations in which
the husband or father is forced to watch their wife or daughter being raped. In other
words, it is not merely the sexual act which is gratifying, but the capacity to humiliate
another man at the same time. Furthermore, the perpetrators' individual aspirations to
power over others (for they too are by and large from opportunity-deprived
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backgrounds) coincide neatly with the state’s need for control over the population in
general.
The normative model is thus shown to have considerable destructive power which can
be manipulated by the state for purposes of social control and creating more space for
political and military manoeuvre – and the nexus of ‘masculinity’, power, violence and
conflict begins to come into focus. Within this nexus it is impossible to dissociate
power relations between individual men from the power relationships existing
between individual men and the state. The gap between individual psychology and
state level power-plays is bridged.
The plausibility of the model is enhanced by the fact that the men who exercise power
in the state are just as much conditioned by the hegemonic model of masculinity and
therefore it would be surprising if they too did not feel the need to shore up their own
self-esteem by sub-ordinating other men. Indeed, the failure of the 1994 peace talks, as
documented in chapter 4, can very much be seen in this light.
Conclusions
In conclusion, a scrutiny of masculinities illuminates the connections between
protection as violation, protection as debilitation, and protection as humiliation. It also
goes some way to explaining behaviours in the war zone as well as contributing part of
the answer to the question of how and why the situation is perpetuated. It identifies a
psychological dynamic which very few men escape. Rather than being instances of
individual moral weakness, the various behaviours identified in the preceding
chapters and elaborated here, are individual expressions of the psychological dynamics
provoked by broad processes of social and political subordination within the national
context. The concern with individual behaviour which permeates discourses of
‘breakdown’ is validated in the sense that something is broken, and this is visible in
individual behaviour, but it is relativised in that explanatory cases are found in bigger
dynamics for which the individual has little responsibility and over which he/she
exercises little or no control. As such there is little value in judging or ‘blaming the
victim’.
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Paradoxically, the construct of masculinity is a key nexus linking the individual with
the social and, beyond that, with the political at the national level: while individual
men lose control over themselves and their households, other actors, notably the state
and NGOs, increase it. The firming-up of the hegemonic model and the narrowing
range of permissible masculinities, suggests that what people are experiencing is not so
much a social breakdown as a tightening of social control, and that the use of
masculinities by men to exercise power over other men is a key part of this process.
This interpretation does also raise a number of further questions. If, as has been
suggested, the state benefits in some discernible ways from the hegemonic model and
has played a key role in creating the conditions of violation, debilitation and change
whereby people’s attempts to live up to it are thwarted, then what name can be given
to these processes, and how do they relate not just to the continuation of this war, but
to the nature of today’s wars more broadly? These questions are explored further in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 8 - Social Torture and the
Continuation of War
Introduction
In Chapter 1 I argued that the situation in northern Uganda should be considered
primarily as one of social torture rather than war. I proposed that the identification of
torture, rather than hingeing on the question of perpetrator intentions, requires an
assessment also of impacts, actors, benefits and functions, and justificatory processes
and mechanisms. I also proposed that although Social Torture shares key features with
individual torture, it can be analytically distinguished from individual torture along a
number of parameters. These include that it is low rather than high intensity, it impacts
on society as a whole rather than being focused on individuals and their immediate
associates and families, and it is geographically extensive and time indifferent rather
than place and time-bound. Furthermore, rather than a readily identifiable and limited
group of perpetrators linked to the state, it involves multiple state and non-state actors
and becomes to a degree self-perpetuating. It also differs to an extent from individual
torture in that its justifications are in the public domain in the form of public
discourses, whereas much of the justification done in individual torture is at the level
of individual psychology, even if it to an extent draws on public discourses.
In this chapter I consider how each of the proposed constituent elements of a social
torture model, and those aspects which distinguish it from individual torture, are
demonstrated in the preceding chapters. I argue that states typically induced in torture
are to be found in the population in general, as are various behaviours akin to those
found in torture victims. These include perpetrators blaming the victim, victims
blaming themselves, victims associating with perpetrators, and also other forms of
victim behaviour which fit a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder arising from
torture.
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I then scrutinise the multiple actors in social torture together with the nature and
motives for their involvement. Taking the distinction between perpetrators, bystanders
and victims as my starting point, I consider the actors to be not just the LRA and
UPDF, but also the Government more broadly insofar as it made the policy decisions
on the basis of which the context for social torture was created and maintained. I also
look at where institutions and organisations such as churches, aid and development
donors, the media and humanitarian and human rights organisations, fit in the
perpetrator-bystander spectrum. Particular attention is paid to international NGOs and
Inter-Governmental Organisations, who in failing to fulfil the humanitarian imperative
of protection and assistance, played bystander roles which at times merged with those
of perpetrators.
The functions of social torture can be seen to include meeting the immediate and day-
to-day psychological, economic and political needs and interests of visible perpetrators
and complicit bystanders. But within a wider process of historical change and the
struggle of the Government to build and hold onto state power in the face of shifting
pressures from both above and below, social torture also served a more strategic
function. Rather than excluding the Acholi from the national polity, it would
ultimately bring about their subordinate inclusion. By this I mean the inclusion of the
north as an integral part of the Ugandan polity, but on subordinate terms set by the
Government in the south. The relatively high visibility of this process, by intimidating
other sections of the national population, in turn helped in exercising control over the
country as a whole, and was part and parcel of a third area of struggle for the
Government, namely negotiating the terms of its own engagement with the
international community.
When turning to the question of how, notwithstanding their role in a larger dynamic, it
was possible for these actors to justify what they did to themselves and their
constituencies, I argue that this was achieved through the use of public discourses and
conscious silences which render the underlying dynamics invisible. The discourses of
‘intra-ethnic war’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘humanitarian crisis’ and their accompanying
silences are taken as the principal examples.
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The discussion focuses on how low intensity and wide impact, geographical extension
and time indifference, multiple actors and functions, and justification through public
discourses all distinguish social from individual torture. I conclude that it is these
features individually and in combination which offer an explanation for the question
with which this thesis begins, ‘why, when many people say they wish it would end,
does a situation such as that in northern Uganda continue?’
Impacts and Methods
That states of debilitation, dependency, dread and disorientation have been induced
not just in a number of individuals, but in the population as a whole within the war
zone, has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters.
All the elements of debilitation outlined in the introduction were prominent features of
life in the “protected villages”, which one respondent described as like being ‘in prison
within your own country’.518 In chapter 6 it was shown that hunger increased the longer
people stayed in the camps. The number of meals people ate per day decreased due to
inadequate and erratic relief supplies, and the resort to subsistence production became
ever more difficult over time. Lack of sleep and fatigue were inevitable when people
were sleeping in fear of raids and abduction, and were further aggravated when, in an
attempt to evade capture, people slept in the bush in makeshift hideouts (alup) or,
alternatively, walked several hours each night to take shelter on the terraces of
buildings in town before returning to their homes in the morning. In the “protected
villages” themselves the quality of shelter was poor, particularly in terms of over-
crowding and the very real risk of fire. There was a serious lack of medical provision
(chapter 5) and beatings were numerous, whether in the form of domestic violence,
school disciplinary measures or at the hands of various military forces. The impact on
physical and mental health in the camp populations, as described in chapters 6 and 7,
was unmistakable and constituted a case of mass debilitation.
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Enforced dependency was most visible at an economic level; as described in chapters 3
and 5, over the course of the period 1987-2003 the backbone of the traditional
household was broken, several times over. Already weakened by years of under-
investment from the national level relative to other areas of the country,519 Gulu &
Kitgum districts experienced a major direct blow in the looting and slaughter of
livestock in the late 1980s, which removed people’s main form of capital and with it
their ability to weather difficult economic times, finance large one-off expenditures and
maintain social cohesion through marriage, burial and compensation practices
(chapters 6 and 7).
The formation of the protected villages from the mid-1990s onwards was a further
blow. From their very inception they further undermined the agricultural subsistence
capacity of the majority of rural households, resulting in the need for ‘substantial
humanitarian assistance… provided on an ongoing basis by the international
community’ (Weeks, 2002: 4). The ‘socio-economic collapse of the north’ was such that,
Despite the humanitarian assistance they have received… the overall picture is
one of severe destitution: of a population accustomed over generations to a
situation of relative self-reliance and even prosperity that has been reduced to
dependency, idleness and debilitating uncertainty with respect to what the
future may hold for them and their children (emphases added).(idem: 4)
It was enforced in the sense that people were restricted in their movement and thus in
their opportunities to seek alternative forms of livelihood (chapter 5). It became
entrenched to the extent that children born in the camps grew up without learning the
agricultural skills they would otherwise have acquired, and so were at a disadvantage
should they eventually be allowed to return to their land.
Dependency was also psychological, as social structures and (already weakened)
traditional authority systems were shattered by the relocation into camps in which
dozens of clans were thrown together unceremoniously (chapter 5). Militarisation and
displacement, and the living conditions in the camps further stripped people of status
and dignity, culminating in thwarted aspirations to adult masculinity and femininity,
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and the emasculation of heads of households and traditional leadership (chapters 6 &
7). Paradoxically people came to see the very mechanisms (e.g. militarisation) which
had thwarted them and created their dependency as the means to escape it, and thus
they joined military forces in a move which was only likely to further consolidate their
psychological dependency (chapter 7).
Dread, or ‘a constant state of fear and anxiety’ aptly describes the state of mind
induced in most inhabitants of the war zone. As Finnström argues, ‘Continued stress
and existential uncertainty about the near future were central aspects of everyday life’
(2003: 19). Camp dwellers not only lived under constant threat of raids by the LRA, but
the fear which this generated was compounded by anxiety about whether the soldiers
supposedly protecting them would in fact do so, as well as about whether the soldiers
might become abusers themselves. Rumours such as the one that HIV positive soldiers
had been instructed to rape civilians fuelled such dread (chapter 6).  Those travelling
from one place to another moved in fear of coming under attack or being blown up by
a landmine. Those in school slept in fear of abduction or forcible conscription. Those in
camps feared being burnt alive if the tightly packed grass roofed huts should catch fire
by accident or be set alight intentionally by the rebels.520 Endless reiterations of the
position that the LRA existed through abduction of children, combined with ever-
changing accounts of what the LRA was doing (Chapter 4), fuelled a sense of dread
which drove tens of thousands to seek shelter in town every night, and tens of
thousands more to hide in mosquito-infested hideaways in the bush (chapter 5), rather
than sleeping in their houses in the “protected villages”.
From when the protected villages were established in 1996, people were kept in doubt
about when – indeed whether - they would be released to return home. Often there
were mixed signals. In early 2002, for example, there was talk of ‘decongesting’ the
camps, policies which would have allowed some people to return to cultivate in their
home areas while still retaining some aspects of the “protected villages” (chapter 5).
Before this ever was concretised, the military geared up for Operation Iron Fist, the
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result of which was ultimately an escalation in LRA activity and a burgeoning of the
camp populations, resulting in further congestion rather than de-congestion (chapters 3
and 5). More generally, there was a long-term pattern of repeatedly raised and dashed
hopes, as each of the numerous phases to the conflict began with acute violence, which
gradually reduced - though it never disappeared - until a failed peace initiative
released a renewed wave of ever more intensive violence from those who were part of
the preceding war, but not of the 'peace process' (chapters 3 & 4). Given this roller-
coaster history of broken deadlines for military solutions (chapter 3), and broken
promises for negotiated ones (chapter 4), in which peace seemed round the corner one
day but rebels were launching Rocket-Propelled Grenades from inside Gulu town the
next,521 people doubted whether any of the efforts to bring the war to an end and
thereby ‘release’ them from its stranglehold were either serious or would bear fruit.
Uncertainty about the macro-picture compounded daily uncertainties about physical
injury (would there be an attack by the LRA, harassment by the UPDF?), hunger (when
would WFP deliver the next relief supplies, and how much would be given? – chapter
6), ill-health (was the Ebola outbreak really an accident? – chapter 3; would there be
access to care? – chapter 5), abduction and forcible recruitment, and death. Equally it
was difficult to know which of the conflicting orders and prohibitions from LRA and
Government (see chapter 4) to take heed of. Just as the true composition of the LRA
and the nature of its links with the LRM remained something of a mystery throughout,
it was similarly unclear just how many troops the Government had in place. The
identities and agendas of soldiers involved in specific acts of violence within Gulu and
Kitgum districts were often never fully established as either LRA or UPDF. In an
alleged rebel attack on a bus, the ostensible rebels all wore UPDF uniform,522 and some
soldiers even admitted to disguising themselves as rebels (Chapter 5), indicating that
                                                                                                                                                           
520 In the Barlonyo massacre of February 2004, for example, people were reportedly forced into their huts
which were then set alight.
521 This was the case in December 1999 when, within days of the signing of the peace accord in Nairobi
between GoS and GoU, the LRA attacked the Resident District Commissioner’s house in Gulu using an
RPG.
522 The Sunday Monitor, 17 May 1998, Fire and death on black Wednesday
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people had to live with profound ambiguities and constantly ask themselves ‘is x a
rebel collaborator? Or perhaps a government internal security operative?’523
This ongoing and pervasive uncertainty played with and undermined people’s
capacity to determine their own allegiances, provoking further disorientation. Further
complexity was added by the fact that many people had relatives on both sides and/or
had experienced ill treatment at the hands of both sides. It was not unusual to have an
abducted brother in the LRA and a cousin in the UPDF, to have lost cattle to the NRA
and food relief to the LRA. As one fieldworker put it:
At least in one way or the other, the majority of Acholi people have suffered either in the
hands of the Government army or in the hands of the LRA. … there were mass killings of
the people of Acholiland, worst was done by government soldiers. This was before 1994.
Later on it was followed by LRA killings ... So every family in Acholiland at least has
suffered from either [one or other] of the two armies.524
In practice therefore, it was very hard for many to give support to either side. The same
fieldworker later reported;
.. pressure is being mounted on the civilian [population] by both the UPDF and the LRA,
making it threatened, sickly. People are so confused that some of them do not know which
direction to take; the LRA or the UPDF, of which to them it is the same animal wearing
different clothes.525
At a village level it was uncertain who would be in control from one day to the next. To
make matters still less clear, returned abductees were recruited into the home-guard
and army. Thus the LRA, the UPDF or the LDUs, all contained people from the area,
former victims now in the position of visible perpetrators. And while the various
armed forces were the visible perpetrators, they were not necessarily the only ones –
they were after all generally acting under orders (excuses of individual indiscipline
notwithstanding) and with various forms of external support. This inability to identify
an unambiguous enemy sustained the sense of being out of control already generated
by the lack of any trusted authorities to whom to turn for protection. Traditional
                                                     
523 In this regard my own experience with research assistants was illuminating. One of the most
forthcoming about the LRA also turned out to be a Government Internal Security Operative (see
Introduction).
524 Awer, 27 July 1998.
525 Awer, 17 December 1998.
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authority structures and justice mechanisms had been displaced but only very partially
replaced with ‘modern’ alternatives (see chapters 5 and 6). Underpinning these day-to-
day tensions was a fundamental tension between nationalist and ethnic identities. The
Government could lay some claim to people’s support by virtue of models of
citizenship, the LRA by its image as an ‘Acholi’ organisation. All these factors meant
there were not just multiple players but also multiple experiences, identities and
loyalties (see chapters 5 and 7). This combination stretched personal loyalties of
civilians to breaking point, reinforced a collective loss of identity and self-esteem,
furthered the internalisation of blame, lessened capacity to organise a coherent
response to what was being done, and offers some explanation to the otherwise vexed
question of how an entire social group allowed itself to be tortured (chapter 6).
Further symptoms of torture
The symptoms of torture also included behaviours which could be placed under the
rubric of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. As discussed in the introduction, the
language of ‘trauma’ was widely used within the area. The fact that psychic numbing
and emotional anaesthesia are frequently symptoms of torture throws further light on
the findings from the traditional healers outlined in chapters 6 and 7. It is possible that
the male impotence which they dealt with on a day to day basis was a sign of such
emotional anaesthesia. The high rates of alcohol abuse which the women attempting
suicide accused their husbands of, may also have served as a form of self-administered
anaesthetic against the trauma of ongoing social torture.
A number of other striking features of people’s behaviour in the war zone also become
more comprehensible once the possibility that they may be symptoms of torture is
allowed.
One is the way in which, when there was a lull in the fighting, as in 1999, people were
eager to believe that peace had come. This was despite the fact that there was no
evidence that this was anything other than a lull which could end at any time (as
indeed it did after the signing of the Carter Centre-brokered peace accord between the
Governments of Sudan and Uganda). As one Member of Parliament said in September
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1999, ‘People say there is peace now, but it is just that Kony has not appeared for several
months.  However the lull may become permanent’.526 While such optimism in response to
lulls in the violence could be taken as an indicator of people’s resilience, it may
plausibly be read as a symptom of trauma, specifically a case of disorientation insofar
as people had lost their sense of the larger pattern despite years of similar dynamics.
It is also striking that civil society in northern Uganda was relatively slow to organise
in order to draw attention to its plight. This can plausibly be seen as a symptom of
disorientation and psychological debilitation which prevented the development of pro-
active and constructive responses. In this regard it is noteworthy that two of the most
prominent organisations in terms of working for peace, namely the diaspora grouping
Kacokke Madit, and the religious grouping ARLPI (Acholi Religious Leaders Peace
Initiative), both enjoyed structural features which lessened their susceptibility to
disorientation and debilitation. As a diaspora grouping with headquarters in London,
Kacokke Madit benefited from a certain distance from the day to day ups and downs of
living and working inside the war zone. As religious leaders the members of ARLPI,
while working at the heart of the war zone, had national and international institutional
frameworks, as well as religious duties and rituals, which provided a certain level of
continuity and constancy in the midst of uncertainty (even if, as argued below, the
level of explicit support provided was disappointing). They also enjoyed a degree of
economic security which was not available to the civilian population at large. This is by
no means to underestimate the tremendous pressures and stresses under which both
organisations and individuals within them were put, simply to suggest that they were
better placed than others to develop pro-active responses.527
Examples of the victims being blamed for their misfortune were numerous. One UPDF
4th Division Commander who ‘…blamed Acholi leaders for the continued war being
waged by Lord’s Resistance Army rebels. He said some leaders are using the situation
                                                     
526 Hon Owiny Dollo, MP, Gulu Conference, September 29 1999.
527 There is some evidence from the literature on individual torture that people with a well developed
political position are better positioned to resist torture than those who lack such a framework within
which to make sense of what has happened to them (Summerfield 1990, Zur 1998).
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to expand their political careers, while others simply keep quiet…528 WFP argued that
there was
a lack of local capacity amid a population whose civil society linkages are weak
and whose expectations of ‘top down’ (Government and/or aid agency)
assistance have inhibited self-reliance.(WFP, 1999: 32)
Examples of Acholi blaming each other and themselves were also numerous.  Chapter
5 described the case of women being admonished by the Ministry of Health Nutrition
Unit on how to feed their children a more balanced diet - as if their children’s
malnutrition arose from a poor grasp of domestic science rather than from enforced
displacement. In chapter 6 I described how people appeared to have internalised
blame, or at least to lay it at the feet of their fellow citizens, for ‘moral’ breakdown,
rather than seeking explanations in the broader political framework.
Many of the churches and related institutions located responsibility squarely with their
congregations. At a 1998 graduation ceremony for seminarians the Catholic Bishop
noted that ‘.. “Peace is not in our area due to lack of love for God.” He called on the
people of Gulu to love their neighbours’.529 When the new Anglican bishop of Northern
Uganda diocese was installed, he said the ‘the 12 year rebellion in the region can only
be solved through love. “Love begets respect, opens avenues for dialogue and solves
all disputes without spilling blood,” … He said the Acholi are divided and only love
can reconcile them’.530 When he made a pastoral visit to Pabbo camp later that year ‘ he
told the congregation to love one another as oneself and learn to forgive each other. In short, a
message of reconciliation was preached.531 Similar messages were preached by religious
leaders of all denominations (e.g. The Life Ministry from Kampala), as well as those
associated with them (e.g. the Anglican Mothers Union).532
Even Acholi MPs at times hectored their own constituency;
                                                     
528 New Vision, 13 June 1998, Wamala criticises Acholi on Kony war.
529 New Vision, 1 June 1998, Army repulses Kony attack.
530 The Monitor, 21 May 1998, Kony war needs love – bishop.
531 Visit on 8 November 1998,  Pabbo report, 23 November 1998.
532 Awach report, March 2000, Pabbo Report; 5 January 1999
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The first requirement now is for the Acholi to come together to understand the conflict,
recognise past attempts to bring it to an end, scrutinise their own responsibilities in the
situation, before acting.  The Acholi are in very deep; they must put up the ladders and
climb out.533
One contributor to the Kacokke Madit e-newsletter stated that he was writing
‘after a lot of thoughts and reflections on how other people in and outside
Uganda view the Acholi community. Everyone living in Uganda knows how the
Acholis are taken. The black image seems to be brought by ourselves’ (KM E-
newsletter No 8, 13 March 2002).
Kony himself challenged this pattern of blaming the general population for a lack of
love and self-reliance, turning the spotlight instead on the leadership. In a message
given to some girl abductees to carry home he
…condemned the religious leaders in the north for their indifference towards the
pathetic plight of the wananchi [ordinary people]. “We the LRA/M are unhappy
with you because of all the evil things done to God’s people in Uganda,” Kony
said in a letter addressed to bishops, priests and the faithful… Kony accuses
religious leaders of looking on as the wananchi are bundled up and forcefully
herded into concentration camps. Kony’s letter said the young and adults die
daily of disease and hunger’.534
Actors
When considering the model of perpetrators, bystanders and victims, as set out in the
introduction, and recognising that the term perpetrator encompasses not only ‘the
torturers themselves, but also those who are in charge of a system which perpetrates
torture.’  (Staub 1990:106), then the perpetrators in northern Uganda would include
both LRA and UPDF and their leaderships, but also extend to include the Ugandan
Government insofar as it planned and authorised the execution of various measures in
the war zone, ranging from public displays of purposive violence (see Illustration 8.1),
to, most notably for the purposes of this study, the policy of “protected villages”.
                                                     
533 Hon Owiny Dollo, MP, Gulu Conference, 29 September 1999.
534 Monitor, 18 July 1998, Kony condemns Gulu clergymen.
328
Illustration 8.1 The bodies of two alleged thieves, killed extra-judicially and put on public
display in Gulu Morgue, where thousands of school children came to look (1999).
The Anglican and Catholic churches could be considered bystanders (those who either
observe directly or at least are aware that torture is being committed, but take no action
to prevent or stop it) insofar as, despite some members (ARLPI) being key actors for
peace at the local level, the institutions as a whole made limited use of their
considerable potential to raise awareness at national level through their congregations
and at international levels through their respective institutional structures.
From a human rights perspective the donors also come in for considerable criticism for
their lack of action: In its 1999 World Report HRW reported that ‘Robust and consistent
human rights-related messages from the EU were the exception rather than the rule’,
and that ‘U.S. criticism of Uganda’s human rights practices became increasingly
muted’. 535 The Monitor quoted directly from the report that the donors’ ‘“increased
rhetoric about the need to respect political freedoms and the rights of civil society in
Uganda was rarely matched by any specific action”’.536 Smaller donors were often
uncritical on rights issues, and of interventions derived from the mainstream account.
For example, when the Norwegian minister for development and human rights visited
northern Uganda
                                                     
535 www.hrw.org/worldreport99/africa/africa3.html .
536 The Monitor, 22 December 1999, US rights group hits at NRM again.
329
‘She praised the traditional means of solving conflict currently advocated by the
leaders there… [and]pledged more assistance to the centre through Red Barnet,
an NGO assisting former Kony rebel captives’.537
But it is the nature of International NGO and Inter-Governmental Organisation
involvement in these dynamics of social torture which deserves particular attention at
this point. It may be argued that it is unfair to critique humanitarians by suggesting
they have a role in social torture, and that they have done the best possible given their
mandates and capacities. Certainly it is not easy to question the validity of
humanitarian interventions – my own attempts to do so have frequently provoked the
furious riposte ‘what would you do then, let them die?’ – but I would counter that
humanitarian interventions in northern Uganda can be critiqued in terms of their own
stated missions and shared commitments to the humanitarian imperative, and that this
critique relates directly to the concept of Social Torture and the related categories of
perpetrator and bystander.
Humanitarian Missions and Mandate
Some major organisations operating in northern Uganda shape their work by focusing
on particular target groups. World Vision, for example, describes itself as ‘a Christian
relief and development organisation working for the well being of all people,
especially children’.538 Save the Children (who work through Red Barnet in northern
Uganda) ‘fights for children in the UK and around the world who suffer from poverty,
disease, injustice and violence’… ‘as an organisation for children, we try to view the
world through children’s eyes’.539 UNICEF takes the convention on the rights of the
child as its framework.540
Other organisations are more explicitly focused on particular types of assistance:
Action Against Hunger’s mission ‘is to save lives by combating hunger, malnutrition
and the associated distress that endanger the lives of children, women and men living
                                                     
537 New Vision, 3 February 1998, More food for North.
538 www.wvi.org/wvi/about_us/who_we_are.htm
539 www.savethechildren.org.uk/scuk/jsp/aboutus
540 www.unicef.org/whatwedo/index.html
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in situations of war, conflict, and natural disaster’.541 The crux of WFP’s somewhat
tautological mission statement is ‘the elimination of the need for food aid’ – through
the provision of food aid ‘for social and humanitarian protection’. 542
What unites these somewhat different missions and approaches, however, is a
commitment to a set of overarching humanitarian principles as set out in the
Humanitarian Charter of The Sphere Project. This project, which many of the agencies
active in northern Uganda were themselves involved in and sponsored (see The Sphere
Project, 2004: 315 for full list of sponsors), attempts to establish principles and
minimum standards for agencies involved in humanitarian work.
In the Charter the humanitarian imperative is understood as;
‘the belief that all possible steps should be taken to prevent or alleviate human
suffering arising out of conflict or calamity, and that civilians so affected have a
right to protection and assistance’ (The Sphere Project, 2004: 16).
In addition to establishing that humanitarianism involves a dual-focus on protection
and assistance, the Charter also ‘affirms the fundamental importance’ of a number of
principles, the first of which is ‘The right to a life of dignity’ (emphasis added). It
acknowledges that this right
‘is reflected in the legal measures concerning the right to life, to an adequate
standard of living and to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment’ (idem: 17 – emphases added).
The Humanitarian Charter thus borrows directly from, and therefore implies a
commitment to, the 1987 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment which is discussed in Chapter 1.
Failures in assistance and protection
And yet, in northern Uganda there was a collective failure to assure a right to life with
dignity – if anything international NGOs (and some national ones) contributed to the
                                                     
541 www.actionagainsthunger.org/who/history.html
542 It was he first UN organisation to develop a mission statement, which runs to some two pages
(www.wfp.org/policies/Introduction/mission )
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consolidation of living conditions which were inimicable to such a life and which I
have described as the context within which Social Torture occurs. Partly this was
because of their tardy arrival – Catholic Relief Services (CRS), for example, while
describing northern Uganda as a complex emergency which began in 1989, only
opened their office in Gulu seven later.543 More importantly, INGOs and IGOs
consolidated conditions of indignity because of the nature of their assistance
interventions when they did become operational. Some examples have been given in
earlier chapters. WFP food relief was unpredictable and wholly inadequate (Chapter
5), and World Vision established demonstration plots for people without access to land
rather than promoting conditions under which they could return to their own land
(Chapter 5). Hunger Alert (a national NGO) gave cattle to women rather than men and
therefore further weakened men socially and psychologically. UNICEF focused its
attention on returned abductees and sought to ignore both adult abductions and child
soldiers in the UPDF (Chapter 4), others focused on the provision of schools within the
protected villages rather than promoting return to places of origin, and so on.
Infrastructure such as schools, clinics and water points, literally concretised the policy
of internal displacement rather than resolving it, and, to the extent that protected
villages were sites of loss of human dignity, such forms of assistance verged on a
perpetrator role.
Furthermore, the focus on assistance activities was at the expense of meeting the first
leg of the humanitarian imperative, namely the right to protection. If by protection we
understand the effort – generally through the application of pressure on the relevant
parties - to ensure that citizens enjoy their access to rights such as basic services,
physical security and the rule of law, rights for which the state and its associated
institutions are responsible, then the performance of the humanitarian community was
mixed at best. When alleged thieves were killed extra-judicially and their bodies
displayed to the public (Illustration 8.1) none of the INGOs (including ACORD) made
any protest to the authorities.
                                                     
543 www.crs.org/about us/who we are/index.cfm
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Broadly speaking there was an inverse relationship between such organisations’ level
of operations, scale and capacities in terms of funding and staffing, and their
willingness to speak up about those aspects of the situation which involved criticism of
the Government of Uganda. Thus local NGOs, notably Peoples’ Voices for Peace,
Human Rights Focus, Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, and Concerned
Parents Association, were by far the most outspoken. National NGOs such as ISIS-
WICCE, Jamii Ya Kupatanisha, Refugee Law Project, were more cautious, though by
2003544 and early 2004 some important reports had been published.545 International
NGOs, who arguably by virtue of the funding they brought to northern Uganda, as
well as the scale of their domestic constituencies, were in a stronger position to speak
up and to have an impact, were still more cautious, as can be seen from their websites
which, almost without exception, continue to give considerable prominence to
accounts of the LRAs atrocities, and make almost no reference to Government policies
or abuses as a factor in human suffering.546 When the INGOs did speak out, it was in
very diffuse fashion with no single organisation prepared to take a strong stance. My
own experience in meetings with the Minister for Northern Uganda Reconstruction
and other INGOs in the wake of ACORD’s eviction from Kitgum district, was that
none of them were prepared to criticise the Government. When I questioned the power
of the LCV Chairman over the Minister of Northern Uganda Reconstruction, I was
subsequently told (in the corridor) that I was ‘very brave’ (the subtext can only be
imagined). In May 2002, partly in response to Operation Iron Fist, some forty local and
international organisations joined a loose advocacy coalition known as CSOPNU (Civil
Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda). This allowed them to conduct
advocacy without any organisation taking sole responsibility for the messages put out,
but the initial momentum demonstrated in a number of position papers547 was not
sustained.  Nonetheless it was an attempt which contrasted favourably with Inter-
Governmental Organisations such as WFP, UNOCHA and UNICEF, which appeared
wholly unwilling to make critical public statements, and generally laid the blame for
all suffering at the feet of the LRA.
                                                     
544 HURIPEC, 2003
545 RLP 2004.
546 For example, http://www.christianaid.org.uk and then search ‘uganda’.
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The classic defence of bystanders is to argue that they did not know what was
happening. Certainly international visitors to Uganda were unlikely to reach the war
zone unless they had work there, and the cappuccino bars, internet cafes and mobile
phones of Kampala often persuaded them that all was well, particularly if they had
seen Kampala in the mid 1980s. UN visitors and donors who did reach the war zone
were generally prevented by their organisations’ insurance policies from travelling to
the most affected areas,548 and NGO staff were often immobilised as their policies
disallowed the use of military escorts (WFP 1999: 28).
Notwithstanding all these provisos, the humanitarians in northern Uganda could not
claim ignorance: There was, as Allen points out (2005b), an extensive literature about
the failings of humanitarianism just across the border in southern Sudan. More
concretely there was also detailed documentation provided by the local NGOs
mentioned above (Human Rights Focus’ 2002 report Between Two Fires, for example,
focused specifically on human rights abuses in the displaced camps549). And by the late
1990s a number of reports had been commissioned which looked some of the
complexities of the situation rather than focusing solely on the abuses of one actor (e.g.
Gersony 1997, Amnesty International 1999, WFP 1999, COWI 1999, Weeks 2002).
The Amnesty International report of 1999 explicitly balanced the organisation’s earlier
critique of LRA abuses (see Amnesty International, 1997) by concentrating on
Government abuses. It argued that, whilst the authorities had not intrinsically violated
international human rights or humanitarian law when they created the camps, they
had nevertheless failed in their obligations under international humanitarian law ‘to
provide protection, in terms of physical conditions and safety from human rights
abuse’, had failed to take steps to minimise displacement, and had ‘not taken effective
steps to bring to an end the situation that has caused displacement in the first place’.  It
concluded that ‘This all raises serious questions about whether continuing action to
                                                                                                                                                           
547 http://www.csopnu.org
548 With the exception of WFP, UN agencies lacked risk insurance for Phase IV security areas.
549 Human Rights Focus, 2002: Between Two Fires.
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compel people to leave the countryside remains consistent with international law’
(Amnesty International, 1999: summary).550
Weeks’ 2002 consultancy report for OCHA, the UN organisation intended to provide
coordination to all humanitarian actors in emergency situations, was researched at the
time Operation Iron Fist was getting underway. It did not flinch from documenting
problems with the Government’s approaches, not least that:
In all too many cases, the military are themselves the source of insecurity,
committing acts of brutality and lawlessness against civilians that rival those of
the LRA (Weeks, 2002: 4).
These reports nuanced the one-sided picture of the LRA as bearing sole responsibility
for human suffering in important ways. The NURP II report is striking in this regard,
for it emphasises the reasons for generalised trauma in the civilian population and
makes the point that these are not specific to northern Uganda:
… the districts of Gulu and Kitgum were found to be the most affected… It
should be noted that conflict and conflict situations directly create trauma
conditions that people experience. Inability to access basic social services;
uncertainty about what the future might bring; physical effects (mutilation &
rape) and social damage (orphanhood); and psychological impact (children
seeing violence) are some of the countless conditions which populations in
conflict and (sometimes) post conflict situations experience. These are the
conditions in which the Government often fails to meet basic needs of the people
of Northern Uganda … It was established that there was only a variation of
intensity, otherwise in one way or the other, everybody was found to be
traumatised (COWI, 1999; 68).
There was also one striking (internal) report which scrutinised the role of the major
humanitarian actor at the time, the World Food Programme. Writing in 1999 the
consultant explored the fact that
tension still remains between the government’s broader political concern to
control the population (for example, through the protected villages/camps) and
the potential co-opting of the aid programme to this end. (WFP 1999: 18)
In reviewing WFP’s handling of this tension, he came to the conclusion that:
                                                     
550 There was no government response to the ‘more than 40 extra-judicial killings, dozens of rape cases and
torture by the UPDF soldiers and Police’ – The Monitor, 21 June 1999, Silence on rights report won’t help.
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In almost all issues relating to individual or group protection there is a difficult
balance between the provision of humanitarian assistance and the implicit
sanctioning of illegal action. This was nowhere more apparent than in the
formation of the ‘protected villages’, effectively sanctioned by WFP through its
close collaboration with the authorities in providing assistance and advice on
registration, locations and common services [emphasis added].
He points out that WFP failed to act on the fact that government rights abuses were a
key factor in forcing people out of their homes, or on ‘the lack of reasonable steps taken
by the authorities first, to minimize displacement and second, to create conditions in
which it can be brought to an end as quickly as possible’ (WFP 1999: 25)
He goes on to highlight how ‘The modalities of the relief operation have been almost
entirely dependent on priorities set by a military strategy pursued by the UPDF’ (WFP
1999: 31), and how:
…the role of convoy soldiers after a while became that of ensuring orderliness at
distributions, rather than safe delivery along the road… This was not only
inappropriate… but also underlined the WFP-government-army axis in the eyes
of recipients. (WFP 1999: 33)
In short:
The programme as a whole was not designed around protection concerns, other
than the general assumption (not necessarily proven) that camps were safer than
outlying villages… WFP may have too readily fallen in line with government
policy, in effect becoming both provider and legitimizer of a villagization
policy… (WFP 1999: 33) [emphasis added]
There is, however, no evidence that this highly critical view had any influence on the
subsequent work of WFP. While WFP’s proposal for the period 1 April 2005 – 31 March
2008 is quite explicit and detailed in setting out the impacts of displacement on the
population, it reverts to analysing the causes solely in terms of LRA activities,551 with
no mention of the Government’s actions as a causal factor, or of ways of addressing the
problems of complicity identified by the consultant.
                                                     
551 WFP/EB-1/2005/7-B/2 (22 December 2004) available on www.wfp.org pp5-10.
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The discrepancy which this example highlights between the analytical capacities of
individuals working within the humanitarian sector and the actions of the
organisations with which they were associated, was not unusual. In the 1999
conference in Gulu, at which many humanitarian aid workers participated, an
alternative ‘reconciliation agenda’ identifying more than eighteen issues of concern
was drawn up (see Annex A), but had little observable influence on subsequent
humanitarian practice.
From various conversations with aid workers it appeared that as well as allowing the
‘saving lives’ argument to override the ‘with dignity’ element of the basic principle,
missions focused on target groups or technical expertise provided a structural excuse
for not taking a broad view of the overall dynamic. For many aid workers it was just a
case of doing what they were good at. In the many cases where organisations such as
Action Against Hunger were actually the implementing partners for IGOs such as
WFP, responsibility for policy decisions was largely delegated upwards.  Thus NGO
workers often saw themselves as simply implementing the policies of others – a classic
recipe for responsibility avoidance. 552  The fact that there were human rights
organisations highlighting rights abuses provided a further structural excuse for
humanitarian aid workers who expressed the view that ‘politics’ was not their business
– and when people saw the way in which Amnesty International’s 1999 report
critiquing the Government drew absolutely no response it did contribute to a sense
that even if you did speak out, it would make no difference.
In summary, the findings presented suggest that neither INGOs and IGOs could claim
to have taken all the ‘possible steps’ on assistance or protection which their own
humanitarian charter commits them to.  In addition to failings in the kinds of
assistance provided, they failed to raise awareness of major factors leading to the
                                                     
552 Action Against Hunger’s website specifically directs the reader to see ‘The opinion of the United
Nations World Food Program on our work in Uganda’. (www.actionagainsthunger.org/who/history.html
). This shows a somewhat worrying desire to be seen to please authority, particularly if we consider
Milgram’s experiment in which he found that authority figures could override people’s moral concern not
to inflict pain on others (Milgram, 1974: Obedience to Authority; An Experimental View).
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complex emergency they were responding to, despite the information being available
in both public and internal documentation.
From a Social Torture perspective the types of assistance provided may have saved
some lives, but did not assure the right to a life of dignity. In the process of saving lives
they often consolidated conditions of indignity and as such can be considered as
placing the humanitarians in a perpetrator role. And if bystanders are defined by their
decision to keep silent about the wrongs which they witness, then the failures of the
humanitarian NGOs to speak up on behalf of the poor and to make a noise about the
violence and injustices arising from the State’s failures (as well as the LRA’s), denied
them the right to protection identified by the humanitarians, and amounted to the
adoption of a bystander position and role.
One possible conclusion to draw would be that the humanitarian imperative is
fundamentally flawed in that it can be twisted to suit purposes which are far from
humanitarian. It seems that just as the Hippocratic Oath provides a convenient excuse
for the doctor to work with the torturer by keeping his victims alive, so the
Humanitarian Imperative can be used to keep people alive while doing little to resolve
their situation and indeed legitimising the government policies which are partially
responsible for it. Additionally the ‘obligation to provide humanitarian assistance
wherever it is needed’ (The Sphere Project, 2004: 317 (emphasis added)) is evidently
applied in highly selective fashion and on the basis of non-humanitarian criteria – for if
humanitarian need had been the principal criteria, then northern Uganda would have
attracted humanitarian interventions far earlier than it did.
A more optimistic conclusion is that there is considerable mileage for those who
subscribe to the Humanitarian Charter to address situations of social torture, but only
if they begin to address the protection and assistance dimensions simultaneously, for
as we have seen, assistance without protection can only contribute to the problem
rather than resolve it, just as protection without assistance also has severe limitations.
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Benefits and Functions
While the costs to the population were manifest, it is evident that the situation of social
torture had benefits and served multiple functions for the actors involved. Alongside
the overt ones of coercing direct victims into particular behaviours (e.g. yielding a
confession, handing over information about ‘rebel co-ordinators’), there were a number
of less obvious, but ultimately more important economic, psychological, military and
political functions.
Economic
As Betty Bigombe noted in the 1994 peace talks, ‘There are others who think that if this
thing [i.e. the war] ends, they will have nothing to lean on’. That people found economic
opportunities in the midst of extreme poverty is demonstrated in chapter 5, where
multiple instances of petty corruption were noted, including the pocketing of extra
ration cards, the sale of relief goods to business men by relief workers, the theft and
sale of medicines by medical staff, the diversion of funds from block farming to
building property in Kampala, and the pocketing of wages from ‘ghost teachers’. It
would also appear that displacement induced poverty, and the resultant lack of money
with which to transport products to market, made some farmers a captive target group
for intrepid produce buyers.
For individuals in the military the economic benefits ranged from relatively petty
business interests such as the sale of illegally logged timber to opportunities for petty
corruption such as the pocketing of ‘ghost soldier’ wages (chapter 5). For the military
as an institution the benefits in terms of justifying increasing the defence budget were
not unimportant.
For INGOs, over and above the substantial basics of relief assistance (chapter 5), the
situation created a number of opportunities. One striking example was the focus on the
psycho-social needs of returned abducted children. The 10,000 or so abducted prior to
2002, the majority of whom had returned, provided a defined, high profile and
relatively limited target group, as well as a self-evident vehicle for the promotion of the
339
rights of the child by organisations such as UNICEF and the campaign against the use
of Child Soldiers. A number of local NGOs - with international NGOs with a mandate
on children close behind – emerged to fill the niche thus created.553
Another niche the NGOs largely created and then expanded to fill was the reinvention
of traditional leadership. Empirically speaking, given that the formation of an ‘Acholi’
identity was in many respects a relatively recent phenomenon resulting from the Arab
slave trade from the mid-1800s  (Atkinson 1989) and the ministrations of the Catholic
Church in the 1920s (Allen, 394), the polarisation into ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ was
deeply problematic (see also Behrend, 1999:5, and Finnström (2003: ch 2) for a counter-
position). Yet international organisations played an important part in projecting an
idealised and de-historicised vision of the traditional leadership as the solution to the
situation in the north. Writing for AVSI one consultant wrote;
In response to years of war, Acholi elders and tribal leaders have worked to
reinstate the prayers and ceremonies once used by their ancestors in the face of
adversity. Their purpose is to seek reconciliation, to pacify the land and to recall
the values that have been at the core of the Acholi culture since time immemorial.
(Bramucci, 2001: 11)
A UNICEF document argued that:
Despite the weakening of traditional culture in Acholiland, especially in the IDP
camps, elders still have considerable influence at community level. They play a
central, unifying role in rituals such as cleansing ceremonies (e.g. after abduction)
and reconciliations after disputes between individuals, families and clans. They
also have a crucial role to play in helping communities fractured by many years
of conflict to heal their wounds, and in helping the older and the younger
generations of Acholis to listen to and learn from one another. (Williams et al,
2001: 38)
The dichotomisation of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’, and the idea of an Acholi culture
with pre-modern roots, were very real and potent sources of political mobilisation and
authority and created numerous possibilities for a range of Government, religious and
                                                     
553 Local NGOs included CPA (Concerned Parents Association), set up by parents of children abducted
from Aboke to work for their return, and GUSCO (Gulu Support the Children Organisation) and KICWA
(Kitgum Concerned Women’s Association), both of which established reception centres for returned
abductees in Gulu and Kitgum districts respectively. These worked closely with World Vision, which also
had a reception centre for returned abductees, and Red Barnet (Save the Children Denmark).
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civilian actors, all of whom sought to use the legitimacy associated with an
involvement in the notion of tradition to achieve their own distinctly contemporary
ends.
For Government, the co-optation of traditional leadership, which would otherwise
retain a worrying potential for dissent, was quite important. Reviving the traditional
structures also created a useful counterpoint to the churches which were becoming
increasingly vocal at that point. At a meeting between the Belgian Government, local
government officials and ACORD on 2 June 1999, the then Minister for northern
Uganda said
As Government we have lost several opportunities in this war. I’m in a precarious
position. This should not be seen as a government initiative, but the truth of the matter is
that it [the initiative to revive traditional leadership] came from us.
For NGOs such as ACORD and Red Barnet, working on strengthening traditional
leadership was a far less demanding task than confronting and challenging the
inadequacies of modern leadership, which were legion.  On a more positive note, it
created a new voice for civil society, alongside NGOs and religious leaders. In doing so
they found some support from civilians who did not wish to acknowledge the reality
of social and political change, and were unwilling to admit that it was impossible to go
back to an idealised pre-colonial time in which there was no such thing as a national
state impinging on local realities.
As it turned out, once the traditional leaders had been restored their role in
reconciliation was by no means as dramatic as had been forecast. When ARLPI
reviewed their contribution to the Amnesty process they found that it was minimal.554
Perhaps because of these failings the traditional leaders became a target for further
NGO interventions, and a channel for  non-traditional conflict transformation
technologies. Despite the fact that they had been restored because of their wisdom in
dealing with reconciliation issues, the British NGO Responding To Conflict held a
workshop for them from 4-8 February 2002 ‘aimed at strengthening and building skills
                                                     
554 ARLPI, Seventy Times Seven, Section 5, 2002.
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of the chiefs and community leaders in conflict analysis/handling, negotiating, and
arbitration’.555  Another economic niche had been found – and the blurring between
‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ was fully achieved.
Psychological
Although it is doubtful whether violence was made acceptable to the public at large,
Uganda had a long history of aggression, and an ideology of antagonism between
different ethnic groups which was nurtured throughout the colonial and post-colonial
period. The persistent and devastating violence experienced under Idi Amin in the
1970s, Obote II and the Luwero triangle in the early 1980s556, as well as severe economic
difficulties and substantial social change which accompanied it, was likely to give rise
to the psychological need for some groups to shore up their own sense of identity and
position in the world by means of a devalued ‘other’ (as suggested by Staub), and to
create the necessary preconditions for scape-goating and devaluation of the Acholi.
The blame for the Luwero triangle massacres, for example, was generally allocated to
the national army dominated at the time by northerners, and as shown in chapter 7
many southerners would agree that they were brought up to believe that the
northerners were less than human. As recorded in chapter 5, some northerners felt that
‘Many Ugandans, especially in the south, dismiss this tragedy, just saying that “… they
are having what they deserve. It’s their turn now. When they have enough… they’ll
stop”. 557 In the 1990s ethnic tensions were further invigorated to an extent by (World
Bank sponsored) decentralisation, under which it became more difficult for civil
servants to work outside their home areas.
President Museveni’s movement system was monolithic rather than pluralist, there
was a strong respect for authority and a remarkable emphasis on the power of the
individual, particularly in the case of President Museveni himself, whom one might
                                                     
555 KM E-newsletter No 5, 15 February 2002.
556 A revisionist interpretation of what happened in the Luwero triangle is to be found in HURIPEC, 30
October 2003.
557 Murru, 1998:11.
342
regard as seeking to develop a ‘Big Man’ cult (chapter 4).558 His insistence on a military
solution to the northern war, as well as developments in the war itself (in particular the
formation of ethnic militias in 2003), furnish further evidence of an ethnicised
psychology of aggression, humiliation and devaluation (see chapter 4).
In the case of northern Uganda, the devaluation which enabled the creation of
“protected villages” in the first place, was deepened over time as basic supports to
dignity such as hygiene or a good set of clothes were stripped away, and as economic
and psychological dependency were induced by life in the camps. The perpetrator thus
gained further grounds to feel superior and reinforce his or her devaluation of the
‘other’.
While the Government and southern Ugandans benefited psychologically from
devaluing the Acholi, it is plausible that the international ‘bystanders’ in turn benefited
from watching this process of devaluation. Though this could not be fully investigated,
observing the perpetrators’ misdemeanours (which confirm their prejudices about their
former colonial subjects’ ‘primitive tribalism’), may have re-assured the bystanders
themselves of their own moral superiority and consolidated the existence of an inferior
‘other’. In other words, devaluation by southerners inside Uganda may have allowed
devaluation of Uganda as a whole by those from outside, a devaluation which may in
turn have been used to legitimate the bystanders’ subordination of the perpetrators at a
higher level.
Political
As this last point suggests, the psychological functions of social torture are intimately
linked to its political ones. As set out in chapter 3, for Uganda, as a political unit which
is little over one hundred years old, processes of state and nation-building are still
ongoing, along lines drawn both literally and figuratively by former colonial powers
                                                     
558 One example of the way this image of the President as all powerful was internalised by civilians
includes the story of an ACORD fieldworker whose wife had been killed in cross-fire between the UPDF
and LRA. After trying for some time to get some compensation from the UPDF, he assured me that he
would go to Museveni himself to get the matter sorted out. Similarly, the New Vision reported that the
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and neo-colonial interests. Literally in the sense of international borders and the legacy
of internal divisions played upon by the colonisers and internalised by the colonised,
and figuratively in the sense of ‘modernisation’ and more recent notions of
‘democracy’, ‘good governance’, ‘structural adjustment’ etc. as propagated under the
rubric of ‘globalisation’.559 These created three identifiable struggles for an incumbent
Government seeking to establish and exercise control.
The first was to achieve the subordinate inclusion of the northern parts of the country.
By this I mean the inclusion of the north as an integral part of the Ugandan polity, but
on subordinate terms set by the Government in the south. The second was to maintain
control over the rest of the country, and the third was between the Government and
the wider international ‘community’ over the terms of the Ugandan State’s inclusion in
that community. This latter struggle is one in which the cards were a priori heavily
stacked in the donors’ favour, and in which the Government was, generally speaking, a
subordinate party seeking to become less subordinate.
Given this need to fight on internal and external fronts simultaneously, social torture
under the guise of ‘war’ could be seen as a rational strategy, and ‘protected villages’ a
weapon of choice. On the internal front it has several functions analagous to those of
individual torture. Within the war zone, Finnström has suggested the protected
villages entail ‘an imposed redefinition’ from citizen to subject and eventually to object
‘as human agency is increasingly restricted’ (2003: 183). I would add that, just as
individual torture breaks down the suspected political dissident, so social torture
breaks down the sub-national social cohesion which is regarded as an obstacle to the
project of national unity. It creates the opportunity substantially to alter and weaken
local organisational structures while also sustaining and even building up military
forces – with support from international agencies whose concern with good
governance melts away when confronted with humanitarian need. The clan units
                                                                                                                                                           
five children of a bus driver killed in an LRA ambush, would approach the President personally for help
with their studies (New Vision, 26 April 2004: Driver’s kids seek presidential help).
559 As the case of hunting (Chapter 5) illustrates, people’s practices came under pressure from war-related
factors (UPDF, rebels), but also from a broader change in socio-economic organisation: the former
‘wilderness’ was now a managed national park with armed game rangers.
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which collectively constitute the ‘tribe’ are effectively dispersed into the protected
villages, traditional socialisation mechanisms are disrupted, old sources of identity are
stripped away and new ones (controlled by the Government) are put in their place.
Demonisation of individuals (Joseph Kony, ‘the Dreadful Dreadlocked One’ – see
chapter 4) and sub-groups, and militarisation in the name of pacification, provide
important opportunities for social engineering and control. The exclusion of subgroups
from the benefits of power, for the purposes of ensuring their subordinate inclusion in
the system, is key to the process.560 War within the ‘excluded’ populations is furthered,
which justifies further militarisation in the interests of pacification by the State.
Social torture was not just about breaking down society in the north, but also about the
larger national picture. Cohen notes of individual torture that ‘Fear inside [the country
where torture is perpetrated] depends on knowledge [of torture] and uncertainty: who
will be picked up next?’ (Cohen, 2001: 19). Similarly, the function of social torture was
not only the subordination of people in the north, but also, through the intimidation of
others with the knowledge that they too could be at risk of such treatment if they step
out of line, the shoring up of national level political control. During my visit in January
2004, I found it not uncommon for people in Soroti to comment on how their ethnic
group, the Teso, had accepted things as they were and were getting on with economic
activity rather than concerning themselves with the political arena the way the Acholi
did.561  In this context the constant coverage of the LRA and the UPDF in the
Government’s newspaper, the New Vision, makes more sense – they were neither out
of sight nor out of mind at a national level, even though the majority of the Ugandan
population had never been near this particular war zone. The war in the north thus met
a specific need to subordinate one part of the country over which control was
somewhat shaky, and at the same time contributed to the wider process of maintaining
a grip on the country as a whole.
                                                     
560 I describe the process as one of subordinate inclusion rather than social exclusion because in some
respects the latter term has been brought into the language of the political mainstream and is now used for
any group that is not enjoying the fruits of an otherwise unproblematised socio-economic and political
dispensation. Subordinate inclusion shows that what is at stake is a dynamic in which power is predicated
on the mutual dependence of the powerful and the subordinate and in which the essence is inclusion rather
than exclusion.
561 Personal observations in discussion with range of local NGO respondents, Soroti, January 2004.
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On the external front, social torture – with all its obfuscatory ambiguities and shifting
dynamics – could be regarded as a useful instrument in the struggle of the subordinate
party (the Government of Uganda) to achieve greater parity with its donors. As the
analysis highlights, in social torture international ‘bystanders’ play a central role in
defining the parameters of what it is possible for the Government to do in its own
‘backyard’. The perpetrators can only operate with the permission of the ‘bystanders’;
by granting that permission, the bystanders become complicit in the perpetration.
Nowhere is more evident than in Museveni’s referral of LRA members to the
International Criminal Court (demanding permission), and their subsequent
(mis)handling of this (becoming complicit in perpetuating his version of events).
This complicity creates a paradox which is at the heart of the success of Social Torture:
The Government needs northern Uganda - indeed, its continued inclusion in the polity
is a sine qua non for the Government of Uganda, just as the international community
needs the Government of Uganda. Were threats of secession such as that made by the
Catholic priest (chapter 3) to be realised, it would be a disaster for the state in terms of
the loss of domestic and international room for manoeuvre which would result.
At the same time the bystanders, even as they display their power vis-à-vis the
perpetrators, make themselves vulnerable to awkward questions from their domestic
constituencies. If, for example, the true situations in the IDP camps were to become
widely known, this would have represented a serious threat to the image disseminated
by the World Bank of Uganda as ‘the main example of successful African post-conflict
recovery’.562 To question the Ugandan Government’s record would have been to
question the integrity of the donors which had long held up this record as exemplary.
The threat of such questioning gave the perpetrators a certain leverage over the
bystanders, who now had a shared vested interest in the success myth. In effect
complicity in social torture under the alibi of ‘war’ deprived them of any moral high
ground from which to attack the Government and thus lessened the power differential
between the Government and its sponsors.
                                                     
562 http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/uganda.htm (cited in Allen, 2005b: 18)
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Justifications for action and inaction
From individual torture we know that perpetrators have to justify their actions both to
themselves and to others. We also know that self-justification is intimately linked to the
need to validate the self, and is generally achieved through the devaluation and
dehumanisation of the ‘other’ (both the victim and the larger social or political group
which s/he represents).  Equally bystanders have to justify their inaction, and often
draw on value systems shared with perpetrators to do so.  As well as this psychological
function for perpetrators and bystanders, such justifications based on devaluation
contribute directly to the humiliation and belittlement of the victim, and as such play a
dual role.
In social torture, the need to justify action and inaction goes beyond the individual’s
need to feel psychologically comfortable; institutions and organisations need to
persuade their constituencies and the general public that what they are doing is
acceptable. The principal means by which this is achieved is through shaping
discourses which purvey only those aspects of a situation which confirm their own
story and activities, and ignore or silence those which are in contradiction. And just as
in individual torture, such discourses exacerbate the humiliation and belittlement of
the victims.
In northern Uganda these discourses focused primarily on the abuses of non-state
actors, as is exemplified in the preface to a report on ‘Women’s Experiences of Armed
Conflict in Uganda, Gulu District 1986-1999’:
Rebel groups in parts of Gulu, Kitgum and other parts of Northern Uganda and
the activities of the Karamojong cattle rustlers on their neighbouring districts
have collectively made the people in these areas despair as they see their human
rights become meaningless privileges in the face of perpetrators.563
Within this larger discourse on non-state actors, the principal emphasis was on the
LRA. The various images of the LRA, which all implied that the LRA had no political
agenda, were visible in the various derogatory labels applied to the LRA by
                                                     
563 ISIS-WICCE, 2000, part 1, page vi.
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Government, academics, NGOs and media (chapter 4). These had the immediate
purpose of dehumanising and humiliating the LRA, humiliation which further fuelled
the violence (see chapters 4, 7). But reports that the LRA was irrational, led by a mad-
man of Acholi origin who abducted, killed and enslaved for sexual purposes those of
his own ethnic group (particularly children), and who was seeking to breed a new
Acholi and kill off the ‘old’ ones, did not just nourish the view that this was an intra-
ethnic conflict and, within that, a war about children, but also fuelled a vision of
anarchy and primitivism, characteristics which were extended by association to the
Acholi ethnic group the LRA is largely drawn from, a group with an anterior history of
being devalued and dehumanised (chapter 7). As one elder noted during the ACORD
conference in 1999;
… the war has greatly degraded the Acholi in the eyes of other Ugandans, who view them
as murderers, stupid, and senseless.  Acholi elders have had to swallow this
condemnation.   
With this focus on the LRA the discourses drew on and reflected the predominant
explanations of conflict in the immediate post-cold war period as found in academic
discourses on internal and intra-ethnic war – and their links with notions of anarchy
and primitivism. These were then overlaid with the language of terrorism and
humanitarian emergency.
Justifying Action
As well as the immediate function of devaluation, the intra-
ethnic/terrorist/humanitarian discourses justified the pursuit of a military solution by
the Government, and, particularly insofar as they were seen as ‘terrorists’, allowed the
Government of Uganda to position itself in the larger ‘war on terror’, and the US
Government to justify an extension of military support to the Government of Uganda.
Within this, they reinforced impunity for a whole range of human rights abuses at the
hands of various elements of Government, and justified the creation of ‘protected
villages’, which were presented as purely a response to the behaviour of the LRA.
Asserting that the LRA was made up primarily of children and abductees silenced the
actual scale and military effectiveness of the LRA, and was used to legitimise military
activity which had nothing to do with the interests of the child and everything to do
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with wider geo-political processes. It ignored the fact that at the beginning of 2002 at
most 1,000 of these 9818 still remained in the hands of the LRA, and that it might be
somewhat disproportionate to send 10,000 soldiers into South Sudan in the hope of
finding these 1,000 unaccounted for children.
For international NGOs, who argued that ‘the conflict with the LRA is essentially
between Acholis, and [that] the peace-building process must involve the Acholi people
at all levels” (Williams et al, 2001: 44), the portrayal of the war as intra-ethnic and
therefore as a localised problem requiring localised solutions, was central to their
interventions for peace, which remained limited to addressing the relationship
between the LRA and Acholi civilians through reviving traditional leadership and
conflict resolution mechanisms (despite the evidence that Joseph Kony despised the
traditional leaders - see chapter 4). It also allowed the NGOs to focus on the victims of
‘intra-ethnic’ abuse, the abducted children, and to argue that they would need a
particular kind of reintegration (a view internalised by many students and teachers).
This was despite the fact that, most students and teachers in secondary schools were
not even aware when there were returned abductees in their midst (see Chapter 6). The
naming of the EU’s assistance programme as the ‘Acholiland Programme’ exemplified
this broader pattern of donors and humanitarians contributing to ethnicising the
situation and to creating ‘the Acholi’ as a homogeneous grouping in which all were
assumed to share the same viewpoint and needs.
When in 2002 the upsurge in violence resulting from Operation Iron Fist was put
together with extremely high levels of internal displacement (also presented as caused
entirely by the LRA), an a-historical ‘humanitarian crisis’ was generated which was
primarily to the benefit of UN agencies and INGOs. The number of organisations
providing relief in the camps had by this point rocketed from 5 in 1996 to over 60.
NGOs issued a statement in which they argued that ‘the current armed conflict in the
region is destroying the gains made from years of rehabilitation in the sub-region, with
communities previously self-sufficient now unable to cope’.564 This was correct in the
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sense that the needs were great, but inaccurate in its implication that the situation had
arisen after ‘years of rehabilitation’. The fact that the so-called ‘years of rehabilitation’
had in reality been 16 years of gradually escalating violence and humanitarian need,
and the accompanying attempts by civil society to find non-military solutions, was
negated at the stroke of a pen.
Justifying Inaction
The use of intra-ethnic/terrorist/humanitarian crisis discourses to justify certain forms
of action obscured the way they also had the effect of justifying bystander inaction in
the face of social torture both to themselves and to their respective constituencies. For,
regarded in isolation, many of the interventions were unobjectionable; who, after all,
would quibble with providing psychological assistance to a child who has been
brutalised? They were justified on the basis that ‘we are doing X because the situation
(as presented by us) demands it’.
Yet this meant that there was no argument that ‘we are doing X rather than Y for this
and this reason’ because the discourses had cast silence over certain issues and thereby
established a number of areas of inaction. For example, the involvement of members of
other ethnic groups, which should have signalled that the LRA was a symptom of
Uganda-wide problems for which the Government bore a share of responsibility, was
never mentioned. The Government tendency to talk of the LRA as a ‘cult-like’ and
irrational group threw a veil of silence over the ways in which the Government had
itself undermined various peace initiatives (see chapter 4) and how such an ‘irrational’
group had maintained an effective relationship with the Government of Sudan over an
extended period of time.565 It also foreclosed the possibility that there might be some
members of the LRA with legitimate grievances and grounds for negotiation. In
February 1998, for example, the UPDF 4th Division Commander ‘rejected the idea of
peace talks with Joseph Kony’s Lord Resistant Army rebels – because their struggle is
aimless….’,566 a position echoed six years later by the British Minister for International
                                                     
565 This compares closely with the relationship between the supposedly irrational RUF in Sierra Leone and
and Charles Taylor in Liberia (Keen, 2005).
566 The Monitor, 23 February 1998, UPDF boss says no peace-talks.
350
Development, who reportedly doubted ‘that calls to bring the LRA to the negotiating
table could realistically be expected to evoke any meaningful response. "Given the
history of LRA activities, it seems to be more of a cult than a political organisation," he
told IRIN. "It's hard to see what there is to reason with."’567 By extension, there was no
place for the Acholi to have legitimate grievances, for the LRA had became a metaphor
for the Acholi, and the demonisation of the LRA by Government and international
institutions alike, assisted in the demonisation of the Acholi as an ethnic group.
Discourses focused on children abducted by the LRA allowed inaction on adult
returnees (the 20,000 adults taken by the LRA accounted for 2/3 of all abductions),
inaction on the rights of the several hundred thousand children who had been lucky
enough not to be abducted but were nevertheless traumatised by the situation in
general.568 It perpetuated inaction on the UPDF’s multiple failures/reluctance to bring
the LRA under control, as well as on the abuses perpetrated by the Government and its
armed forces in the name of protection. These included the recruitment of children into
the UPDF,569 and the existence of child wives of UPDF soldiers (with several divisions
based in northern Uganda, these were surely more than the average of 116 per year
girls abducted by the LRA over the period 1986-2001 (total 1741)).
The discourses thus enabled inaction on the fact that “protection” had long been a
violation of all categories of human rights (chapter 5), and served to hide a long-term
process of physical and psychological debilitation. They allowed inaction on the
economic dependency and political restructuring (e.g. the re-ethnicisation of
governance through decentralisation), the introduction of discourses of control under
the guise of ‘rights’, and the undermining of all aspects of socialisation into local
                                                     
567 IRIN, 7 April 2004, Extend amnesty for northern rebels, UK minister tells
government.
568 .If one considers that children under the age of 18 accounted for at least 50% or 400,000 of the total
population of Gulu and Kitgum districts, and that 220,000 of these were aged between 8 and 18 (i.e. were
at risk of abduction), then the 800 or so children abducted every year accounted for at most 0.4% of
children at risk of abduction (i.e. aged 8-18), and 0.2% of the child population as a whole (aged 1-18). As
noted in chapter 5, there was little attention given to the orphans of victims of the war or AIDS.
569 When UNICEF finally surveyed the UPDF’s Lugore training camp in 2003, they found 10% of recruits
were “probably” under the age of 18 – IRIN, 13 November 2003: Uganda should do more to stop child soldier
recruitment – UNICEF.
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culture. They also allowed inaction on the use of “protected villages” as sites of de- and
re-socialisation (chapters 5 and 6), most dramatically evidenced in child suicides and
the fundamental undermining of adult masculinities and the resultant humiliation of
men (chapter 7). While the number of organisations providing relief in the camps
rocketed, there was no corresponding increase in calls for the camps to be dismantled.
In short the discourses did not question the Government’s agenda for northern
Uganda, and they absolved the Government, donors and INGOs alike of responsibility
for the continuation of the situation. That donors also found the fiction of intra-ethnic
war convenient, seems plausible, for it obscured the extent of their interest in the status
quo in Uganda and their corresponding failure to exercise their potential to influence
the situation. It left undisturbed the image they had constructed of post-1986 Uganda
as a success story, an exemplar of the wisdom of structural adjustment, good
governance and the African ‘renaissance’. It meant that the conceptual strictures and
political strait-jacket of the ‘intra-ethnic’ model could be left undisturbed, and helped
to ensure the continued ignorance of their constituents overseas, many of whom (even
those who considered themselves ‘well-informed’), did not know what they did not
know (i.e. they did not know what they were not being told), and would not have
welcomed their view of beneficent humanitarianism being shaken. For INGOs the
focus on humanitarian assistance needs not only justified the humanitarian scramble
for northern Uganda, it effectively de-historicised the entire conflict and thereby
legitimised the INGOs’ inaction during the sixteen years build-up to the (predictable)
‘crisis’.  The discourses thus structured both thinking and intervention, typically
resulting in many interventions to address the needs of a minority of victims, against a
staggering lack of action on the torture of the majority.
Discussion
Low intensity but wide impact
Social Torture is low intensity in the sense that the processes are not always readily
discernible, and its impacts are not always immediately visible, yet they are felt by the
majority of the population. Because the experience and impact of social torture is so
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generalised, it is difficult to pick out the individual victim and much suffering
effectively is rendered invisible.
Thus the impacts on the young and old of forcible uprootment from their homes
became less and less discernible as they increasingly affected the majority of the
population and thus became the norm. Equally the impact on significant numbers of
children of having their parents abducted, was not highlighted, nor was the impact on
parents of having their children abducted. Neither children nor adults knew if those
taken were still alive, even fifteen years after abduction took place (see chapter 6). Like
the families of the disappeared in Latin America discussed by Melamed et al (1990: 25)
they could therefore justifiably be considered the indirect victims of torture, or victims
by association. Equally, the population in general was exposed to repeated cycles of
hope and despair, as peace initiatives held out false promise of a resolution.
Camp officials in Pabbo pinpointed the cross-generational transmission of impact
when they argued that a sense of being redundant and powerless was as much of a
problem for younger as for older men ‘because the children feel the powerlessness [of the
adults]’.570 (see chapters 6 & 7) Finnström also brings the Acholi concept of cen, roughly
translated as ghostly vengeance, to bear on this discussion, noting how it will ‘expand
socially, in space and time, and to other people’, such that traumatic experiences
become part of ‘the structuring of social life, group identity and collective memory’
(2003: 219).
This low intensity contributes to the perpetuation of the situation insofar as the
majority of its impacts are never addressed, for in what is effectively an externally
determined psycho-social triage system, agencies deal only with the most visible
victims. Their interventions do not acknowledge the depth to which many other
individuals have also been affected. Were they to look at these other individuals in
more manageable isolation, they might not hesitate to describe them as torture victims.
In yet another paradoxical reversal of perceptions, the ‘helpers’ become unable to see
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the trees for the wood. As such the interventions needed to break the process of social
torture are never initiated.
Geographically extensive and time-indifferent
Unlike individual torture which is concentrated in very specific locations, which even
if known are kept screened from public view, social torture is geographically extensive,
for the entire ‘war zone’, and all the protected villages within it, can be considered a
site of social torture. Furthermore, some of the processes integral to social torture, such
as devaluation of the victims, continue for Acholi who travel outside the war zone
whether to other parts of Uganda or further afield. Those coming to the UK, for
example, continue to see the mainstream account of the situation being disseminated to
the public through the media and the publicity of international NGOs. Whereas for the
individual who has been tortured in a cell, exiting from that cell offers a degree of
physical and time distance from the events which took place inside the cell, this option
is less clear-cut for those subjected to social torture.
Again, the difficulty in pinning down the process to a clearly defined place and time
also requires multi-local interventions to break it. It is not enough to intervene just in
Gulu or Kitgum, efforts also have to be made in other sites, whether these be Kampala,
London or Washington.
Multiple actors
The situation also continues because it involves a larger number of actors than is
conventionally understood in war situations. Whereas most interventions take the two
actor LRA-GoU model as their starting point, the social torture model suggests that
churches, NGOs, INGOs, media and IGOs, as well as the civilian population all need to
be considered as important contributors to the dynamics. The discussion of
interventions in the name of the humanitarian imperative throws into question the
notion of passive bystanders: the relationship between perpetrators’ actions and those
of bystanders suggests that ultimately the distinction between the two breaks down.
Just as the doctors described by Staub shift between bystander and perpetrator
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positions with disturbing ease (1990: 68), so the humanitarian agencies in northern
Uganda demonstrated the fundamentally fluid interrelationship between the two roles.
Whereas Staub sees the perpetrators as ‘those who are in charge of a system which
perpetrates torture,’ and he regards bystanders as in some way outside this system, the
WFP example suggests that some apparent ‘bystanders’ in fact play an integral part in
enabling and contributing to the system. Insofar as WFP provided for and legitimised
‘illegal action’, it had a systemic importance from the very early days of the protected
villages strategy. It could therefore be considered a demonstrably complicit bystander, a
position shared by many of the NGOs who worked in the camps, effectively enabling
and legitimising a villagisation policy whose benefits in terms of protecting the
population were never demonstrated, and whose costs to the population were
manifest.
Although at any given point in time it is possible to pinpoint perpetrators, victims and
by-standers, over time many people traverse all three positions, creating a fluidity
which is at the heart of what keeps conflict going, in part because so many people are
both impacted on and themselves implicated, in part because existing mechanisms of
accountability, such as the Convention Against Torture, cannot accommodate this
fluidity, complexity and range of culpabilities.
Multiple functions
Interventions to break these dynamics would have to address the various
psychological, economic and political and functions which continuation of ‘war’ serves
for many of these actors. Not only is the range of those concerned quite wide (from
those most visibly involved such as the LRA and the Government, to those more
generally associated with attempts to address the problem such as churches, IGOs and
INGOs), but the different functions are in fact interrelated. In the process of meeting
their psychological needs, perpetrators generate a further need to justify their actions
and inactions to themselves and others. When these justifications are externalised in
the form of public discourses such as that of ‘intra-ethnic war’ and ‘Acholi
backwardness’, they in turn generate a particular pattern of interventions such as the
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re-invention of traditional leadership and the ‘rescue’ of abducted children (chapters 6
& 8), and the associated establishment and consolidation of economic and political
interests (over and above the petty economic opportunities which the context creates
for soldiers and rebels alike (see chapter 5)). The political economies established as a
result of meeting micro-interests fit the overall political function of sustaining a process
of subordination for as long as possible rather than rushing to achieve it as an end, for
while some of these interventions appear to deal with the negative impacts of social
torture, their own survival, paradoxically, lies in the continuation of social torture.
For as long as the Government continue to struggle to hold together the country, and
to the extent that the process of subordinating the north helps to do this, it makes sense
for the Government of Uganda to draw out the social torture for as long as possible –
hence the time indifference described above. If the subordination of the north were to
be fully achieved, alternative mechanisms would have to be found for keeping the
other fragments of the country under control. It is therefore more important to sustain
the process of subordination of the Acholi as a means to the end of keeping control
elsewhere, than it is to achieve complete subordination of the Acholi as an end in itself.
Just as in individual torture the perpetrator seeks to keep the victim alive, so in social
torture. This would explain President Museveni’s alleged refusal to accept offers from
the US Government to deal with Joseph Kony once and for all.571 By extension, the
tensions between Government and civilians over the terms of their inclusion in the
Ugandan polity would not go away even if the LRA in its existing form were to come
to an end. Further expressions of dissent would emerge, just as the LRA itself emerged
from the remnants of the UPDA and the HSM. Indeed, the referral to the International
Criminal Court, in which the focus is on LRA perpetrators to the almost total exclusion
of UPDF ones, can be seen as yet another catalyst of such dissent. Equally the struggle
of the Government to assert itself on the international stage would not come to an end
even if the north of the country were eventually brought to subordinated inclusion.
                                                     
571 I and others have on a number of occasions asked people with links to the US military why they did not
simply use a missile strike to ‘take out’ Kony, and the answer was consistently that the offer had been
made and turned down.
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In an important sense, therefore, although the language of perpetrators, victims and
bystanders, which was generated in large part in response to the Nazi genocide of the
Jews,572 has application to the situation in northern Uganda, there must be reservations
about describing the camps as ‘concentration camps’ or the war in the north as
‘genocide’, as does the LRM (see Annex D). Subordinate inclusion by way of social
torture differs from genocide in two important respects; it targets groups for
subordination rather than elimination, and it is an ongoing (modifiable) process rather
than in any sense a ‘final solution’. Indeed, for the Government in particular, it is of
more use as a means than as an end.
Social Torture acquires its own momentum
Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the social torture dynamic is that it acquires its
own momentum which does not require the continued involvement of the original
perpetrators. This can be seen in physical and mental stunting as a result of prolonged
malnutrition; while the 20,000 or so abducted children are seen as a threat to stability,
in reality it is the half million or more children growing up in the camps under such
conditions who are a much bigger ‘time bomb’ which threatens future processes of
economic production and political participation. As noted in chapters 5 and 7, very few
of the youth will benefit from tertiary education and the resultant employment
opportunities it opens up. Equally the spread of HIV may undermine these basic
processes, by cutting through the ranks of the trained and skilled, as well as productive
manual labour.
In the medium term, the violation which people experience in the camps does not just
deepen their impoverishment and accompanying physical and psychological
debilitation; these in turn become a source of violence. While some resort to abuse of
self, many others, as suggested by the literature on torture and violence, cope with
their own oppression by oppressing others (Staub 1995, Gilligan 2000). If ‘difficult life
conditions’ create a psychological need to re-establish self-esteem through the
degradation of others, how much more so the experience of social torture itself?
                                                     
572 See for example, Raul Hilberg’s ‘Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe 1933-1945.
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People’s sense of security, of ‘positive identity’ (both individual and group), and of
‘connection to others’ are all at risk in the war zone, as is ‘a meaningful comprehension
of reality, a sense of how the world is ordered and of one’s place in it’. Many victims of
social torture thus are likely to come to feel psychological needs similar to those which
led the perpetrators of social torture to oppress them. Meeting these needs is often
achieved through abusive actions which, as chapters 6 and 7 show, generally
exacerbate the poverty and debilitation of those abused. In short, the former objects of
torture can become its agents.
When those who were oppressed become perpetrators themselves, they do not always
turn on their own oppressors – they are more likely to displace their anger to others
less powerful than themselves. This can be seen in the proliferation of ‘small men’:
subordinated adult men seeking to regain their self-respect by turning against women
and subordinating youth. Indeed, the locally internalised discourse around returned
abductees (see chapter 6), exemplifies a wider discourse within the war zone of 'youth'
as a category of 'others' who have energy, are no longer fully under the control of their
parents/society at large, and are under severe economic pressures to become involved
in lives of crime (see chapters 6 and 7). This discourse turns them into people who need
to be helped - and thereby brought back under the control of adults. Some of the youth
in particular came to see being recruited into the military as one of the only ways out of
the impasse of poverty and oppression by their own elders. Paradoxically therefore,
one of the mechanisms which thwarts the achievement of civilian men’s adult identity,
becomes seen as the means to regain it, despite the fact that in reality it is more likely to
consolidate psychological dependency than to break it, and is almost certain to feed
into the further escalation of violence.
This apparently voluntary militarisation of some oppressed youth, who as soldiers
become involved in various abuses, is also a good example of the formation of
perpetrators out of former victims, and further underlines the argument that the
categories of perpetrators, bystanders and victims are fluid rather than fixed. It is also
an indicator of the extent to which an atmosphere of fear and distrust, coupled with the
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physical disruption caused by displacement, creates barriers to alternative, non-
violent/non-abusive routes out of the position of victim.
Such an analysis raises complex questions of agency. It might be argued that to talk of
an abstract concept, social torture, acquiring an independent momentum, is to belittle
the agency of those most affected, and that only some changes in peoples’ behaviours
are directly attributable to the interventions of various external actors, while others
(such as voluntarily joining the armed forces) are their own (chosen) adaptive
responses to the debilitation arising from multiple violations over an extended period
of time. This distinction, however, is in many respects an artificial one which rests on
an illusion of choice. The widespread debilitation and vulnerability which were such a
prominent feature of the protected villages effectively reduced the options available to
people, such that even if they appeared to be ‘choosing’ to behave in a particular way,
it would be generous in the extreme to describe this as a ‘free choice’.
In the context of such a severely circumscribed set of choices, the introduction of
alternative practices by external actors, whether in the field of demonstration plots,
cattle for women, or political re-education, became easier as people had little realistic
option but to go along with them. As such the camps acted as crucibles for and
accelerators of social change - on terms set by outsiders. Long-standing props for
socialisation, and thus for ‘moral’ behaviour, had been removed. Economic survival
strategies were established in a context in which the economic dependency of the
population as a whole was being systemically consolidated. Attempts by elders to
regain a degree of political control at a local level were going against the flow of long-
term national processes of political change.
Social Torture is justified in public discourses which themselves become
instruments of social torture
When partial representations of reality were allowed to pass muster as total
explanations, they did not just set the terms of debate and intervention in northern
Uganda as a whole, they also became part of the distortions which helped to keep the
dynamic going. Rather than simply a reaction to social torture, the public discourses
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were an integral part of it. These externalisations of psychological process into the
public arena, together with their related institutional practices and silences (and
‘forgetting’), were not just crucial to enabling inaction and legitimating the visible
perpetrators. In generating interventions which left real needs unattended, they
aggravated both physical and psychological processes of debilitation.  In disregarding
(and thereby suppressing) alternative voices and interpretations (often the voices of the
tortured), they themselves became a form of further psychological violence and
therefore an instrument of social torture and subordination in that they further
weakened people’s sense of control over their own lives and environment. As Zur says
of what happened to the widows of la violencia in Guatemala:
The ‘official truth’ undermines alternatives, deliberately violating people’s
memories. The violence to people’s memories, though less tangible than the
physical violence from which it is not entirely separate, affects victims for years
because the violence is internalized (Zur,1998: 170).
Not only did the discourses of intra-ethnic war and humanitarian crisis present a
skewed and partial version of reality while laying claim to objective and moral ‘truth’,
but they were often generated by the very people who were supposed to be helping,
people who should have known better.
The despair induced by the silences in the discourse was evident when religious
leaders complained that
…many of these facts we are mentioning are systematically silenced or distorted.
We are told that the insecurity is soon coming to an end, that so many rebels
have been killed. The truth is that things are just getting worse by the day, people
are often left unprotected and that many abductees (mostly children) are the ones
being killed in armed confrontations. Given the seriousness of this situation, we
the religious leaders wonder why this great tragedy unfolding in Northern
Uganda hardly features in the international news.573
Comparing media coverage of their situation with that given to other contexts they
noted that;
                                                     
573 ARLPI Press release, 31 January 2003.
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Two children killed in Israel will appear in the front page of all world
newspapers, while hundreds of children killed in Northern Uganda seem to be
nobody’s concern.574
The sense that such coverage devalued the Acholi was sharpened by the duplicity of
those perpetuating the discourses, for many of those living inside the war zone were
aware that lack of international attention was not due to lack of knowledge. The title of
ARLPI’s report on the camps  (Let My People Go: The forgotten plight of the people in the
displaced camps in Acholi’ (ARLPI, 2001)), for example, implied that the problem was not
that nobody knew what was going on, but rather that they had ‘forgotten’. One human
rights activist I interviewed put it bluntly:
The international community also has a portion of the blame, especially the international
press who subscribe to government policy when reporting on Uganda [he specifically
mentioned the BBC at this point]… Diplomats who have been here have a lot of
information, but they don’t go public with it, except when they are about to leave [a
former US ambassador was mentioned here]…  For the love of our people we have to fight
our intellectual dishonesty.575
The fact that ‘helpers’ knew the reality but persisted in presenting a very partial
version of it to their international audiences, positioned them simultaneously as
‘helpers’ and co-perpetrators, a duplicity which added to people’s sense of
disorientation and dread. As well as playing a supporting function, the discourses and
those who generated them were thus further instruments of social torture in their own
right.
Conclusions
This chapter has sought to elaborate the multiple dimensions of a social and political
process which, taken together, constitute a form of torture. The range of actors
responsible for inducing debilitation, dependency, dread and disorientation is not
limited to the LRA and GoU, but is considerably wider. A correspondingly wide set of
benefits and functions are addressed by social torture, and this is justified through a
number of key discourses and entrenched through the interventions which these
discourses legitimise. Key areas of discourse established to serve these purposes are
                                                     
574 ARLPI Press release, 31 January 2003.
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those of intra-ethnic war and, related to that, of the war being about 10,000 children
rather than 800,000 people, and of humanitarian rather than political crisis.
When looking at wider processes of social and political change, the fighting between
GoU and LRA forces becomes only one of several key elements of the situation. Ethnic
groups such as the Acholi are uncomfortable with nationhood, and the state is uneasy
with yet contributes to the persistence of ethnic identities. There are also tensions
between the Government and national population, and between the Government and
international community. Long-established donor states are reluctant to cede power to
emerging states, while the Government of Uganda, as a relative newcomer, still seeks
to consolidate its power. ‘Bystanders’ in these struggles, most obviously the
international NGOs, are pulled selectively into supporting various elements of these
processes, and, in allowing this to happen, they compromise their value claims and
therefore potentially their funding base.
Taking all these different elements into account, it is possible to see that the
fundamental process in northern Uganda is one of social torture, a process which
contributes to the subordination and inclusion of the Acholi by the Government and of
the Government by the international community.
The key to the perpetuation of social torture lies in maintaining the cover provided by
the LRA-GoU war. For in a reversal of what we generally expect, rather than torture
being used to prosecute war, war in northern Uganda is being used as the disguise
under which to prosecute social torture. It is a successful disguise, to the extent that
when people wish the situation would end they think solely in terms of the LRA-GoU
war ending. When the disguise is stripped away, two of the more paradoxical features
of the situation become more comprehensible. The Government’s refusal to dismantle
the protected villages despite their long-standing failure to achieve their stated
objectives of protection and containment, for example, can be attributed to the success
of the protected villages in contributing to the subordination of the civilian population.
                                                                                                                                                           
575 Human Rights Focus, Gulu, January 1998.
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Similarly the Government’s reluctance to engage in negotiations with the LRA (or to
allow civil society actors such as ARLPI to pursue a non-military solution) and its
‘failure’ to achieve a decisive military victory make sense if it is recognised that success
in either option would have stripped away the cover provided by the war.
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Chapter 9 - Conclusions
The case-study of the LRA-GoU war as a disguise for a more complex and far reaching
process of social torture, offers a counter-narrative to the mainstream discourse around
today’s wars which I described in Chapter 1 and which I have argued shapes both
interpretations of and interventions into the situation in northern Uganda. In
relationship to the Convention Against Torture, the model of Social Torture, by
drawing on and integrating what I termed the ‘building blocks of a counter-narrative’,
broadens the lens through which to identify and address the phenomenon of torture.
In regard to addressing the situation in northern Uganda, the model also suggests a far
broader range of interventions than is generally considered.
Social Torture offers a counter-narrative to the
mainstream discourse
Social Torture is a counter-narrative in the sense that the range of local, national and
international actors involved, the intersection of a multiplicity of economic and
political motivations with psychological needs arising from cycles of oppression and
subordination, and the trans-national nature of justificatory public discourses and
value systems, cannot be easily accommodated in the depoliticising binary oppositions
such as ‘internal-external’, ‘greed-grievance’ and ‘rational-irrational’ which underpin
the mainstream discourse of internal war. By explicitly seeking to integrate this
complexity, Social Torture offers a multi-dimensional explanation for situations of
protracted ‘war’, an explanation which includes and links together numerous elements
of existing literature such as the constructed nature of war, the political economy of
humanitarian assistance, globalisation and global governance, discourse theory and
psychoanalytic theory as applied to the phenomenon of violence. As such it places
emphasis on the systemic nature of the process. This is represented in Diagram 9.1
below. It is also a counter-narrative in the sense that much of this complexity is
identified through taking a ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’ approach.
364
Diagram 9.1: An elaborated model of social torture
What is not immediately evident from the above diagram is that, when dichotomised
conceptions of who the actors are (e.g. Government vs. Rebels, insiders vs. outsiders,
perpetrators vs. victims, military vs. civilian) give way to a more comprehensive and
fluid range of actors, then the causal and locational internal-external oppositions
implicit in internal models of war fall away. The catalysts and dynamos of today’s
wars are neither exclusively within the war zone, nor simply external to it.
Importantly, they are located in both – and, as the analysis of discourses exemplifies -
in the interactions, influences and mutual dependency between the (geographically)
internal and external. The cast of actors involved in creating and perpetuating the
dynamics of war extends well beyond the evident military groupings, to also include
international governments & donors, multi-lateral organisations, religious groupings,
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international and national NGOs and media, ‘victims’ and diasporas, and academics
and policy makers.
It is not just the range of actors which breaks down a clear internal-external
differentiation, but the nature of the relations between them. Despite suffixes such as
‘national’ and ‘international’, they do not neatly divide up into oppositional categories
defined by geographic origin, as they are inter-dependent and multi-local in terms of
their operations and decision-making. This is clear in the ambivalent power relations
between ‘perpetrators’ and ‘bystanders’ – whereas in the basic model of perpetrator-
bystander-victim the perpetrator is the most powerful, in social torture the visible
‘perpetrators’ (Government of Uganda) are in most respects subordinate to key
‘bystanders’ (‘external’ states), yet at the same time they are able to exercise leverage
over the bystanders because of the bystanders’ complicity, a complicity which puts
them in a shared position vis-à-vis external constituencies such that they jointly
generate the discourses which serve to mask the true nature of what is going on.
Interdependence extends to value systems, indeed some actors draw on conceptual
frameworks which explicitly transcend or disregard geographic boundaries, such as
traditionalism vs. modernism, Africanism vs. Arabism, Christianity vs. Islam, deism
vs. animism, neo-colonialism vs. independence. Even where they appear to correspond
to prejudices about geographic origin (e.g. traditionalists from ‘Africa’, modernisers
from ‘the West’), such conceptual forces are in reality always inter-linked, as
demonstrated by the revival of traditional Acholi leadership (chapter 8), an ostensibly
local initiative which was catalysed by an expatriate and funded by foreign donors.
Such interdependence puts a question mark over the ‘new wars’ analyses which
explain war as due in part to the internal weaknesses of states. Kaldor, for example,
argues that the ‘haves’ derive their strength from access to the new technologies and
the espousal of multi-culturalism and associated liberal values, while the ‘have nots’
are weakened by lack of access to the benefits of the new interconnectedness, and by
their espousal of what Kaldor variously terms ‘particularism’, ‘exclusivism’ and
‘identity politics’ (2001: 75). In other words, blame is placed at the door of the weak
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states, whose weakness is reflected in their having made two unwise, but unrelated,
choices.
I would argue that while the Ugandan state is in important senses weak – particularly
in its dependence on external funding – this is not due to a lack of perspicacity on its
part, but to the paucity of means at its disposal with which to establish and maintain
control over its population. The reality of social torture and subordinate inclusion,
notably the mass violation and debilitation in camps, and the use of hegemonic
masculinities and identity politics to humiliate and devalue, are reflections of that
relative poverty and powerlessness. While elements of these dynamics demonstrate
that the state has some capacity to resist international pressures insofar as it uses the
ambiguities of social torture, and the complicity of ‘bystanders’, to compromise its
donors and thereby lessen the power imbalance with them, they also ensure the State’s
continued weakness, as the ‘bystander’ states will use their knowledge of what is going
on as a source of leverage (aid conditionalities) on the ‘perpetrator’ state, and thereby
help to keep the State itself in a weak and subordinate position with limited options for
exercising control over its population. Both perpetrator and bystander states are
therefore caught in a situation of mutual dependence of their joint making.
This mutual dependence in turn suggests that, far from the idea of a post-Cold War
vacuum where previously there was a ‘world order’, there is in fact an equally
systemic quality to today’s wars. The failure of the ‘weak states’ argument is therefore
not so much a descriptive as an analytical one - the weakness is well described but its
systemic nature is not well identified. The weak states do not espouse particularism,
exclusivism and identity politics in opposition to multi-culturalism and associated
liberal values, but rather with the covert support (arguably the permission) of the
supposed purveyors of ‘cosmopolitan’ values. The situation thus appears closer to
Duffield’s notion of ‘subordinating forms of North-South integration’ (Duffield, 2001:
5).
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Greed-Grievance
The model of social torture furthermore suggests that the pursuit of a single
overarching motivation in explanation of today’s wars (or any war for that matter) is a
flawed enterprise.  Even if, for the sake of argument, ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ did
represent the whole gamut of possible motivations, which of the two would be
regarded as the real motivation in cases where grievances arise out of a failure to
satisfy greed? And even supposing that one of the two could be identified as the
primary motivation, it still remains to correctly determine the quality of the greed or
the grievance. For example, one explanation offered for some of today’s wars is that
people are angry at being kept out or excluded from the global system and its benefits.
The LRA by contrast appear angry at the Acholi being drawn into or included in that
system with no discussion of the terms of their (subordinate) inclusion. And perhaps
most importantly, even if greed or grievance could be identified as the cause for a war
beginning, they do not offer a satisfactory explanation for why wars continue. For the
motivations of actors are not uni-dimensional; the perpetrators combine psychological
wants and needs with economic and political interests. Nor are motivations static; as
the experience of oppression or victimhood within a given context gives rise to the
need to oppress/perpetrate in turn, then what drives people, and their resultant
positions in the dynamics of war, changes over time. As I argue in chapter 8, even the
elaboration of a simple perpetrator-victim binary model into a marginally more
complex triangle of perpetrator-victim-bystander fails to accommodate the reality that
over time people can shift between these respective positions. While terms such as
‘perpetrator’, ‘bystander’ and ‘victim’ have descriptive validity at a particular point in
time, they cannot capture this changing positionality over time or the changing
motivations associated with each.
The role of motivation is further qualified by the simple reality that the majority of the
people who are most impacted on find themselves in a war rather than deciding to go
to war. Where the resultant economic imperatives and psychological dynamics drive
people to self-destructive actions or violence escalating behaviours, these must to an
important extent be regarded as independent of questions of ‘rationally’ articulated
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motivations or intentions based on self-interest. And as the psychology of denial
suggests, people can simultaneously know and not-know what they are seeing or
doing, a key function of which is to protect their sense of their own moral identity. It is
thus possible for humanitarians who come into such contexts to continue to believe
that they are still ‘doing good’, when objectively their activities are already doing some
harm. In short, people’s expressed motivations for going to the war zone are not
directly correlated to the actual impact of their actions.
Furthermore, people’s self-destructive and violence-escalating behaviours may appear
irrational in that they don’t serve the person’s best interests, but they create
opportunities for others to pursue their ‘rational’ economic and political interests in the
form, for example, of certain INGO interventions. As such there is no de facto division
between individual and group psychology and political economy, or indeed between
‘rational’ and ‘irrational’.
The incorporation of the psychologies of oppression and denial into an analysis of war,
and in particular the recognition that over time these will have some influence on
peoples’ positions and behaviours within such wars, qualifies Keegan’s argument that
today’s wars are the result of long-suppressed hostilities and tensions being able to
come to the surface following the end of the Cold War (Keegan, 1998, 66). Without
denying that there are hostilities whose origins people trace back to pre-colonial times,
the Uganda case suggests that they have since evolved through multiple phases of
colonial and post-colonial divide and rule and resultant cycles of oppression and
victimhood. Today’s hostilities thus build on historical tensions, but cannot be reduced
to them.
These psychological cycles and their associated political economies also suggest that
searching for the ‘root causes’ of today’s wars, as was attempted by many analysing
‘complex emergencies’ in the 1990s, is problematic. They seem to indicate that, as an
evaluation of humanitarian responses to the Rwanda Genocide concluded, ‘recent
events result from a cumulation of events of the past, with one factor forming a
building block for the next, and all actors and factors interrelating and interacting’
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(Millwood, 1996: 13). If some of today’s perpetrators were yesterday’s victims, and
some of today’s victims will be tomorrow’s perpetrators, then it is more important to
examine the interweaving of complex events and processes, and the multiple truths for
those who live these causes and effects, than to search for specific ‘root causes’.576
While the various components of the mainstream discourse on ‘internal war’ both
implicitly and at times explicitly depoliticising the present, they themselves constitute
a conceptual and political force in the here and now. As I have shown in Chapters 4
and 8, important elements of the mainstream discourse were reflected in the way
northern Uganda was portrayed, with the LRA-GoU war presented as internal and
intra-ethnic, and the LRA as irrational terrorists or greed-driven bandits, and as the
problem rather than a problem. The ‘humanitarian crisis’ which people are portrayed
as having brought upon themselves in intra-ethnic wars provides a mantle under
which international actors can intervene. In this respect the discourses of internal war
ignore the agency and role of various actors, and by ignoring key psychological
dynamics, negate the complex subjectivities of the many people who live through such
situations. In silencing them, such discourses directly contribute to their further
subordination and thereby contribute to what Nader calls an ‘ideology of harmony’, in
which the portrayal of violence as irrational is used as a form of social control (Nader,
1992).  The mainstream discourse, as operationalised in northern Uganda, thus played
a role in shaping the dynamics of the very phenomenon it purports to be describing
and analysing.
In the process, such discourses obscure meaningful analysis of the national and
international political economy of conflicts in the post- Cold War era. Although works
such as those of Keen (1994), Duffield (1994, 2000), Richards (1996) and Kaldor (2001),
indicated that there were vested ‘external’ interests in areas affected by war, and
indeed in the prosecution of warfare itself, the mainstream discourse gave this little
attention. The humanitarian nature and intention of any international intervention was
assumed and reasserted in nearly every branch of the discourse. On this basis alone,
                                                     
576 The iterative nature of cause and effect is implicit in the idea of a ‘vicious cycle’ of deprivation and
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the mainstream discourse on war can be seen to form an integral part of the broader
development discourse and the ‘international relations of dominance and
subordination’ (Abrahamsen, 2000; viii) which it supports.
Similarly the discourse on ‘internal war’, which, like the discourse on good governance
and democracy, also coincided with the end of the Cold War, filled the need for
alternative legitimations for and modes of foreign intervention. In one sense the
already oversimplified view of Cold War proxy wars were simply reversed. Just as
these were portrayed as externally driven ones which had no internal energy of their
own, so post-Cold War wars could not be explained as proxy and therefore logically
had to be internally driven with no impulse from outside. In this way, the notion of
‘internal wars’ did not threaten the historic oversimplifications of the ‘proxy war’
model, indeed it confirmed them and prevented too close a scrutiny of other (non-Cold
War related) dynamics of the Cold War era. As such, the visions of post-Cold war
conflicts as internal are like the wider discourse on development in that they obscure
‘the interconnectedness of states and political forces in the global era’ (Abrahamsen,
2000: xi).
In summary, the discourse of internal wars, generated by some actors and used by
others to intervene in (and thereby exercise a degree of control over) areas to which
they claim to be ‘outsiders’, does not reflect the complexities of today’s wars. By
maintaining simplistic oppositions such as ‘internal-external’, ‘rational-irrational’ it
stifles the possibility of multi-dimensional explanations and the more effective
interventions which such explanations could generate. Rather than explaining the
problem of wars and their continuation, they are used by ‘bystanders’ to elaborate
policy and practice. In generating inappropriate interventions and silencing the
subjectivities of those most concerned they contribute to the devaluation of the latter
and as such are component of the dynamics of social torture in today’s wars zones, a
form of discursive violence which underpins the more visible physical forms of
violence. The very existence of this discourse belies the picture it seeks to portray of
                                                                                                                                                           
violence (see Moore: 1996: 1).
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war as internal, for its usage constitutes a traceable form of linkage between the local
and international, the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Any meaningful understanding of war
thus has to include an analysis of the analyses of war and the degree to which, through
discursive violence, they underpin physical violence.
Social Torture goes beyond the Convention Against
Torture
One question raised by broadening what is placed under the rubric of torture, and who
is considered as involved, is whether the integrity and condemnatory power of the
term ‘torture’ will be weakened, either conceptually or in terms of action taken against
perpetrators. For Social Torture, or torture on a mass scale, does not describe the
behaviour of a few individuals, rather a systemic process and dynamic which is
enabled by a range of actors, including those of governments, multi-laterals, NGOs and
academics.
At a conceptual level it can be argued that the content ascribed to terms such as torture
is not fixed; it can and should change over time to reflect shifts in understanding. For
example, what is considered child abuse in the present, has changed dramatically in
the last few decades as a result of changed understandings of the impacts of various
forms of behaviour, such as physical beating, on a child’s development. In countries
such as the UK, sexual orientation which only a few decades ago put people at risk of
imprisonment, has in the last ten years or so come to be recognised as legitimate
grounds for claiming membership of a particular social group – and therefore can be
used as grounds for claiming asylum.
It is also important to reiterate that in Article 1 of the Convention against Torture the
definition is broad enough to include much of what I have placed under the rubric of
social torture, and that in Article 3 ‘flagrant or mass violations of human rights’ in an
asylum seeker’s country of origin are stipulated as possible grounds for considering
the person at risk of torture.  There is nothing to suggest that this excludes the mass
violations of human rights entailed in the forcible displacement of populations, or in
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the failure of Government forces to protect physical security, or provide access to basic
education and health care, as described in chapter 5. Although it might be argued that
later articles in the convention (Articles 10-13) put considerable emphasis on torture in
situations of ‘arrest, detention or imprisonment’, many would regard the situation in
the protected villages, with their tight curfews and risk of shooting if caught outside
the camps, as akin to imprisonment.
However, the concept of Social Torture goes beyond what is addressed by the
Convention Against Torture in several respects. Firstly, the range of actors is larger and
more complex, and the nature of their involvement more nuanced than a rigid
perpetrator-victim distinction suggests. I have argued that there are many actors who
are neither hands-on torturers, nor passive bystanders, whose moment of involvement
may be transient relative to its impact and who may not even go near the war zone
itself, but who are complicit insofar as their actions enable the conditions in which
social torture can take place. In addition, many are non-state actors who have not
signed up to any formal obligations. The restricted Convention model of the
perpetrator group as those public officials who personally inflict physical torture and
those who authorise this, cannot be used to hold the majority of actors accountable,
though it might be argued that as Article 1 includes not just those acts which are
inflicted by or at the instigation of public officials or other persons acting in an official
capacity, but also those acts which are inflicted with the ‘consent or acquiescence’ of
such persons, it partially accommodates bystanders as well as visible perpetrators.
Whereas consent requires a verbal or written ‘yes’, acquiescence requires the absence
of a ‘no!’. As such the concept of acquiescence, to an extent coincides with that of the
bystander who does nothing despite having the capacity to do otherwise.
Secondly, the categories of perpetrator, bystander and victim are shown to be fluid,
such that over time, as victims seek to deal with their victimhood by becoming
perpetrators, membership of the perpetrator group is likely to grow, creating a simple
problem of scale for those seeking to deal with torture through legal prosecution.
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Thirdly, the legal definition of torture takes the fact that pain is ‘intentionally inflicted on
a person’ as its starting point and therefore focuses primarily on the identification and
demonstration of conscious intention to harm, whereas in the identification of Social
Torture the intention to inflict pain on a person cannot be used as a criterion. For it is
argued that social torture succeeds precisely because of its ability to combine and
create synergy between unconscious wants and needs and various economic and
political interests. While the intentions of individuals and institutions are not
eliminated from the picture, they are not the critical issue, indeed they cannot be the
critical issue as social torture is at least in part defined by the involvement of
bystanders who do not – arguably cannot - acknowledge their own complicity. Social
Torture relies on the fact that people have psychological mechanisms, and generate
discourses to externalise these, specifically to convince themselves and others that they had
no bad intention (critics of humanitarianism, for example, are likely to temper their
criticism by acknowledging that even if the humanitarians do harm, they do so with
the best of intentions).
To ascertain which intention is the issue – the intention to do harm or the intention to
benefit from somebody else’s doing harm, for example? – is thus extremely difficult,
especially once it has been ongoing for nearly two decades. Even if people pursue their
interests ‘rationally’ once they find themselves in a given situation, this does not
automatically equate to having had an intention to create that situation, though it may
contribute to wanting to perpetuate it. Such ambiguities around intention highlight the
practical limitations of seeking to address the complex realities of mass torture through
exclusively legal frameworks, in particular the difficulty that peoples’ actions are not
reducible to intention, and that the burden of proof of intention is very hard to meet,
the more so when working in a war zone. It is for this reason that Social Torture is
identified through the composite of acts committed, responses to them, benefits
derived from it, legitimations used by those involved, and situations arising from it,
rather than through a scrutiny of intentions.
There is some risk that the practical, conceptual and logistical constraints on the
identification of intention in Social Torture will be interpreted to mean that the analysis
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of the multiple forms of involvement and causal responsibility is wrong. This though
would be a non-sequitur. The mismatch between available legal mechanisms which can
only handle very limited numbers of actors, and the realities of social torture which
involve a whole spectrum of them, does not necessarily demonstrate limitations in the
analysis of social torture, rather it reflects the known constraints of the available legal
mechanisms.
Sticking with a narrow definition of torture and responses to it would also condemn us
to inadequate responses to situations such as northern Uganda. A narrow vision of
visible perpetrators, which by its silence absolves the many other partially responsible
parties, may add to the tensions which are a part of what keeps conflict going for it can
quickly appear closer to scape-goating than justice. It may fail to address the
grievances of the many who suffer at the hands of ‘minor’ perpetrators, never see and
are therefore not so concerned with the ‘major’ instigators behind the minor ones. It
may thus be more of a hindrance than a help in the cause of peace making and post-
conflict reconciliation.
To deal with the limitations of a legal approach requires a shift in emphasis, away from
preoccupations with intention to harm and towards a concern with responsibilities for
harm. If the multiple ways in which a wide range of actors contribute to the
perpetuation of war in situations such as northern Uganda are acknowledged, then an
actionable hierarchy of responsibilities can be established.  This is necessary both to
deal with the range of actors involved, and their locations – for there is a need to focus
not just on physical visibility in the war zone but also on responsibility for the war
zone.
In this hierarchy, causal responsibility is shared by many, while moral responsibility
can only be attributed to a sub-section of these, and legal or criminal responsibility
applies to a smaller sub-section still. Causal responsibility does no more than establish
the link between an action and its consequences (e.g. a person gives money in good
faith to an aid agency which misspends it), whereas moral responsibility is relative to
an actor’s capacity to have done otherwise, a capacity which itself is a function of that
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actor’s access to resources such as information, economic, political, and social power,
psychological resilience, and so on. Those who enjoy access to such resources and
choose not to use them have greater moral responsibility. The relationship between
causal and moral responsibility is not fixed as the resources available can change. Legal
responsibility is always likely to remain restricted in practice, for to vest excessive
hopes in top-heavy legal institutions such as the ICC is to guarantee that only a tiny
fraction of those involved in perpetuating suffering are held to account, and to ensure
that wider questions of causal and moral responsibility are never addressed.
Each type of responsibility requires a very different set of responses or interventions:
punishment is reserved for legal responsibility through existing criminal justice
processes, whereas expressions of disapproval are pertinent for moral responsibility
(voting for another party, or withholding funding would be obvious mechanisms), and
supportive interventions for those who are causally responsible but cannot easily be
held morally responsible, let alone legally.
Establishing an actor’s moral responsibility on the basis of their capacity to have done
differently than they did, might ultimately prove more useful than a legal process. For
if some actors rely heavily on a domestic economic support base or political
constituency, and many of their supporters/constituents would not want their own
moral self-image destroyed by association with the immoral actions/inactions of those
they sponsor, then holding such actors morally responsible for predictable harm
arising from their actions or inactions could create very real pressures for changes in
approach. Highlighting an actor’s capacity to have done otherwise would also be
particularly useful in the pursuit of those who have done harm through inaction.
This creates an onus to improve the quality and quantity of certain types of
information available to actors, in particular about the predictability of the harm which
has been done, for if the dynamics whereby harm is done are better understood, and
harm – whether through action or ‘inaction’ - therefore becomes more predictable, the
capacity to hold actors to account will be increased.
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Social Torture suggests the need for more comprehensive
interventions
By highlighting the systemic aspects of today’s ‘wars’, social torture demonstrates, as
does Galtung’s term ‘structural violence’, that something which people considered
acceptable in fact is not, and that actors have responsibilities which are frequently left
unacknowledged and for which they cannot be held accountable through existing legal
mechanisms.
But a social torture analysis should serve not just to hold actors to account, but also to
create a shift in understanding and the resultant interventions. It obliges people to re-
assess a situation that they observe. Whereas understanding the situation as primarily
one of war prompts interventions which are inevitably partial and frequently
inappropriate, if the war can be placed in its larger context of social torture then the
reasons why neither a military solution nor a negotiated settlement between the LRA
and the GoU has been achieved (and why even if they were they would be
insufficient), can be better understood.
The social torture analysis also brings into focus some parallels with situations which
are generally not associated with today’s ‘wars’. Thus, for example, it is possible to see
how as the dynamic of social torture deepens, and people resort to self-destructive
behaviours, the protected villages in Northern Uganda may increasingly resemble the
ghettos of North America, which Castells describes as ‘part of an earthly hell’ in which
America ‘is systemically reproducing its deepest pattern of social exclusion, inter-racial
hostility, and interpersonal violence’ (Castells, 1998: 148). Similarly it confirms
Gilligan’s model of violence, not just in terms of the psychoanalytic insight he offers
between patterns of humiliation, shame and violence, but also the political economy of
ensuring that these are perpetuated rather than broken.
Rather than regarding war as an aberration, it is necessary to situate it in broader
processes of social and political change. The recognition of multiple dimensions and
parallels with ‘non-war’ situations also offers a far greater range of entry points into
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the complex task of bringing such situations to an end, entry points which may include
but should certainly go beyond those being generally pursued to deal with war. Rather
than peace hinging on how you deal with one reclusive figure, such as Joseph Kony, or
one sub-group of traumatised people, such as returned abductees, it becomes clear that
meaningful peace also involves addressing the multiple and systemic causal forces
implicated in the perpetuation of social torture and the war which disguises it.
Rather than focusing solely on the absence of ‘rationality’ of some actors, it is
important to scrutinise the form and potency of discourses of others, whether at local,
national or international level.  Rather than simply trying to identify the political
agenda of one group, it is also important to establish the complex of psychological
needs and economic interests of all those involved, whether as military, donors, civil
society or humanitarians, as Keen has demonstrated with regard to Sierra Leone (Keen,
2005). Perhaps most important is to explore how best to address the impacts of nearly
twenty years of violation, debilitation and humiliation, impacts which contribute to the
self-perpetuating momentum of social torture whereby victims become perpetrators
along the lines suggested by Gilligan (Gilligan, 2000).  In particular the patterns of
devaluation and humiliation which are such a feature of the dynamic and which offer a
potent explanation for behaviours in both the civilian population and the LRA, needs
to be broken. This requires psycho-social approaches to address questions of self-
esteem, interventions into discourses of masculinity and femininity, and both political
and developmental interventions to address inequalities at a national level. These
should create an economic climate within which non-violent masculinities can be
developed and within which the Government’s sense of control is secured. If these can
be put in place, then a number of the actors in social torture will find alternative and
less harmful ways to meet the needs of economics and institutional survival.
In conclusion, a Social Torture analysis offers considerably more opportunities for
action. If the range of actors is widened, then there is more scope to influence them and
less hangs on one individual or one grouping. Equally, if the theatres of any given war
are multiple and global, this creates more points of intervention, many of them more
accessible than the war zone itself. In conclusion, a Social Torture analysis offers
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considerably more opportunities for action. If the range of actors is widened, then there
is more scope to influence them and less hangs on one individual or one grouping.
Equally, if the theatres of any given war are multiple and global, this creates more
points of intervention, many of them more accessible than the war zone itself.
While northern Uganda works particularly well as a case study of Social Torture
insofar as it combines extremes of violation and inaction in the ‘protected villages’, the
use of justificatory discourses and silences, the involvement of a multi- and trans-
national cast of actors, and a particular structural relationship between the State, LRA,
civil society and international community, the model of Social Torture could
potentially be applied to the analysis of many other situations of protracted conflict
and socio-political change, not least if they are generally thought of as ‘internal’
conflicts. Sierra Leone, for example, shares certain key features, such as a prolonged
state of uncertainty in which people did not know whom to turn to, supposed
protectors turned into oppressors, and war served as a cover for a range of other
economic and political projects (Keen, 2005).
But as war is only one of any number of potential disguises for processes of systemic
subordination, Social Torture could also be used more broadly to look at places which
in systemic fashion deny people the right to life with dignity, and in which confining
people produces behaviours which are then used to dehumanise and devalue them
and justify their further confinement, whether this be in historical cases such as the
Jewish ghettos in Poland, or more contemporary examples such as the North American
ghettos described by Castells, and the protracted situation of the Palestine. Further
situations in which the fine line between camp, ‘protected village’ and prison suggests
parallels with northern Uganda are to be found in numerous refugee settings, not least
that of Congolese refugees in refugee camps in Tanzania who risk landing in prison if
they leave the camp boundaries.
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Annex A: Communique from the Participants at the
International Conference on the theme 'Peace
Research & the Reconciliation Agenda', held at
District Farm Institute, Gulu, Northern Uganda, 27
- 29 September 1999
Towards a Reconciliation Agenda in Northern Uganda
Preamble
We, the participants attending this conference on 'Peace Research and the
Reconciliation Agenda', held from September 27 - 29 at the District Farm Institute,
Gulu, Northern Uganda, express our solidarity with the suffering people of northern
Uganda: those living in protected villages, those who have been abducted, the parents
and relatives of those who have been abducted, those who have been victims of other
forms of human rights abuse, those living outside their home areas against their will,
those in the diaspora, all those whose lives have been disrupted in one way or another
by the thirteen year insurgency in northern Uganda, those who are struggling to re-
build their lives, and those who strive to restore hope and confidence to the
population.
During this conference the participants heard stories of atrocities, of killings carried out
in cold blood, of abductions, of rape and defilement, of traumatisation and of
breakdown of traditional values and authority. We heard graphic accounts of the
negative impacts of the conflict on livelihoods, and the struggle to find alternative
means of survival.
We also heard about heroic efforts being made by various stakeholders, including the
Government of Uganda, political leaders, elders, international and local non-
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governmental organisations and human rights groups, women's groups, youth
organisations and religious leaders, to address the problem of insecurity and to offer
help and assistance to those who have suffered as a result of the war.
We applaud the willingness and commitment of the local authorities and civil society
in the area to engage in open discussion about the issues which need to be considered
in the reconciliation agenda. We deeply appreciate the active participation of the
Uganda Peoples Defence Force in the conference.
We are grateful that the Government of Uganda has now come out openly with a clear
policy of support to all who are seeking to resolve the conflict through dialogue. We
also salute the gesture of goodwill given by the Government of Sudan in sending its
Members of Parliament to Uganda to discuss matters concerning Uganda-Sudan
relations. We do recognise that this is a conflict with major international dimensions
which cannot be addressed by the local people alone, and that a resolution of the
conflict requires the commitment and concerted effort of  regional and international
actors, hence the need for a multi-faceted approach.
We applaud the solidarity shown by leaders from all parts of northern Uganda,
reflected in the full participation  of Resident District Commissioners and District
Council Chairpersons, Bishops and District Khadis from throughout the Greater North.
The conference has been further enriched by the presence and active participation of
academics, community workers and human rights activists from all parts of the globe,
notably from several countries in the region. They shared with us their personal
experiences of working in conflict-ridden areas and of the struggles of the people in
those areas to come to terms with the harsh realities wrought by the conflicts.
The stories we have heard of the experiences of the Acholi People of dealing with the
conflict in this part of Uganda, and the experiences of people of Rwanda, of Mali, of
Eritrea, and of Somalia point to the need for vision, courage and resilience in dealing
with insecurity. This must be tempered with wisdom, honesty and diplomacy. The
main lesson we have learnt is that peacebuilding requires collective effort,
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collaboration, networking, and should be based on well-researched information.
Everybody and every institution has a role to play in the common quest for
reconciliation and restoration of peace and stability.
Declaration of Principles
Therefore, in the light of the challenges and urgent needs, we the participants gathered
in Gulu, Northern Uganda, urge that the following issues be considered integral to a
meaningful reconciliation agenda:
• Early adoption and implementation of the Amnesty Bill with full participation of
all key stakeholders
• Promotion of Human Rights and the Rule of Law
• Successful Return and Resettlement of all categories of uprooted people
• Rehabilitation and Reconstruction embracing all uprooted and traumatised people
• Promotion of Industrialisation, commercial agriculture and livestock  in northern
Uganda
• Infrastructural Development
• Community Economic Empowerment
• Normalisation of Uganda-Sudan relations
• Active engagement in dialogue by all concerned parties and stakeholders
• Encouraging constructive International Pressure
• Special support for Secondary and Higher Education
• Marginalisation of the women and youth
• Special measures for dealing with sexual abuse
• Relations between Government and Local People
• Relations between UPDF and Local People
• Improving relationship with the Karimojong
• Relationship between home and the diaspora
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• Networking and Collaboration
• Role of the Media
• Information and Research
The conference participants recognise that this is not the final agenda and that there are
many further issues to be added by themselves and by other parties unable to attend
the conference.
They further welcome the expressed commitment of donors, international NGOs, local
NGOs, religious communities, youth groups and women's organisations, to develop or
support processes of reconciliation, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of
the Acholi sub-region and northern Uganda at large.
Appeal
We appeal to all parties  - the Government of Uganda, the LRA, local community,
international donors and Governments, local and international NGOs and human
rights organisations and diaspora groups, to recognise that the sentiments expressed at
this conference reflect the overwhelming commitment on the part of all those present to
creating the most conducive environment possible for the ultimate resolution of the
conflict, the restoration of peace and stability, respect for human rights and observance
of the rule of law.
Made in Gulu this 29th day of September, 1999
Bishop of Soroti, Rt. Rev Ilukor
On behalf of the conference monitoring committee and participants
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Annex B: Testimony of an LRA soldier who
returned under Amnesty, October 2001. Recorded
April 2002, Kampala
A comment on the integrity of this testimony
It may be argued that I am relying unduly on this source. After all, as Behrend argues,
field research in a war zone is complicated by the way mass media affects
what we have up to now called ethnographic reality. They create feedback.
Ethnographic reality can no loner be assumed to be ‘authentic’; rather, we
anthropologists must consider how it is produced – and what models it imitates’
… It is already becoming apparent that in future, anthropologists will
increasingly be confronted with an (ethnographic) reality that they themselves
(together with the subjects of their research) have created. (1999: 5).
I myself was quite sceptical. Jacob was clearly very aware of portrayals and
perceptions of the LRA. Nevertheless, there are several reasons to be confident that
Jacob’s account, although necessarily subjective and quite possibly informed by
‘feedback’, offers valid insights into the LRA. Its sheer length, complexity, and level of
detail would be difficult to simulate – to do so would have required access to
extraordinary amounts of documentation. Less visible from the printed page is the
extent to which he was positioning himself vis-à-vis mainstream perceptions of the
LRA, shifting between ‘we’ and ‘they’ depending on what was being discussed, also
protecting friends who remained in the LRA by censoring some parts of the story, and
insisting on the inclusion of certain details which would signal to those who had also
been there that this was a first-hand account. Had the story been fake it is unlikely that
he would have been able to simulate those behaviour patterns in the telling of it.
He also had a considerable sense of urgency about telling his story. Several previous
attempts to work with journalists had failed as they did not have time for the level of
detail he wanted to give. After leaving Uganda I tried for many months to keep in
contact with Jacob, with no response. I hesitated about making his account public,
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fearing it might damage him in Uganda. It came as a severe shock to learn in October
2003 that he was already dead. It took a further four months to establish that his death
had occurred only a few months after recording his testimony. I was told that the
UPDF took him to a barracks in Koro (just outside Gulu town), apparently to persuade
him to join them. When after three days he still refused to work with them, they killed
him.
For ease of reference I have divided the account into a number of sections:
Section 1: Abduction
Section 2: Integration into the LRA in Sudan
Section 3: Life in the LRA
Section 4: Escape and return
These are followed by a number of further sections which reflect where we digressed
from the primary account in order to fill in the picture of specific aspects of the LRA.
1. Treatment of ‘stragglers’
2. Control exercised over people’s sex lives
3. LRA sick bays
4. Herbal remedies used by the LRA
5. Organisational chart of the LRA for the year 1999-2000
6. The four holy spirits guiding Joseph Kony
7. The Yards
8. The Controllers
9. Items kept in the Yards
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An Aye: I am the one577
Section 1
1.1: Abduction
I will not forget my days when I remember November 15 1995 when I was abducted
from my home village and taken to live in captivity far away from home for many
years in Southern Sudan. I am called Yakobo Engena born in 1969. In my village where
I came from I was staying with my parents, but now I am living alone in Gulu town
without parents (they are all gone/deceased – my father died in 1990, my mother died
in 1994; when abducted I was staying with my paternal aunt in Acaba trading centre).
I still remember the way I was taken to the bush by the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army.
It was on Friday evening at around 10.00 o’clock when the rebels entered my village
well armed with a group of brave men who were selected for the mission. I was
already asleep in my hut as I had cycled more than 40km that day. When these people
came to one of the trading centres near my home it was already night and they first
went to attack Acaba Technical Institute where they captured 200 students. Some
managed to escape capture by running down into the village. Many of the students
jumped from the windows and others from the doors, and some got wounded at this
time as they tried to escape. The rebels split up throughout the village with some
looking for more children to be captured and others continuing to burn houses and
loot the properties of the civilian community. They looted clinics, shops and other
important places.
The abducted children were ordered to carry with them food and looted properties in
the convoy. The convoy moved from place to place where they needed to go and they
continued disturbing the peace of the civilian’s. In the process many children were
                                                     
577 This is the title given by Jacob himself
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taken from their homes and parents. As we moved from Acaba where I was abducted
towards Minakulu, this process continued. Every person captured was tied in chains
for fear that they might escape. We were told to hurry to move very quickly to catch up
with time before crossing the main road heading from Kampala to Gulu at a place
called Bad Cati (sleeve of shirt). When we approached the main road everybody was
made to stop and wait until the rebel commanders had gone ahead to check that
nothing would happen when people crossed the road. We then started moving until
everybody had crossed and then continued walking some distances, about 200 yards.
There was a young boy in front of me carrying 45 kilos of sugar and I was carrying
25kg bag of sugar and three pairs of shoes. The young boy was almost collapsing from
the combination of load he was carrying on his head and the speed at which he had to
walk out of the UPDF soldiers who were following up to rescue the abducted children.
One of the rebels came nearer to me and told me to exchange the heavy load the
younger boy was carrying with mine. By bad luck during the exchange of these heavy
loads one of the bags got torn and about 2.5kg of sugar poured down onto the ground.
I tried my level best to control the torn sack but it happened that it had already poured.
Three rebel commanders who were guarding us came to me and asked me what had
happened. I told them I’m sorry but the bag was not properly tied so the mistake
(accident) occurred.
These commanders were not at all sympathetic to me, instead they started beating me
terribly. After this I was terribly beaten. Laker Lucky, the commander leading the
convoy, came and ordered me to be shot later. However, when I was at my last hour,
they discovered I was a technician, so he told the soldiers not to kill me but to watch
me closely because I seemed to be one of the people who wants to escape (I later stayed
with him until we reached Sudan and we became friendly). If I should try to escape at
anytime I was to be finished without any further discussion.
By now we were in the bush heading down to a place called Okule in Minakulu, some
20km from home and we were already getting tired of walking long distances. We
were also hungry but nobody cared, they simply ordered us to move until we reached
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the final destination where we were supposed to be taken that day. There was no
stopping whether for short or long call, people had to defecate as they were walking.
The whole 150 boys were chained together. The 50 ladies were not chained together
but were made to carry crates of beer, sodas, radio cassettes, and other looted
properties. Before we reached Okule the rebels set many houses ablaze. Goats and
chickens were looted.
We were hoping that many people captured were going to be released because we
included elders, people with white hair whose duties were mainly to carry looted
properties. However, two old men who were frustrated at walking all the way
collapsed on the ground and, although we were almost reaching the first final
destination of the day’s journey where we were going to spend the night, they were
then beaten to death with axes. And that was the end of these two men.
We reached our destination at around 5.00pm on 16th November. The place was called
Opuk in Okule parish in Minakulu county. The home we stayed in belongs to a man
who worked as a coordinator for the LRA. He would gather military information about
UPDF soldiers, and could also be sent to town to purchase other important things the
LRA wanted to be taken to Sudan or for military use, such as gum boots, clothes and
other essential commodities.
While I was in Okule parish it turned out that one of this man’s sons was married to a
girl from my home village of Acaba. She was a lady called Doreen. When Doreen saw
me she was shocked to find me in such a desperate situation. She had no chance to talk
to me but gradually she managed to push information to the commander that ‘before
you here I have a brother to me and you have captured him’. She asked ‘why couldn’t
you leave this boy?’ but the commander ignored the young lady completely.
When it was already coming to around 7.00pm we were divided to different positions
for protection under military guard. During the night all the boys were put together in
a single roomed house (ot lum). The girls were put in another house. The next morning
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when everybody was complaining about the way we were squeezed together that
night. The rope was untied for the night and fixed again in the morning.
17th November: Some few people were then released (3 old men and one lady who had
a disease of the legs). The most important looted goods were then carried along the rest
was left behind and collected by the civilians in that area. We then proceeded until we
reached another village where we got the information that UPDF were making a
follow-up to rescue the abducted children. So we then had to hurry for more distances
in case of attack by the UPDF soldiers and other militias who were controlling the area
between Minakulu and the Saint Thomas Senior Secondary School. Immediately Some
soldiers were immediately selected to go and investigate whether the information was
correct. When nothing happened we eventually stopped to rest and cook food before
being told to proceed. We were now heading to a place called Koch, and the UPDF had
already noticed the LRA movements.
We continued moving for some distance until we reached the place where we were
supposed to spend the night (Koch). On arrival we found the overall commander of the
operation, Mr John Matata Okello with some other comanders (eg. Murefo and others)
based here, and they were lying under a big tree reading newspapers which had been
brought to them by local coordinators. We were then registered by Matata and from
there were allocated to different units of Sinia brigade. Some were taken into
‘Headquarters’, others to Teranga battalion, others to Hoka battalion, and others to
Siba. I was taken to Teranga battalion headed by a man called Odong Latek.
We proceeded again and when we stopped for the night we made a camp with
Headquarters at the centre and the other battalion units spread around at a distance of
about 30 metres. Officers ordered us to make small thatched shelters for the night for
them. We then cooked some of the food we had been carrying, ate and slept the night
outside on the ground.
The following morning (18th) we had an attack by the UPDF soldiers who had been
sent from Gulu and Koro military defence. They found us where we had been sleeping.
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We (the abductees) were still newcomers who could not participate in the battle and
we were moved away from the battlefield heading towards Bobi. Others were selected
to carry the wounded people down to the sick bay in Koch. The LRA battled with the
UPDF leaving a number of casualties on both sides. The fighting took almost two
hours, and eventually the UPDF were defeated. Many UPDF soldiers were wounded
and some died. The remains which they took from the UPDF soldiers, such as
clothings, uniforms, gumboots, guns, were then put to fire [burnt], not carried with
them. LRA soldiers who died were just left; they only covered them with leaves and
prayed for their souls.
The ones who were wounded were carried along on stretchers to be taken to the sick
bay (in Koch) where they were supposed to be given treatment until when they were
cured.
The convoy then continued moving until I found that we were already crossing the
main road coming from Gulu to Bobi, from west to east. We continued from there until
we reached Tegot Ato hill (where there is a radio transmitter) where UPDF soldiers
caught up with us and launched another heavy offensive against LRA. From there
many UPDF soldiers died and some LRA soldiers also died and the wounded LRA
soldiers were taken to a sick bay in Tegot Ato.
On leaving Tegot Ato we proceeded towards the north where by the time we were
about to cross the main road we met together with the anti-personnel carrier named
Mamba, which fired a lot of bullets onto the LRA convoy. So people had to retreat and
in the process some18 school boys who had been captured from Acaba Technical
Institute managed to escape. That night (18th) the commanders gathered together the
remaining abductees and other soldiers who ran for fear of bullets the Mamba was
shooting and we slept there in that village called Abere, Lalogi division (Omoro
county).
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The following morning (19th) we were then taken to somebody’s home where we the
abductees were gathered together.
The commander in charge of the convoy, Mr John Okello Matata, checked on the
number of abductees before a radio message was sent to Joseph Kony about what had
happened the previous day. Kony asked him why he had decided to ignore his orders
and the military option which he was supposed to carry out, and added that that was
why Matata had caused the convoy to enter into a UPDF ambush. This conversation
made Matata very angry. Young officers were deployed around that home in Abere
because the home was fenced, and they were ordered to go and bring heaps of sticks
which were used to beat us terribly. Nobody was allowed to cry and if you did that
would be the end of you. We were beaten until nobody could walk. Two boys who did
cry were shot to death on the spot. Their bodies were just picked up and dropped near
the home. That is where I got wounded on my back, a wound which took three months
to get cured, and the scar of which can still be seen today.
After this action we were ordered together with the convoy to leave the place that very
morning (19th). We continued until we were about to cross the road leading to Odek, a
point where again there was suspicion of military ambush ahead. The LRA soldiers
decided to penetrate the ambush by force and they managed. So we ran in a hail of
bullets until we managed to cross to the other side of the Odek road (from west to east)
for about two miles. From there we proceeded up to Aswa Ranch which we reached at
around midday. Everybody was very tired and they decided to spend the night there.
From Aswa Ranch we went to Anaka. At this point we were no longer tied together.
We spent two days in Anaka where again there was another battle in which we lost
five soldiers. It was now approaching the time for fasting and we proceeded deep into
Murchison Falls Park where we spent fourteen days fasting. We were just staying in a
bushy covered area where we were being taught the policy of LRA. After the prayers
then we had to leave. People were sent to loot in Anaka trading centre. Some went to
the mission, others went to Anaka hospital and health centre in the centre where they
looted drugs, micro-scopes and other medical apparatus. That was on the 22nd of
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December. We went down to the no-man’s land heading towards Adjumani and we
stopped on the way in Kabarega National Park where we spent two days and we again
moved east towards Pabbo with UPDF in close pursuit. They launched a further
offensive where a helicopter gunship was sent to come and patrol from above while
the infantry were pushing forwards to rescue the abducted children.
On 25th December 1995 UPDF launched another attack on the LRA. By this time we
were back in Aswa and two of our officers got wounded; one called Ojara Signaler was
wounded in his thighs and another fellow called Smart was wounded on his legs. They
were both taken to the sick bay in Tegot Ogili (Kitgum) where they were supposed to
get treatment. The following day we headed back west and crossed a rocky area full of
running water bordering Kitgum and Gulu. We then crossed the Kitgum-Gulu road
and headed back towards Anaka.
Just before we could reach our destination in Anaka a lady in the LRA who was
rumoured to be trying to engage herself to two army officers was shot dead under a
big mango tree with a silenced gun. We left her lying in her own blood. Everybody was
called to see the dead body to let everyone know that if you commit any of these
offences then you will be killed directly.
1.2. Journey to Sudan (December 1995/January 1996)
When we reached the area near Pabbo we looted bags and bags of rice. We took goats
and salt from the village. Then we turned back towards Kitgum district, crossing to
Lagile. We proceeded up to Pajule. We crossed to Patongo. Then we went and spent
the night on the mountain called Got Ogili where we went and checked on people who
were taken to the bay for treatment. From there another fellow called Odong Richard
was killed because he was found making plans with his friends as to how they could
escape from the convoy. He was killed using Lukile [see below] and left lying on the
rocks.
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That evening we were taken on top of the mountain where we made a big fire and
people were addressed by Matata Okello. He told us about the current war they were
undertaking inside Uganda, and that we would be heading back to Sudan before long.
We then spent the night there.
The following day we came down [from the mountain] and crossed to a place called
Omiyanyima before crossing the river Pager and heading towards Padibe. When we
were there a message was received from Joseph Kony in Sudan for the LRAs who were
in Uganda to return back to Sudan. From this point LRA commanders had to make
arrangements for us to move safely back to Sudan. Soldiers were selected to go and
loot properties, food and other important things both to help us on the way and to be
taken to the people inside Sudan.
For the journey to Sudan we were lined up in eight rows. We were again attacked by
UPDF on the way, but LRA managed to open the way by fire. We continued moving
heading towards the Atebe River which marks the Uganda-Sudan border, and a
helicopter gunship was sent again to come and check on the direction LRA was
heading – by this time civilians were complaining a lot that the government is leaving
the children to be taken down to Sudan without steps being taken to rescue them. So
the helicopter had to fire some bullets at the moving convoy and the LRA also fired
their guns to threaten the helicopter from controlling them and to allow them to
continue moving ahead. Thereafter the commanders decided that people should start
running ahead because there were soldiers following after the LRA.
This time they were on the way to cross the border to Sudan. Before reaching the river
Atebe, people suffered a lot because there was a scarcity of water. Some became so
tired they could not continue moving and were killed by the blocking forces [see
below], their bodies simply left behind. The majority though continued until we
reached the river Atebe. The river had very deep water that was not easy for us to
cross. So they used a long rope where people would climb to cross the river to the
other side. Two people were drowned in the process of crossing.
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After we had crossed the Atebe river it was already 6.00pm. The commander John
Matata Okello ordered the properties and military arms they were carrying along with
them to be checked, as well as the number of abductees, because when they reached
the camp they would have to present a working report to the Chairman (Joseph Kony)
as to how the operation had proceeded down inside Uganda. Having found that some
commanders had mishandled the abductees such that many were no longer present,
and that some of the properties were also missing, he ordered a terrible beating for
some of the officers until some of the properties which had been hidden among them
were rescued. Some also lost their rank because of their misbehaviour during this
operation.
1.3 Arrival in Sudan
We then moved to an area called Limwu, there was nobody there, we only found
remnants of pangas and hoes, ruined houses left there by the SPLA. It was dry season
and extremely hot. There was absolutely no water and many children died during the
one day we took moving from the border up to Aru. The commander survived by
drinking sodas which had been looted sometime back. We crossed to a place called
Aweno Olwiyo until eventually we reached the Government of Sudan military post at
a place called Issac where we were welcomed and given different types of food to eat.
After the message that we had arrived had reached the LRA headquarters some six
lorries were brought to collect us up to the LRA camp in a place called Aru, a distance
of some 9 kilometres. The lorries belonged to the Government of Sudan. They made
several journeys to collect the abductees and soldiers to the camp.
Section 2: Integration into the LRA in Sudan
2.1: Arrival in Aru Camp (18 January 1996)
We reached Aru on 18th January 1996 at around 5pm in the evening. Aru camp was
built on both sides of the Nimule-Juba road about 58km from Juba. Gilver and Stokri
were on the west side of the road, Sinia was on the east. Control Altar extended across
the road, but with Kony’s headquarters on the west side.
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We were gathered together to wait for our friends whom we had left behind to come
and join us. When we were now all together we were addressed by commanders from
different units telling us why we had been brought to their camp. They told us we
were brought to be trained and to become soldiers because we have to work hard and
make sure we go back and overrun Museveni’s government.
The convoy which I had been abducted by was that of Sinia brigade. We met different
people from different tribes. I even met my tribal men who had been abducted earlier
and taken to Palutaka (in Pajok, Sudan). By this time they were used to the camp. They
were able to tell us how they were maintaining their life and about the conditions in
the Sudan. They even advised us not to be worried about home because if you
continued worrying a lot about home then you could either die or you may fall sick,
and they warned us that if the commanders notice you have that intention of going
back then they will decide to kill you instead.
We were then released to go to our brigade Sinia where we were allocated to various
positions. For example some went to  Brigade Headquarters, others to Teranga
Battalion, Hoka Battalion, Siba Battalion [see organisational chart]. Then people were
divided and taken to stay with their commanders who were heading the brigade.
The following morning on the 19th January 1996 we were then gathered so that the
adjutants, Regimental Sergeant Majors (RSM) and brigade admin could collect
information about our particulars. They asked us our names, district, home village,
parish, parents, qualifications, age/dob. All this was noted down in their particular
book, which was then used for the Parade State (Roll Call) which took place each
morning, early enough for the information to reach the Brigade Headquarters by
8.30am. They in turn had to take the information to the overall Headquarters, where it
was processed before being taken to Joseph Kony by 10.00am each morning. During
the Parade State details of any sickness, deaths, births, absence without leave, duties,
loss of weapons, food distribution would all be noted and steps taken later in the day
to address these. As such those abductees who arrived in Aru in poor condition
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physically eventually received some treatment, but it was not immediate upon
arrival.578
200 had been abducted initially from Acaba. Of these 18 escaped but many others were
added as we moved: by the time we reached Aru in January we totalled about 1500. 2
elderly men had been killed near Acaba for being too weak to continue, 1 twentyfive
year old man was killed in Got Ogili for trying to escape, 2 children drowned crossing
the river Atebe, and a further 50 or so children had died of thirst in the march to
river Atebe and across the border in the Limwo area.
2.2: 1st meeting with Joseph Kony, 20 January 1996
The following day on the 20th January Joseph Kony was invited by the Brigade
Commander John Okello Mutata to come and address the newly arrived abductees.
Other high ranking officers like Ottii Lagony, Beba-beba, Celestine Akury, Buk, Nyeko
Tolbert (Chief Personnel Administrator at the time), Mr Odego (Military administrator
from West Nile), the Secretary to the Chairman, Mr Paul Okodi, Field Commander
Omona (who was the former UNLA signaler at the rank of Corporal), and junior
officers like Lucky Laker, and Major Otullu, were amongst the officers who attended
the ceremony in Sinia Brigade.
When Joseph Kony came to address us he was a major general by rank. He told us ‘we
have not brought you here to kill you, but because we want you to be trained and
become soldiers so that we can go back and launch offensives against Museveni’s
regime which is oppressing the population of northern Uganda’. He talked of the
Uganda Government killing off innocent civilians in Uganda, capturing civilians who
were then taken to Luzira, and persecuting and poisoning ex-soldiers who were taken
to Luzira after the military takeover from the late Major General Tito Okello Lutwa. He
added that ‘now that you are brought to Sudan here get to know we are in suffering
and you must change yourselves and your faith to be a true rebel who will work hard,
                                                     
578 Jacob noted that the amount of sympathy people received depended on whose authority they fell
under. Some of the LRA had been trained in the UNLA, WNBF etc and had some sympathy, others had
been abducted themselves from deep in the villages and did not know any other way.
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train, and have his guns ready to go back and fight against UPDF’ (By then it was still
called NRA [changed in 1996]).
2.3: Joseph Kony’s Regulations
We were also instructed by JK that there were some regulations we were supposed to
follow:
1) Whoever is brought from Uganda must undergo smearing with shea nut oil and
ashes, after which you have to stay for three days without washing. You will then
be allowed to greet and eat together with fellow LRA because they will assume you
are now part of them.
2) You are not supposed to hold a gun or any bullets before training
3) Nobody is allowed to go out of the defense [the camp] without informing the
authorities. Also nobody is allowed to shoot the gun because many times soldiers
have been hurting themselves by either shooting their legs, their hands or one
another in what we call ‘mistakes’.
4) You are not allowed to eat certain types of food and fruits, e.g. mango, oranges,
lemon, edible rats, pork, honey, sheep, duck, eggs (only children up to age 5 can eat
eggs) etc.. Why? Because the Holy Spirit believed that the opposing enemies of
LRA such as the NRA for example, would use these items for witchcraft to overrun
the strength of LRA (for example, if you ate honey you would be wounded
immediately you are in battle). So LRA had to counter the enemy plans by using
their own witchcrafts by stopping their militants from either eating or using the
above items as foodstuffs.
5) No stealing; if you are caught stealing you may either be killed or terribly punished
.
6) You are not allowed to fall in love with any girl or woman unless it is  authorised
by the military council. This is to control the rate of unwanted pregnancies and
prostititution within the camps.
7) You have to respect your mother and father. Now that you have been taken to any
of the officers or commanders then you must bear in your mind that is now your
father or mother. Because if you don’t respect then you will find yourself in
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difficulty and you may continue suffering because of your misbehaviour within
your ‘family’. No ladies or other women are allowed to share houses with their
commanders or have sexual relations with any commander before they have gone
together to swear before the yard.
8) Any LRA is not allowed to get married or in touch with any foreign lady be it a
sudanese, or otherwise. If you happen to commit such then you would either be
killed or deserve a terrible punishment for the same.579
9) All the tribes who joined the LRA were termed to be the new Acholi community,
‘Acholi Manyen’ who were fighting against the government because they have their
own agenda. They were informed that the people who are now taken to Sudan
might in fact be safer than people who were left behind in Uganda because of the
happenings which were taking place inside Uganda. For example, cases of
homosexuality, ladies being taken by UPDF soldiers, problems of money causing
many girls to become prostitutes, in the end you find lots of people dying of AIDS
disease. So the few people who are in Sudan could be safer than those left behind.
10) LRA is carrying a holy spirit war so LRA are well versed with their prayers, their
way of belief, to God, such that LRA is the only chosen people of God who are
fighting using the assistance from the Holy Spirit.
11) LRA as a rebel movement has no room to spare for our enemies because whenever
we go for battle we kill, we murder, we rob, and loot without being sympathetic to
our enemies. That is why most people fear LRA atrocities.
12)  JK said LRA is a movement which stands for itself. We will make sure we fight
until we overrun the Government of Museveni. He also said ‘LRA and their
objectives will not accept any Ugandan government decision unless the conditions
which made LRA go down to the bush are fulfilled (i.e. the ten commandments).
We shall only have dialogue with the Government of Uganda under certain
conditions, including that the Government will apologise to the LRA for the long
war and for the insults they have made about LRA. And that is because M7 last
time said he cannot negotiate dialogue with the criminals’.
                                                     
579 According to Jacob there was no intermarriage with Sudanese women as a result
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13) Kony commented that if the elites of the Acholi tribe continue supporting M7’s
government then they will be the sufferers because when two elephants fight it is
the grass which suffers. So the Acholi community should open their eyes to know
that some people are betraying them by trying to promote war against the LRA.
This was the speech he made while addressing us in Sinia brigade when we were first
arrived in Aru camp in Sudan.
The Brigade Commander of Sinia was then ordered to ‘recruit’ us again since we are
new faces and we need to be welcomed and to know the policy of LRA such that no-
one amongst us would try to escape from the camp back to Uganda.
2.4: Initiation into LRA and military training
The following morning on the 21st of January we were again called for assembly. Some
of us had already been beaten down in Uganda and we managed not to be beaten
again because John Matata Okello said these people were already beaten as a sign of
recruitment, but 17 others were selected and were terribly beaten with canes and sticks
by a group of young children aged 15 and below who had been abducted sometime
back and were now well versed with the situation. Two people died on the spot. They
were just taken and thrown to the bush without burial. They got rotten there. That was
the end of them.
We then immediately started training how to dismantle and reassemble guns. After
which we continued training, we were taken for target practice and then for field-craft
training e.g. how to take cover, how to assault the enemies. Parades were also
conducted and we were assured that to be a good army you must first of all know how
to parade very well. There was also training on how to use other machines like SPG9
recoiler guns, grenades, V10 recoiler guns, LMG (local machine gun), SMG (sub-
machine gun), as well as on how to use mines of different types. Most of us got used to
how to shoot guns.
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Section 3: Life in the LRA
3.1: Shortages of food and water (January/February 1996)
The major problems we were facing were that there was not enough food or water. We
were all taken under guard whenever we were going to the water well, which was
some 3km away from the camp. After some days a group of four boys managed to
escape from the water well. They were followed and were nowhere to be seen. So order
was put forward that nobody is allowed to go to the water well until time is scheduled
for everybody. So we experienced difficulties of thirst and we improvised another
strategy of carrying water in small jerrycans to help us whenever there was no time to
go and fetch water.
Talking about the problem of food, Sinia Brigade had never cultivated enough food for
their brigade, both because they had been operating for quite a long time inside
Uganda and because by that time Aru was still a new camp made after the LRA was
attacked in Palutake. As a result many of us had nothing to eat with the exception of
cooked sorghum which was divided into little quantities for us to chew before sleeping
for the night. During the day you could find the abductees in the old potato gardens
removing the left-over tubers that they would then chew or roast during the evening
when people are gathered together.
I stayed together with 13 other boys in the home of an old man called Mr Omwa580.
Because of the food shortage these thirteen boys decided to go and pick a certain tuber
called oye. When they brought this plant they chopped it into pieces and cooked it to
eat. After eating this all thirteen boys died one after the other and had to be taken and
buried down in the bush. This happened because although oye is eaten by some tribes
in southern Sudan it requires a lot of processing to make it safe to eat: It is first
chopped into pieces which are left in running water. After some time these are then
dried in sunshine and cut into smaller pieces and then pounded in a pestle and mortar
                                                     
580 a man who once worked together with Mama Alice Lakwena fled with her to Nairobi where they were
taken to a place called Thika to camp. After four years he decided to rejoin LRA movement.
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to make flour. This is then mingled like maize flour to make bread. Without this
process it remains poisonous. Myself and four other boys who were staying another
officer called Ojuk who was in charge of us did not eat this tuber so we escaped dying
from this poisonous food.
After the death of these thirteen boys a report was sent to Joseph Kony and as a result
he had to order that nobody should be found trying to dig any tuber or cooking it to be
eaten.
In addition to this kind of eating of raw food and various leaves of sweet
potatoes, cassava and other possible leaves, there was also an outbreak of the
epidemic named cholera in Sinia brigade, causing the death of more than 200
people. There was no possibility of medical assistance that we could get because
the camp was still a new place LRA had just come to and they were still trying
to make proper connection with the Sudan government.
After these events a message was sent to the Sudanese Government and they
decided to start sending lorries to bring food and other assistance to LRA camp
in Aru. By the time food was brought many people had died due to
malnutrition. When the food arrived people started to practice their appetites
once again, but ate too much too quickly. This also gave us many problems
because some people were roasting sorghum flour which gave many people
stomach problems. There was another break-out of cholera and a further twenty
five people died although there was enough food for everybody. These
problems further reduced the number of children who had been abducted and
brought to Sinia Brigade. Many of the abductees continued to be weakened
because there was a lot of work to be done putting up new buildings, which
involved going to collect bamboos from a long distance, for example moving a
distance of 6km to and fro when you were already weak. Some eight children
died on the way.
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3.2: Food raids in Dinka villages, March 1996
In March 1996 another plan was brought forward by the military committee, that since
children were dying in large numbers and they don’t enjoy the food-stuff brought from
the Sudanese Government we must start going down deep in the village to look for a
variety of foods and other plantation crops like cassava stems, millet, sorghum, beans,
maize and cowpeas to be planted in gardens they had cultivated. So people worked
very hard to make sure they had dug large plantations to plant all these crops.
Thereafter many people were sent to go down in the village and raid food from the
Dinkas’ area. They sent about 200 soldiers and 150 abductees down to the village.
When they reached the village I was among them: we went into the village, we roamed
the village, we attacked the Dinka by shooting them with guns, we killed five Dinkas,
we burned houses.581  After which we gathered a lot of sorghum which had been
hidden inside anti-hills on the mountain. We even got white ants, and honey sealed in
pots. We collected them all and brought them back to the commander. We even got
stools which were made by the Dinka, as well as lion-skins, donkey skins, bows and
arrows; all these things we carried along with us. The operation took two days because
we were searching for more food from neighbouring villages in a place called Captain
Cook. After finishing the operation a message was sent to Joseph Kony that we have
got a lot of things here: ‘We have got all possible foodstuffs you had sent us to look
for’. So he replied ‘if what you have collected is enough then you can come back now’.
On our way back to the camp we had a shortage of water because we had gone deeply
into a barren land occupied by the Dinka, and when we left the Dinka’s place we were
carrying heavy loads. That was at eight o’clock in the morning. By ten o’clock in the
morning things changed. Some of the children started collapsing because they were
now thirsty and nobody could help because they had little water. So you find that
some just decided to go and sleep under a bushy tree in search of a cool position.
                                                     
581 This section exemplifies the narrator’s occasional tendency to try to distance himself from responsibility
when describing actions which will be viewed negatively, but equally the difficulty of sustaining this
distanced narrative position. Thus ‘they’ sent people to raid, but ‘when they reached the village I was
among them’.
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Others continued moving hoping that they will get water because they were told that
some people were bringing water to rescue the situation. A message was sent to JK and
people from different positions in the camp who had sent children to go and collect
food for them immediately decided to collect water and rush to the rescue of those
children.
Unfortunately some of the children were already very weak and people in the convoy
decided to take them and lay them under the shade of trees while other people
continued moving.  Now, the rescue team which was sent from Aru camp came slowly
by slowly because the land was full of depressions which made it difficult for them to
move quickly to catch up in time to assist their brothers. When they managed to reach
the position at around midday the people who were already unconscious were left
behind and the people who could still continue moving were rescued and continued
moving although they were very tired. I too was very tired but I prayed to God that he
should help me and not let me die in the wilderness. And he did good and helped me.
Until when I was brought water and I had to drink, that is when I felt I was alive.
It was so hot that even those who brought water for us were at risk of dying because
the water they brought got finished and they also began to suffer. Three ladies and one
man called Mr Acel Calo Apar missed dying narrowly although he was a commander
and had commanded those who had brought water to rescue the children and various
men who had gone for the operation.
The nine people who were left behind lay there until in the evening when all of them
revived and when the Dinkas came in pursuit of the LRA they collected all the nine
children and took them along with them. They kept these children properly until they
found a way of sending a message to the GOU and a helicopter was sent and nine
children were brought back to Uganda here (1996). Before I left LRA when I was still in
the bush I heard one of the boys talking in Radio Uganda explaining the problem they
got when they were sent to go and collect food in that area of Captain Cook. I was thus
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able to confirm that the nine children never died although they had been left behind
and nobody had gone back to check on them.
When we arrived back at the camp the food we had collected was divided among the
different places in the camp where Joseph Kony thought there was too much problem
of food. From this time people began staying more comfortably. Although Government
of Sudan was supplying more food LRA would supplement this by going to attack the
neighbouring villages within Sudan in SPLA areas for more food support (the seeds
which had been collected in the raids described above were not yet ready for
harvesting).
3.3: Arrival of members of WNBF, 17 March 1996
On 17th March 1996 a group of 270 soldiers headed by a commander called lt Col Juma
Oris from WNBF came from Yei and joined LRA in Aru camp582. When they came they
were warmly welcomed. After two days a parade was organised to welcome the
WNBF, at which introductions were made between commanders of the two forces.
LRA also expressed their opinion about the joined forces and they commented that
they had joined hands to work together to make sure they overthrow Museveni’s
government.
3.4: Juma Oris Day, 7 April 1996
Time came when it was approaching the celebration for the day for one of the spirits
called Juma Oris (not the same as the person who brought WNBF soldiers on 17
March). That was on the 7th April 1996 when everybody was gathered for the assembly
to receive information from the Holy Spirit and to celebrate the day the Holy Spirit
appeared to LRA commanders inside Uganda at a place in the bush near Lacekocot
which the LRA called Bethlehem.
Joseph Kony said ‘we are soon going to expect an attack from the NRA’, and he said
‘we shall lose some of our officers here because they do not fully support our
                                                     
582 he later died in Khartoum on 9 March and was also buried there
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movement, although they are the full commanders within LRA’. He also stressed that
‘when this war will come then we have to select only 250 men to go for the battle. If we
exceed that number even by one person then the war will turn against us’. He also told
the congregation that there were some abductees brought here who were anti-LRA
movement, and he called these ‘anti-LRA supporters’ although they were within the
LRA camp. These abductees suffered the most because they were all the time suspected
of wanting to escape at any time from the LRA movement.
By then the field commander was Mr Omona and the Chief of Operations and Training
was Mr Ottii Lagony. On that day, Lagony as a very senior officer, was responsible for
hosting the other high ranking officers from the whole camp and the celebration took
place at his home.583  People gathered there, ate food and drank tea. There was strictly
no alcohol and no smoking because ‘a guerilla man has to be alert at all times’584. There
was no marijuana either. After the ceremony people prayed and some continued
enjoying themselves but already everyone was discussing about the report which was
revealed by Malaika in the Yard earlier that day.
3.5: Attack by NRA/SPLA, 9 April 1996
The following day people were gathered up in a field where all the military weapons
were exhibited to be checked and cleaned and tested because LRA was suspecting a
heavy offensive from NRA/SPLA. The WNBF soldiers who had joined LRA were also
present to assist LRA fight against the NRA/SPLA. Soon after this a standby of 150 was
selected to go and attack NRA/SPLA before they could reach the defense in Aru
                                                     
583 According to Jacob, Ottii Lagony & Okello Can Odonga were assassinated on 6 December 1998,
following allegations that they had sold a radio to the Sudanese. Lagony’s ten wives were then distributed
to other commanders, as were two of Can Odonga’s three wives. The third committed suicide by
swallowing Ambush, a pesticide, when she heard that her husband had been killed. This differs from
Temmerman’s account that Lagony was killed after having been accused by Kony  of plotting to surrender
with all the children under the terms of the Amnesty Act in the wake of the 1999 Nairobi agreement (2001:
158).
584 Another reason given is that ‘drinking alcohol and smoking may cause difficulty to soldiers and it may
be difficult for them to get these things because all these you need to walk to look for them and also the
problem of money, whereby if everybody were engaged in drinking and smoking then it would be
difficult to keep the defense and to stick to orders’.
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These people they took two days going to where they were supposed to put their
defense and wait for NRA/SPLA in order to disorganise their plan of coming. But
when they entered the defense of the incoming NRA/SPLA they fought. As the NRA
offensive was very heavy the LRAs decided to retreat back to come and defend their
camp. That is where we lost one of our commanders called Lieutenant Ojuk whom I
was staying together with.
After that encounter between LRA and NRA/SPLA, the enemy continued to come with
their heavy offensive towards the LRA camp. They had heavy artilleries, tanks,
mambas (anti-personnel carriers), and all sorts of guns. In the evening they attacked
the LRA camp in Aru with a combination of heavy shelling and infantry coming from
both sides of the defense. Eventually the NRA/SPLA succeeded in overrunning the
LRA camp.
They burnt the palace of Joseph Kony, the ammunition stores full of weapons brought
from Juba and other food stores which were brought for the people, as well as burning
other houses. The NRA/SPLA entered the camp from different sides until LRA and
WNBF had to abandon the camp. The NRA/SPLA ambushed the lorry which was
carrying LRA properties to be taken to Juba and they burned it off, leaving the lorry on
the road. They also set heavy ambushes on the way from Aru to Jebeleen where they
killed even many of the Sudanese Government soldiers who were now retreating
towards Juba.
Many people died in this war and many properties were also left because a day before
the attack the Government of Sudan had sent tonnes of food and ammunition to LRA
and war broke when these things were being divided to various positions within the
camps and most of the things were left after the attack. Many people fled the camp and
made their way independently to Jebeleen.
Some of the LRA soldiers led by a commander called Tabuleh decided to come back to
fight against NRA/SPLA in an attempt to recover the camp again. But they never
managed because the NRA had overrun the camp due to some of the LRA
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commanders who became too frightened. But on the other side NRA was already on
their feet to withdraw the artilleries and other ammunitions back. This was revealed by
one of the participants who was on the NRA side and was again recaptured by LRA
when they came for operations in Uganda and he was taken to Sudan. He revealed this
information that if LRA had tightened their belt for a little time then NRA/SPLA were
not going to overrun the camp.
For myself, I was with my commander Mr John Okello Matata working on shelling 120
mm artillery. We tried our best to shell the battle but when we found that the camp
was now overrun we came together with Tabuleh and he told us to leave the camp
because almost every part of the camp was now overtaken by NRA/SPLA. We then
had to leave everything in complete destruction, though we managed to dismantle
some of the artillery guns.
We left and started moving slowly by slowly. Anti-personnel artillery were shelling the
camp and throwing other bombs towards where we were. I carried my RPG bomb on
my back leaving all my properties and I started following the people who had gone
earlier, especially women and children who were already on the way to Jebeleen. Since
many people had not expected this attack to have happened that evening on 9th April
some of them got confused because they had left a lot of their properties behind and
they decided to try and come and collect them. But unfortunately some of the people
who came back lost their lives in the process.
The following morning everybody had to shift from Aru up to Jebeleen (a distance of
22km). Some of the abductees who were very weak were also left in the defense in Aru
and when the NRA/SPLA overran the defense they rescued all of them and they were
all repatriated back to Uganda. When we reached Jebeleen NRA/SPLA had not
completed their offensive against LRA so they continued pursuing LRA until they
reached up to Jebeleen where they wanted to overrun the Government of Sudan camps
as well as the new LRA camp.
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As soon as the Sudan Government knew that Aru was overrun and that LRA had now
come to Jebeleen, full lorries of ammunitions, food supply, jackets, uniforms were
shifted to Jebeleen where LRA was camping. The Government monitoring office in the
Government force situated on mount Jebeleen also sent a report that the NRA was now
approaching the LRA led by an NRA commander known as Firepower. So a standby of
different classes was then selected and I was selected among the first group who went
to attack the NRA/SPLA who were by then already camped on the mountain at a
distance called 39 (ranging from Juba) (those markers go up to Soroti following the old
Arab trading routes). (Jebeleen is 33km south east of Juba, distance 39 is south of
Jebeleen). When we reached a position where we knew our enemies were now nearby
we dug our trenches (andarchies). Immediately the enemies started attacking us with
mortars, tanks, APCs, and other weapons. Eventually they stopped and we then
managed to sleep that night.
The following morning NRA/SPLA soldiers and other militias brought from Uganda
had already covered the lowland part of Jebeleen. LRA sent more troops to come and
attack other sides which were already occupied by the enemies. The Sudan
Government, knowning that NRA/SPLA were going to try to overrun their defense on
Mount Jebeleen, managed to send two helicopters which were countershelling the
NRA/SPLA army which were by now located up on the mountain around 39. When
the helicopters came to shell the mountain 39 a second time the NRA/SPLA managed
to shoot one of them down.
The remaining helicopter returned to Juba and informed the Sudan army of the loss of
the other one, at which point the Sudan Government ordered their commanders to
send heavy artilleries and many of their soldiers to come and support LRA against the
NRA/SPLA offensive. 3 lorries full of soldiers came from Juba. They were deployed in
Jebeleen. Another 4 lorries were taken to 39 where the war was waged very heavily for
about five days until UPDF soldiers were finally expelled from Jebeleen. Many of them
died in Jebeleen. For example nine tanks were captured and burned out. Four tanks
whose operators had run away were then taken to Juba by the Sudanese army. From
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that day LRA and Sudan army became one and began to share all their military plans
due to the hard work they had done to help overcome the NRA/SPLA attack.
3.6: Jebeleen, April 10th 1996
It was after this battle that LRA again shifted its base and made their full camp in
Jebeleen where they stayed there for the next three years. We moved there on 10th April
1996 straight after the battles were over.  We continued staying in Jebeleen until
January 1999, which gave LRA a lot of experience about various offensives and Sudan
took a lot of interest in LRA, giving LRA the opportunity of making a lot of ambushes
and burning most of the SPLA vehicles which were supplying food and arms brought
from Uganda.
3.7: Offensives in Uganda
LRA often moved from Jebeleen down to Uganda to come and do operations inside the
country. Immediately after the heavy atrocity LRA committed inside Uganda by killing
two hundred people in Atiak, as well as cutting off ears and mouths, the GoU
published a letter which was sent to the United Nations accusing LRA of the atrocities
they had done inside Uganda. This brought a lot of dislike of the LRA from the
communities inside Uganda as well as from the UPDF.
At this time LRA was organising to come and launch another offensive in Uganda. The
operation was made clear to all the soldiers. We had three weeks of rehearsal in
Jebeleen, after which the whole convoy had to come down to Uganda heavily entering
Gulu via Atiak in January 1997. When they entered Uganda they fought heavily and
this was the time when UPDF soldiers were heavily ferried to go and camp in different
parts of Gulu commanded by the present Army Commander Kazini.
LRA fought several battles using different strategies inside Uganda over a period of
almost three months, during which we lost some of the LRA officers including the
army commander called Mr Opiro Agula. These battles which were heavily fought in
Gulu caused fear to the GoU and the President himself had to come to Gulu and shift
his headquarters to Gulu until the war was over (By that time Col Wasswa was 4th
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Division Commander). Then, when other officers were still continuing the operation
with soldiers inside Uganda, Kony and some of his nearest officers decided to go back
to Sudan to look for more assistance in arms and food to be brought to the soldiers
who were still operating inside Uganda. Another group was selected to ferry all these
things down to Uganda and Kony remained in Sudan to settle other matters of military
administration.
After a short time a new programme was drawn and as such the defense was
transferred one kilometre ahead towards Juba. They moved the defense, which was
now known as Jebeleen II, because Jebeleen I was very near to that of the Sudanese
military defense.  The UPDF were already aware of this position so as a military man
you have to change. Also children were moving between the two camps and causing
confusion. Putting a greater distance between the two camps made it more difficult for
people to move between them without being noticed.
So, the camp was transferred and people started building in the various positions
identified by the military committee for the brigades.
3.8: Visit of Ugandan Delegation, June 1997
Another accusation was put onto LRA that they were abducting a lot of children,
including the Aboke girls, of which a good number have been taken to the rebel held
base in Jebeleen. Then immediately a delegation from Uganda concerned to go right up
deep in the bush to check whether the accusation put on LRA was correct. And indeed
a group of people like Owiny Dollo, Sister Raquele and others colleagues came up to
Jebeleen with some of the Sudan security and they went up to the front-line in search
of the Aboke girls and young children under 15 years of age.
But soon after the information was sent to LRA by the Sudan Government LRA
decided to hide the Aboke girls and children under 15. So when Raquele went to the
front line (by then the commander whom they found there was called Lagira and he
was the real man who abducted these girls from Aboke girls school) they had hidden
these girls and young children in the bush for quite a period of time. It was only after
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the visitors had returned back to Juba that these children were then told to come back
to the camp.
Unfortunately Raquele and the colleagues managed to get one girl who was from
Aboke, but this lady refused to talk to Raquele in fear of being killed. When Raquele
returned from the front line with her colleagues they came to Joseph Kony’s palace
where she pleaded with Kony to accept the release of the Aboke girls who were now in
the camp. But Kony and his commanders did not allow the decision which Raquele
and her colleagues had asked for. They confirmed that the few numbers of girls she
wanted were there but they were not going to be freed.
At this point one of the girls appeared to Raquele and the colleagues. Raquele asked
the girl, who was crying, ‘now that they have got you here what is your decision?’ The
girl said ‘I want to go back home and if possible I must go together with you’. Kony
ordered that if Raquele decided to take along this lady with her they should both be
shot, and the delegation had to leave.
As soon as Raquele had left for Juba this girl was called up to Kony’s palace. She was
questioned and then she was taken to the COT Mr Ottii Lagony, to decide on why the
lady appeared to these people who had come from Juba. She was then ordered to be
killed and within short time she was beaten then taken to the bush and killed. This was
because LRA was keeping these girls for political reasons.
In another incident two other ladies, one called Catherine who was the head girl of
Aboke girls, tried to organise with two of her friends to escape back to Uganda. But
when their plan was discovered the two ladies were stoned to death by the younger
children (the third lady was a young one who revealed the information and so was not
killed). 585
                                                     
585 This account differs from that given by De Temmerman, in that he describes meetings with both Lagira
and Kony, neither of whom were available according to Temmerman (2001:132). It confirms however,
Temmerman’s account that one of the girls who did talk to Sister Raquele was killed following the visit
(2001; 148).
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3.9: Revision of standing orders, 1 December 1998
This took place on Whistle Day, 1st December 1998: this is the day when one time LRA
was inside Uganda and there was a heavy operation on LRA. So there was no time for
anybody to talk to one another because the soldiers after them were in large numbers.
So time for fasting came when LRA were still operating inside Uganda and wars were
also after them, so they couldn’t talk to each other because they had to sit and fast for a
period of time then everyone had to whistle to one another in case they wanted to
communicate. And that day is still remembered by LRA and known as Whistle Day.
Before this revision Joseph Kony was unhappy with the behaviour of some of his
commanders and he used the revision of standing orders to demote some people and
promote others as a way of tightening discipline and stopping people from discussing
issues, a process which threatened many people. Ottii Lagony was demoted from army
commander to a mere 2nd Lieutenant. Okello Matata was appointed the second
chairman to JK and to replace Ottii Lagony. Banya was to follow Matata. Ottii Vincent
was made Chief Intelligence Officer. Kolo Okello continued to work as the political
commissar of the LRA/M. Owor Lakati was appointed Brigadier General, and Nyeko
Tolbert was appointed Chief of Staff. Buk Oringa was appointed brigade commander
of Stokri. Major Odongo was appointed brigade commander of Control Altar. Caesar
Acellam was appointed Brigade Commander of Sinia, and Lieutenant Colonel Bunia
was appointed brigade commander of Gilver.
3.10: Explosion of ammunition store (November 1999)
We continued staying in Jebeleen for some months and a mysterious happening took
place there. One afternoon at about two o’clock some boys who were seated in front of
the ammunition stores as guards set fire to a charge and the whole stores containing a
wide range of newly delivered stock of ammunitions got burnt down completely.
Nothing was rescued. There were big explosions because some explosives like mines,
grenades and shells were contained there. People had to run away until the explosions
were over because they feared the deadly explosive anti-aircraft missile called SAM7.
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The initial interrogation and investigation made did not give everybody a good
understanding about what had happened, whether there was an enemy infiltration or
some sort of sabotage. Eventually it was confirmed that it was some of the boys
guarding the store who had set fire to it. This made the suppliers very angry since it
was a great loss and what they had given to LRA had not yet been utilised. Therefore it
became one of several issues causing the Sudanese Government to lose interest in the
LRA as they realised that despite the many times they had been supporting LRA a lot
of their military equipment had been wasted.
3.11: Attack on civilians near LRA camp (December 1999)
Another thing which made the Sudanese lose interest in the LRA while the LRA was in
Jebeleen was that in late December 1999 there was a large attack on the Sudanese
civilians who were staying near to the LRA camp and this was claimed to have been
the SPLA who had attacked the civilians but after investigation it was proved the
civilian attack was by the LRA because Trinkle Brigade, commanded by Brigadier
Owor Lakati of LRA thought the civilian community who were living on the suspected
side would be a possible chance for the enemies to come and attack them, so they
decided to chase them out of that place; several houses were burnt down, children,
men and women were shot dead. Other people escaped.
The following day we went to the village where the incident had occurred, we found
that there were some dead bodies lying, some of the children burnt and others were
still burning in the burning houses. Another woman I saw was shot from the door
while she was trying to escape. She was shot from behind together with the child and
she fell down and they both died. She had just come for a Christmas celebration and
she was preparing the following morning to go back to her home in Juba (I knew the
husband who was a Sudanese soldier).
This brought a lot of misunderstanding between the LRA and the civilian population
in southern Sudan, and LRA at this time was hated by the civil society in Juba and
elsewhere in Sudan. This also gives a clear picture of the kind of thing LRA had been
doing down in Uganda. Although they may say the atrocities attributed to them are
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not their doing, an example like this makes a clear meaning of what LRA normally do
whenever they go down to Uganda for operation. On this issue, it should be noted that
people would even return from operations in Uganda and recount everything they had
done, including killing people and attacking military positions.
The Sudanese Government eventually came and gave the LRA five days to withdraw
their camp from Jebeleen to Nisitu. They even sent five lorries from Juba to come and
assist LRA in transportation of their properties from Jebeleen to Nisitu. Five days later
there was nobody to be seen in Jebeleen, although immediately after the LRA left the
Sudanese Government sent six lorries of troops to occupy the position which LRA had
left behind. Since the transfer was so quick many properties and crops in the garden
were left behind, and the civilians living in the area came and picked those things.
3.12: Move to Nisitu (January 2000)
When we reached Nisitu people stayed there for a a few weeks and the military
committee, with information from the Sudanese Government, decided to go deep
15km in the bush but not before Joseph Kony and some of his officers took a walk
down to the bush. He had informed the people during the time when he was
conducting prayers in the Yard that he would be going out in the wilderness to pray
about what had happened abruptly and he would receive some of the information
from the Holy Spirit to guide LRA as to what to be done for the near future and what
will come in the near future. So he went and he took two days in the wilderness.
After he had come back he told everybody his journey had been to go and see where
the new camp would be put. Each and everybody should get ready with their hoes,
pangas, sickles, to go down and start building the new camp because the camp in
Nisitu was not large enough to accommodate all the people who had come from
Jebeleen. And people went down into the bush again to start making new houses for
the camp, which was known as Lubanga Tek.
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3.13: Lubanga Tek ( February 2000):
The plan for the camp was already drawn according to the usual arrangement. The
headquarters were at the very centre, guarded by a new brigade called Trinkle made
up of men selected by the chairman, Joseph Kony. There was then a circle of high
ranking officers, then commanding officers including majors, captains, other officers
from lieutenant to second lieutenant, warrant officers to corporals. Control Altar
became a brigade on a slightly higher level than Gilver, Sinia and Stokri.
I came late to Lubanga Tek because when I reached Nisitu my woman was already
pregnant and about to deliver. After she delivered I had to make a follow up to the
new camp where I built two huts and I was staying in the communication centre under
the control of the director of signals called Lumumba Martin.
The place we were settling in was quite overgrown although the area had been settled
by the SPLA maybe twenty years earlier. We found the remnants of ruined huts which
were settled by the SPLA, ammunitions which were left behind, cages for small hens,
granaries, grinding stones and the like. We also found the land was fertile for
cultivation. There was a nearby river called river Kit which was helping people with
water. We found the area was full of wild animals which people would hunt. These
factors made the place to be more suitable for the stay of the people. The weather of the
place was too cold because it was yet new and it was fully covered with big trees
which created a lot of dew. People found it difficult at the beginning, but as time went
on people started cutting trees, making charcoal, digging to plant crops and so we
adapted to the conditions of the area.
Now, the Sudan government was still wondering why we decided to transfer from
Nisitu to Lubanga tek without their notice, but they continued sending food aid,
uniforms, and other assistance like medical care down to the bush to help people. We
had two lorries, one was a Hino ZY, the other a Fuso truck. We also had three Toyota
Landcruisers – one for the chairman, one for the second chairman, and one was given
to the LRA representatives (ambassadors).
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Since LRA/M was maintained by the Holy Spirit each and every time they go to
another camp they always make sure a yard is built within a few days. Until it is built
people go pray under a big tree chosen to provide enough shelter to cover the whole
congregation.
Lubanga Tek was four days walk from Uganda.
3.14: The move to Bin Rwot, April 2000
At this time LRA was frequently changing their plans and they had caused a lot of
problems to themselves and they were now a long distance from Jebeleen, such that it
was not easy for them to walk to Uganda. Despite this the LRA still continued
although they were far away from the border. At a certain point a decision was made
to open another camp called Bin Rwot, which was another 9 miles between Sindru
road and Lubanga Tek.
As in the move to Lubanga Tek people went there together with Joseph Kony in the
wilderness where they prayed for four days in search of a better position which the
Holy Spirit would recommend as suitable for another defence to be built there. In this
place the Holy Spirit released a message to the LRA commanders telling them to have
two defences. In case of any attack one would come up quickly to rescue the other and
all the military arms and weapons were to be kept in both of these defences. This new
camp, known as Bin Rwot, was then opened.
Grass thatched houses were built and women, children and men were taken to live
there. Some of them also participated in planting large fields for crops like simsim,
cowpeas, beans and cassava plantations and keeping domestic animals within the
camp. This place was well enjoyed by the people because there were a lot of wild
animals which they could hunt, and set traps for. Meat was not a problem to people
living there. So people enjoyed this area because it was like living in the village.
At this time there was no constant wars or going out to operation as had been the case
in the past, although a good number of soldiers could be sent out to go and patrol at a
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distance of ten kilometres from all directions to ensure that no enemy would infiltrate
the camp. At the same time some of the LRA were operating widely inside Uganda and
a few were also operating elsewhere in Sudan. There was a lot of hard work LRA was
doing within both camps to sustain themselves since the Government of Sudan had
already stopped giving supplies.
Although the relationship between the Government of Sudan and LRA worsened, for a
number of political reasons the LRA got organised and Joseph Kony went to Nisitu
camp with his commanders and met with the Sudanese army. For the first time, they
discussed a lot of issues concerning the current situation of the LRA. This was done
together with delegates who had come from the Carter Centre, but they did not come
to any agreement. After which the delegation went back to Khartoum with promises
the LRA had made. After a little time they came again and met with Joseph Kony on
the same issues. These were as follows:
1) LRA should renounce rebellion and talk peace with the Uganda government
(dialogue)
2) They were told to release any abducted children who were 15 years old  and
below which had been taken to battle at any time, as this is against the
children’s rights.
3) LRA should release the commonly wanted Aboke girls if they were to continue
with their war properly.
4) The atrocities committed by the LRA inside Uganda, for example burning
houses, looting, killing people and many others should stop
5) LRA should be transferred 1000km far away from the border of Uganda and
Sudan and that would mean LRA would be taken beyond Khartoum for
resettlement.
6) Sudan should stop supplies of food, uniforms and ammunitions to LRA
because this would be another way of stopping LRA from attacking the military
and civilian communities inside Uganda.
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At this time LRA was in some dilemmas about whether or not to accept the conditions
which the Carter Centre and the Khartoum Government had put forward. After some
months JK decided to call some of the political wing who had their main offices in
Khartoum, to come back to the bush and join hands together with others. But only two
of the members responded to his calls back to come back to the bush at a place called
Lubanga Tek. After which they had to continue up to Bin Rwot where they were had to
build their homes. The other political members refused to come back because they had
confirmed rumours about what had recently been done by the LRA Movement leaders
in Jebeleen, namely the recent killing of the late Army Commander Ottii Lagony. In
fact the Sudanese security told them that they need not come back to the bush. As a
result two of the politicians remained in Khartoum until they had processed their
tickets and were flown to Nairobi.
3.15: Breakdown of Relations with Government of Sudan
The movement secretariat which was the head office in Khartoum was then closed and
another office was opened in Juba. At this time things were not normal but LRA was
watching what may come again because there was no way to keep all parties satisfied.
The Sudan government tried to support LRA with some food aid, especially to help the
innocent people like children, women and men who no longer knew what was going
on. Although the Sudanese Government continued to support LRA, the JK understood
this to be a deception/trick behind which efforts were being made to capture him and
some of his commanders.
Joseph Kony decided to stop receiving supplies of food, arms and uniforms from Juba,
saying things like ‘any food being brought by Arabs must not be accepted because they
may be poisoned’. He even decided to refuse messages and information from the
Sudanese Government although there was still contact with the Carter Centre. So he
continued to stay settled in his camps in Lubanga Tek and Bin Rwot, without any more
assistance from the Government. Kony and his commanders turned against the
Government programme because they were told that if they refused all the conditions
set for them, then United Nations troops were to be brought up to Juba to disarm Kony
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and his rebel group.  They might include troops from Libya, Sudan, Egypt, Uganda,
Tanzania, Rwanda.
At this time Kony stopped most soldiers in the camp from moving between Lubanga
Tek and the Sudanese Military Camp. As a result there was little communication
between some of the LRA commanders and the Sudanese army commanders, although
it continued at a low level because this was the only way the LRA could get a market
for selling their produce they had, such as charcoal, and also allowed them to purchase
other essential commodities like sugar, salt, drugs, clothing and fuel for their vehicles.
3.16: Building links with Equatoria Defence Forces (2000)
After all these occasions JK wrote a letter of recommendation of the LRA movement
and three of his commanders (Ottii Vincent, Owor Lakati and one other) took it to their
former companions who were soldiers of the Equatorial Defence Forces led by
Commander Kenyi in southern Sudan. The EDF’s base is situated at a place called
Upper Talanka. At the first meeting the EDF and LRA soldiers decided to dialogue
with each other although they had had some conflicts in the early 1990s.
For the second meeting some LRA officers were sent to meet with their EDF
counterparts in another EDF camp in a place called Agoro on the Sudan side of the
border. At this meeting they sat together and agreed with each other on some of the
reasons why LRA wanted to join with them. LRA, in reaction to the insult from the
Sudan Government, wrote a letter stating that they were ready at any time to fight
against the Sudanese Government if any attempt was made to send external troops to
come and disarm them from within their camp.
But since the EDF had a strong connection with the Sudanese Government and were
getting their supplies from them they decided to send a copy of this LRA letter the
Government of Sudan. When this letter reached the Government the Sudan, their
security decided to call Kony. He initially refused to meet with them, but later was
persuaded by his commanders and they went and met with the Sudanese officers.
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During their meeting, at which they were supposed to discuss among other things the
current political issues taking place, the Sudanese Security also produced a copy of the
statement which had been sent to them by the EDF about what LRA was proposing to
do, namely to launch an attack against Sudanese Government soldiers.
There was no way the LRA could deny this evidence and they had to apologise for
they never thought this would have reached that level, but they were not happy with
the tricks played on them by the Sudan Government because when they meet they can
talk important issues and agree on them, but on the other side Sudan Government will
only be giving them a carrot and [simultaneously coming with] a stick behind.
3.17: LRA drawback
Actually there was now a total drawback in the LRA programmes. So they decided to
start other activities to unite everybody who are in the camp. They started traditional
teachings about village life in Uganda and differences in how people are undertaking
culture these days. Some of the LRA who were operating inside Uganda were already
blocked inside by the UPDF. So Kony sent a message to them to try hard if they could
penetrate their own way then they had to come back. Some few numbers came back to
Sudan while others continued operating inside Uganda.
The remaining people who were led by the commanders, for example Lieutenant
Colonel Onen Kamdulu, started  making dialogue with some of the civil population in
the year 2000. They succeeded and they were welcomed by the UPDF soldiers and
Government of Uganda to continue with the dialogue and some of the soldiers who
were operating on the other side led by Lieutenant Colonel Tabuleh came together and
the dialogue continued.
At a certain point in 2001 Kamdulu’s group were given their camp in Pabbo with a
Landrover vehicle [in] which they were allowed to freely move from their defense then
go into Gulu town. The UPDF at all times were responding to the LRA’s demands. For
example, they gave Kamdulu mobile telephones which would help them at all times to
talk and coordinate the affairs of the dialogue.
420
In October 2001 these people decided to go back to Sudan because Kony sent the
information from Sudan that the dialogue being undertaken by Kamdulu and his
group was not proper. For this matter Kamdulu must first of all go back to Sudan and
then they will make another arrangement. Before these people could leave to go back
to Sudan they decided to take back all the equipments they were given by the UPDF,
for example the mobile telephones, the vehicle and a few other things they were using
at their Pabbo camp. The vehicle was left somewhere in town. The mobile phone was
sent back to UPDF through one of the coordinators. (by that time – October 2001 - I had
just come so I was visiting UPDF)
The LRA disappeared from Pabbo without informing the military headquarters in
Gulu. After they had gone back to Sudan there was nothing much anybody in Uganda
could do about it, except that people were worried now that these few numbers of LRA
were allowed to come freely into the town then they might have taken the whole plan
which may give them courage to come and attack Gulu at any time. People who were
co-ordinating this dialogue, for example the LCV chairman Lt Col Walter Ochora and
other leaders, lost their chances of talking with the LRA.
When the LRA who were inside Uganda went back and reached Sudan they were told
not to come back because Kamdulu was forcing this dialogue without the acceptance
of the chairman JK but he never knew what was happening although dialogue could
bring peace between LRA and Government of Uganda. Until now they are in Sudan
1st November 2000: 9 military commanders left LRA camp and escaped to Juba with
about 35 children whom they had gone with to work in the field at a place called Nisitu
(the former camp). These are the ones who came later and stayed in Hotel Roma in
Gulu in February 2002.
The Nine Officers who escaped on 1 November 2000
Rank & Name From
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Colonel Sururu Abudhala West Nile (ex-WNBF. He also worked during Amins’
regime and then joined WNBF after which he joined LRA)
Major Mohamed Nasuru Bombo (Amin’s soldiers, joined WNBF then LRA)
Captain Okwera Bruhan Adjumani (Amin’s, also WNBF, then LRA)
Captain Adam Faisle Busoga (Jinja area) (ADF, WNBF, LRA)
Captain Okilan Joseph Teso/Soroti (UPA, LRA)
2 lieutenant Okodel Teso/Soroti (UPA, LRA)
Lieutenant Mina Mukwas Kapchorwa (UPA, LRA)
The first group which returned to Sudan was led by Lt Col Odongo. At this time I was
planning how to leave the camp. On 23 February 2001 450 LRA soldiers were selected
to go and collect food in connection to attack one of the Dinka defences which was in a
place called America. This is a place which was settled by the SPLA because the area is
materialise and is full of minerals. For example, gold is found there. So LRA fought
with them and they overran the camp. And they started mining gold from this area.
Two officers lost their lives during this operation. Others returned back with a lot of
things, for example cattle, sheep, goats, sorghum and many other things they got in the
SPLA camp. When these people who had gone for the operation returned back to the
camp at Lubanga Tek they reached the camp on the 25 February. Then the following
day was made to be a victory for those who had been for the operation. So a big
ceremony was organised.
Section 4: Escape
4.1: Escape to Nisitu
By then I was working as the military adjutant in the headquarters. I was having a lot
of work to do until I decided to leave the camp because I found that nothing was
happening that could push LRA ahead. We were just getting blocked and people were
now returning to village life although we were in a military combat. Also unnecessary
arrests had already started amongst high ranking officers and even junior officers, as a
result of which some even lost their lives.
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Before these officers left there was a meeting which was called and the meeting
included all the tribes who were non-Acholi. He tried to politicise these people by
saying that ‘we really like you in our movement and we don’t have any segregation
with you at all because we know you are part of us and we need your assistance to
develop our movement so we can work together’, but these people were quiet to such
questions. They knew there was something going to be wrong since they had been
marginalised and talked of. So they decided to leave the camp without anybody
knowing.
After these nine officers who felt they were being victimised for being non-Acholi
escaped, JK gave a strict order to the camp saying that whoever is found escaping
would be killed straight away, and if anyone is captured attempting to escape only the
evidence need to be brought, not the body. As a result many people became afraid.
So, as I was working in the office I did watch what was going on and I decided for
myself that I have already served enough for the movement so I must go home and rest
my brain. Alright… Then I got organised, informed my wife, informed my friends and
fellow brothers that I may leave you anytime but they never knew the date.
It was night time after the celebration when I picked my woman and child and I picked
another fellow with his two women and five children and we left the camp at around
midnight. We had to travel all the night; fifteen kilometres from Lubanga Tek to Nisitu.
When we reached there I left my wife and child and the other people hidden in the
bush and I entered the Sudanese military defense in the morning at around 6 o’clock in
the morning where I was welcomed by the guards. They informed the commanding
officer, a major Salah Fadal Mullah (he was a best friend to me, I used to go to his place
and repair his TVs and other equipment) in charge of the barracks of Nisitu.
When he heard I had already arrived he picked his vehicle, a Toyota Landcruiser and
rushed to check on where I was. Immediately he got me he was very happy to see me.
So he asked me whether I had come alone but I told him there were some people
somewhere. Then we went and collected the children and women and the other fellow
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whom I had left to look after them from where they were hiding in the bush. We
picked them and all our luggages and we got into the car and we were taken to the
defense in Nisitu.
4.2: Transfer to Juba
From there we had our breakfast and were then put into another lorry which was
going up to Juba. We were escorted until up to Juba bridge where the Sudan security
lies. We were taken to live with the security for some two days. We were cooked food,
we ate and everybody enjoyed. Then on the third day we were then taken to the
security office handled by the military police for investigation. When we arrived there
we were pushed to jail direct, leaving the women and the children outside. From here
all of us were again confused because we had no idea what might happen. Either the
Sudan security would take us back or they would give us chance to stay in Juba or
continue with our journey up to Khartoum.
We stayed in jail from 8.30 in the morning until we were released again at 8 in the
evening. This was because they wanted to know whether our escape was really from
the bush and what we were talking about was true. So the Sudan security officers
whom we knew came and met with us and they emphasised that if these people had
left JK’s camp in this way in this great number then it means there might be something
wrong down in the camp. So the following day the investigating officers were sent and
they came to us. Both of us who were men were then investigated and we told them
we were tired of suffering in the bush and that what we wanted was to be connected so
that we come home rather than being enslaved in the bush.
After the investigation was finished and the vehicle was ready our things were
checked and anything connected to military combat like chargeable batteries, uniforms,
shoes, books and other documents was removed from us. We were then taken right to
the airport and we entered the office of the security where we were again checked to
find that there was nothing. We met with the Acholi chief of Pajok (Mr Okumu
Charles) who is working hard in connection with the Sudanese security to connect
children who escape their way from the bush to find their way home.
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We were then handed over to a certain organisation in Juba which is working in
connection with UNICEF Toto Chan [Total Child?] Centre  for Trauma (centre me lit
wic). (tel Juba 20606). We found also a Japanese woman who is the coordinator of this
camp called Mrs Tetseku Karuanagi. We also stayed with other people who helped us
within the camp, people like the director of this camp called Mr Jimmy Long. The
camp had a cook called Mary Kamala, a driver called Mr Wilson Anthony, an assistant
called Mr Michael, and a senior Acholi woman called Esther who was very interested
to see that all the Acholi children who were taken to Sudan were repatriated back to
their homes. Then you have some other people like Soro Jatoma and Enineio Soro and
these were the workers we got there in Toto Chan. We stayed there for nine days. We
enjoyed the camp, it was well furnished with two storeyed houses and all the facilities
to welcome the escapees who are brought to this centre. They also have things like
television and radios which they are using all these things to change the minds of the
traumatised children who come from the bush at any recent time. They were showing
films of how a woman can stay with a man and again may decide to refuse a man, for
example the most interesting tape we had was about a Nigerian lady called Ama of
Nigeria.
4.3: Transfer to Khartoum
We stayed comfortably in this camp until on the 10th March when early in the morning
three vehicles were brought. One for our transport, two for the Sudan security, the
third vehicle was for the co-ordinator of Toto Chan. We entered the vehicles with all
our luggage and were then escorted to Juba airport. We were then taken inside,
everything we had was checked and packed properly. We had to wait for one and a
half hours, before the plane which we were booked on, Sudan airlines  flight 313 Juba-
Khartoum, landed. That is when I knew everything was changing and I can reach
home now safe from any pursuit by the LRA.
After our tickets were brought to us (the amount per person was 26,039 Sudanese
Dinar) we entered into the plane and the plane  took off thirty minutes later. It took us
two and a half hours until we landed safely in Khartoum airport where we were then
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welcomed and taken into a transit vehicle which was already informed and waiting for
us. From here we went to check offices in the airport then we were transported up to
Soba Camp where we were received nicely. We met some of our friends who had
escaped earlier. We even had information about some of our friends who had already
been repatriated down to Uganda.
We started staying there, we met different people, different decisions and many other
interesting places. So we get used to Khartoum. Three days later on 12 March 2001
ambassadors from different embassies, including the British, German, Egyptian,
Danish and Canadian Embassies, came to meet and witness our presence within the
centre. Carter Centre was also present. They started bringing us new clothing, shoes,
bags, and any other essential items to meet our basic needs. On the 13th March men and
women were separated into different camps. Children and women were handed over
to the organisation called Save the Children while men were to be kept by the IOM
International Organisation for Migration headed by the programme manager called
Salah in the head office in Khartoum.
4.4: Seven months in Khartoum
We met many different people in Khartoum. We were taken to places of interest. For
example, we went to the Zoo where we saw different types of animals and many other
things. We went to Omdurman to see how the place is developed. On Sundays they
always hired buses to take us for Sunday services. While I was in Khartoum I never
thought of staying without any job. I started to do my handiwork within the camp. I
also decided to open my workshop in a place called Engazi where I was moving to
every morning to repair radios, TVs, and other electronic equipment. I made a lot of
friends and even went to visit other places like Jebel Awuliya, Kassala, and Souk Libya,
the biggest market situated on the western side of Sudan.
By this time many of the children who were coming from the bush were repatriated
down to Uganda. We had not yet got enough information about what was happening
in Uganda. We could only hear things from people who came to Uganda, or read them
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from newspapers or hear them when listening to Radio Uganda during news hours
(from 6 o’clock until 9 o’clock in the evening).
So we sent one of the representatives from the Carter Centre concerned with conflict
resolution to go down to Uganda and come back to inform us about the current
situation. When he returned back to Sudan he told us Uganda at the moment is a
peaceful country. So you can go back without any fear, although there was some news
of ambushes which can be heard through radios being operated between Gulu and
Kitgum.
We then decided that if the current situation in Uganda cannot cool down then we
would decide to go and resettle ourselves outside to places like Canada and United
States. We continued staying for some months until some delegates from Nairobi
headquarters of the IOM came to our camp (Soba) to check our condition, how we
were surviving in the camp. We met, talked with them and we made our decision that
we feel we should go back home in Uganda. So from there they took our photographs,
they went with them up to Nairobi where they said they will go and find what is
happening in Uganda and then afterwards they will inform us and arrange for our
repatriation back to Uganda. Immediately they left a group of three people came from
Uganda sent by the Uganda Government to go and check on those of us who were still
living in Khartoum. If at all we were ready to respond to the Amnesty Act no 2 which
states that any person ‘referred to under subsection (1) shall not be prosecuted or
subjected to any form of punishment for the participation in the war or rebellion for
any crime committed in the cause of the war or armed rebellion’
But, although we were convinced by the delegates which includes Justice Onega,
chairman of the Amnesty Commission, Commissioner Lutara, Rafael Makoa, we
accepted their appeal but we had no trust on the amnesty because we had an example
of a man who was called Goan who returned to Uganda through Zaire after 29 years in
exile and was then prosecuted for the alleged killing of the Gombolola chief in
Mbarara. And we also feared that if we were to come down to Uganda we might be
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abducted again because those people who escape and go back to Uganda are all known
by the rebel LRA who are still in the bush.
4.5: Repatriation
However, on October 14th we had a report from the office of the Manager of IOM
calling on us to get ready for repatriation because the headquarters in Nairobi had
arranged for our tickets to fly us back to Uganda. We finished making all the possible
arrangements for the journey until on the 19th of October we were celebrated well until
midnight by both Save the Children and IOM staff. They then brought two mini-buses,
two land-cruisers. We greeted our friends who were remaining in the camps,
everybody was joyous, and at 12 midnight we entered the mini-buses. We took
photographs for the memories until we had to wave to our brothers who were
remaining in Soba camp.
Then we were taken to the airport in Khartoum. We were directed to the reception in
the airport where all the checkings on our luggages  and tickets were done until the
plane we were boarding came from Cairo. At 4 o’clock in the morning we then
boarded the plane from Khartoum to Nairobi. It took us three and a half hours to reach
Nairobi. We arrived at Nairobi at 7.15am. Then we went to the reception where again
we were checked then after one and a half hours we had to board the same plane,
Kenya Airways, from Kenyatta Airport in Nairobi. We flew to Entebbe which took us
two hours 50 minutes to reach. At around five minutes to midday we then landed at
Entebbe airport.
When I reached Entebbe I could not believe I was already at home because when I
reached I found everything was quite different from where I had come from. As soon
as we landed and came out of the plane it was raining but the rain stopped
immediately. When we came out we thought we were the prisoners of war brought
from elsewhere because there was nothing that showed to us that we were fully
welcome as had happened to some of our friends who came for the first time. We never
knew who received us in the airport until I saw journalists with their cameras just
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taking photos. Except we were then guided by one of the white men to the reception
where we took some sodas and bread.
At this point the programme which had been agreed to in Khartoum was changed
without consulting us. Although  we were brought as families we were once again split
up and the programme told us each and every one should go to his own district. We
then had to divide ourselves from our families. My wife and my child were flown to
Kitgum. Those going to Gulu then boarded a minibus (kamwunye) which then carried
us from 2 o’clock up to 6.30pm. When we arrived in Gulu we were taken to the centre
called World Vision and received a nice welcome.
From there again we were divided into two groups. Others were then taken to GUSCO
centre. That was on the 20th October in the evening. We had to stay in World Vision for
one month. After five days I decided with one of my brothers to go and visit our family
in the KICWA centre in Kitgum. We went there and we got them and others were
already counselled to go home. So I accompanied my family down to the village in
Namukora at a place called Omiyanyima, where I left my wife and child. IRC would
not allow me to sleep there because I only had permission to go to KICWA, but I met
several people who had come to see their daughter which I had brought to them. I was
then thanked for the endeavours I had made to bring the girl back home together with
the child. Then I had to come back up to KICWA where I spent three days before
returning World Vision.
I continued staying for a little number of days and I decided to leave for home. When I
went home I found that my name was already cancelled and everybody knew I was
already dead, so when I met my brothers and sisters they started crying and I gave
them courage that it was God’s plan for me to be captured and since he has brought me
back nobody should worry. When I reached my home I found that all my parents were
already dead and one of my brothers had also died and there was nothing I could do
except pray for their souls to be in eternal life. Then they had to make a party for me
and everybody was happy to see me back home. Until now I am staying a peaceful life
with my fellow countrymen.
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Section 5: Treatment of Stragglers
When people are moving in a convoy and you get tired you are not left behind because
they know the UPDF could pick information from you. When a convoy is moving, five or
six people known as ‘blocking forces’ are left about one mile behind to find any stragglers
and deal with them. They carry radio and communicate with headquarters.
If they feel you are somebody important, somebody whom they think has a particular job
to do, such as a teacher or nurse, they can send back some soldiers to carry you along on
the stretcher. If you are not important, they take a small axe known as Lukile and they
strike you at the base of the skull from behind. If you do not die immediately, you are just
left behind on the ground. These ‘Blocking Forces’ carrying Chinese rifles with bayonets
on them can spear you to finish you off or else you can be thrown in the bush to rot there
without anybody knowing about you. While waiting to die, blood comes from the nose.
That is why when you talk of the atrocities committed by LRA, the UPDF were collecting
true information.
When adapting to that life of marching 80km every day, I had a problem with my feet.
When you don’t have shoes to protect your leg, you cannot move such long distances.
You need a sandal or if somebody has an extra pair of gum boots then you can walk freely.
People end up walking on their heels because the wounds on the soles of their feet do not
allow them to walk fully on the whole foot. I was not killed because they knew I was a
technician. I took some remaining slippers which were of different sizes. One side of the
slippers gave me a pair. All my nails came off during that first journey and only grew
back when I reached Sudan. All the skin was removed from the soles of my feet. They used
to give us shea nut oil to rub on. After some time they got cured”.
Section 6: Control exercised over people’s sex lives
Cases of bwoc (impotence) included both people who were already bwoc at home, and
others who became bwoc after abduction. Some people stayed a long time without having
sex and don’t have the appetite. It is the chairman who decides if you are ready for a
woman; even if you don’t want you are given. In this process you will find that
complaints are brought forward by women that so and so is impotent. Many cases of such
were there. Joseph Kony tried very hard to help these people, even some of the high officers
who had these cases were also cured. If you are given a lady and she fails to get pregnant
people will start to ask ‘what is wrong with this fellow?’ If they find that you have this
problem with you, then they will process these herbs and they start giving to you until
when you feel better and you resume your normal way of life.
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It happened once that a lieutenant called Obedi who was in Gilver brigade was killed in a
firing squad having committed anal sex (butu ki dud latin) with a 14 year old boy.
Moreover, he had two women. His neighbours had discovered him when he was already
behind the young boy. He was discovered because officers don’t share their rooms with
women. In case they want them they just call the woman for a night or two after which
the women go back to their houses. So one of his neighbours had come across to his house
at night to inform him about the work programme which was going to happen the next
day, but he came across them and found the man was already on the bed with the young
boy.
When the young boy was asked he revealed that he was having sexual relations with
commander. The young boy was then taken to the authorities concerned with handling
cases within the defense, after which the military committee decided according to the
standing orders that whoever has committed such an offense is liable to firing squad. The
lieutenant was then tied to a tree and executed.
Nothing was ever done to the boy but he was given some herbs to swallow and prayers
were conducted to relieve him from thinking too much of what happened to him. (he was
still too young to have a wife of his own). The wives of the man who was shot were taken
to other positions and given to other men who could look after them.
Immediately after the firing squad everybody was called to the assembly to be informed of
such happenings and the chairman and his commanders revealed to all the LRAs by
revising the standing orders that whoever was found committing offenses against the
standing orders will be killed or dealt with according to the law. This made many people
to be threatened about their lives because in case you are caught you would think yourself
dead”.
Section 7: LRA Sick Bays
A sick bay is a safe place where wounded casualties are taken to seek treatment. This one
is always a place where no-one can find the position where the sick people are kept. There
are very many such sick bays. People are taken in small numbers in each so that it is easy
to care for them. These places are co-ordinated by civilians who will look for food, drugs,
and other necessary items ... Also some well armed soldiers are left there to guard the sick.
We also have some of the medical assistants who were captured sometime back and taken
to the bush (these included ‘Dr’ Onen Griffiths, ‘Dr’ Elia, ‘Dr’ Acito, ‘Dr’ Otim, Alice,
Okwera, Gama, ‘Dr’ Ochol, ‘Dr’ Saidi, ‘Dr’ Oloya [died 2000 on operation in Uganda]
and many others). These are the people who were giving assistance to the wounded from
battle, and were mostly people chosen by the Holy Spirit of the LRA to go and participate
in looking after people in the bay.
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Pregnant women and children are also kept there, and other people to keep the bay we
have them [there are other people there who look after the place]. They always come to
neighbouring villages to collect food from the civilians by attacking them and looting
their food and properties. The strength of the Holy Spirit protects the sick bay; whenever
the UPDF is to go and look for the LRA in the bay they will just get lost.
The people in the sick bay also have radio for communication which they normally use to
inform the LRA base in southern Sudan about the situation inside Uganda and the
programme of the UPDF against LRA. Also some of the civilians who help them carrying
the food to the bay are not allowed to reach the exact position …
Regulations in the bay:
While you are in the bay you are not allowed to go anywhere until you are fully cured.
Prayers are conducted at all times. Fasting for up to 40 days at a time (people can eat and
drink at night. Also small children and mothers with very small children are allowed to
eat and drink) until when the Holy Spirit reveals that everyone should now stop fasting
and prayers are conducted to everybody and they are told other things that may come or
regulations to be followed while in the bay.
Fasting can be done 1) when there is war 2) when there is expectation of epidemic 3) to
prevent a happening such as an attack. After a long fast the Holy Spirit may reveal to
Joseph Kony that from now onwards such a happening will not be. Then people will
continue eating and chewing 4) if there is a message from the Holy Spirit about any
fighting which may come 5) when there is a complete lack of  assistance from external
sources such as Sudanese Govt 6) when people are going for war they are made to fast for
a few days.
Sometimes, when the malaika (Holy Spirit) reveals that nothing bad is going to happen,
then he may cancel the fasting for the soldiers going for war but they are not allowed to
meet with their women. They call this Agaba. Sometimes you stay outside the camp
defences, you don’t come home when you are going for the battle. Except when you fall
sick or there is another change of command in which case you are allowed to come back.
When the wounded are completely cured they are allowed to join the convoy for another
battle. Others who were (more) seriously wounded or have broken legs continue staying
in the bay until they get cured. So for many years LRA had been very strict in keeping
many people in the sick bay. For example, women who get pregnant always have the
advantage of delivering their children without any effect from military offensives.
Some women may be taken to the neighbouring village (some of the wounded also may be
left with people in the village; the healthy go to the village, look for somebody known to
them, give some money to keep that patient for a certain period of time until they get
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well). It was not difficult because this is a war which was supported by the community.
The community would just assist because they know that these are our children so we
need to keep/look after them. There were also some cases where people informed the UPDF
about sick people being kept within the village, and they were then surrounded and taken
to the barracks. For example, we have a boy who was called Oloya who was found by
UPDF in one of the villages in Atiak and was taken back to UPDF HQ in Gulu and was
then ferried to World Vision to be counselled…”
Section 8: Herbal Remedies used in the LRA
1) The major drug or herb in both Sudan and Uganda that LRA uses for people who have
deadly wounds and broken legs is what we call fungi from rotten trees (Obwol Yat).
They grind this fungi to make it soft and they tie or bandage it with the broken leg and
the deadly wounds are also dressed with this and many people get cured
2) Animal furs such as that of emekemek, an animal which crawls and is found in
mountains
3) Fat from python is drunk for TB (moo nyalo)
4) cassava is fermented and mixed with other ingredients like yeast from millet or
sorghum, bark of ogali, olilimo, ocayo and many others
5) soda lime from ash is used to generate quality, makes the drug taste a little bit bitter
6) for people who are eunuchs (Labwoc) [impotent] drugs like the bark of Okweyo, banana
roots/suckers, Latubetube – a plant growing in a dry area like Atiak: this one is even
collected from Atiak, carried up to the camps in Juba where it is dried and pounded and
sold to Arab traders in Juba who take it up to Saudi Arabia and sell it. Even a very
small amount will make you hungry for sex immediately.
7) Mad people are given Oketodede; this is made out of barks of trees and other ingredients
like paraffin. Kinds of madness (lapoya): when people die in battles you will see blood
coming out of dead people, you will be moving over dead people, so the souls can catch
you so you find other people became mad. People can start shouting, moving like a
soldier, seeing things others can’t see, having nightmares. There were very many cases
because the area where people were camping had once been SPLA camps and many had
people died there and the remains of the skulls and bones of their bodies were left there.
The remains of their huts can be got there until now, along with grinding stones,
animal bones and mango plantation.
8) skin diseases: Agaba (a climbing plant), shea nut oil, burnt banana leave ash mixed with
shea nut oil were also used
9) infertile women (Lalur): take banana roots, roots (te) of a tree called te kworo, te akere,
and many other herbs that can make them reproduce
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10) They also distil drugs to make injections. E.g. the bark of Opok, Ogali, Olilimo, and
grasses like Ajan, Obiya (spear grass), Ogada (elephant grass), are distilled and injected
for syphillis and many other diseases.
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Section 9: Organisational chart for the year 1999 - 2000
Who are you? Divo Silindy Markey Juma Oris
The Chairman, JK
Secretary to the Holy
Spirit: Paul Okodi
Control Altar: controlled by
camp commandant with
Adjutant/RSM (Regimental
sergeant Major)
administration block
political wing
signal department
air defence
logistics department
medical department
religious affairs/The Yard
intelligence department
Sinia Brigade
Brigade Headquarters
Commanding Officer
Brigade Admin
Brigade Adjutant
RSM
4 controllers/The Yard
Medical staff
Medical assistant
4 Intelligence Staff
Stokri Brigade
Brigade HQ
Commanding Officer
Brigade Admin
Brigade Adjutant
RSM
4 controllers/The Yard
medical staff
medical assistant
4 Intelligence Staff
Gilver Brigade
Brigade HQ
Commanding Officer
Brigade Admin
Brigade Adjutant
RSM
4 controllers/The Yard
medical staff
medical assistant
4 Intelligence Staff
Trinkle Brigade
Brigade HQ
Commanding Officer
Brigade Admin
Brigade Adjutant
RSM
4 controllers/The Yard
medical staff
medical assistant
4 Intelligence Staff
Teranga  battalion
Hoka Battalion
Siba Battalion
Chapu battalion
Mendu Battalion
Quipolar Battalion
1st Battalion
2nd Battalion
3rd Battalion
Chief Controller: Major Onen Unita
Political Wing:
Political Commissar =  Sam Otto
Kolo
Dominic Wanyama
(spokesman)
Nathan Opolot (sec’tary)
Bwone (deputy sec’tary
Mzee Banya (ambassador)
Tolbert Nyeko (adviser)
Bongomin (adviser)
Madaka (trainer)
Kapere (trainer)
Jacob Engena (trainer)
Jimmy Ociti (trainer)
Acellam Caesar (coordinator
GoS-LRA)
Vice chairman = Mzee Banya
2nd Chairman/ Chief of Operations & training = Matata
ADC for Chairman = Capt Kapere
Director of Intelligence &
Combat = Ottii Vincent
Chief of Security = Cosmas
Akoca
Assistant ADCs x 
Capt Onyac Lapek
Capt Okumu Binan
Medical staff (HQ):
Acito Santo
Elia Onen
Griffith Onen
Capt Agnes (midwife)
Capt Margaret Alyata
(midwife)
1st Battalion
2nd Battalion
3rd Battalion
Each battalion:
Officer In Charge
Intelligence Officer
Signal Officer
Medical assistant
Adjutant
RSM
Controller
Brigadier General = Rasca Lukwiya
Chief of Staff = Tolbert Nyeko
Deputy Chief of Staff = Owor Lakati
Admin General = Jimmy Ociti
Brigade General Admin = Salvatorio
Okumu
Chairman’s
escorts
Security guards
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Section 10: The Four Holy Spirits Guiding Joseph Kony
Juma Oris: is the malaika (angel/spirit) which controls peace within LRA. He makes
sure there is complete health within the camp. If there is any epidemic he informs Joseph
Kony to improvise a local drug which should be used – this might include stopping people
from eating a particular type of food or fruits. Spear grass may be woven and tied around
the wrist and last for three days after which when he says it is already enough then these
things are removed and that expectation of the epidemic will have gone and only a few
people will suffer from it.
Silindy Makay: This is a female spirit, the one who called LRA to go and stay in Sudan.
She said ‘come and stay in my place, nothing will happen to you, you will be assisted
properly in all ways by the country you are going to live in’. She first appeared in
Bethlehem (in alero, Gulu district). So when people got in problems they would say ‘wa
lego Silindy maleng’ (let us pray to the virgin Silindy), and some parents have named
their daughters after her.
Who are you? Is the malaika or holy spirit which is a commander and controls wars and
commands wars whenever LRA is going to face any battle he is the one to reveal all the
information through JK
Divo is the malaika which receives all the information about what is going to happen to
LRA. Whenever advice is brought forward by this spirit immediate action is always taken
... For example, if there is any visitor coming to LRA with any progressive ideas then the
spirit reveals it earlier before the visitor can come. The spirit may propose or say that
‘such and such a lady will give birth at this time’ - it does happen exactly. ‘Children who
are born at this period of time must be baptized exactly’ - people respond. ‘Ladies who are
without children must go to the yard and take some herbs’ - everybody takes time [to go
to the yard]. When there is any good information or bad information the spirit informs all
the people in the camp to undergo fasting for a particular period and people do respond
positively.
So these were the few important jobs done by the Holy spirits which is up to now
controlling and maintaining LRA at a full stand, and the motto of LRA is to resist until
they succeed.
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Section 11: The Yards
The Yards are circular spaces with an altar in the middle and a thatched hut where clean
water and shea nut oil is kept for anointing people. The men who work in the yards are
known as controllers. Their duties are to control the war and divert the enemy plans by
sprinkling clean water and other witchcraft ideologies which may tend to break the enemy
plans. The controllers are said to be ‘clean’ people who don’t quarrel, they are ready to
teach other people who fell into mistakes. Their work is to anoint people, for example
women who lose their former husbands and need to be engaged to other men. Women who
lose their husband take six months or less without meeting with another man until the
process from the yard (Wire) is finished and they come to swear in the yard. Then they
will be allowed to go and continue with their living. If wire is not done, you may find that
the soul of the deceased husband could come and disturb his children.
In Lubanga Tek the main yard (Gang Twer) was right next to the Head Quarters. …we
normally pray on Friday and after prayers nobody is allowed to go and do any work.
People sit fully and rest the whole day. And when going to the prayers, all officers put on
white gowns (kanjji). People sit according to status. Women sit separately. The whole
yard is surrounded by guards.
Prayers started at about 7.30 and could go on until about 11.00. When we went to the
Yard we normally entered the yard with high respect. When you go in you put your
clothing or mat to sit down on where you are supposed to sit. You sit with your legs
underneath to one side or straight out in front of you and holding your rosary. You clasp
your hands across your chest and pray for yourself. Then you open your eyes. Then one of
the ladies may start the chorus so people start clapping and singing. You sing and finish,
then the chairman comes in to preach. He may take a verse in the bible and preach about
it to people, comparing what happened in the past with what is happening at present
within the LRA and also in the world. Then people are told to stand up. When you stand
up, you stand putting your hands on your chest. You sing songs. After singing, people
sit down.
The chairman (Kony), after his preaching, will comment on the issues that have been
happening during the week. He will tell people some of the messages revealed to him by
the Holy Spirit. He may give orders to certain conditions which are not favourable to
behaviours, health, way of living and of course going to dig and give assistance to
disabled people within the camp. Officers may come with issues which are happening
within their brigade and these messages are always put to the chairman to go and decide
with the committee what is to be done.
For example, somebody may be very ill in the brigade and needs to be taken to the
hospital, then the committee has to see what is to be done and after that the person is
driven in a car and taken to hospital in Juba. Another one is when a woman is about to
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give birth they have to bring the information before the congregation to know what is
happening. Also when somebody died, all this information is taken to let the committee
officers and other people to be well aware. Also when new-born babies are brought to the
yard, then JK has to decide a day on which these children are to be baptised in the yard.
He also informs women who have children to take the young ones to the yard to be given
local drugs which protects them against certain diseases.
He may also talk about maintaining better types of food, proper utilisation of whatever
one may be having in his home. Then people are asked to kneel down and touch their
heads to the floor and people pray say for 15 minutes; throughout this time he is praying.
After which people answer amen and resume sitting position. Then people can break off
and go outside the Yard, meet your friends from different brigades, discuss, chat.
Everybody goes to their respective homes. People can visit each other on such days after
prayers”.
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Map of a Yard. The circle was indicated using white stones.
Section 12: The Controllers  (Lunyut Twer)
The Lunyut Twer are used by JK for many purposes. He instructs them on specific
medicines they must give to people, he sends them out into the bush to divert attacking
soldiers. For example, if the chairman tells you that ‘soldiers are coming to attack the
defense and we need to send soldiers to defend but none of them will get killed if you
perform the right things’ then they go and perform the duties, and it happens as the
Chairman said.
These people are chosen by the Holy Spirit. They are always men. They are the ones who
have dreadlocks (Wic anginya). There is a tree called Opobo which they remove the barks
and after removing the barks they pound it. After pounding it they wash their hair with
it. After washing the hair begins to twist. After twisting they weave it into dreadlocks.
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To enter the yard they have first to wash completely and come when they are clean. (A
menstruating woman can never enter the Yard1). There are other control measures
performed in the Yard while the battle is being carried on; this is where they can detect
the strength of the war and they apply their magicianship by using stoves (sigri) and
some of the man made models of human beings out of clay. These are put on the stove and
they curse them (e.g. ‘shoot him, shoot him’ ‘who are you, you are the master of the battle,
don’t let your people be overrun! Make sure the enemies are defeated!’, ‘sprinkle water!’.
When they see that the war is going to be tougher, they also improvise other means to
make sure our people can overrun the enemies). This is the work of the controllers.
The controllers handle the cross, the calabash with water inside. They go to the front
when people are fighting and sprinkle water in the middle of the fighting as others are
firing weapons. Also singing songs of praise.
In headquarters we had about twelve controllers. Each brigade had its own yard, and at
times Joseph Kony would order that the people go and pray in their brigade yard rather
than the main yard in Headquarters.
Each brigade might have four controllers who move with the brigade. This is because
there are some instances where the headquarters cannot rush immediately to rescue
somebody who is sick, so the controllers are instructed from JK by radio on what to do.
Some of the commanders can also be given that strength of the spirit when they are going
for battles and they can perform twer themselves in connection with the controllers.
In the Yards the controllers are responsible for keeping the area clean, checking the things
in the yard, giving the reports of the work they were told to do. Giving drugs to people
with different sicknesses. Guarding the yard so that nobody comes and enters the yard
without authority from the yard commander. The following few people I know were the
recommended controllers working in the yard in Lubanga Tek in 1999:
1. the Yard commander was a Major called Onen Unita
2. Captain Ogila
3. 2nd Lieutenant Omony
                                                     
1 This appears to confirm the account given by a returned abductee to the Monitor: ‘”If someone has their
menstruation,” said Josephine, “she must report it. You are not to cook, to touch anybody, not to work,
only sit and wait for food. You don’t go for any activities. It’s believed a girl who is menstruating, if you
accept her service or touch her, you will be killed during the war” (The Monitor, 15 April 1998, Kony kids
survive on urine).
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4. Lieutenant Okwera (now deceased; hit by a bomb shelled by the enemies to the
camp. When the bomb fell on him he was blasted and torn into pieces)
5. Captain Murefu died on his job while he was in Uganda when he went for an
operation
6. Lieutenant Ojok is still continuing with his work with the Yard
7. 2nd Lieutenant Okello still performs his duties up to now
8. Lieutenant Opira died in a battle inside Uganda.
9. Lieutenant Oryem is still continuing with his work
10. Lieutenant Oyat is a hard worker in the Yard
Section 13: List of items kept in the Yard Store (Ot Twer)
Shea nut oil (Moo Ya): This is called a holy tree of which the oil was picked and used for
anointing Jesus. So they use that oil for all purposes such as when somebody has a muscle
dislocation, on open wounds, anointments when a lady is going to be married to
somebody. It is put on the eyes, the face, the arms, legs etc. When somebody has eye
disease they put shea nut oil in the eye. When somebody is poisoned they give shea nut oil
mixed with other drugs to drink and the poisons come out. We used to smear pimples
with it. When there is epidemic they may look for a water pool, mix other drugs with shea
nut oil and then drop [the mixture] into the pool. So people go there, swim and cross the
water pool and you come out. Meaning that noone will be attacked by any of these
diseases. And shea nut oil is not eaten by the LRA (but it is eaten in Gulu and other
places).
First Water (Pi Kot Maleng): This is the water collected during the first rainfall of the
new year. For this occasion new jerrycans are used in which to collect the rainwater.
These jerrycans are not touched by any women or other people except the controllers.
First water is used when people are ready to go for war and it is filled into small bottles
for everyone to keep on their own as an emblem of faith in LRA/M. You really believe in
the Holy Spirit of the Lakwena. You don’t drink that one, just carry it in a small bottle
around the neck. It is also used to sprinkle as a sign of cleanness.
White rocks (got matar/got twer): this one is pure white, and its location is indicated
by the Holy Spirit. These are the same type of rock as was used by Alice Lakwena as stone
bombs. When given to people in small pieces to be worn on bracelets or around the neck,
it stops the enemies from identifying who you are. Instead they will just get confused and
will not look at you. During operations these stones can be placed around the place where
the soldiers are resting and enemies cannot find them. Joseph Kony and the controllers
tell people to place stones in certain locations near where they are coming to rest, cook etc
and he will set the hour for departure, and even if the enemy come very near they will not
see the LRA. When leaving, the rocks are often left behind.
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Ashes/camouflage (buru matar): this is a white soil smeared on people as a traditional
drug to change your feelings about past events and to indicate that you are now a new
person in LRA. You take three days after using it and then you can go and wash yourself.
Then now, you belong to this society in all ways possible. The controllers are the people
who know where all these ashes (buru matar/camouflage) are extracted from. But no-one
else knows where these things are got and nobody is allowed to use this anyhow. When
you first arrive you can stay for two days, then the report form the Holy Spirit will tell
Joseph Kony that all the abductees who are brought must be taken to the Yard and
smeared with Ashes, shea nut oil, and sprinkled with First Water. Then after this you are
given all the regulations that you have to follow while you are in the camp [see Section
A].
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Annex C: Two representative accounts of LRA raids
Palaro, 26 November 1998
People in Palaro Camp are gripped with fear following the news that the main stream of
the rebels (LRA) had entered into the country from their main base in Sudan. The normal
activities that prevailed … from September to October have been halted by the new
change of events. This was made worse by the rebels raid on the camp on the 5th
November 1998… at around 2:00 PM [there were] rumours of rebel presence … about 5
miles north of the camp. This was revealed by the army in the camp detach. They were
able to pick the message from the rebels communicating among themselves using radio
calls. The soldiers in the camp then sent communication to their counterpart in a place
called AGORO POK to organise themselves so that they set a joint ambush at the
strategic rebel passage point. Despite their endeavour to set the ambush, the rebels never
bypassed that spot.
At about 11:00 PM the rebels entered the camp and started shooting instantly in all
directions while concentrating mainly on the direction of the dispensary (medical unit) in
the camp, which dispensary they looted thoroughly of all the drugs and other essential
medical equipment.
As the rebels were just entering the camp they found one man trying to hide his bicycle in
the bush. They questioned him why he was hiding the bicycle, which question they could
not expect an answer to. The rebels then later beat up the man and left him unconscious
with a very big stone placed on his chest, but later he …recovered and the following day
he was transported to Gulu and admitted at St. Mary’s Hospital Lacor.
During the rebel raids on the camp the army responded from their detach by firing
toward the direction of the rebels in the camp, but their firing never scared the rebels as
they continued their looting of the dispensary and later walked away unhurt. One of the
mortars fired from the army detach fell on one of the shops and completely destroyed the
shop and the items. A goat was also shot and died during the cross fire. Also a boy
sustained a bullet injury in the chest.
As the rebels were withdrawing from the camp at around 3:00 am in the night they
abducted two women …whose huts were near the dispensary. One of the women was
carrying her baby on her back. The rebels beat her up and left her unconscious to die, but
also by good luck she recovered. One of the other women was found to be in possession of
a photo album full of photos of soldiers. The rebels went with her and her fate is not
known yet.
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During the raid people from the camp fled in disarray in all directions. Others went as far
as 7 Km away from the camp and slept in the bush. They came back only the next day in
the morning.
It was also learnt that the rebels intended to attack the homeguard training camp at
LUGORE (PATIKO PRISON FARM IN AJULU) that same night [this is only a few
kilometres away], but when they found that the training unit was heavily guarded they
resorted to the silent operation in the surrounding village … looting food items, other
necessities in the houses of the camp stayer. They also abducted 14 people from there and
later fled back to the bush.
Pabo, 17 October 1998:
On Saturday, evening hours about 8:00 pm local time, 14 rebels encroached zone B and
C. They abducted 20 people. They asked for the positions of the government troops in
terms of possible ambushes against them. They also wanted to know who sells gum boots
so that they could raid the place concerned. On their movement they looted rice, posho,
goats, chickens. The people they abducted, their ages ranged from 11-40 years of age.
These included men, women, boys, girls. Unfortunately [a girl] age 12 was highly defiled.
It was established that Okello Arabi of Labala parish was the rebel commander. They took
the abductees up to Acebe hills and later up to Orungwa whereby they were released.
They were instructed to inform the UPDF that if they are willing to follow them, they are
ready for counter offensive.
The LCs expressed annoyance over the issue. The UPDF were later deployed to follow
them in the bush.
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Annex D: An account of the 1994 Peace Talks
A detailed chronology of events has been written up by a journalist who attended the
1993-4 meetings (O’Kadameri 2002). The account which I draw here does not seek to
duplicate this, but rather to give a sense of some of the dynamics at play in the various
meetings. It is drawn from two principal sources. Firstly a series of lengthy key
informant interviews with one of the elders who was present at the meeting of 10
January and at the Atoo Hills meeting of 22 January,2 secondly a transcript of a
significant portion of the meeting of 22 January 1994 which was made from a video-
tape and subsequently translated into English. There are some discrepancies between
details of the story recounted by the elder, that which emerges from the transcript, and
that of O’Kadameri,3 but the overall convergence between the different accounts is
strong.
Meeting of 10th January 1994 (summarised from elder’s
account)
In the run up to the January meeting, Mrs Betty Bigombe, then Minister of State for
Pacification of the North, called over 45 elders from Kitgum and Gulu to a meeting at
the Medical school in Gulu Hospital. During four days discussion of possible causes of
the war there was some tension between the two districts as those from Kitgum
blamed Gulu for hosting the rebels. When it came to selecting twenty people for the
delegation, eighteen came from Kitgum, three from Gulu, as the Gulu people said
‘since you [people in Kitgum] are blaming us you should go and talk with them’.4 5 The
delegates were identified by giving priority to those whose fathers and grandfathers
                                                     
2 Interviews held on 4, 7 and 11 August 1998, Gulu.
3 E.g. events which O’Kadameri places on 2 February are covered in the video footage as being on the 22nd
January.
4 These included: Okot Ogony (muslim representative), Okot Payera (muslim representative),  Erico Ogulu
Odong (Omoro), Yonacana Latigo (Odek - now stays near Pece stadium), Okidi Angol (Son of Rwot Angol
in Kitgum district, Patongo county), Nicolas Opoka, Arweny.
5 Under British rule Kitgum and Gulu formed the Acholi region, and were subsequently divided into two
and have since been further split with the creation of Pader district in 2000. There are some minor
linguistic differences which broadly correspond to the Kitgum/Gulu division, with people in Kitgum
talking ‘Acholi mamalo’, and those in Gulu talking ‘Acholi mapiny’.
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had been Rwodi (chiefs/elders), and also included people known within the district but
not connected to Government, such as Reverend Ochola, later to become Bishop of
Kitgum and a prominent peace activist. The chairman for the Acholi elders was Mr
Akera Anania from Gulu District, and the vice chairman was Rwot (Chief) Opoko
Labogoloro from Kitgum District. They were led by Colonel Wasswa (Muganda) of
Gulu 4th Division and Mrs Bigombe (Acholi).
They left Gulu at 8.30, in army vehicles and with eleven guards to escort the Divisional
Commander, and reached Pagik, a venue chosen by the LRA, before 10.00am. At the
barracks they were stopped and received a message from Kony to proceed without
guns. After much discussion the whole delegation decided that if the Minister was
willing to die so were they and all guns were left behind. The Divisional Commander
eventually agreed.6
They left Pagik at ten, on foot, and after about 1km they found the first rebel road-
block. Over twenty rebels started sprinkling water on their bodies and checking them
for weapons. They were allowed to pass. The Vice chairman (Okot Ogony) was leading
because Pagik was his home area. After another 1km they found a second road-block,
with the same checks and sprinkling with water, which the rebels described as their
greeting. The third road-block was the same.
At Okot Ogony’s home they found more rebels and were checked a fourth time. The
home had been a collection centre for cotton production, and the LRA were using it to
store foodstuffs like simsim (sesame). Okot Ogony's sons were transporting simsim for
the rebels, selling it in town and bringing the proceeds to the rebels, and some of
Ogony's family members were also staying there.
At the fifth road-block the sprinkling of water was done by young soldiers, but older
ones were also present. Men outnumbered women, though all wore the same combat
                                                     
6 In O’Kadameri’s account Kony’s demand delayed the whole process by a day as the army members were
not initially permitted to leave their weapons behind (2002: 39).
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uniform and proper gum boots – the same as the UPDF (see Chapter 5 for further
discussion). Passing the sixth road-block they found a clearing prepared under a big
tree, with some logs for seats. The rebels saluted the fourth Division Commander and
the Minister. Kony’s representative and 2nd in Command, Odego, talking in English,
outlined for them the LRA’s structure and described the training he had received
under Obote in Israel, America and Germany. He welcomed Bigombe’s delegation,
saying she was a trusted woman who loved Uganda and Acholiland, and that even
though he himself was a Lugbara from West Nile he was convinced that the elders
who accompanied her were true Acholis because otherwise they would fear being
killed. As young people the LRA were ready to reach a compromise with Government
representatives and elders which would enable them to come out of the bush (By this
time there were very many soldiers there).
He then introduced some of the other LRA leaders, and proceeded to make a number
of points. He reminded the elders that he had heard of their 1991 resolution that the
whole population should take up bows and spears to fight the LRA. He also raised two
questions to be addressed by the Government delegation: Firstly, what had happened
to Kilama (a member of the UPDA who was killed after the peace agreement in 1988)?
Secondly, how would they be treated if they came out of the bush?
Colonel Wasswa responded, saying they were good questions, that the purpose of the
peace talks was to address such issues, and that in their company they had church
leaders, rwodis and other elders who had agreed to go with Bigombe to witness the
peace talks. Bigombe said she had nothing to add at that moment, and was not yet
willing to go into any depth [i.e. neither question was answered]. As Kony himself had
not yet been seen up to this point, she asked them to call Kony to explain to them what
they were doing as they said they were God's agents doing what the Bible said. Kony
was in fact already there, sitting among the rebels, dressed like an ordinary soldier.
Kony greeted people in fluent English, translated into Luo by one of his people, and
then began a long speech, beginning by stating that he was aware of all the blame
being put onto him for his soldiers killing people, abducting young women, and raping
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married women. He said he was an agent of God doing God's work, that he was led by
the Holy Spirit in all things, and could predict what successes and failures would befall
his troops.
He said they knew the elders blamed them for having fought the bush war, but they
also knew as rebels that when Museveni took over it was the elders who had urged
them to resist, arguing that a Munyankole (a member of the Banyankole ethnic group)
could not lead the Acholi. He claimed that it was this initial blessing of the elders
which had brought the LRA this far. He then pointed out that according to tradition
the Rwodi Moo (the anointed chiefs) were not supposed to go to where the fight was
(because they were 'clean people'), and that by going to peace talks in the battle zone
they had already failed in their traditional mandate. He also said that for him, as a
member of the Catholic church who was doing what was stated in the Bible, he was
really ashamed to have seen elders who had blessed his fighting then telling him to
stop doing so. He said he was contented that the initial blessing the elders had given
him was still valid and so there was nothing that would shake him from his power.
Returning to the two questions posed by his deputy, he reiterated that they were
reluctant to come out if the Government could not answer the questions about Kilama
and their safety.  He said he had asked many friends both in and outside the country
what he should do: some had encouraged him to stop, others to continue. He pointed
out that their success in getting connected with the Government of Sudan was a result
of the Government of Uganda agreeing to host the SPLA in Uganda. He also said it
was from observing the SPLA-GOU relationship that they learned the value of
friendship. For all those reasons he would be content to come out of the bush, but not
because of being defeated. How they would come out of the bush was not yet clear (i.e.
they might come out fighting).
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He closed by saying that Bigombe had a good feeling for a mother who should be
looking after her children at home.7 He said he should be forgiven for the two and a
half hours he had talked because he was talking on behalf of the Holy Spirit. He
suggested that the next peace talks be held at Te Got Atoo (at the base of Mount Atoo
on the way to Cwero), and concluded by saying that he was aware that the
Government was not in a position to give answers to the questions, so there was
nothing further to discuss.
According to the respondent there was complete silence as he spoke, and the delegates
were all asking themselves whether they would leave the place alive. When at about
5pm Bigombe and the Divisional Commander said ‘let's have some lunch of tinned meat
and biscuits’, the rebels said ‘no, we cannot eat something from the Government’.
When the rebels refused to eat (Acholi tradition says that once someone has eaten with
another person they cannot kill that person (see also Finnström, 2003: 234, 297)) some
of the elders wet themselves and others developed acute diarrhoea. But they had to
persevere, so after Kony had wished them a good journey and shaken hands with
Bigombe and Wasswa they set off back to Pagik at 5.30pm. Some were so affected by
fear that they could not walk properly, and it took them until 8.00pm to reach Pagik.
On the way they all talked of other things.
At the barracks they boarded the lorry the same night and went back to Gulu. Those
from Kitgum spent the night in the medical school. Those from Gulu were taken home.
They were informed to report at 9am to the medical school and receive some
allowances, 10,000/= each for those from Gulu, 17,000/= each for the delegation from
Kitgum.
After receiving the allowances a discussion was held. Minister Bigombe started by
saying 'you have now seen what is involved in talking with Joseph Kony'. Some of the
                                                     
7 This could be interpreted to mean that her involvement was regarded in a positive way – or a veiled
suggestion that she would be better off fulfilling traditional roles.
449
elders reacted that if that was the way then it was their last time and that what the
rebels did was not good because at the end when Joseph Kony spoke some developed
diarrhoea and others were also very afraid. Opoka Laphokoloro and Akera Anania,
leaders of the approximately nine Rwodi Moo (anointed chiefs), said that the other
elders had let them down and should be released, and indeed they eventually resolved
that they could not go because of the shameful treatment they had received.
The meeting of 22 January 1994 (summarised from video
transcript and elder’s narrative)
When the date for the Atoo hills talks came, the elders from Kitgum failed to come
back. The much reduced delegation left Gulu at nine thirty in the morning, following
the Moroto Road using a Landrover, three Isuzu trucks, a Toyota pickup and
uniformed soldiers with fully loaded Light Machine Guns.8 After seven kilometers they
turned left towards Ato primary school where they found the first and only road-block
less than one kilometre from the venue where they were received. The footage shows
the LRA delegation of around fifty people arriving led by a man talking out loud as he
cleanses the ‘conference centre’ by sprinkling holy water all around. Three of the
delegation were dressed in religious clothing. Joseph Kony himself was not among
them.
Odego, the LRA representative who had talked to them at the previous meeting,
introduced the key commanders and controllers, all of whom he referred to as
Lapwony, meaning ‘teacher’.9  He then stated the LRA’s purpose as being:
                                                     
8 The delegation included Mrs Bigombe, Colonel Wasswa, Colonel Tolit, Rev'd Ochola, Rev’d Olwedo
Laker, Islamic representative from Pabbo called Juma (who was not in the first delegation), Kot Ogoni
(elder from Paicho Pagik whose home was being used and who was later killed by rebels), Akera Anania
(Bobbi Division and secretary General of the UPC Gulu district), Captain Kibula (District Administrator),
Yusuf Adek and Erico Ogulu.
9 Commanders included George William Omona Komakech, Alex Otii Lagony, Sunday Arop,  Matata,
Jackson Achana, Tolbert Nyeko, Kato Kizito, Onen, Okello Kega, Simon Okot. Controllers included Ginaro
Bongomin Abonga, Amos Lagen and Vincent Makamoi.
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to sign an agreement which will show that there are no more hostilities between us and
the NRA. Most of the talking will come after finishing this. Praise be to the almighty
God.
Bigombe expressed the fear that Kony’s absence showed a lack of commitment. She
also stressed the need to come out of the meeting with an agreement, arguing that
‘what delays becomes stale’. She pointed out that
There are many who do not want peace to prevail. There are those people who are
benefiting from the war. There are others who think that if this thing ends, they will have
nothing to lean on. There are some people who do not feel that being happy is good, who
believe that development shouldn’t take place and peace shouldn’t be there. Such people
can also come to you to discourage you, and to us the Government to discourage us. This
will bring doubts. We will find ourselves reaching a point where we shall say that if it’s
like this let the talks stop, if it’s like then we still have no answers. So I want to say that
we should come up with something and that it should materialise quickly so that it may
bring shame on those who do not have interest in peace prevailing.
Colonel Wasa also expressed disappointment at Kony’s absence before handing over to
Colonel Fred Tolit, Director of Military Intelligence and himself an Acholi from Omia
Anyima village in Kitgum. Tolit rapidly de-railed proceedings by questioning the
sincerity of Joseph Kony:
We as human beings try to measure the level of seriousness by what those people who are
directly involved in an issue say about it [i.e. Kony is not serious because he is not here to
tell us what he has to say]. Myself, as a government representative, as someone who was
sent from Kampala to add weight by joining the Minister and the Division Commander
to see what we were discussing, I feel as if we are turning these talks into a joke…
…I would pray that you analyse critically, use the power of God (most of you talk about
God), so use the power of God to enable sincerity and truth to come amongst you…
… we should know that the Government, as a body that sees what is in this country and
beyond, has its own programmes, which are many. In these programmes people are
assigned different duties, that such and such a person do this, such a person do this. Once
they have completed their duties they meet and will be asked to report back.
Having made the point that dealing with the LRA is only one amongst many concerns
of the Government, he goes on to suggest that the LRA’s concerns for their own safety
are unfounded, arguing that the Government would have no interest in killing people
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who come out of the bush as this would defeat the purpose of their own overthrow of
the previous Government, which was to stop it from killing at will. He then states that
From the government side, we took the issue of ceasefire as a mutual understanding
between you and us, as a local arrangement...  that affects us as Ugandans. Because the
war that has been going on in Acholi since 1986 is causing problems in all other areas of
Uganda, because there are many things which we as Acholi could have cultivated and
sold, the proceeds of which would have been collected and submitted to the Government to
assist it in buying drugs for our hospital. But because there is no cultivation or any other
meaningful activity being done here you find that money that is collected from other
people is sent to the treasury, part of which is sent to us here for making roads, buying
drugs and helping schools.
He then requested the LRA to show them the document they had drawn up so that
they could discuss it and amend it appropriately, reminding them however that
Government has policies which must be followed. Whatever we do we should do it on
condition that we are respecting government, because even God put it clearly in the Bible
that Government should be respected. This is found in Paul’s letter to the Romans,
Chapter 13. Reverend, please read for us Chapter 13 from verse 1 to about the 10th which
talks about respect to God, no no, respect to Government’.10
Commander Omona Komakech responds by saying:
We... the LRA.... even if everybody abuses us and say this is a curse and not a holy spirit,
we know that it is the Holy Spirit.. Now, I have come to respond to what Lt. Col. Tolit,
who is a son of Acholi, has said. Son of Acholi and my brother, let me respond. I will start
answering in the following way; that one thing we must all focus our feelings on is the
truth. Because if we do not have the feeling of truth in our hearts.. then whatever we do,
even if we collect ourselves and say let us go together [i.e. join the Government], there
will still be bloodshed - the way Tolit wants it. For us to have truth in our hearts, let us
stop despising one another… Secondly, my brother Tolit, you should note that if we [the
officers] were not there or the young soldiers were not there… Kony would not be in the
bush.’
He also reacts to the pressure from Tolit to reach a signed agreement by drawing
parallels with the 1988 peace agreement with the UPDA:
Did it bring peace? Why not? Isn’t it because of shallow thinking? They separated from
us and they rejected us and started shooting at us, yet we had been telling them let us
unite together so that we all come out of the bush together and join the Government. So
                                                     
10 Book of Romans, Chapter 13, Verse 1 'Let every person be in subjection to the governing authorities. For
there is no authority except from God, and those which exist are established by God'.
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what happened? Have you weeded the banana trees? [i.e. have you destroyed us?]  eh...
Acholi have a proverb that ‘doing things in a hurry made the hyena spotted -  like an
army uniform’..  is that what you want to do to us? [i.e. as you did with the UPDA].... if
there is no hidden agenda, we are very serious on this issue and the talks will not fail, and
I want to repeat that you will not hear that LRA have picked guns to go and fire at NRA.
Never, unless you people start shooting at us with a plan of your own, then we defend
ourselves.
He goes on to draw out the divisions within the Government delegation, particularly
between Bigombe and Wasswa on the one hand, and Tolit on the other:
I am just praying Mama [i.e. Bigombe]. You are the key, you and Wasswa. You know
very well that you are the key for this peace negotiation… we do not want to deal with
individual interests…. Because there are people who want to push us the way they think
best suits their interests, so that others think they are the ones who worked very hard to
bring us out of the bush…
I used to think you were not taking us locally, but today I have heard from Tolit that this
is ‘local’ peace talk. Today I have understood. I have thoroughly understood. But this will
not stop us and should not prevent you from going ahead: you [Bigombe] don’t give up,
you and Wasswa. The total destruction which has occurred in Acholi makes me feel sad
and also makes you feel sad. It also makes Wasswa feel sad even though he is not an
Acholi. That is why the two of you tried your level best, who else apart from the two of
you has tried to look for us so that we can talk peace face to face? There is no-one. [long
pause] I feel very annoyed and very sad to hear this. [long pause]. Because if people
pursue worldly or personal interests then this is going to spoil the talks. Because you
want things to be done your way, but not in the interests of everybody. This issue must
not end when it only meets Government interests, or only the interests of the LRA; it
must meet the interests of all the parties, including our elders who have suffered.
In a dramatic shift of the discussion, he starts telling a story of how one of the rebels
had been caught defiling an eight year old girl the previous night. Both the man and
the girl were brought forwards. Omona goes on as follows:
Some of the crimes that have been happening are done by people whom we have sent to be
arrested today so that you may know them; if we have ten children there are bound to be
wizards amongst them; later we are going to show you, we the followers of Kony,  that we
do not want bad things. We are going to show you now a soldier of ours, a wrong-doer
whom we arrested and who is here. We are going to show you here, we are going to shoot
him by firing squad in front of everybody here. You should note that such wrong-doers
are not working in the interests of Joseph Kony to rape girls, abduct people in the villages
or to do bad things. You should note that even among God’s servants, be it a reverend or
whoever, there are those who, even if they have a white collar, could be witch-doctors. In
the same way among us there could be such people. Among us we do not say we are all
holy. There are always people who do bad things. You see, they will always be there. So
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you have to pardon us if bad things are done. You should pardon us and we pray that you
pardon us. Such people are the ones we shall start working on. Even on your side, there
are some NRA [who do bad things], you see?
Omona ends with a direct attack on Tolit:
…Lieutenant Colonel Tolit…, it looks as though what you have been talking about is
basically telling us to put down our arms and surrender the way you want it. But let me
tell you that we are not surrendering. For us, we are not people who have come here to
surrender. We have come to negotiate for peace… We are not saying that you have been
defeated in fighting us or scattering us, neither are we saying that we can no longer fight.
So you must know that the way you want us to come out is not what we want. Because
much of what you say, if people listen to you carefully, and if people follow, it will bring a
lot of sadness to them. So I still want to repeat and as I wind up I still say that we do not
want any more bloodshed; what will not happen again is that Holy has started fighting
against the NRA. You should know that those of us who are present here, we are fighting
against the Devil. If we were to be given the freedom to spread the word (of God) then we
would not be fighting now. We are not here fighting to be rulers or leaders of the country,
and Kony does not want to become a President. Kony has already been given his office,
the Holy Spirit has anointed him to be the preacher, to go and spread the word of God.
Praise be to our Lord Jesus Christ. [ends and sits down]
Tolit responded to this by trying to explain his use of ‘local’:
…most of the times at home where we grew up if someone says you are ‘local’ then we
think that that person thinks you are hopeless or simply somebody who has nothing. (In
this case) ‘Local’ means something that has been made from home to help people in that
area.
He also further provokes the LRA by saying ‘I do not see that we should start unbuttoning
shirts to see who has the bigger chest’.
After an intervention by the LRA spokesperson the Reverend Ochola from Kitgum
urges that the soldier be spared:
Earlier on one of our brothers said that people who have done bad things should be killed
by firing squad, even Museveni said ‘if a soldier does something wrong then he should be
taken for firing squad’, but this does not solve problems. Death is not a solution for bad
deeds, and killing does not solve problems.
He also draws on the parable of the prodigal son, implying that the Government
delegation should behave as the father towards the LRA as the prodigal son, and he
draws on ethnic and national patriotism when he says:
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I will be grateful if you respect Mother Bigombe, if you respect our country Uganda and
more especially Acholiland. So that our name, which has been tarnished for a long time,
should be clean again. So that we know that we are all God’s children. Just like other
children of God in other countries.
Bigombe sought to move the negotiations on by saying that the LRA had done well in
arresting the soldier:
I even heard with great delight that you are not happy when some children under your
command commit atrocities and you will always want to punish them in order to teach
them not to repeat such atrocities. We have heard about this, but we want to request you
to put aside this issue of the firing squad. We should look for other ways of teaching them.
She then called on the meeting to move on to discuss the main points of the ceasefire.
Seven soldiers and seven LRA were chosen to discuss the details and went away from
the main meeting for about two hours to discuss and write. While waiting, Bigombe’s
team took soda and biscuits. The LRA again refused these, saying that once talks were
concluded they could sit together.
When the fourteen came to report back, the LRA representative reported that they had
met resistance. They had asked how much money the government would give, and
also wanted a guarantee from the Government that they wouldn't be killed in the same
way as Kilama was. They said the Government soldiers had refused these requests and
that they knew it was Tolit who had instructed them not to accept what the rebels
would say.
Unfortunately, the video recording ends at this point. According to the key informant,
the man charged with defiling a girl was taken and beaten to death in front of the
Government delegation’s eyes, using sticks. When Bigombe protested, they replied ‘we
have been annoyed by Tolit, he said we have been defeated so we want to show that we still have
power’. He goes on to report that the LRA spokesman had said ‘we shall conclude another
time’, after which the Government delegation boarded their vehicles with a lot of fear.
Over the next six miles or so they found seven road-blocks, at which they were
checked but no arms or ammunition were removed and they were not sprinkled with
water. People were not happy with Tolit for trying to interpret the Bible, saying this
should have been done by the religious leaders.
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It appears that a further meeting did take place, as the text of a written cease-fire
agreement was later signed in Lacekocot on 2nd February 1994 between Col Samuel
Wasswa, and George Komakech Omona (see ACCORD 2002: 82).
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Annex E: Notes on the LRM
On the web it is stated that
The Lord’s Resistance Movement is a Movement formed in 1994 in the Northern
part of Uganda in East Africa to prevent the extermination of citizens in the
North, East, South and West respectively by the ruthless Uganda government
troops (UPDF). We have waged armed resistance against the systematic
elimination of the people from Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western
Uganda, and shall continue to do so, until the ultimate “REMOVAL” of the
fascist military junta in Kampala.
They continue by describing themselves as ‘a truly national phenomenon’ and claim
that ‘Every Ugandan endorses our policy and fully supports the LRM/A liberation
struggle’. They view the situation as deliberate genocide ‘implemented by the fascist
military junta in Kampala on the people of Uganda’, and claim themselves to be
fighting to build a republic built on democracy and freedom, respect of human rights,
constitutionalism, and free markets.11
Their literature and statements return repeatedly to five major issues;12 that they are not
Christian fundamentalists, that they do have a political agenda, that there are many
government abuses which are being covered up, that western organisations are
hypocritical and have vested interests in war, and that the media, in particular the
western media, are responsible for anti-LRA propaganda.
The need to deal with allegations of fundamentalism is evident throughout their
materials, though the explanations are not particularly convincing:
The name “LORD’S” was adopted by members of the Rural Population who
decided to pray for divine intervention in order to prevent the countless pogroms
and massacres of the peasant population by the National Resistance Army now
known as Ugandan Peoples Liberation Army headed by Major General Yoweri
                                                     
11 http://members.tripod.com/~lordsmovement/index.html
12 At the time of my fieldwork most of their press statements were reported to be faxed through from 235
Earls Court Road, London.
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Kaguta Museveni. Thus the name is a representation of the people’s Plight and
Agony.13
In June 1998, one LRM speaker at a meeting organised by the Institute for African
Alternatives, reportedly said that
contrary to Western media propaganda, the LRA was not a fundamentalist
Christian organisation, but “a powerful political movement.” He also said the
LRA had no intentions of using “the Ten Commandments as a governing tool.”14
Another important characteristic of the LRM material is a pattern of presenting an
alternative history and of pointing out the hypocrisies of government and international
organisations. An LRM press statement issued on 18 June 1998, for example,
attacked both the UN’s Olara Otunnu and the GOU’s External Security Director
General David Pulkol, arguing that as the person who had negotiated a peace
deal with “the same government that had abducted young children in Luwero in
1985” [i.e. the NRA] he should not now be praised when he reaches out to the
abducted children in southern Sudan – also that he was ignoring the issue of
child soldiers in the SPLA. They also accused UNICEF of abducting children and
sending them through the SPLA to Juba so that they could be shown as
abductees of the LRA.15
In an undated letter to the public, signed by Kollo Sam, chairman of the LRM,16 he
wrote that the war was being waged by the government in order to extract mineral
wealth from people in the north, and also for European agencies such as the
UN/Human Rights Watch, World Vision and UNICEF to make money: ‘all these
various groups in Gulu, Kitgum, Apac and Lira are all for their own interest and that of
Museveni’. The letter also goes to some lengths to point out discrepancies between the
image of Uganda and the reality, in terms of issues such as poverty and injustice, and
claims that the various international agencies ‘say there is nothing wrong with
Museveni because he is fulfilling the interest of the whites’. The writer’s last point is
                                                     
13 http://members.tripod.com/~lordsmovement/index.html
14 The Monitor, 29 June 1998, Kony holding UPDF POWS – LRA claims.
15 The Monitor, 19 June 1998, LRA rebels blast Otunnu, ESO boss, New Vision 19 June 1998, LRA raps UN’s
Otunnu.
16 According to other sources he was the political commissar within the LRA’s headquarters in Sudan (see
Annex 1). The term Chairman was generally reserved for Joseph Kony.
458
‘be very careful of the relief items they are distributing in the camps such as food,
clothes, medicine, because these days there are many ways of fighting’.17
Further LRM documentation asserts, contrary to all other existing evidence, that the
LRM/A ‘were formed in 1994 under the leadership of the late Ben Nono Opiro’ and
that ‘The Lord’s Resistance Movement and Army were not even in existence between
1986 and 1994 when Museveni’s army subjected millions of Ugandans to holocaustic
massacres…’ (1998ii: 3). The rustling of Acholi cattle in the late 1980s is blamed on
‘motorised men in NRA uniforms’ – rather than the Karamojong - and it is claimed that
the meat of the rustled cattle was sent to Libya ‘in exchange for arms to be used for
entrenching the dictatorship’. He also alleges that that in August 1987 50,000 people
were massacred at Soroti airport in cold blood… (1998ii: 12). As in the earlier
document of April 1998 human rights organisations are said to have been duped by the
NRA and Museveni, and the conclusion is drawn that the LRA cannot negotiate: to do
so with a ‘dictatorship which has committed and continues to commit genocide; has
provided in the Constitution and legislations for a one-Party cum military rule….
Would be a most inhumane abomination and utter perdition.’
A third document produced in June 1998 under the title ‘The Strength for Peace:
Building for the Future’, follows a similar pattern, although this time it is argued that
‘The LRM/A was formed in 1993 after the surrender of the Uganda Peoples Democratic
Movement.’ They claim that ‘hundreds of thousands of civilians were massacred by
government troops’, that children in GUSCO are members of Local Defence Units
recruited by the government, and that the Aboke girls were ‘evacuated’ for their own
safety, not abducted (1998iii: 1-13).
The revisionist assertion that the LRA began in 1994 - rather than in 1987-8 as all other
evidence points to – raises serious doubts about the extent to which the LRM in
London or Nairobi represented the LRA’s position and about the credibility of their
other claims. The vehement denial of a fundamentalist Christian element to the LRA’s
                                                     
17 This was given to one of my research assistants in 1999 – if genuine it is interesting, but even if fake and
written by someone else in Gulu district, it suggests that the view that there is no support for the LRA may
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make-up suggests tensions between the LRM London and the LRA in Sudan, even if
not a complete break.
Annex F: List of items for sale in Pabbo Camp, 3
March 1999
Name of Item Quantity Ush Source
Potatoes 1 heap 100 Camp
Millet {seed)     “  50    “
Sorghum (seed)  1 mug 50    “
Cassava (Fresh) one heap 100    “
Bread 1 heap 50    “
Maize (Fresh cob) 1 kg 1000    “
Maize (seed) 1 mug 50 Gulu
Maize (flour) 1 mug 100 Camp
Rice 1 mug 700    “
Beans 1 mug 100    “
Peas 1 mug 100    “
Tomatoes 1 heap 50    “
Green Vegetable (boo) 1 bundle 50    “
Onions 1 50    “
Sugar Cane  1 stalk 100    “
lemons 1 heap 50    “
Local Tobacco 1 leaf 100 Gulu
Ginger each 50    “
large fresh fish  Madi/Apac
cows meat 1 kg 2000    “
pork  1kg 1800    “
hen  one 2500    “
milk 500ml 800 Gulu
smoked meat from wild animals 1kg 2000 Wilderness
Soap 1 bar 800 Gulu
Salt 1 kg 500    “
cooking oil 1/2 litre 1200    “
soda one bottle 500    “
local beer (arege) one bottle 500    “
1 trouser 2nd hand 5000    “
1 dress 2nd hand 4500    “
                                                                                                                                                           
be incorrect.
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Annex G: Account of World AIDS Day, 1 December
1999, Anaka
‘...By 2.00 pm the hospital working staffs (medical assistants and nurses) were in front
marching in the street, passing round the hospital buildings and beating drums and
songs condemning AIDS. A pupil girl of below 18 years carried a placard reading WE
CONDEMN AIDS. The words were written in capital letters and in two colours. WE
CONDEMN was written in black ink – and the word AIDS was in red ink.
Pupils from the four primary schools numbering about 2,500 were in a line marching
behind the medical staff. By 2.30 pm the function was in full swing. [the] Chairman LC I
of Padung Kol… gave a speech of welcome followed by the chairperson for the AIDS
committee. The LC III chairperson and his vice were there. I sat among the teachers.
The village women and men were not present at the function – they went harvesting
simsim and millet in their fields. … So, the majority present in the occasion were school
pupils and their teachers. Out of about 3,500 people who attended it, about thirty perhaps
represented the village population. Two UPDF hung around in uniform.
The function went ahead. The practical lesson of how HIV/AIDS spreads and affects
people was dramatised by the women’s association in a drama named “Oweko Ngwen
kum Tuk”.18 The play taught how people get affected by HIV/Aids beginning from
courtship – sex – sickness – blood test to prove positive – drug consuming by the patient
looking for a cure, and the final death for ever, then the final funeral rites closed
everything.  It was a very interesting drama for school pupils – what a good practical
lesson.
Dr. Lokwiya mentioned every year the calendar date of 1st December is a world aids HIV
day. He warned people to stick to one partner or zero grazing.19
                                                     
18 This literally means “White ants are left on the ant hill”, a saying people use when someone has
struggled to find something which is actually staring him in the face.
19 ‘Zero grazing’ refers to a form of cattle husbandry whereby the cattle are kept in one place and food is
brought to them rather than being free to graze. In the context of HIV education it refers to monogamy.
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Annex H: List of compensation payments drawn up
by the Rwot Moo of Atiak Division together with
his committee,20 March 1999:
1. If you kill a person using poison, spears, logs, etc you will pay for the person 16 head of cattle
and 3 goats.  If your wife died you will pay for her dowry five head of cattle and 3 goats.
This is when you didn't pay dowry to the parent of the wife.  When this head of cattle is paid
the two bodies - the offender and the side where the murder took place - they all come
together. Each side brings one goat and they are slaughtered. They exchange and eat and at
the end they drink a herb called oput.  This is to unite the people.
2. When you killed a person who came to kill you or to rob you, you will pay one head of cattle
and one goat
3. If you set a fire to grass and burn a person dead you will pay ten head of cattle and 3 goats
4. If you disturb bees from bees hives and they sting a person to death you will pay ten head of
cattle and 3 goats
5. If your domestic animals bite or make a person to become disabled or died you will pay 3 head
of cattle and 3 goats
6. If you break a tooth or teeth of a person you will pay one head of cattle and one goat for each
tooth.21
                                                     
20 This included a vice chairman, secretary, treasurer, chairman for compensation payments.
21 Atiak, 30 March 1999. At the time, one head of cattle was costed at 30,000/- while one goat was 10,000/-.
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